The Cool Rays of Aesthetics and Reasoning: Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* and its Role in the Evolution of Ālaṃkāraśāstra

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ABSTRACT

The Cool Rays of Aesthetics and Reasoning:
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This dissertation is an intensive study of Jayadeva's *Candrāloka*, a medieval Indian treatise on poetics, accompanied by a partial translation of the work and its three principal commentaries from the original Sanskrit. The dissertation is divided into two parts, the first devoted to the critical analysis of the text, and the second, the translations and explanations of selected portions of the treatise and translations of the commentaries to these portions. The analytical section shows how misleading approaches toward the history of *alaṃkāraśāstra* have led modern scholars to neglect the more innovative contributions of the *Candrāloka* to Indian poetic theory. It elucidates Jayadeva's critique of Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*, one of the more revered treatises in Sanskrit poetic tradition, and explains how the *Candrāloka* restructures the prominent topics in *alaṃkāraśāstra* in order to accommodate the evolving analytical dimension within Sanskrit literary culture. While semantic theory emerges as an essential topic in Sanskrit poetics in treatises composed at the turn of the first millennium and thereafter, in the majority of these works, the execution of semantic analysis occurs at the beginning of works and provides a necessary context for the authors' aesthetic positions. In the *Candrāloka*, Jayadeva performs his semantic investigation subsequently to his technical and aesthetic evaluation of poetry. Through such a sequence, Jayadeva demonstrates that aesthetic theory significantly informs the epistemological evaluation of language. This dissertation argues that by reformulating the relationship between aesthetics and logic, Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* serves an important theoretical bridge between the canonical

posture observed in *alaṃkāraśāstra* works of the early second millennium, such as the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, and the more analytically vigorous theory of poetics found in the seventeenth century work of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AS -- Ruyyaka, *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, ed. Pandit Durgāprasād and Kāśīnāth Pāṇḍuraṅg Parab (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1982).

BhP -- Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, Bhāṣāpariccheda with the Siddhānta-Muktāvalī, trans. by Swami Madhavananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1977).

CĀ -- Jayadeva, Candrāloka of Jayadeva with the Ramā Commentary of Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa, ed. Mahādeva Śarma (Bombay: Gujarāti Priting Press, 1939).

De, *HSP* -- Sushil Kumar De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960).

DhvĀ -- Ānandavardhana, *The Dhvanyāloka of Śrī Ānandavardhanāchārya with the Lochana Sanskrit Commentary of Śrī Abhinavagupta* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1965).

DhvĀLoc -- Abhinavagupta, *Dhvanyālokalocana*, in *The Dhvanyāloka of Śrī Ānandavardhanāchārya with the Lochana Sanskrit Commentary of Śrī Abhinavagupta* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1965).

IP -- Edwin Gerow, *Indian Poetics*, vol. 5, fasc. 3 of *A History of Indian Literature*, ed. Jan Gonda (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977).

Kane, *HSP* -- P. V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1971).

KA -- Bhāmaha, *Kāvyālaṅkāra,* ed. and trans. P. V. Naganatha Sastry (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991).

KĀ -- Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa*, ed. Pandit Rangacharya Raddi Shastri (Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1970).

KAS – Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtrāṇī,* ed. Ratna Gopāl Bhaṭṭa (Benares: Braj B. Das and Co., 1908).

KP -- Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, ed. Ramabhatta Jhalakikar (Pune: Bhandarkar Institute Press, 1965).

NSM -- Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī with the Prabhā of Śrī Nṛsiṃha Deva Śāstrī*, Offset Reproduction (Varanasi: Vyas Prakāshan, 1990).

RĀ -- Gāgābhaṭṭa, *Rākāgama* in *Candrāloka of Shri Jayadeva with the Rākāgama commentary of Gāgābhaṭṭa*, ed. Ram Ananta Shastri Vetal (Benares: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1938).

RG -- Jaganātha, *Rasagaṅgādhara*, ed. Mathurā Nāth Śāstrī (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983).

ŚĀ -- Pradyotanabhaṭṭa, *Śaradāgama* in *Candrāloka of Jayadeva*, ed. Gangasagar Rai (Varanasi: Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, 1985).

SD -- Viśvanātha, *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (Delhi: Bharatiya Book Corporation, 1988).

VSK – Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita, *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī*, 3 vols, ed. Gopala Śāstri (Varanasi: Chaukhambha Saṃskṛt Saṃsthān, 1998).

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To Dr. Gary Tubb

navavarṣāvadhiṃ yāvat sthitvā śrīgurupadayoḥ|

pāṣāṇo 'pi rasān vindyāt kim punar mādṛśo janaḥ||[1]

[1] Special thanks to Diwakar Acharya for helping to formulate this idea in Sanskrit verse.

PART ONE

Introduction

The origin of illumination

The title of this dissertation refers to the well known Sanskrit epithet for the moon, *śitāmśu* – "having cool rays." Unlike the sun whose rays can be blistering in the summer heat, the moon emits only gentle, cool beams that are never oppressive, except perhaps to those who are separated from their lovers, for whom the moon's sensuous glow can itself be a source of torment.

In the account from the *Mahābhārata*, when the gods and demons churn the ocean in their quest for the nectar of immortality, the first two things to emerge are two sources of illumination, "soma, the calm moon, with its cool rays, and the sun of a hundred thousand rays."[1] The desirous gods wrest these sources of illumination from their aquatic origin, one of which provides enchantment, the other clarity of vision.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, a hierarchical relationship is established between the sun and moon. The sun becomes a resting place on the *devāyāna*, the "Gods' path," leading to *brahma*, eternal oneness and emancipation, while the moon becomes a station on the ancestors' path leading first to a transient celestial habitation, but eventually descending back to the cycle of worldly existence. The sun expedites a path of knowledge leading to eternal emancipation, while the moon expedites a path of

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[1] Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, *Hindu Myths: A Sourcebook Translated from the Sanskrit* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1975) 276.

temporary enchantment.[2] However, in a slightly later Upāniṣad, the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the moon is incorporated into the path of the gods, thus integrating the path of enchantment and the path of emancipation.[3]

The title of Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* literarally means "moonlight" but on more than one occasion, Jayadeva metaphorically identifies his text as an ocean.[4] In an early verse, Jayadeva beseeches the gods and worldly scholars to churn this ocean of literary eloquence for wealth, beauty, fame and immortality using the churning rod of logical reasoning (*yukti*). The implication is that only through rational investigation does one firmly attain the most precious rewards of literature.

Jayadeva recognized that to some of his audience, poetry would appear to be an peculiar substrate for logical inquiry, and thus he clarifies that the *Candrāloka* is the "single locus of reasoning and shining savorable *rasa*[5]." Here the *Candrāloka* (Moonlight), metaphorically transformed into the ocean, is illuminated by the sun of reasoning. Through this transmission, the "the cool rays of the moon" become invested with rational efficacy. Throughout the *Candrāloka*, the aesthetic investigation of poetry

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[2] Extracted from Patrick Olivelle's translation of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* in *Upaniṣads* (New York: Oxford, 1996) 6.2.15-16, pg. 83-84.

[3] Ibid, 5.10. 2, pg 141-2.

[4] *yuktyāsvādyalasadrasaikavasatiḥ sāhityasārasvatakṣīrāmbhodhir agādhatām upadadhat sevyaḥ samāśrīyatām* / (*CĀ*, 1.3ab). Poetic ornaments (*alaṃkāra*) can be understood as figures of speech. I have translated this term as ornaments, because *alaṃkāra* is also the general term for jewelry and other similar adornments.

[5] See citation in previous verse for the Sanskrit to this expression. As for *rasa*, it is difficult to provide a concise statement of what the experience of *rasa* entails. Nevertheless, those unfamiliar with this term should understand that this is generally held to be the consummate aesthetic experience in South Asian arts. It is characterized by a temporary sense of transcendence and freedom that arises from a profound suggestion of emotion. While in some aspects *rasa* is similar to catharsis, one should hesitate to equate the two experiences too closely, as significant differences exist in their methods of production. Those unfamiliar with Sanskrit literary and aesthetic theory might wish to consult Daniel H. H. Ingalls' introduction to the translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* and its commentary the *Locana* (Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, 1990), for a useful explanation of the phenomenon of *rasa*.

sheds critical light on the mysterious functions of language, which continue to elude the full comprehension of logicians, grammarians and linguists. Nowadays, when we look at moon's reflection in its legendary place of origin (the ocean) we are amazed at its likeness, yet beguiled by its strangeness as well.

First Encounters with the <u>Moonlight</u> (*Candrāloka*)

Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* is an Indian treatise on Sanskrit poetics, generally believed to have been composed in the thirteenth century. This text is famous for providing one of the most lucid accounts of the numerous figures of speech that operate in classical Sanskrit poetry. It also provides a systematic presentation of the most prominent topics of poetic inquiry in the Sanskrit tradition: *doṣa* (faults or blemishes), *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinction), *guṇa* (poetic virtue), *alaṃkāra* (ornaments), *rasa* (aesthetic relish), *dhvani* (predominant suggestion), *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* (subordinate suggestion), *lakṣaṇā* (indication) and *abhidhā* (denotation)[6]. These terms will all be discussed in detail in the third chapter of this dissertation which specifically examines the structure of the *Candrāloka*. Jayadeva provides original illustrations for each subtype in each category of poetic interpretation discussed in the text. In this regard, the text is studied within the pre-college (SLC) curriculum in Nepal,[7] and is enormously useful for students of Sanskrit poetry, though such a pedagogical purpose may not have been the intention of the author.

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[6] These topics are listed here in the sequence that they are presented in the *Candrāloka*.

[7] Middle (SLC) Students' syllabus, classes 9 and 10, Sanskṛt Middle School, Bhaktapur, Nepal.

The *Candrāloka* was composed during a transitional era of Indian intellectual history, and a number of important developments ensued within a century or so of its composition. The most significant of these was the development of the *navyanyāya* system of logic whose genesis is commonly attributed to Gaṅgeśa in the thirteenth century, though this important movement undoubtedly had widely dispersed roots that would have required a long period of germination. In addition, a new systematic approach to the study of grammar would soon emerge which incorporated the more scientific spirit of the new logicians in the re-examination of its own enigmas, particularly, the difficulties of verbal semantics.[8] The *Candrāloka* provides evidence that such considerations were already circulating among intellectual and literary circles of Jayadeva's era. A close examination of the text reveals a more modern approach to semantic theory, and a more vigorous attention to epistemological categories that are characteristic of both the grammatical and logical schools of the later medieval era. By incorporating this awareness within a poetic discourse, Jayadeva demonstrates a surprisingly modern perspective for a literary rhetorician of his era, a fact that is largely ignored by scholars in the modern era.

Despite this deeper current of progressiveness, Jayadeva's text on the surface appears to be so remarkably simple and congenial that Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī Khiste writes that "there is no other work, as far as we know which may be confidently placed in the hands of ardent beginners as a safe guide to the study of Sanskrit Poetics on old traditional

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[8] In the second half of the second millennium, Sanskrit grammarians such as Koṇḍabhaṭṭa began to apply a more scientific understanding of the nature of sound, physiology, and perception, into specific topics of inquiry, particularly *sphoṭa*.

lines."[9] For the most part, Jayadeva avoids the use of overly technical language and instead employs common descriptions and analogies to support his explanations. Defining what constitutes poetic blemish he states:

> The experts proclaim that the flaws which arise in speech and meaning are those things, which, when entering the heart, bestow pain along with delight.[10]

Similarly, when defining poetic ornaments he writes:

> Alaṃkāra (ornament) is an arrangement of word and meaning, which, like a necklace and other jewelry, is a source of delight on account of tradition or because of the maturity of its creator.[11]

Concerning *rasa* he provides the following comparison:

> Even for those with sensitive hearts, it expands delight and dissolves the manifestation of all other experiences, as does the smearing of sandalwood paste.[12]

Because of his depth of understanding regarding poetic principles, Jayadeva is able to provide definitions that convey complex aesthetic and psychological processes in ordinary language whereas others with less intimate understanding might resort to an abundance in technical terms.

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[9] Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī Khiste, introduction to *The Candrāloka*, by Pīyūṣavarṣa Jayadeva, The Kāshi Sanskrit Series, no. 75 (Benares: Chowkhamba, Sanskrit Series Office, 1929) 2.

[10] *Syāc cetoviśatā yena sakṣatā ramaṇīyatā / śabde 'rthe ca kṛtonmeṣaṃ doṣam udghoṣayanti tam* (*CĀ*, 2.1).

[11] *Śabdārthayoḥ prasiddhyā vā kaveḥ prauḍhivaśena vā / hārādivad alaṃkāraḥ sanniveśo manoharaḥ* (*CĀ*, 5.1.)

[12] *Galad vedyāntarodbhedaṃ hṛdayeṣv ajaḍātmanām/ milanmalayajālepa ivâhlādaṃ vikāsayan* // (*CĀ*, 6.2cd).

Jayadeva's illustrations of the poetic ornaments are without doubt the most impressive feature of this text. They are precise in their exemplification and startling in their evocation. Demonstrating *vikalpa*, a clever form of opposition, Jayadeva writes:

> Kānta! Citte 'dhare vâpi kuru tvaṃ vītarāgatām[13]
>
> [A woman states:] "My darling! Either you make your lower lip devoid of redness (lipstick) or you make [my] heart devoid of redness (passion)."

Here a woman notices that her lover's lip bears the lipstick of another woman and warns that she will become "passionless" on account of his unfaithfulness. Illustrating *parivṛtti*, the opposition of excess and scarcity, he writes: "

> jagrāhaîkaṃ śaraṃ muktvā kaṭākṣān śatruyoṣitaḥ[14]
>
> having released a single arrow you acquire the sidelong glances of [all] the enemy women.

These illustrations evoke *rasa* at the same time that they reveal their ornaments. In the first example, both the erotic *rasa* as well as the wrathful *rasa* are suggested, whereas in the second verse, both the heroic and the erotic *rasa*, as well as the pitiful *rasa* are simultaneously evoked.

Jayadeva's use of *alaṃkāra*-s reveals an original perspective regarding the relationship between poetic ornament and *rasa*, by most traditional accounts, the two most distinguishing features of Sanskrit poetry. The majority of *ālaṃkārika*-s in the

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[13] *CĀ*, 5.96cd. The Sanskrit verse has been provided in the text to demonstrate this verse's economy, which is achieved through the figure of speech known as *tulyayogitā*, in which a property that is mentioned only once is to be applied to multiple substrates in consideration. Here the property *vītarāgitā* ("the property of having dissipated redness" or "the property of having dissipated passion") is applied to be understood in relation to both *citte* ("in [my] heart") or *adhare* ("in [your] heart"). Here the figure *tulyayogitā* is achieved in dependence of the figure *sleṣa* (pun), since the single word *rāgatā* is alternatively used to mean "redness" and "passion."

[14] *CĀ*, 5.94cd..

second millennium subordinate the function of poetic ornament to that of *rasa*, with the understanding that the components of poetry should be oriented toward the production of *rasa* as the consummate experience in poetry. Jayadeva preserves the autonomy of the *alaṃkāra*-s as independent sources of poetic charm. To a certain degree, he even places *rasa* at the service of ornamentation.

While the *Candrāloka* is by no means an historical text, it inevitably indicates many interesting facets regarding the evolution of *alaṃkāraśāstra.* Jayadeva similarly demonstrates a revisionist agenda in verse 1.4 –5, where he writes:

> We praise the expanding assemblage of lights that are the statements of the suns that are [the] former masters. Praising these, the dust motes that are my own virtue are illuminated.
>
> The opinions of [my] predecessors should not be suspected as being stained by this [text]. Rather, they are ornamented by this, just as the eyes of doe-eyed ladies are [ornamented] with collyrium.[15]

This dedication cum apologia conveys a simultaneous reliance on and dissatisfaction with the theories of his predecessors. Jayadeva clearly preserves many of the fundamental approaches to the study of poetry that are found in the works of earlier *ālaṃkārika*-s, but he also establishes an independent position in a number of places. He reintroduces the study of *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinction), a topic that had its origin in the field of dramaturgy,

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[15] taṃ pūrvācāryasūryoktijyotiḥstomodgamaṃ stumaḥ /yaṃ saṃśritya prakāśante madguṇās trasareṇavaḥ// nāśaṅkanīyaṃ eteṣāṃ matam etena dūṣyate / kiṃtu cakṣur mṛgākṣīnāṃ kajjalenêva bhūṣyate // (*CĀ*, 1.4-5).

but which has numerous applications to poetry, and which had for the most part been disregarded by earlier *ālaṃkārika*-s.[16] While accepting the dominant categories of poetic ornaments, Jayadeva adds a number of original *alaṃkāra*-s to his own repertoire. In this respect, the image of *rasa* expanding the ocean of ornaments may have a literal application, since Jayadeva indicates that the advent of *rasa/dhvani* theory[17] necessitates an expansion of the varieties of ornaments.

The Neglect of the <u>Moonlight</u>

Although the *Candrāloka* is frequently praised for its effective explanation of the poetic ornaments (*alaṃkāra*-s) and its charming as well as accurate illustrations of these, it has rarely been the subject of critical examination. Most modern scholars of Indian poetics have assumed that the author, Jayadeva, relied exclusively on the established theories of his predecessors, and that his text is merely an attractive assemblage of their views, ornamented by his distinctive illustrations. Such scholars have judged the majority

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[16] The distinctions between *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinction), *guṇa* (poetic virtue) and *alaṃkāra* (poetic ornamentation) are quite subtle. Different *ālaṃkārika*-s divide their functions in various ways. According to the more literal understanding of these three terms, *lakṣaṇa* should designate the most characteristic features of language that distinguish poetry from other forms of speech, *guṇa* should correspond to the inherently beautiful "qualities" within poetic language, while *alaṃkāra* should designate the "ornamental" aspects of poetic language that enhance the inherent beauty. In practice, however, such designations are mostly evocative and the actual boundaries between these three poetic attributes are frequently ambiguous. There can be no categorical determination of whether the beauty of a verse is characteristic, inherent or ornamental.

[17] This topic will be clarified later, but for now, the reader should understand that this refers to a revolution in literary interpretation that developed at the close of the first millennium, positing that *rasa* in literature in drama, can only be successfully evoked through suggestion, and that such a *rasa* amounts to the true beauty of poetry. In other words, *rasa* can never be achieved by stating an emotion ("I am heartbroken") or even metaphorically identifying an emotion (He was a sinking ship"). Only by suggesting an emotion through its determining factors (*vibhāva*), its expressive manifestations (*anubhāva*-s) and the variations of shifting sentiments that surround the dominant emotion, does *rasa* truly arise. The dominant exponent of this theory was Abhinavagupta, who lived at the turn of the first millennium.

of works on *alaṃkāraśāstra* written in the interim between Mammaṭa (eleventh and twelfth centuries) and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja (seventeenth century) to be lacking in significant original content, and they have regarded the *Candrāloka* in a similar light. This is unfortunate, because the *Candrāloka*'s congenial style conceals a number of fresh insights into the function of poetry and language, and reveals a rich array of information regarding the evolution of Indian poetics and Indian theories of language.

This dissertation reconsiders the function of the *Candrāloka* as a poetic treatise examines its contributions to the evolution of *alaṃkāraśāstra.* While the *Candrāloka* was written after the advent of the ground breaking poetic innovations in *rasa/dhvani* theory brought forth by Ānandavardhana (ninth century) and Abhinavagupta (tenth century),[18] the text nevertheless emerges during a critical transition in Indian intellectual history, a century or so before the advent of major methodological advances in grammar and logic. This dissertation examines how the *Candrāloka* distills and reorganizes theories from the earlier traditions, and in so doing prepares the terrain for a more modern logically intensive poetics discourse. In addition, this dissertation will demonstrate that in Jayadeva's view, poetic investigation is a viable mode of epistemological inquiry, particularly as it illuminates the more subtle operations of verbal signification.

Mysterious Origins

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[18] These are respectively the author of the *Dhvanyāloka* and the author of its most famous commentary, the *Locana.* The former provides the most original and brilliant integration of the theory of verbal suggestion (*dhvani*) while the latter contextualizes the theory of *dhvani* with respect to the theory of *rasa,* which had formerly been the central preoccupation of dramaturgy. The prevailing understanding of Indian poetic history justifiably gauges their era to be the apex of Sanskrit poetics.

The origin of the *Candrāloka* remains largely an enigma. While the text repeatedly identifies the author by name (Jayadeva), and provides his alias (Pīyūṣavarṣa) as well as the names of the author's parents (Mahādeva and Sumitrā), it neglects to mention the author's place of origin, his teachers, or any of the author's patrons. Nevertheless, silence with respect to these points is not unusual in texts of the early medieval period. In a verse that is repeated at the close of each chapter, Jayadeva specifies that his father was famed for ritual expertise:

> mahādevaḥ sattrapramukhamakhavidyaikacaturaḥ
> sumitrā tadbhaktipraṇihitamatir yasya pitarau
> anenâsāv (chapter no.) sukavijayadevena racite
> ciraṃ candrāloke sukhayatu mayūkhaḥ sumanasaḥ

> May this (#) chapter of the great *Candrāloka*, composed by the true poet Jayadeva -- he whose father is Mahādeva, the one most knowledgeable in the science of rituals, the most important of which is the *Sattra* (Soma sacrifice), and whose mother is Sumitrā, she whose mind is engaged in devotion to him (Mahādeva) -- bring delight for a long time to come.

This information is reiterated in the colophon.[19] Unfortunately, this is the extent of the biographical knowledge that can be derived from the *Candrāloka* itself.

There is a similar scarcity of cross textual references - both in the *Candrāloka* concerning other texts, and in other texts concerning the *Candrāloka* – by which we might infer the date of Jayadeva's text. Jayadeva composes his own illustrations exclusively and hence does not cite verses from other texts. Verse 1.8[20] of the *Candrāloka* is almost definitely a critique of the first sūtra of Mammaṭa's

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[19] *Jayanti yajñikaśrīmanmahādevāṅgajanmanaḥ*
sūktipīyūṣavarṣasya jayadevakaver giraḥ (*CĀ*, 10.6).

The appellation *pīyuṣavarṣa* is also mentioned in verse 1.2d: *candrālokamayaṃ svayaṃ vitanute pīyūṣavarṣa kṛtī* (the skillful Pīyūṣavarṣa will bestow his own moonlight).

[20] *angīkaroti yaḥ kāvyaṃ śabdarthāv analaṃkṛtī / asau na manyate kasmādanuṣṇam analaṃ kṛtī.* (*CĀ*, 10.8).

Kāvyaprakāśa,[21] and allows us with relative certainty to date the *Candrāloka* after the *Kāvyaprakāśa*.[22]

The mystery surrounding the *Candrāloka* and its author is compounded by the fact that we have not discovered any commentaries on the *Candrāloka* that were written before the sixteenth century, some three centuries after its composition. A commentary written by a student would have been a likely place to discover biographical information on Jayadeva, but such a work does not exist. The earliest commentary that we know about was was written in the late sixteenth century, by Pradyotanabhaṭṭa, a scholar whose patron was a king of Ayodhyā.[23] Some time shortly thereafter, the famous South Indian scholar, Appayadīkṣita, wrote a treatise on poetics entitled the *Kuvalayānanda* which he

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[21] .*tad adoṣau śabdārthau saguṇāv analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* (*KP*, sūtra 1, pg. 13). These two verse along with Jayadeva's critique will be investigated thoroughly in chapter two. Because numerous cross references to the *Kāvyaprakāśa* exist, this text is more readily dated than the *Candrāloka*.

[22] Kane writes: "Mammaṭa quotes Abhinavagupta (who was still living in 1015 A.D.) and *Navasāhasāṅkacarita* (composed about 1005 A.D.). He also refers to the liberality of Bhoja to learned men (*yad vidvad bhavaneṣu bhojanṛpates tat tyāgalīlāyitaṃ* on udātta). Even if this verse was composed during Bhoja's life, it must have been composed towards the latter part of his life, as it would have taken some years before his fame spread abroad. It was shown above that Bhoja could not have ruled beyond 1054 A.D. Hence the *Kāvyaprakāśa* is not most probably earlier then 1050 A.D. Hemacandra wrote his *Kāvyānuśāsana* about 1143 A.D. and mentions Mammaṭa.... The *Kāvyaprakāśa* was commented upon by Māṇikyacandra in his *Saṃketa* in saṃvat 1216 (i.e. 1159-1160 A.D.) and a ms. of the work is dated saṃvat 1215 (i.e. 1158))....Therefore, the *Kāvyaprakāśa* was composed at all events before 1100 A.D. Hence the date fo the *Kāvyaprakāśa* lies between 1050 and 1100 A.D. (Kane, *HSP*, p. 274.)

[23]
asya sthitito nagarī bhavato 'yodhyā bhavaty akhilā
iti raghuvaṃśād adhiko jayati baghelā 'bhidho vaṃśaḥ
devapater iva śaktir yasya jaye bhūbhṛtāṃ prathitā
śrovīrabhadradevas tatra dhārākhaṇḍalo jātaḥ
daśarathato raghupatir iva tasmād iha vīrabhānubhūpālaḥ
ābaddhadharmasetur jagati samudre samudbhūtaḥ
tattanayo nayanirmalakīrtitaḥ nimagnagāmūlam... [In a footnote to the 1985 Chowkhambha edition of the *Śaradāgama*, Gaṅgasar Rai suggests that there is an omission in the text at this point, and that because of evidence in other texts sponsored by Vīrabhadradeva, the Baghela monarch who sponsored the composition of the *Śaradāgama*, we should understand that the son of Vīrabhānu was named Rāmacandra and this was the father of Vīrabhadradeva.]
jayati tadīyas tanayaḥ kavigoṭhīdaivatārāmaḥ
kriyate yasy nideśāc candrālokaprakaśo 'yam
śaradāgama iti vidito bhaṭṭācāryeṇa yatnena (*ŚĀ*, 1.1, p. 2).

states to be based on the *Candrāloka.*[24] While the dates of these two scholars can be accurately determined through a wealth of evidence, these dates provide little assistance in the dating of the *Candrāloka*, as we are left with a four century hiatus between the upper limit of Mammaṭa in the twelfth century and the lower limit of Pradyotanabhaṭṭa and Appayadīkṣita in the sixteenth century.

Fortunately, there exists a drama entitled the *Prasannarāghava*, whose author also identifies his name as *Jayadeva* and the names of his parents as Mahādeva and Sumītrā in the prologue to his work.[25] There are also marked dictional similarities between the two works that supplement our confidence in the common authorship of the *Candrāloka* and the *Prasannarāghava.*[26] The prologue of the *Prasannarāghava* also states the author's

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[24] *candrāloko vijayatām śaradāgamasaṃbhavaḥ/*
hṛdyaḥ kuvalayānando yatprasādād abhūd ayam// (*Kuvalayānanda*, concluding statement, p. 188). ("May the moonlight (*Candrāloka*) which is born of the harvest moon be victorious! This wonderful delight of the water lilies (*Kuvalayānanda*) arises from its grace"). The mention of *Śaradāgama*, in this verse, may or may not be in reference to Pradyotanabhaṭṭa's commentary on the *Candrāloka* which utilizes this expression as its title.

[25] Sushil Kumar De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960) 196. S. K. De cites verses two from the prologue *Prasannarāghava* demonstrating Jayadeva's pedigree:

> vilāso yadvācām asamarasaniṣyandamadhuraḥ
> kuraṅgākṣībimbādharamadhurabhāvaṃ gamayati
> kavīndraḥ kauṇḍinyaḥ sa tava jayadevaḥ śravaṇayor
> ayāsīdātithyaṃ na kim iha mahādevatanayaḥ.
>
> lakṣmaṇasyêva yasyâsya sumitrākukṣijanmanaḥ
> rāmacandrapadāmbhoje bhramad bhṛṅgāyate manaḥ (*Prasannarāghava*, 1. 14-5).
>
> The grace of his speech, which has unparalleled sweet flowing rasa,
> Evokes the sweetness of the cherry lower lip of a doe-eyed woman.
> This king of poets from the Kauṇḍinya clan known as Jayadeva, the son of Mahādeva,
> How could he not obtain a hospitable reception in your ears just now?
>
> The mind of this one who was born from the lap of Sumitrā, like Lakṣmaṇa,
> Becomes a bee hovering about the lotus feet of moon-like Rāma.

[26] When considered in tandem with the statements of common ancestry in these two texts, the similarity of diction from these verse fragments may support this conclusion (From the *Candrāloka*):

membership in the Kauṇḍinya *gotra*,[27] but Kauṇḍinya is such a pervasive clan name that it does little to help determine Jayadeva's geographical origin.[28]

Fortuitously, Jayadeva's *Prasannarāghava* seems to have attracted more immediate attention than his *Candrāloka*. Quotations from this drama are found in Śiṅgabhūpāla's *Rasārṇavasudhākara*, which, according to S. K. De, was written in the first half of the fourteenth century, and the *Śārṅghadharapaddhati*, which was compiled by Śārṅgadhara in the middle of this same century. [29] While this evidence significantly restricts the parameters for the dating of the *Candrāloka*, we are still left with approximately a two century period during which the text might have been composed. Moreover, as we have not yet discovered any significant source of biographical information, we have no knowledge of geographical, institutional, professional or even economic factors that may have influenced this work. We are left with only the text itself.

Disenchantment in the Moonlight

tarkakarkaśapurnoktiprāptot-kaṭadhiyāṃ vṛthā (6.27cd). (From the *Prasannarāghava*): *teṣām karkaśatarkavakravacanodgāre 'pi kiṃ hīyate* (1.18cd).

[27] A patronymic lineage derived from a legendary sage.

[29] S. K. De states: "...verses from the *Prasanna-rāghava* (i.19 and 33) are quoted in *Śāraṅgadhara-paddhati* (164 and 3520), compiled in 1363 A.D. ; while Śiṅghabhūpāla, whose date has been fixed at 1330 A.D., cites the drama itself in his *Rasārṇava-sudhākara* (pp. 258, 277)" [De unfortunately does not state the edition he consults] (De, *HSP*, vol. 1, p. 198). P. V. Kane writes: "Viśvanātha quotes a verse (*kadalī kadalī*... in [*sic.* from the vṛtti to] IV.3) from the *Prasannarāghava* (I.37) of Jayadeva..." (Kane, *HSP*, 299). Confirming this evidence I have found that the verse *kadalī kadalī, karabhaḥ karabhaḥ karirājakaraḥ karirājakaraḥ / bhuvanatritaye 'pi bibhartti tulām idam ūruyugaṃ na camūrudṛśaḥ//* (*Prasannarāghava* 1.37) is printed in the verse iv.4 in the Bharatiya Book Corporation edition of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (1988) p. 193.

We cannot know for certain why the *Candrāloka* received so little attention in the first few centuries after its composition. While the text never inspired a large amount of exegetical works, once the *Candrāloka* was brought to the public's attention by Appayadīkṣita, it became quite famous throughout India, and enjoyed popular success. In the modern era, the *Candrāloka* is one of the favored manuals consulted in the explanation of poetic ornaments. Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* (seventh century), another treatise on poetry that attracted few commentaries, was nonetheless frequently cited by later *ālaṃkārika*-s. We can only hypothesize reasons why the *Candrāloka* was initially neglected on the basis of the character of the text in relation to that of more successful and more frequently commented-upon works that were written during the same time period.

The text of the *Candrāloka* reflects no large-scale controversy. It does not provide any strikingly new concept in poetic exegesis, but instead relies on the methods and categories that were established by earlier writers on the subject. Moreover, the *Candrāloka*, in most cases, presents a single monolithic view and does not manifestly review the evolution of different concepts; nor does it contrast the positions of different authors and schools in regard to specific poetic principles. The presentation of alternate view points is conventionally seen as requisite in medieval Indian analytical treatises. Most treatises of this period devote more text to the elaboration and refutation of opposing views than to the presentation of the author's own view, yet the *Candrāloka* neglects such a convention. While this may be partially explained by the fact that the *Candrāloka* lacks an auto-commentary where Jayadeva might have conveniently

explored such opposing viewpoints, other authors such as Bhāmaha in his *Kāvyālaṃkāra* (seventh century) were able to convey contrasting opinions within versified format.[30]

The turn of the first millennium in India had been a period when the literary world was inspired by the intense controversy surrounding Ānandavardhana's theory of verbal suggestion, which presented a striking challenge to the pre-established doctrines of verbal significations ascribed to by the dominant Indian philosophical schools.[31] Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* incited a number of counter-treatises which sought to refute the theory of suggestion, proposing alternative explanations of poetic charm, which were in accordance with the orthodox view that enumerates the operations of verbal signification as two: denotation and indication. According to the traditional view of Indian poetic history, Abhinavagupta's commentary the *Locana*, which was written at the turn of the millennium, refuted all of these challenges to the theory of *dhvani*, and furthermore applied Ānandavardhana's theory of *dhvani* within a new and dynamic explanation of how poetry and drama produce *rasa.* According to traditional accounts, Abhinavagupta's theory achieved extraordinary and overwhelming success, and from this time onward, the theory of *rasa/dhvani* met with little resistance in poetic circles. Such a view is no doubt oversimplified but, to a significant degree, the exciting controversies following the initial reception of the *Dhvanyāloka* subsided after the *Locana* established what would become the dominant theory of poetry. The *Candrāloka* does not reflect upon the disputation that established the primacy of the *dhvani* theory. Moreover, it discusses

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30 In the fifth and sixth chapters of the *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, Bhāmaha engages in a significant disputation regarding the function of the *pramāṇa*-s as well as the operation of language.

31 Ānandavardhana had proposed that a third operation of signification exist in language in addition to denotation and metaphorical identification. This theory directly challenged the views of both the logicians (*naiyāyika*-s) and the exegetists (*mīmāṃsaka*-s) who accepted only denotation and indication.

dhvani and *rasa* merely as individual contributors to overall poetic charm rather than as centralizing aesthetic principles. In this respect, the *Candrāloka* may well have appeared as an anachronistic work, refusing to acknowledge the major revolutions in poetic history and failing to acknowledge the methodological superiority inherent in a unified theory of poetry.

There are other signs of obsolescence that one might potentially perceive in the *Candrāloka.* Composed some three centuries after the advent of *dhvani* theory, the text focuses primarily on poetic ornamentation (*alaṃkāra*), which had been the principal focus of the earliest genre of works in *alaṃkāraśāstra.* Even if such a focus is justified, this resuscitation of *alaṃkāra* as the predominant component in poetry had already been executed by Ruyyaka in the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* a century or two before the *Candrāloka*'s composition. While Ruyyaka begins his text with an historical overview that provides a context for his *alaṃkāra*-centric theory of poetry, Jayadeva does not clearly justify his decision to establish *alaṃkāra* as the most significant element in poetic discourse. Nor does Jayadeva truly orchestrate his theory of poetry around the function of the poetic ornaments. They just happen to be, in his view, the most significant source of poetic charm.

Jayadeva's incorporation of the category of *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinction)[32] is similarly puzzling. While the *lakṣaṇa*-s are a prominent topic of discussion in dramaturgical works going back to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, none of the *ālaṃkārika*-s prior to Jayadeva proposes *lakṣaṇa* to be a separate category of poetic exegesis. Jayadeva offers

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[32] This *lakṣaṇa* should be carefully distinguished from *lakṣaṇā* (indication) which is an entirely different sort of entity. The first is a property of language whereas the second is a one of the three well-known operations of signification .

no explanation for the inclusion of *lakṣaṇa* in his poetic system. He merely states that function of the *lakṣaṇa*-s in poetry is akin to that of the shining golden forehead of kings.[33] Earlier *ālaṃkārika*-s at times discuss *lakṣaṇa,* but primarily within the context of the poetic ornaments. None has found reason to organize these into a separate category of properties. Indeed, most of the *lakṣaṇa*-s appear remarkably similar to ornaments. Jayadeva describes the *lakṣaṇa mithyādhyavasāya* ("illusory resolution") as that where "both a product and its means are unreal. [As in] 'bring me a garland of sky flowers strung on a cord of moon beams.'"[34] Such an expression could easily be classified as a type of *alaṃkāra.*

Compounding this obsolescence, the *Candrāloka* was almost certainly composed in the form of a *kārikā,* a text constituted only in verses.[35] Hence the text lacks an auto – commentary where Jayadeva might have potentially recounted the disputation surrounding important questions of poetic interpretation. Such an auto-commentary is found in the important *alaṃkāraśāstra* works preceding the *Candrāloka* such as Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* and Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkārasarvasva,* and indeed in most of the important works of *alaṃkāraśāstra* in the second millennium. Ingalls explains in his introduction to the translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* :

> And this is quite in keeping with the form in which other Sanskrit treatises on literary criticism have been handed down. Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita,* written in the age of Abhinava, comes to us in precisely the same combination of *Kārikas*, prose commentary, and supplemental stanzas.

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[33] *svarṇabhrājiṣṇubhālatvaprabhṛtīva mahībhujaḥ* (CĀ, 3.11).

[34] *syān mithyādhyavasāyaś ced asatī sādhyasādhane / candrāṃśusūtragrathitāṃ nabhaḥ puṣpasrajaṃ vaha* // (CĀ, 3.7).

[35] No significant evidence exists for an auto-commentary to the *Candrāloka,* although there are no statements categorically proving its non-existence, either.

> Except for the absence of supplemental verses the same is true of the text of Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Hemacandra, and Viśvanātha. Not only literary criticism but Sanskrit treatises on most scientific or philosophical subjects tended to be composed in this form. One may instance the works of Bhartṛhari the grammarian, Kumārila the ritualist, Dharmakīrti the Buddhist. [36]

In the medieval period, the presence of an auto prose commentary written by the author himself becomes an expected feature of rigorous analytical treatise. By composing a text without such a prose commentary, Jayadeva may well have trivialized his text in the eyes of some critics. Nevertheless, the seventeenth century commentator Gāgābhaṭṭa states, not without professional motivation, that the *Candrāloka* is a "dense work" and that it had "not been properly understood despite great efforts in the past."[37] Jayadeva's text demands an enormous degree of interpretation as will be seen in the translation of the commentaries in the second part of this study,

Another possible reason why the *Candrāloka* may not have gained initial popularity might be Jayadeva's criticism of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. The *Kāvyaprakāśa* was one of the most beloved texts of Jayadeva's era, and Jayadeva's rather disdainful critique of Mammaṭa's definition of poetry may have been poorly received by scholars. Jayadeva criticizes Mammaṭa for suggesting that poetry can exist without manifest *alaṃkāra*-s, which for Jayadeva amount to the most distinguishing characteristic of poetry. As this critique will be discussed extensively in chapter four, we will not present the details of this controversy at present. Viśvanātha, an *ālaṃkārika* who lived a century or so later

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[36] Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) 25.

[37] *anekaiḥ kleśair yan na paricitam adyâpi gahanaṃ...* (*RĀ*, prologue). ("This difficult work is not well understood despite many previous efforts. [Hence] there is mockery of my efforts toward this [goal]...").

than Jayadeva, also criticizes Mammaṭa's definition of poetry in his *Sāhityadarpana,*[38] and there is no evidence that his work was ever marginalized on account of this criticism of Mammaṭa. Even so, we should consider that Jayadeva censures Mammaṭa for accommodating poetry lacking manifest *alaṃkāra*-s, which in Jayadeva's view are the most essential characteristic of poetry, whereas Viśvanātha criticizes Mammaṭa for allowing poetry without *rasa*, which, according to Viśvanātha's view, is the defining characteristic of poetry. While Viśvanātha , like Jayadeva, criticizes the popular *Kāvyaprakāśa*, he does so in order to support the most popular view of the time, that *rasa* was the essential characteristic of poetry. Jayadeva's critique is based on the less popular view during this era that ornaments are the absolute requisite of poetry.

By presenting *alaṃkāra*, rather than *rasa* and *dhvani*, to be the to the critical feature of poetic expression, Jayadeva defied the favored interpretation of his era. Such a critical stance may have discouraged readers from engaging with his text. Inevitably, *Candrāloka* required a highly influential champion such as Appayadīkṣita to draw greater attention to its merits as an *alaṃkāraśāstra.*[39] Appayadīkṣita's *Kuvalayānanda*, however, is based solely on the section of the *Candrāloka* that investigates poetic ornaments pertaining to meaning. Even though subsequently two highly renowned scholars, the *mīmāṃsaka* Gāgābhaṭṭa and the grammarian Nagojibhaṭṭa, wrote formidable commentaries on the entirety of the *Candrāloka*, this treatise is best known in relation to the Appayadīkṣita's text, and is generally understood, like the *Kuvalayānanda*, to be a treatise specifically on *alaṃkāra*.

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[38] *Etena – 'analaṅkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi' iti yad uktaṃ tad api parāstaṃ* (*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, 1st Paricheddha, p. 13).

[39] Yigal Bronner has discussed this relationship extensively in an unpublished paper that was presented at the World Sanskrit conference in Helsinki in July, 2003.

Misjudgment in the Moonlight: An Uninformed Evaluation

The appraisal of the *Candrāloka* by some of the most revered modern scholars of Indian poetics is not particularly well informed. P. K. Kane, the noted historian of Indian Poetics, states: "The work is divided into ten *mayūkha*-s and contains about 350 verses. The style is lucid and easy, the language is flowing and sonorous, and the work is admirably adapted to the needs of beginners."[40] Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī Khiste, the editor of the first Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series edition (1929) of the *Candrāloka* with the commentary *Śaradāgama*, makes a similar pronouncement:

> The *Candrā*loka is a unique work, dealing with almost all the topics treated of by Sanskrit poeticians. It is undoubtedly elementary in character and method of treatment and is in no way comparable with other standard works which bristle with elaborate disquisitions and learned discussions on almost every page of them. It consists of *kārikā*-s written in *anuṣṭup* metre, in a style which is lucid and easy and in a language which is flowing and sonorous. Like *Bhāmaha* and *Daṇḍī* [sic], he gives his own examples, but his superiority to these *ācārya*-s in this respect, is clearly borne out by the succinctness and pithiness of his apt and appropriate illustrations. In most cases, one half of the *kārikā* gives the definition and the other its example....There is no other work, as far as we know, which may be confidently placed in the hands of ardent beginners as a safe guide to the study of Sanskrit Poetics on old traditional lines.[41]

Both the statements of Kane and Khiste demonstrate over-hasty conclusions.

First, Kane's enumeration of 350 verses, reiterated by S. K. De in his own history, significantly contradicts the number of verses contained in the three printed editions of

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[40] P. V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1971) 290.

[41] Khiste, Introduction to *The Candrāloka by Pīyūṣavarṣa Jayadeva with the Commentary, Śaradāgama alias 'Chandrāloka prakāśa' by Padmanābhamishra alias Pradyotana Bhattācharya*, ed. Nārāyaṇa Śāstrī Khiste (Benares: Jai Krishnadas-Haridas Gupta, 1929) 2.

the *Candrāloka* as well as the number of verses in a manuscript of the *Ramā* commentary of Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa stored in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in Pune. All of these editions and manuscripts contain 293 or 294 verses.[42] Kane was aware of these editions as he mentions them in his history. Second, while Kane and Khiste may be correct in pointing to Jayadeva's lucid style, their evaluation that this work is specifically adapted to "the needs of beginners" flies in the face of the judgment of Gāgābhaṭṭa that the *Candrāloka* is a dense and difficult work.[43] Gāgābhaṭṭa, himself, wrote the most difficult and logically dense commentaries to the *Candrāloka*, the *Rākāgama*. Kane's and Khiste's evaluations also disregard Jayadeva's own pronouncement that the *Candrāloka*'s has been written for scholars.[44] Frequently, when pedagogical works are composed, an author will include a statement that the work has the purpose of instructing youths (*bāla*). The word *bāla* does not appear in any such context within the *Candrāloka*. Rather, his text is on repeated occasions addressed to scholars. Verse 1.3 includes the plural vocative *budhāḥ* in the sense of "scholars" and "gods." Verse 1.2 includes the plural vocative *cinmayacittacandramaṇayaḥ*, "you who have moonstones for hearts/intellects." Each chapter, moreover concludes with the aspiration *ciraṃ candrāloke sukhayatu mayūkhaḥ sumanasaḥ* ("may this chapter delight gods and scholars for along time").

[42] Verse counts of these editions be summarized as follows: Chaukhambha Edition with *Śaradāgama* – 293; Chaukhambha edition with *Rākāgama* – 294; Gujarati Printing Press Edition with *Ramā* - 294; Manuscript of the *Ramā* from BORI – 294.

[43] See note 37.

[44] Yigal Bronner's unpublished paper compares the pedagogical status of both the *Candrāloka* and the *Kuvalayānanda*. Here, I must thank him for bringing some clarity to my understanding.

Third, while Kane and Khiste are correct is noticing Jayadeva's lucid style, the texts of the *Candrāloka* contains many concealed puns, secondary meanings, and textual references, which might be easily overlooked by less experienced readers, particularly if the work is read without a commentary. Often these encryptions constitute an essential component of the overall meanings of verses. In the first verse of the *Candrāloka*, the expression *jāgratkalaṃkai' ravadhvaṃsaṃ hastayate* can be rendered in at least three ways: 1) "she (Sarasvatī) takes away the deficiency in speech that is due to public disgrace;" 2) "she (Sarasvatī) touches with her hand that person who is not censured by anyone on account of their soft and melodious speech;" and 3) "she (Sarasvatī having manifested as the eye of Śiva that has the form of the moon) removes the wilting of water lilies through her expanding digits."[45] Without sufficient grammatical training and experience, it is unlikely that a student would recognize all of these meanings.

S. K. De, the author of the indispensable work *A History of Sanskrit Poetics*, who along with Kane still remains the overall authority on Sanskrit poetics, writes:

> Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* has been a deservedly popular manual, but in spite of its clearness and brevity of exposition and aptness of its illustrations, it is nothing more than a convenient epitome, its most remarkable feature being its detailed treatment of poetic figures, which occupy nearly half its bulk.[46]

Like Kane, he incorrectly enumerates the verses as 350 in number. Another formidable modern scholar on Sanskrit poetics, Edwin Gerow, provides a similar appraisal:

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[45] One should refer, for clarification of these three renderings, to the explanation of this verse in the second part of this study,.

[46] 248-9.

> Other works remain that seem less 'poetic' than pedagogical: inventories of figures and other technical terminology (*Candrāloka* of Jaydeva) or frankly practical advice to the academic poet: the *kaviśikṣā* works typified by the *Aucityavicāracarcā* of Kṣemendra. The former have often achieved great popularity, especially when commented upon (*Kuvalayānanda* of Appayadīkṣita);... [47]

While it would be impudent for me to question the overall acumen of these scholars regarding Sanskrit poetics, I might suggest that, as Kane and De do not even cite the correct number of verses in the editions available to them, they may not have read this work very thoroughly. Gerow does not give the distinct impression that he has read the text any more carefully than have Kane and De. Kane and De, while providing biographical information for the commentators of the *Candrāloka*, do not contribute significant observations regarding the contents of the commentaries themselves, saving citations of the colophons that are used as biographical evidence. Khiste comments ever so briefly on the *Śaradāgama*, which he himself had edited, but mentions nothing regarding the content of the other commentaries. All of these scholars, at the very least, should have mentioned Gāgābhaṭṭa's *Rākāgama* for its astute technical explanations and for the wealth of external illustrations applied to the *Candrāloka*, most of which are taken from Śri Harśa's *mahākāvya*[48] the *Naiṣadhacarita.*[49] Gāgābhaṭṭa had written a

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[47] Edwin Gerow, *Indian Poetics*, vol. 5, fasc. 3 of *A History of Indian Literature*, ed. Jan Gonda (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977) 260.

[48] *Mahākāvya*-s are long formal poems regarded to be the most excellent in the Sanskrit tradition on account of their perfection of formal attributes of poetry.

[49] One of the more complex and ornate of the later *mahākāvya*-s treating the *Mahābhārata* legend of Nala and Damayantī. Banerji (1989) states that the work was probably written in the 12th century. The author, Śri Harśa, is also said to have composed the well known *vedānta* treatise *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*.

commentary on the *Naiṣadhacarita* prior to writing his commentary on the *Candrāloka*, and hence had a large reservoir of poetic verses to call upon.

We should understand that Kane's and De's evaluations of the *Candrāloka* are over-determined by their close engagement with British intellectual traditions, at a time when India was still under British colonial rule. P. V. Kane received training in British law, and S. K. De had embraced British customs since early youth. A childhood friend of De, R. C. Majumdar, describes his early memories of the scholar:

> The first thing I distinctly recollect—because it deeply impressed me – is the dress of Susil. He came to the school in English dress, which was somewhat unusual for a schoolboy. It was not long before I learnt the secret of it. One of his uncles, Kiranchandra De, was already a member of the Indian Civil Service, and another, Prabodh Chandra De, had gone to England to qualify himself for the same service. Susil himself was expected to follow their example, and hence he was trained in English manners and habits from an early age. I still remember how Susil often showed me letters written to him by his uncle Prabodh De from England. We read with avidity the many interesting things about England and English life which the letter contained, and Susil naturally grew enthusiastic about them.[50]

De's embrace of English fashion was paralleled by a full immersion in European scholarly priorities. He apples a variation of cultural Darwinism in his understanding of the transformations of Sanskrit poetics; the disparate elements of *alaṃkāraśāstra* being selected or rejected according to their efficacy in producing the perfection of the species of poetics, as exemplified by Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, and Abhinavagupta's *Locana.* While one might argue that an evolutionary understanding of Sanskrit poetic history can be derived from medieval Indian evaluations of Sanskrit poetics which themselves extol the merits of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta's unified theories

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[50] R. C. Majumdar, "Susil Kumar De: A Reminiscence," in *S. K. De Memorial Volume*, ed R. C. Hazra and S. C. Banerji (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1972) 1.

above those of their predecessors,[51] the historical methods that that Kane applies in his own *History of Sanskrit Poetics* do not resemble anything found in traditional scholarship. Moreover, even though the majority of medieval Indian scholars of poetics adopted the unified perspectives of Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana, they never dismissed but continued to practice the discriminative analysis of figures of speech and poetic virtues and faults that was the hallmark of earlier poetic scholarship.

The teleology[52] that both Kane and De superimpose on their histories of Sanskrit poetics, however, far exceeds the evolutionary perspectives found in traditional works. In Kane and De's view, the quest for a unified theory of poetry becomes the guiding principle to the evolution of Sanskrit poetics, and as such, theories that do not advance such a perspective fall by the wayside. Furthermore, once a unified theory is perfected at the hands of Ānandavardhana in the tenth century and Abhinavagupta a century or so later, in Kane and De's view, the tradition loses the impetus to evolve in a productive fashion, and henceforth becomes decadent.[53] As Larry McCrea explains, the unparalleled esteem extended to the works of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta "has led most scholars of *alaṃkāraśāstra* to denigrate and downplay the significance of alternative

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[51] Both Abhinavagupta and Ruyyaka present evolutionary perspectives in their own works. Abhinavagupta presents his own theory of Rasa as the culmination of a theoretical development initiated by three predecessors: Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śri Śankuka, and Bhaṭṭanāyaka. (See Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, 220-6). Ruyyaka, on the otherhand,characterizes the shifting perspective within the Sanskrit poetic exegesis of the four centuries preceding his own time by summarizing, in a chronological sequence, the essential positions of the most revered authors in this tradition.

[52] I borrow this concept and term from Larry McCrea's excellent Ph.D. Dissertation *The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir* (Chicago, 1998).

[53] John Epling, *A Calculus of Creative Expression: The central Chapter of Daṇḍin's Kāvyadarśa* (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1989) 14-15.

theories of literary aesthetics, (both those of Ānandavardhana's predecessors and those of later theorists)."[54]

Hence it is not surprising that Kane and De do not direct more of their attention on the *Candrāloka*, as it demonstrates few of the characteristics that they appraise most highly in poetic treatises. While the *Candrāloka* is a deeply structured work, it does not present a unified theory of poetry. Rather, it discusses the individual components of poetry --*lakṣaṇa, guṇa, alaṃkā*ra, *rasa* -- as separately functioning entities. Contrary to the priorities established in the *Dhvanyālokalocana*, the *Candrāloka* affords more attention to *alaṃkāra* than to *rasa.* Moreover, according to the logic of McCrea's diagnosis, the *Candrāloka* suffers in De's and Kane's estimation simply by virtue of being composed after the *Dhvanyālokalocana* and the *Kāvyaprakāśa.*

The Commentators and their Commentaries

One of the most significant motivations for choosing the *Candrāloka* as the centerpiece of my dissertation had to do with its commentarial tradition. The *Candrāloka* inspired commentaries from three revered authors each from a distinct philosophical orientation. Pradyotanabhaṭṭa was a *nyāya* scholar patronized by king Vīrabhadradeva, the Mahārāja of Rewa in the mid to late sixteenth century. Gāgābhaṭṭa was a highly renowned *mīmāṃsā* scholar from an important family of exegetes. He was the nephew of

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[54] Larry J McCrea. *The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir* (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1998) 2.

the revered scholar Kamalākarabhaṭṭā (early seventeenth century).[55] As a scholar, Gāgābhaṭṭa wielded influence in both intellectual and political circles. Vaidyanātha (early seventeenth century), is widely known as the most adept pupil of Nāgeṣabhaṭṭa, the famed grammarian of the seventeenth century.[56]

While Pradyotanabhaṭṭa is best known as a logician, he does apply *navyanyāya* methods to the investigation of poetic controversies, even though he writes during the sixteenth century. His patron, king Vīrabhadra, was a literary aficionado, who himself wrote a resume on Vātsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra* entitled the *Kandarpacūḍāmaṇī.*[57] Gāgābhaṭṭa was one of the most astute analysts of language theory in the late medieval period and wrote a formidable text on this subject entitle the *Bhaṭṭacintāmani.* This text investigates all the existing (at Gāgābhaṭṭa's time) theories of verbal signification in a vigorous methodical fashion. As explained earlier, he also produced a commentary on one of the most complex of the *mahākāvya*-s, Harṣa's *Naiṣadhīyacarita*. He was also the Brahmin enlisted by the Marathi general Shivaji, to perform Shivaji's modified *upanayana* ceremony and to officiate at Shivaji's coronation.[58] He does seem to be have been a scholar attracted to simplicity, nor one who was lacking in things to do with

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[55] "His literary activity is assigned by P. V. Kane roughly to the period between 1610 and 1040 A.D. Kamalākara wrote on various subjects, particularly on Smṛti. His *magnum opus* is the *Nirṇaya-sindhu.* Of his other works, mention may be made of the *Śūdra-kamalākara.*" [Sures Chandra Banerji, *A Companion to Sanskrit Literature*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989) 53.].

[56] Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, ed., *The Philosophy of the Grammarians.* Vol. 5 in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990).

[57] Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum.*

[58] Pandurang Vaman Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, pt. I (Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974) 379-80. By many accounts Shivaji was born a Śudra, and hence Gāgābhaṭṭa was commissioned to re-orchestrate the coronation ceremony to accommodate unorthodox caste status.

himself According to Aufrecht, Gāgābhaṭṭa wrote at least twelve works on a variety of topics in *mīmāmṣa* and *dharmaśāstra*. Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa was born into a family of Marathi Brahmins who resettled in Benares. He is known to have lived in the latter half of the 18th century.[59] Sures Chandra Banerji states that Vaidyanātha was known to have written a number of commentaries on Nāgeśa's works. The fact that such scholars, who were not primarily *ālaṃkārika*-s or poets, were interested in the *Candrāloka*, indicates that the work appealed to a serious philosophical sensibility. Any scholar investigating the *Candrāloka* should properly consider why intellectuals of such caliber directed their attention to the *Candrāloka*, when modern scholars such as Kane, Khiste, and De have presented this to be a rather superficial and perfunctory treatise.

Clouds Filtering the Moonlight: the Effects of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and the *Kuvalayānanda* on the Reception of the *Candrāloka*.

We have mentioned earlier that Appayadīkṣita's *Kuvalayānanda*, in bringing fame to the *Candrāloka*, also encouraged readers to regard the *Candrāloka* as a treatise devoted solely to *alaṃkāra*. Hence, most of the attention directed at the *Candrāloka* is focused on the fifth chapter, which details and exemplifies the function of the poetic ornaments. Many earlier scholars who did not specifically study both the *Candrāloka* and the *Kuvalayānanda* have frequently identified the two texts, the result being that two texts are frequently confused in descriptive catalogues, databases and collections. The

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[59] Sures Chandra Banerji, *Historical Survey of Ancient Indian Grammars (Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit)* (Delhi: Sharada Publishing House, 1996) 137.

Kuvalayānanda, while increasing the fame of the *Candrāloka*, has also had unfortunate effect of discouraging readers from investigating the entirety of the *Candrāloka*.

Another text which ultimately obscures the collective understanding of the *Candrāloka* is Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Of all the texts in the *alaṃkāraśāstra* tradition, this text has had the greatest effect on the common understanding of poetry and poetics. The *Kāvyaprakāśa* was the earliest and by far the most popular of the encyclopedic treatises whose purpose is not to present a striking new theory of poetry, but rather to present an authoritative position in regard to the full spectrum of poetic issues. Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana* (twelfth century) and Viśvanātha's *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (fourteenth century), which explain the features of drama in addition to those of poetry, also fall into this category of texts. More commentaries have been written on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* than any other work in *alaṃkāraśāstra*, and it ranks among the most commented-upon texts in Sanskrit literature.[60] The *Kāvyaprakāśa* in a number of ways presents what becomes the canonical view in Sanskrit poetics.[61]

There is strong evidence in the *Candrāloka* that Jayadeva felt resentment toward the popularity of the Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*. He mocks Mammaṭa for his definition of poetry in verse 1.8 and quite conceivably castigates Mammaṭa in verse 1.2 as well.[62] While Jayadeva utilizes the same ten-chapter structure as did Mammaṭā in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Jayadeva designates his chapters as *mayūkha*-s ("rays") instead of using

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[60] De, *HSP*, 156.

[61] Kane, *HSP*, 266.

[62] *re re svairiṇi nirvicārakavite mâsmatprakāśībhava* (*CĀ* 1.2b) ("But you, unfaithful wench! Undiscerning poesy! Do not illuminate yourself through me"). The use of the word *prakāśī* may will indicate that Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* is the target of censure here.

Mammaṭa's designation, *ullāsa* (flash). Even though he emulates Mammaṭa by choosing a title that incorporates the idea of "illumination," he adopts the word *āloka* rather than *prakāśa*, thus demonstrating a greater allegiance to Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* than to the Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa.* Jayadeva also sequences the topics in his text in a radically different order than does Mammaṭa, and throughout the text he appears to go out of his way to present views that are different from those of Mammaṭa. He incorporates an extra topic of discussion *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinction) neglected by Mammaṭa, and provides a more demanding series of qualifications in his definition of poetry.[63] Lastly, he accepts only two varieties of poetry, *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, rejecting the third category, *citra*, which Mammaṭa had accepted before him.[64] Jayadeva seems determined to out-perform Mammaṭa by creating more comprehensive definitions, investigating more topics of poetry, and expanding the number of *alaṃkāra*-s.

Ironically, as history would have it, the commentaries to the *Candrāloka* end up interpreting the Jayadeva's text through the lens of the *Kāvyaprakāśa.* For instance in verse 1.3, Jayadeva indicates that the purpose for studying the *Candrāloka* is the attainment of beauty/wealth (*lakṣmī*), the nectar which is skillful instruction, and the moon of fame.[65] In his comment to this verse, Gāgābhaṭṭa states:

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[63] Mammaṭa requires that poetry be faultless, possess *guṇa* and also incorporate ornaments, either in a manifest or un-manifest form. Later *ālaṃkārika*-s such as Viśvanātha and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja (seventeenth century) criticized Mammaṭa for presenting too narrow a definition of poetry.

[64] Mammaṭa had presented three categories of poetry: 1) *dhvani*-- poetry where the suggested meaning is predominant;, 2) *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* -- poetry where the suggested meaning is subordinated to the expressed or indicated meaning, and 3) *citra* --a variety of poetry having no suggestion, but merely a charm dependent on exceptional ornamentation or clever pictorial presentation.

[65] *śrīr asmād upadeśakauśalamayaṃ pīyūṣam asmāj jagajjāgradbhāsurapadmakesarayaśaḥśītāṃśur asmād budhāḥ* (*CĀ*, 1.3).

idam upalakṣaṇaṃ. vyavahārajñānānarthanivṛttiparamānandaprāpti-rūpaprayojanatrayam apy adhikaṃ bodhyam[66] ("This is the implication. Three additional purposes are understood: those having the form of the attainment of worldly knowledge, the achievement of the cessation of harm, and the attainment of supreme bliss.")

These three additional purposes are found to be found originally in Mammaṭa's statement in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* 1.2:

kāvyaṃ yaśase 'rthakṛte vyavahāravide śivetarakṣataye
sadyaḥ paranirvṛtaye kāntāsaṃmitatayopadeśayuje

Poetry is for the purpose of fame, the achievement of wealth, worldly knowledge, the destruction of what is other than auspicious, instantaneous supreme bliss, and for the possession of the type of instruction that resembles that from beautiful woman.

Mammaṭa's definition states six causes, whereas Jayadeva states three. Hence, to achieve an equivalence between the two definitions, Mammaṭa explains that Jayadeva's definition implies three additional purposes. Gāgābhaṭṭa similarly states that Jayadeva's metaphor "the nectar comprised of skillful instruction" (*upadeśakauśalamayaṃ pīyūṣam*[67]) is equivalent to Mammaṭa's characterization of "instruction similar to that of a beautiful woman."[68] While such an interpretation is possible, there is no guarantee that this is

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[66] *RĀ*, 1.3.

[67] *CĀ*, 1.3.

[68] *atrâmṛtapadena prabhusaṃmitasuhṛtsaṃmitakāntāsaṃmitopadeśatraividhye 'py udeśadvayasya śabdārthapradhānatathâsvādāviṣayatvāt kāntāsaṃmitopadeśasya rasapradhānatayâsvādaviṣayatvād amṛtatulyatayā tṛtīyopadeśo vyajyate* (*RA*, 1.3) (Here, by the word nectar, [he indicates] that of the three types of instructions -- 1) that which resembles the instruction of a ruler, 2) that which resembles the instruction of a friend, and 3) that which resembles the instruction of a lover -- the third type of instruction

precisely what Jayadeva wished to express. In a number of other cases, Jayadeva's intention is truly at cross purposes with that of Mammaṭa.

Vaidyanātha is perhaps even more guilty of superimposing Mammaṭa's view onto the *Candrāloka.* He seems particularly intent on establishing consistency between the two texts. We will explore this in greater detail in later chapters. For now, we can observe the opening of his comment to verse 1.8 of the *Candrāloka* where Jayadeva has clearly criticized Mammaṭa's definition of poetry for allowing the absence of manifest ornaments. Vaidyanātha attempts to soften Jayadeva's rebuke, stating:

> *prakāśoktisamarthanaṃ sūcayitum upahāsadvārā tāmāpātato dūsayati aṅgīkarotīti* ("In order to indicate the adequacy of a statement in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, he (Jayadeva) initially criticizes this mockingly.")

Vaidyanātha's claim is that Jayadeva and Mammaṭa have essentially the same interpretation. Gāgābhaṭṭa assumes a more realistic posture here and acknowledges that this is a genuine rebuke against Mammaṭa. The fact that Vaidyanātha and at times Gāgābhaṭṭa impose the theory of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* onto the *Candrāloka*, even when there is no clear warrant demonstrates how deeply the former text had penetrated the aesthetic sensibility of Indian intellectuals during the medieval period, and how difficult it was for subsequent *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s such as the *Candrāloka* to assert their textual autonomy.

The Unique Structure of the Moonlight

is suggested because the instruction of a lover is like nectar on account of the fact that the word and meaning do not constitute its object, [but rather] *rasa* is its predominant object.

Because scholars have been so influenced by the *Kuvalayānanda* and thus identified the *Candrāloka* so strongly as an *alaṃkāra* text, most have neither seriously investigated the other chapters in the *Candrāloka* nor contemplated the greater structure of the work. Perhaps another reason for scholarly indifference to these other chapters is Jayadeva's uninspiring treatment of *rasa* in the sixth chapter. Here, with the exception of the charming second verse of the chapter describing the experience of *rasa*,[69] Jayadeva rather routinely enumerates the nine varieties of *rasa* – erotic, comical, wrathful, pitiful, disgusting, terrifying, heroic, wondrous, and tranquil – and explains the emotional determinants (*vibhāva*-s), resultant expressions (*anubhāva*-s), and the transitory emotions (*vyabhicāribhāva*-s) concerning each of these *rasa*-s in a somewhat mechanical fashion. Jayadeva's explanation of the fourfold classification of 1) *rasa*, 2) apparent *rasa*, 3) sentiment, and 4) apparent sentiment is similarly unoriginal, as is his description of the four styles (*rīti*) and the four types of dictional ambience (*vṛtti*). Jayadeva gives the impression that in this chapter he is merely fulfilling his duty, rather a disappointment in a chapter explaining one of the most spontaneous and powerful aesthetic experiences.

Jayadeva seems to recover his sense of purpose in the next four chapters (seven through ten), which explain the functions and varieties of the different modes of verbal signification. Here he demonstrates a keen ability to describe precise distinctions in language and cognition in simple but compelling language. While these chapters themselves contain only a few original insights, they become a source of interest when contemplated as a sequential structure. Jayadeva's decision to explain the operations of verbal signification (denotation, indication and suggestion) in a sequence opposite to

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[69] See page 6 for citation of this verse.

what is conventionally seen in *alaṃkāraśāstra* reveals an original perspective on the operation of verbal signification. Jayadeva throws into question the assumption that denotation is the primal cause of the indirect operations of signification. By describing suggestion first and indication second, he implies that our understanding of the indirect functions of speech informs our understanding of what we regard to be the direct operation of speech: denotation (*abhidhā*). Moreover, such a sequence also encourages us to question: just how direct is direct signification.

Just as unusual is Jayadeva's decision to explain the operations of verbal signification after he has already explained the aesthetic features within poetic language such as *lakṣaṇa*, *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra*. Conventionally, *ālaṃkārika*-s explain the *śabdavṛtti*-s (operations of verbal signification) at the beginning of their texts so as to provide a linguistic foundation to the study of aesthetic processes. Jayadeva's structure on the other hand presents his explanation of the aesthetic functions in language as a foundation for the more analytical elucidation of the operations of verbal signification. The full investigation of Jayadeva's structural innovation is the specific topic of the second chapter in this study.

Presentiment in the Moonlight: Jayadeva's Anticipation of Future Discourse

In a number of distinct ways, Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* hearkens backward to earlier periods in *alaṃkāraśāstra* and dramaturgy. Its revival of *lakṣaṇa* as an independent category of poetic interpretation and its concentration on *alaṃkāra* as the

primary vehicle of poetic charm are both features of earlier works in these fields. However, the *Candrāloka* exhibits a number of subtle features not seen in earlier treatises which serve as important links to the later poetic tradition. Perhaps the clearest example of this is seen in the third verse, which we have already cited on pg. 3, note 4 where Jayadeva states that his text is the single locus of reasoning and *rasa.* In spirit, such a statement would seem more appropriate to much later works in the *alaṃkāraśāstra* tradition, specifically to the *Rasagaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja.

In other passages, Jayadeva presents points of view that develop into more pronounced positions in future poetic and philosophical doctrines. Two such examples are his explanations of the cause of poetic capacity and his definition of what constitutes formal poetry (*kāvya*). Here he significantly departs from the mainstream tradition of his era, and though his theories may have certain imperfections, they demonstrate an orientation toward more modern theories of poetry. Two additional cases can be found within Jayadeva's explanations of verbal signification. The first of these is Jayadeva's explanation of 'indication' which avoids the standardized formula popularized by Mammaṭa and instead acknowledges the importance of the speaker's intention within metaphorical identification. Jayadeva's view closely resembles the explanation of indication formulated within the *navyanyāya* tradition. The second pertains to Jayadeva's classification of six types of words: words that denote 1) generic properties, 2) qualities, 3) actions, 4) connections to things, 5) names, and 6) phonetic self-reference. Here Jayadeva appends two additional classes of words to the four that were instituted by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya.* I have not discovered such a six-fold enumeration in any other treatises. Jayadeva's introduction of these two new classes of words, words

denoting connections to things such as "staff-possessor" (*daṇḍin*) and self-referential words (*nirdeśa*), which denote their own phonetic composition, demonstrates a keen awareness of the semantic controversies that were such a prominent field of interdisciplinary discourse in the second millennium. These innovations are the specific topic of both the second and third chapter of this dissertation.

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into two parts. Part one, which has already commenced with this introduction, contains three additional chapters. The first of these will discuss distinctive features of Sanskrit poetics, and how Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* interfaces with evolving traditions of *alaṃkāraśāstra.* Accordingly, this chapter considers some of the limitations inherent in what has become the dominant historical interpretation of Sanskrit poetics, and recounts successful recent efforts to remedy the theoretical prejudices that obscure our understanding of how this tradition has evolved. The second chapter examines the structure of the *Candrāloka* in relation to that of other works in *alaṃkāraśāstra*, and suggests some possible hypotheses as to why Jayadeva applies such an idiosyncratic sequence of topics within his treatise on poetics. The thesis of this chapter is that Jayadeva intends for his aesthetic inquiry into poetic language to inform his more strictly epistemological inquiry into the nature of language and semantics. The third and final chapter of the first part identifies some seeds of modernity that are planted by Jayadeva in the *Candrāloka.* The chapter discusses four cases where Jayadeva's explanations anticipate significant innovations in later traditions of poetry, logic and grammar.

The second part of this dissertation provides a translation of the first chapter (*mayūkha*) of the *Candrāloka*. The translation of each verse is followed by a detailed explanation of the verse in the light of three principal commentaries: the *Śaradāgama* of Pradyotanabhaṭṭā, the *Rākāgama* of Gāgābhaṭṭa alias Viśveśvara, and the *Ramā* of Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa, as well as translations of each of the comments to the verse by these three commentators. The one exception to this is in Gāgābhaṭṭa's extensive comment to the consecutive half verses 13cd – 14ab for which the translation is still in progress. I have translated the individual commentaries in order to investigate whether the philosophical orientations of the three commentators influences their aesthetic and literary interpretation.

Chapter One – Sanskrit Poetic Theory and the Evolution of Methodologies in *Alaṃkāraśāstra*

This chapter contextualizes the study of the *Candrāloka* within the framework of Sanskrit Poetry and traditional systems of poetic exegesis. It also considers the methodological limitations inherent in some of the previous efforts to provide a conclusive understanding of the history of *alaṃkāraśāstra.* Here we are faced with something of a "bootstrapping" problem. It is impossible to discuss the evolution of Sanskrit poetics without appealing to the understanding of the basic exegetical categories of *alaṃkāraśāstra.* On the other hand, it is misleading to suggest that these exegetical categories exist as fixed concepts, for it is clear that they are best understood as concepts in evolution. This is a common enough difficulty, and I have therefore decided to engage in a basic discussion of Indian poetry and the nexus of poetic theories that arise as a critical response to this. I begin by discussing the specific approach to poetry in the Sanskrit traditions and subsequently introduce some of the essential formal categories of interpretation relied upon in poetic treatises. Next, I discuss how these concepts evolve chronologically in the discourse of different *ālaṃkārika*-s, and point out some ways in which the evolutionary models of certain modern scholars have limited our understanding of the complex transformations that have taken place in the Sanskrit poetic tradition. Lastly, I discuss how the *Candrāloka* can be understood as the last in a series of methodological "undertows," whereby the poetic ornaments are reinstated as the most essential feature of Sanskrit poetry. These "undertows," while seemingly retrograde, exert a productive force on tradition, encouraging it to evolve with greater precision and depth.

Elements of Poetry and the Specific Concerns of Sanskrit Poetics

In order to better understand the function of the *Candrāloka* as a poetic treatise, it is important to consider the purposes and methods that distinguish the critical investigation of poetry known as poetics and specifically the principles and topics that define the genre known as *alaṃkāraśāstra* or Sanskrit poetics. The term *alaṃkāraśāstra* literally designates "the science of making beautiful," though this of course refers specifically to poetry. Not all rhetoricians and literary theorists would agree that the purpose of poetry is to create beauty, but I think most would agree that poetry should give rise to a significant aesthetic experience through language, and that it should do so through a certain form of language. Some systems of poetry demand that poetry produce a pleasant experience, while others acknowledge that a form of aesthetic import can arise even from discomfort and unpleasantness. It is the same in any field of aesthetics. What exactly entails this aesthetic experience is subject to enormous variety from culture to culture, and even within a single culture many variations of interpretation normally exist. Despite the lack of consensus, studies on poetics nevertheless strive to delineate specific principles that govern the poetic creation of aesthetic experience and to characterize the special nature of the experience that arises from great poetry. Such investigation is circumscribed by the manner in which the investigator determines what constitutes poetry. A significant portion of the discourse in studies on poetics concerns this determination as well as the classification of those things that make poetry good or beautiful.

In *alaṃkāraśāstra*, a tradition developed in the earliest known works whereby the author of a treatise attempts to identify the formal components of poetry. Realistically, of course, the delimitation of what characterizes poetry is refined through the practice of and reception to poetry. Sanskrit poetry has its roots in the epic traditions of India which produced two rather voluminous masterpieces, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The composition of these texts most likely began a few centuries before the common era and continued for the next few hundred years. By the first or second century C.E., the earliest of the formal poems known as *kāvya* were composed and performed in the context of royal courts. This was an elite form of entertainment designed both to delight and to edify its audience, but also to affirm the pleasures and rewards of its privileged lifestyle.[1] Because such poems were composed in Sanskrit, a language which has complex and highly specific grammatical regulations, this *kāvya* necessarily developed its own highly regulated system of formalities. The fact that such poetry was composed to entertain royal entourages fostered its ornamental style and the tendency to operate according to conventionally established patterns. This is not to say that *Kāvya* was rigid and did not evolve, but rather its evolution proceeded according to a highly structured system of conventions, which encouraged poets to produce a form of literary beauty that could be easily recognized and readily contextualized according to earlier models.[2] A similar pattern can be seen in the development of European classical music in the late renaissance. Despite the numerous conventions and parameters restricting their

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[1] Indira Viswanathan Peterson, *Design and Rhetoric in a Saṇskrit Court Epic* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003) 1.

[2] Ibid.

inventiveness, Sanskrit poets demonstrated enormous originality and freedom within their art form.

Many of these poetic conventions had their origins in the dramatic arts, which according to De, Gerow and others, were introduced earlier as a form of royal entertainment. In such a context, verbal communication is supported by an extensive system of visual signs, ranging from the set design and costumes to the gestures, postures and facial expressions of the actors. In all likelihood, the earliest works on Sanskrit poetics were preceded by a detailed manual on dramaturgy that described the visual, dramatic and poetic requirements of drama. The text was called the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and was attributed to a legendary sage name Bharata, though most modern scholars believe this text to have been composed over a period of several centuries.[3] The *Nāṭyaśāstra* introduces many of the categories of interpretation that become mainstays in the poetic tradition: *guṇa* (poetic virtue), *alaṃkāra* (poetic ornaments), distinctions in style based on geographical region,[4] and of course *rasa*. It also introduces a category called *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinctions), which Jayadeva incorporates into his system of poetics, though he seems to be the only *ālaṃkārika* to do so. These categories of poetic interpretation, with the exception of *lakṣaṇa* are in a highly formative state in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*,[5] but nevertheless they demonstrate a methodological continuity between the two modes of aesthetic discourse, dramaturgy and poetics.

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[3] *IP*, 227.

[4] Bharata designates such styles as *vṛtti*, though the later *alaṃkāraśāstra* tradition designates these as *rīti*.

[5] *IP*, 227.

The Importance of Speech in Sanskrit Poetry

In most poetry traditions of the world, there is enormous concern for the sound and the texture of words produce meaning. This is especially true in Medieval Indian poetry, which was typically experienced in performance, and hence in which speech sound is the single sensory basis of aesthetic experience and the most direct source of sentiment. This is not to detract from the power of poetic meanings, but rather to emphasize that sound of speech produces the most elemental level of emotion during the experience of poetry. While the texture of language is of significant concern to all literary and many non-literary writers as well as orators, poets generally pay the most exquisite attention to the intricacies of phonetic combinations and the effects of phrasing, meter and chime. In effect, poets compose poems out of speech sounds as much as they do out of meanings.

The fact that Sanskrit phonemes are organized into such distinct groupings according to their sites of articulation, their voicing, and their level of aspiration makes them particularly effective as the building blocks poetry. The organization of the phonemes into vowels, seven classes of consonants, semivowels, and sibilants enables *ālaṃkārika*-s to investigate the patterning of speech sounds in poetry with enormous levels of precision. Because of the standardization the duration of utterance for syllables, it was possible for poets to generate intricate metrical patterns, and in turn for these to be readily recognized by educated listeners. Moreover, this heightened attention to textural, phonetic and metrical elements had its origin in Vedic recitation where perfect accuracy in meter, pitch and pronunciation was seen as a requisite for ritual success, and indeed

failures were believed to have the potential to cause disastrous consequences. In the Vedic context, certain sound combinations were understood to be auspicious while others were known to be clearly inauspicious. The evaluations of efficacious and auspicious speech sounds from the Vedic period undoubtedly contributed to the heightened scrutiny of sound at the aesthetic level within systems of Sanskrit poetics.

Indirection of Meaning and Figures of Speech in Poetry

Another essential feature in all poetic cultures concerns the use of indirect meanings. Metaphor and other forms of semantic indirection are in reality common features of all speech use, including scientific writing and everyday communication. The reality is that a great deal of verbal communication relies on metaphor in one form or another. A number of modern scholars have gone so far as to postulate that metaphors form the basis of verbal communication, and that direct signification comes at a secondary stage.[6] Nevertheless, the use of indirect meaning in poetry is qualitatively different than in most other forms of speech. In conventional speech, indirect meanings are used when a particular concept is beyond the range of direct signification. Metaphor or some other form of trope is used as an alternative route to get at a meaning that is otherwise inaccessible. The metaphor here is an expedient, a servant to the meaning which is the ultimate aim. In poetry as well as other forms of literature, indirection is used not only to access meanings that resist direct expression, but primarily to produce a distinct form of literary charm, a pleasure that arrives from conceiving a concept through

[6] See Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

an unusual pathway of associations and connections. More often than not, the indirect meaning is just as significant or more so than the targeted meaning. Hence, frequently in literature an indirect meaning is used even when a direct expression is fully available, simply because the indirect meaning carries a suggestion that would not otherwise be evoked through any direct expression. Many different purposes exist for the different types of indirect expressions that are found in poetry. Their operation is enormously subtle and complex. These become the topic of a significant discourse in Sanskrit poetics which is classified under the term *alaṃkāra*, meaning "ornaments" or "figures of speech."

Alaṃkāra – The Concept of Poetic Ornamentation

The types of indirect meanings in Sanskrit poetics are generally classified as varieties of *alaṃkāra*-s (ornaments or figures of speech), but in Jayadeva's work certain types of indirect expressions are also classified as *lakṣaṇa*-s.[7] Not all *alaṃkāra*-s involve indirect meanings. *Upamā* (simile) is the most well known example in which a figure of speech can be accomplished solely through the direct meaning of words. When we say "her face is like a lotus," the comparison does not demand that the literal meaning of any expression be replaced with a related meaning. Furthermore, many figures of speech do not pertain to meanings but rather to the sound of the words in an expression, as in the case of different types of *anuprāsa* (alliteration).

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[7] Jayadeva (3.5) describes the *lakṣaṇa pratiṣedha* as involving an indirection of meaning: *pratiṣedhaḥ prasiddhānāṃ kāraṇānām anādaraḥ / na yuddhena bhruvoḥ spandenaiva vīrā nipātitāḥ* ("When there is a disregard for a well known cause, this is the *lakṣaṇa pratiṣedha* ("denial"). [As in] 'heroes are cut down by fluttering eyelashes, not battle.'")

The classification of different types of ornaments is the dominant preoccupation in the early tradition of *alaṃkāraśāstra.* Such a differentiation, though hairsplitting at times, trains the connoisseur of poetry to be exceptionally perceptive in regard to the patterning of sounds in verses as well as the different types of relationships, substitutions, concealments that can be expressed through poetic language. As we have stated earlier, the word *alaṃkāra* etymologically conveys the meaning "beauty maker," but as this word is used to describe jewelry and other adornments, the word comes to mean "ornament." Jayadeva states that "the ornaments, though distinct from the body of speech (i.e. distinct from the words and meaning), are thrilling to the connoisseur just as are the necklaces of women."[8] The *alaṃkāra*-s produce either a pattern of sound or a poetic meaning that serves as an ornament to the normal functioning of language. While this feature of language may seem to be external to the true intrinsic beauty of words and sentences, it was the favored aspect of poetic speech for a number of significant *ālaṃkārika*-s. The attractiveness of ornamentation as a feature in language may be traced to the *Ṛg Veda* 10.71, where speech is said to present her body to a seer like a beautiful wife wearing beautiful clothes.[9] The idea that the virtuous language possesses adornment appears quite early in the history of Sanskrit language.

The Relationship between *Ālaṃkāra* and *Guṇa*

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[8] *tilakādyam iva strīṇāṃ vidagdhahṛdayaṅgamaṃ / vyatiriktam alaṃkāraṃ prakṛter bhūṣaṇaṃ girām //* (*CĀ*, 4.11).

[9] *Uto tv asmai tanvaṃ vi sasre jāyêva patya uśatī suvāsāḥ* (*ṚV*, 10.71.4). Interpreting this verse in the *Mahābhāṣya* (1.1.1, *Paspa÷āhnika*), Patañjali identifies the grammarian as the fortunate one to whom speech is revealed in her true form.

The *alaṃkāra*-s (poetic ornaments) and the *guṇa*-s (poetic virtues) are conventionally set apart by the metaphors associated with their respective terms. Whereas the ornaments are described in their effects to be similar to necklaces and other jewelry, the virtues are described to be like courage in a man.[10] In this way, while they may be more noble and sincere in their function they are not as immediately appealing. Different *ālaṃkārika*-s take different stances on which is more essential to the operation of poetry, *guṇa* or *alaṃkāra.* Bhāmaha (seventh century) clearly attaches more significance to the *alaṃkāra*–s, to which he devotes one hundred and sixty verses of his *Kāvyālaṃkāra.* Vāmana (ninth century) states that "the *guṇa*-s are those properties that produce the beauty of poetry."[11] Vāmana also claims that the style of composition (*rīti*) is the soul of poetry. In his view, the poetic virtues (*guṇa*-s) are the properties that manifest style, and hence he portrays them as the foundation of poetic beauty. Vāmana still acknowledges that *alaṃkāra*-s are the most noticeable feature in poetry and begins his text with a statement to this effect.[12]

The Importance of Style (*Rīti*)

Both Daṇḍin (eighth century) and Vāmana, characterize the styles (*rīti*) as the regional patterns of speech operating within poetry. According to different authors, there are different numbers of such styles. Bhāmaha lists only two, *gauḍhīya* and *vaidharbha*,

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[10] Jayadeva states merely: *amī daśa guṇā kāvye puṃsi śauryādayo yathā* (*CA*, 4.10) ("these ten virtues in poetry are like courage, etc., in a man").

[11] *kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ* (*KAS,* 3.1.1).

[12] *kāvyaṃ grāhyam alaṃkārāt* (*KAS,* 1.1.1) ("poetry is perceived through *alaṃkāra*").

associated with the eastern and southern regions of India.[13] To these, Vāmana adds a third, *pañcālī*.[14] While *rīti* becomes a dominant category in poetry only for a brief spell in history, the function of these styles in the classification of poetry persists for many centuries, well into the middle of the second millennium.

Dhvani – Verbal Suggestion

Dhvani (verbal suggestion) is widely considered to be the most distinctive and important feature of Sanskrit poetry. While its effect is striking, its function is enormously subtle, and strictly speaking it is impossible to state a criterion for what exactly constitutes suggestion. Ānandavardhana spends the balance of his *magnum opus* the *Dhvanyāloka* describing this subtle operation of speech through numerous examples and analogies. Nevertheless, we can describe certain conditions that are present when verbal suggestion operates. When the literal meaning of an expression succeeds in conveying a sense without any obstruction or unsuitability, and yet another meaning, distinct from this, arises, the operation of speech producing this other meaning is known as suggestion. In this way suggestion is differentiated from indication, which depends on some form of unsuitability in the literal or intended meaning to instigate the substitution of a related meaning. Jayadeva expresses suggestion through the image of a woman whose beautiful eyes maybe staring straight in the face of one admirer, at the same time

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[13] *KA*, 1.31-32.

[14] *KAS*, 1.2.13, p. 21.

she expresses more genuine affection to someone else through side-long glances.[15] Ultimately, the existence of this suggestive function of speech can be substantiated only by the testimony of connoisseurs of language. As no causal mechanism can be discerned in the case of suggestion, this type of expression produces a fully surprising charm to the reader sensitive to its effect.

Denotation and Indication

The two most widely accepted operations of speech, denotation and indication, have been pervasively examined in all the major epistemological traditions of Indian philosophy. Denotation, the direct or literal function of verbal signification, is of fundamental concern to systems of philosophy that ascribe to the authority of the Veda. In order for the Veda to be an authoritative knowledge – it becomes for many Indian religious traditions the highest authority – words themselves must be established to have the agency to produce correct knowledge. The primary means through which correct knowledge is communicated is denotation (*abhidhā*) also known as *śakti.* Through such a linguistic potency (*śakti*), words are invested (either inherently, according to the *mīmāṃsaka*-s and grammarians, or by the will of gods, according to the *naiyāyika*-s) with the capacity to convey specific meanings directly. Indication on the other hand was also widely discussed, because it was necessary to establish that language possesses the capacity to communicate true meanings indirectly. This was necessary to explain why the

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[15] *sāmmukhyaṃ vidadhānāyāḥ sphuṭam arthāntare giraḥ / kaṭākṣa iva līlākṣyā vyāpāro vyañjanātmakaḥ //* (*CA*, 7.2) ("Speech conveying an alternate meaning though it [already] provides a direct meaning is said to have an operation having the nature of suggestion.")

Veda presents so many statements that cannot be understood literally, and to demonstrate that there exists an authoritative means to interpret such statements.

Despite the pervasiveness of these topics within philosophical forums, denotation and indication were not significantly investigated in the early poetic tradition. Prior to Ānandavardhana, *ālaṃkārika*-s were more preoccupied with the effects of language as manifested in specific patterns of sounds and meanings seen to be the determining factor of poetry's charm. Such study did not necessarily require an investigation into the operations by which words signify meanings. There is no doubt that these *ālaṃkārika*-s were aware that the indicative operation functions in the majority of figures of speech based on meaning. Nevertheless, they were able to classify these ornaments without resorting to epistemological theories of a semantic nature.

Such a semantic complacency changed radically when Ānandavardhana came forth with his striking theory of verbal suggestion. Suddenly, it became essential to delimit precisely what constitutes denotation and what constitutes indication so that the operation of suggestion could be clearly differentiated as an independent means of verbal knowledge. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta expend more energy analyzing indication, because this was the operation that is most likely to be confounded with suggestion (*vyañjanā*). Both of these can be classified as non-literal meanings. Similarly, both the indicated and the suggested meanings are understood to some degree through a form of cognitive suggestion. This difference is that indication relies upon the ability of one meaning or concept to suggest another, whereas according to the theory of verbal suggestion words themselves have the inherent capacity to suggest meanings. Abhinavagupta in particular took up the responsibility of defending Ānandavardhana's

theory against the onslaught of critiques from exponents of more traditional theories of verbal singification.

Whereas denotation conveys a meaning directly through convention, indication must be impelled by some form of inhibition of this direct meaning either because the denotative meaning of a word leads to a semantic contradiction within a sentence, or because the intended denoted meaning of a word leads to an impossible meaning within a sentence.[16] Because of this contradiction, the listener is impelled to conceive of a meaning that has a relation (*sambandha*) to the original direct meaning of the word and that suitably completes the meaning of the original sentence. This connected or indicated meaning is understood by the listener either because of some convention that associates the two meanings, or because of some useful suggestion that the connected meaning brings to the expression. In English, for instance, when we say that a car is a 'lemon,' a listener understands, not that the car is a actually a lemon, but that the car was produced defectively, because of the convention established between the word "lemon" and the meaning "something defective." On the other hand, if we say that someone "is a sparrow," the listener understands the indicated meaning that someone is "like a sparrow" because such a meaning carries the suggestion of delicacy and flightiness.

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[16] The *navyanaiyāyika*-s modified the earlier definition of indication to account for certain cases where a word is clearly used indicatively, i.e., it is meant to give rise to a connected rather than a direct meaning, but where some alternate but intended meaning of the same word could potentially complete the original sentence meaning. For instance, the stock example *kuntāḥ praviśanti* ("the spears enter") indicates the sense "the men holding the spears enter"). Here, the indicative meaning is caused by the impossibility of the spears themselves entering some room or house, because spears do not have a will. On the other hand, we can conceive a literal meaning for *kuntāḥ praviśanti* in the sense of "the spears enter [the bodies of the enemy soldiers, having been thrown by the heroes]." In this case, we must specify that the cause of indication is not simply a contradiction of the literal meaning, but specifically a contradiction with respect to the intended literal meaning, i.e. "the spears enter [the room]." In this case, the speaker intentionally uses a word in a contradictory sense so as to give rise to a metaphorical meaning.

The Distinction Between Indication and Suggestion

Both indication (*lakṣaṇā*) and suggestion (*vyañjanā*) involve suggestive operations, but in the case of indication this suggestion is motivated by an inappropriateness of the literal meaning of some word or expression, whereas in the case of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) the suggestion arises even though the direct meaning is perfectly suitable. Why exactly *vyañjanā* arises is something of a mystery, though to a certain extent this is related to context as in the *prakṛt* verse:

> Panthiaa ṇaettha sattharamatthi maṇaṃ pattharatthale gāme
> Uṇṇaapaoharaṃ pekhkhia ūṇa jai vasasi tā vasasu.[17]
>
> Traveler, there are not even the most meager of mattresses to be found in this village, where the ground serves as our bed. Even so, when you have seen the mounting storm clouds you will stay.

Here the verse reveals the context of a guesthouse during the rainy season. Here the literal statement made to the traveler is that when he sees the threatening storm clouds, he will stay despite the absence of a comfortable bed. Even though this literal meaning is perfectly logical and appropriate, a suggested meaning is informed by the storm clouds that serve as a kindling stimulant (*uddīpanavibhāva*) of the erotic *rasa*. Hence the suggestion is that the traveler will stay because he will want to enjoy the company of the beautiful women in the house.

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[17] *Ramā*, 7.14. Sanskrit Translation: *pathika nātra srastaram asti manāk prastarasthale grāme unnatapayodharaṃ prekṣya yadi vasasi tadā vasa//* (from Vamanacharya Ramabhatta Jhalakikar, *Bālabodhinī* in *KP*, verse 58, p. 133).

In other cases, however, the context is withheld, and the audience is required to presume a suitable context that might give rise to a statement as in the case of the *prākṛt* verse:

ua ṇiccalaṇippaṇḍā bhisiṇīpatammi rehai balāā

ṇimmalamaragaabhāaṇapariṭhṭhiāsaṃkhasuttivva[18]

See how the crane rests in utter stasis and repose upon the lily pad

Like mother of pearl affixed on an emerald.

Here, critics explain that this is a statement uttered by a woman to a female friend in the presence of a stranger to whom she is attracted. The suggested meaning is that this is an exceptionally isolated place with no visitors and that a couple might meet there for a romantic engagement. In this case, only those who possess an exquisite sensitivity to language, who have practiced extensively in imagining the speakers within similar verses, and who have poetic insight, are said by tradition to be capable of discerning such suggestion.

The suggestion that functions in indication (*lakṣaṇā*) is easier to discern, since it is oriented by the connection between the indicated meaning and the literal meaning. For instance, in the stock example of indication -- *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* ("a hamlet on the Ganges") -- the indicated meaning "shore' is related to the literal meaning "Ganges" through a relationship of proximity. The shore is proximate to the Ganges. It is not literally possible for the hamlet to be on the Ganges because all the inhabitants would drown and the houses would sink (unless they were houseboats). This impossibility motivates the substitution of "shore" for "Ganges." Here it is understood that the

[18] *Ramā*, 7.14.

indicative expression "on the Ganges" is used rather than a literal expression of the indicated meaning "on the shore of the Ganges," because the indicative expression "on the Ganges" carries over the suggestion of purity and coolness.

Rasa: Its Meaning, Varieties and Manifestation

While *rasa* probably did not become the subject of formal literary discourse until well into the first millennium,[19] it was clearly a dominant aesthetic goal for poets even in the earliest of poems, dramas and, indeed even the epics. The term *rasa* carries with it an enormous wealth of associative meanings that in truth derive from various literal meanings of the word. Hence *rasa* brings to the fold an understanding of "juice" or "liquid," "essence," "sap," and "flavor." The first three meanings imply the most intrinsic nature and indeed procreative force of some entity. The fourth meaning, "flavor," conveys perhaps the most intimate sensory experience. One tastes what one imbibes, what is digested and becomes a part of oneself. At a metaphoric level, it transfers the sense of nectar, bliss and intoxication. Furthermore, *rasa* can be understood as that which gives rise to such an experience of intimacy and bliss, or at a metaphoric level, the experience itself. This latter sense seems to be the most common meaning of the word *rasa* in the aesthetic context of *alaṃkāraśāstra. Rasa* in literature, poetry and drama amounts to an experience of transcendent aesthetic intimacy, whereby a common but enduring emotion, suggested through the ingenious methods of a poet or playwright, becomes the object of a contemplation that leads to the simultaneous experience of bliss,

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[19] Gerow, 227.

detachment and freedom. The question of how *rasa* manifests in poetry, literature and drama becomes the topic of one of the most vibrant aesthetic controversies in literary history. The earliest known accounts of this are provided in Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabhāratī*, in his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (6.32) as well as in his *Dhvanyālokalocana* (2.4). In both cases, an evolution of *rasa* theory is presented through the views of four scholars: Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta himself, who naturally provides the definitive view. Despite the fascinating nature of Abhinavagupta's view of *rasa*, it is important not to lose sight of the evolutionary nature of *rasa* theory, and to take into consideration the earliest interpretations of *rasa* found in the initial *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s.

Before we proceed to review these different theories, it should be explained that *rasa* is associated with a number of emotions that have a particularly enduring nature known as *sthāyibhāva*-s (standing emotions). Writers differ in their enumeration of these varieties, but the eight most common types of standing emotions are desire (*rati*), mirth (*hāsa*), anger (*krodha*), grief (*śoka*) repulsion (*jugupsā*), fear (*bhaya*), energy (*utsāha*), and amazement (*vismaya*). The *rasa*-s that associate with these are the erotic (*śṛṅgāra*), comical (*hāsya*), wrathful (*raudra*), pitiful (*karuṇa*), repulsive (*bībhatsa*), terrifying (*bhayānaka*), heroic (*vīra*), and wondrous (*adbhuta*). A number of treatises, including the *Abhinavabhāratī*, add to these the *rasa* of tranquility (*śāntarasa*) which is said to be associated with the *sthāyibhāva* of forebearance.

The earliest text explaining the manifestation of *rasa* is the *Nāṭyaśāstra* which states: *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ.*[20] Exactly how we translate

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[20] *NŚ*, 6.32.

this verse, known as the *rasasūtra*, depends on how we understand the manifestation of *rasa.* At base, the verse states that from the confluence of three types of factors: emotional determinants, emotional expressions, and transitory states of emotion, there is an accomplishment of *rasa.*

In his famous discourses on the production of *rasa* presented in the *Abhinavabhāratī* and the *Dhvanyāloka*, Abhinavagupta presents three provisional views which are successively refuted as a development to his own personal theory. The first view is that *rasa* is nothing other than the *sthāyibhāva* which has been elevated to the level of *rasa* through an association with emotional determinants (*vibhāva*), the emotional expressions (*anubhāva*) and the transitory emotional states (*sthāyibhava*). The second view is that an audience observes an actor imitating the emotional determinants, expression and transitory states associated with a character's *sthāyibhāva*, and falsely infers this to be the character's emotion. This false inference of the character's *sthāyibhāva* is said to produce the *rasa* in the audience. The third view is that *rasa* arises in the audience because of the special nature of poetic words. Poetic words, in addition to having denotative capacity, have an aesthetic efficacy (*bhāvana*) which is capable of creating *rasa* through the universalization of the determinants, expressions and transitory states, and have as well the efficacy to produce the enjoyment of the *rasa*-s in the audience.[21] Since the full debate of these positions is quite lengthy and has been described effectively in other places, I will not recount it here. For a helpful partial account, one would do well to refer to Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan's translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana*, pg. 221-233.

[21] Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan trans., *The Dhvanyàloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) pg. 221-6.

As is evident from the descriptions of the different *rasa*-s as well as the various theories explaining how these manifest, the investigation of *rasa* addresses a different aspect of poetic experience from the technically oriented categories of interpretation we have previously explained. Whereas the earlier categories are associated specifically with properties of language, or of language giving rise to particular patterns of meaning, *rasa* relates to more psychological engagement with language. One cannot explain or differentiate the *rasa*-s without investigating the nature of an audience's cognitive and emotional response, whether this be to poetic language or to the language, music and visual presentation in drama. To some degree, the theory of suggestion provides a link between the more linguistically poetic interpretation and *rasa*. The works on poetics that focused on the operation of suggestion and the experience of *rasa* in poetry occasioned a significant paradigm shift in poetic theory. As Sheldon Pollock explains:

> A new shift of attention from modes of literary production (writer-centered, prescriptive theory) to processes of literary cognition (reader-centered, descriptive theory) brought with it a growing concern with the affective response to literary representations, whereby the principal locus of *rasa* —the site of its effect and the realm of its investigation – was transferred from the text to the reader. The beginnings of this epistemic shift can be detected in the new concerns of Ānadavardhana (ca. 850).[22]

Such a shift, while compelling on account of the introduction of an enhanced metaphysical component in Indian poetics, encountered significant resistance from more prescriptively oriented *ālaṃkārika*-s.

[22] Sheldon Pollock, "Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa.*" *Asiatische Studien /Études Asiatiques* 52, no. 1 (1998): 117-192.

Tensions between Prescriptive and Theoretical Approaches to Poetry

Reviewing the sequence of *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s written from the ninth century onward, we can observe a tension between more technically based doctrines, described by Pollock as prescriptive, and more theoretically based doctrines that attempt to characterize poetry through a central organizing principle. Those of the latter type do not necessarily reject the former type of investigation but rather subordinate the investigation of individual technical elements to the investigation of the central organizing principle. A rudimentary effort in this direction is seen in Vāmana's *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra* (ninth century) in which the author presents style (*rīti*) as the nexus of other formal considerations such as *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra.* Closely following Vāmana's work in time was Rūdraṭa's *Kāvyālaṃkara* (ninth century), which is not to be confused with Bhāmaha's work of the same title. While Rudraṭa is well known for achieving one of the earliest systemizations in *alaṃkāraśāstra,*[23] his work does not truly privilege any one feature of poetry as the governing factor for the others, although clearly the *alaṃkāra*-s are brought back to the forefront of aesthetic interpretation in this treatise. Rudraṭa's system pertains mostly to the organization of ornaments into different logical categories according to the chief operating principle. As Gerow states:

> Rudraṭa's treatment of the *śabdālaṃkāras* is intellectually elegant because of the clarity of the underlying principles of relation. Equally elegantly, he accounts for the *arthālaṃkāras* (7-10), by grouping together figures of

[23] Gerow, *IP*, 239.

> assertion according to the natural or logical categories that underlie that assertion: *vāstava* "factual": *aupamya* "similitudinary", *atiśaya* "hyperbolic" and the familiar *śleṣa*, "pun" or more precisely here: "sense-congruence".[24]

While Rudraṭa's text does consolidate the disparate functions of ornamentation within groups having more unified aesthetic purposes, his system still preserves the technical focus of earlier works such as Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* and Daṇḍin's *Kāvyadarśa.* His view of poetics still thrives on multiplicity rather than total unity of aesthetic purpose.

Shortly after Rudrata's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* was written, Ānandavardhana composed his *Dhvanyāloka*, a text which not only postulates an essence to poetic expression, i.e., suggestion, but also explains the other features of poetry, *guṇa*, *alaṃkāra*, *rīti*, to be the aesthetic subordinates of this central essence. In this respect, it is true that the *Dhanyāloka* is the first manifestly integrated poetic doctrine to emerge in India. Ānandavardhana accomplishes this integration by subsuming the technically oriented investigations under the operation of semantic efficacy, specifically to the newly postulated power of verbal signification known as *vyañjanā* ("suggestion") whose distinct province is within poetic expressions. Nonetheless, while he classifies suggestion as a semantic operation, Ānandavardhana can only substantiate its existence by appealing to the authority of the experience of connoisseurs whose hearts are sensitive enough to perceive the subtleties of suggested language and sentiment. In his comment to *Dhvanyāloka* 1.4, Ānandavardhana states: "it is this thing that is well known to connoisseurs that reveals itself in distinction from the well known ornaments and the

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[24] *IP*, 240.

limbs [of poetry] just like the charm of a beautiful woman."[25] Hence, Ānandavardhana integrates the individual poetic features not only by subsuming these under a single semantic principle, but by investigating this semantic principle according to the cognitive and psychological response of the audience. [26] In his his view, the components of poetry become significant to the extent that they produce a charming response in the audience.

While it would be misleading to view individual texts as following one or the other of these approaches exclusively, one can clearly observe that emphasis vacillates between technical/prescriptive approaches and theoretical/experiential approaches, the former being predominant in the works of authors such as Bhāmaha (seventh century), Rūdrata (tenth century) and Ruyyaka (twelfth century) and the latter in the works of Ānandavardhana (tenth century), Kuntaka (eleventh century), Abhinavagupta (eleventh century). More balanced approaches can be seen in the works of Vāmana (ninth century), Mammaṭa (eleventh-twelfth centuries), Jayadeva (thirteenth century) and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja (seventeenth century).

These vacillations motivated a continual refinement within the technical apparatus as well as a persistent re-evaluation of the essential experience, thus leading to a more satisfying and stable appreciation of the beauty in poetry. *Ālaṃkāra*-s originally enumerated as only four in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*[27] are increased to forty-one in Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, eighty in Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, and one hundred thirteen in

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[25] *Yat tat sahṛdayasuprasiddhaṃ prasiddhebhyo 'laṅkṛtebhyaḥ pratītebhyo vâvayavebhyo vyatiriktatvena prakāśate lāvaṇyam ivâṅganāsu* (*DhvĀ*, *vṛtti* to 1.4, p. 47).

[26] This idea is a reflection on Sheldon Pollocks aforementioned article (1998).

[27] *upamā rūpakaṃ caîva dīpakaṃ yamakaṃ tathā / alaṃkārās tu vijñeyāś catvāro nāṭakāśrayāḥ //* (*NŚ*, 16.40, vol 2, p. 233).

Jayadeva's *Candrāloka.* On the other side, Vāmana, at the turn of the ninth century, defines the *ātmā* of poetry to be *rīti* (style).[28] While the contemplation of style certainly provides a more unified response to poetry than the investigation of subtypes of *alaṃkāra* and *guṇa* that characterizes Bhāmaha's and Daṇḍin's approaches to poetry, style is an elusive concept, which does not provide a stable basis for the full structuring of the range of poetic attributes. In the tenth century, Ānandavardha creates a far more solid basis for a unified poetic theory by perfecting the theory that verbal suggestion constitutes the essence of poetry. Abhinavagupta's subsumation of Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion into his own theory of *rasa* resulted in an even more radical integration of aesthetic principles demonstrating the relationship between aesthetic semantic and semantic function in poetry. Here the several aspects of poetic expression are integrated through a distinctive psychological experience (*rasa*), which becomes manifest through the semantic process known as verbal suggestion (*dhvani*).

Alaṃkāra Based Poetic Theory vs. Rasa Based Poetic Theory

There is no question that Abhinavagupta's defense of Ānandavardhana's theory of verbal suggestion largely quelled the debate over the existence of verbal suggestion. His reconstitution of this theory within the framework of *rasa* provided the dominant paradigm for future speculations on the nature of poetry. Nevertheless, a number of *ālaṃkārika*-s persisted in emphasizing ornamentation (*alaṃkāra*) as the most distinctive feature in poetry, and hence as the most important category of critical discourse. Such an

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[28] *rītir ātmā kāvyasya* (*Kāvyālaṃkāravṛtti*, 1.2) cited in *De*, *HSP*, vol. 2, p. 90.

attitude has the effect of an undertow against the dominant tide of poetic discourse in the second millennium, inevitably strengthening the cycle of waves in the historic devlopment of *rasa*-based poetic theory. Perhaps the most significant of these *ālaṃkārika*–s is Ruyyaka, the author of the *Alaṃkārasarvasva.* The title of this text means the "omnipresence of *alaṃkāra,*" the sense being that *alaṃkāra* is the most pervasive of poetic features. While his text includes a lengthy prologue on the evolution of poetic theories to the author's date, the bulk of the text is exclusively devoted to the investigation of poetic ornamentation. Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* is a subsequent treatise which similarly focuses on poetic ornamentation. Unlike Ruyyaka, Jayadeva contextualizes the central role of *alaṃkāra* by describing the full spectrum of technical, experiential and semantic elements that operate within Sanskrit poetry. Significantly, Jayadeva's lengthy chapter on *alaṃkāra* is the fifth of and thus central of ten chapters.

Problems in the Historicity of Indian Poetics and the Classification of Genres

Our contemporary understanding of the history of Indian poetics has been considerably advanced by efforts of P. V. Kane and S. K. De; we have already cited their opinions on a number of occasions. These two Indian scholars pioneered the modern field of this study in the first half of the twentieth century. With seemingly inexhaustible energy they have created significant order within the tangled web of chronology in this genre, and have discerned for us the structure and predominant thrust within most of the major texts in *alaṃkāraśāstra.* Indeed, as Edwin Gerow writes in his own *Indian Poetics*:

"No serious work on the subject can be undertaken without their aid."[29] They have made the study of poetics approachable by providing a coherent vision of evolution and classifying authors and works according to distinct and recognizable genres. Nevertheless, as a number of scholars have suggested in recent years, it is time to take stock of certain methodological obstacles that have emerged in the wake of their explanations. In particular, their treatises foster the misleading notion of a linear evolution which begins with the investigation of discrete poetic techniques and which terminates, effectively, in treatises that successfully reveal the true essence of poetry. Indian poetics, in this view, is seen to degenerate after this evolution reaches its climax in the eleventh century, since subsequent works merely reiterate the more original statements of a perfected theory or to stubbornly and erroneously return to more primitive modes of analysis.

To be fair to these scholars, it should be admitted that the origins of such an interpretation can be traced back to the tradition itself. In his excellent dissertation, *The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir* (Chicago, 1998), Larry McCrea explains:

> It is certainly true that Ānandavardhana's theory ultimately came to exercise virtually universal sway in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra, superseding all rivals, and an important part of the task facing the historian is to explain why Ānandavardhana's theory was found preferable in comparison with others. Nevertheless, the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra is far from a one-sided story of the dhvani-theory's triumph. The earlier Ālaṃkārikas whose theories Ānandavardhana sought to displace exercised great care and sophistication in their study of literary language; the issue raised by their analysis of the formal components of poetry remain central for all later Ālaṃkārikas, including Ānandavardhana and his followers. Powerful critiques were raised against Ānandavardhana by rival Ālaṃkārikas, particularly in tenth and eleventh century Kashmir (as we shall see). The dhvani-theory gained general acceptance only after a long struggle with proponents of these rival theories, and was shaped in

[29] *IP*, 218.

> important ways by the need to effectively counter the antidhvani arguments raised by these opponents. Devotion to the dhvani-theory has made it difficult for many modern scholars to take these rival theories seriously as alternatives to Ānandavardhana's, and their accounts of the dhvani-theory's struggle for supremacy suffer as a result. [30]

One explanation as to why such an understanding has taken such strong hold, as McCrea goes on to state, relates to the persistent attribution to the Sanskrit poetic tradition by scholars of the quest to uncover the soul of poetry. While it is true that a number of important *ālaṃkārika*-s do expressly identify the *ātmā*[31] of poetry, this identification does not represent the culminating purpose within their poetic doctrine. Such authors proceed to explain in great detail how the poetic feature that is identified to be the essence of poetry informs the various levels of poetic discourse. When an author fails to do this, the identification of the "soul" of poetry bears little weight. Such is the case in Vāmana's *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra* where the author's statement that style (*rīti*) is the soul of poetry does not contribute significantly understanding to his subsequent explanation of the qualities and ornaments.

Clearly, the unified theory poetry found in the *Dhvanyāloka* presents many advantages as a working system of poetry. The equation of the soul of poetry as *dhvani* allows for a classification of the stature of a poem according to the predominance or subordination of the of the suggested meaning. We should not assume that the development of methodological innovations in Sanskrit poetics was uniformly oriented toward this goal. The opposition of forces of integration and forces of diversification

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[30] Lawrence J. McCrea, "The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1980), 3-4.

[31] Literally "self," but in the context of this expression, "soul" or "essence" of poetry comes closer to the sense.

served as an important catalyst for the development of *alaṃkāraśāstra* as it did in the development of Indian philosophical doctrines of the same era. In the future, an investigation of this relationship may find fruitful grounds for study in the writing of Bhoja, who was an influential figure in both *alaṃkāraśāstra* and *vedānta.*

Another problematic expedient resorted to by Kane and De is the organization of *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s into genres such as *alaṃkāra* works, *rīti* (style based) work, *dhvani* (suggestion based) works etc. While such a differentiation does have a legitimate basis in actual focus of these works and initially provides a useful set of oppositions through which the student can appreciate the range of themes pervading *alaṃkāraśāstra*, the division of works into inflexible categories inevitably restricts our full understanding of the networks of influence contributing to the development of individual doctrines as well as the interdependence of competing theories of interpretation. In this respect, V. Raghavan's exhaustive study on *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* and Gerow's astute historical re-evaluation in *Indian Poetics* represent considerable progress in the development of a more realistic vision of this sector of Indian intellectual history.

Promising Models in Modern Scholarship

In his voluminous monograph *Bhoja*'s *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, Raghavan supports his central textual investigation with a meticulous study of the most persistent features in *alaṃkāraśāstra.* Rather than organizing his work by authors, works, and genres, Raghavan traces the development of each feature of Indian poetic exegesis. Moreover, he does not restrict his discussion to poetic work, but considers the influence of related

philosophical disciplines of thought influenced the development of concepts within poetic *śāstras*. Raghavan's work is immensely useful to serious students of Indian poetics. While not intended to serve as a history of poetics, it is enormously useful as an historical reference. Less experienced readers and students may be intimidated by its length and detail and may find Edwin Gerow's *Indian* Poetics far more approachable. Gerow discusses individual authors and works in a chronological sequence while illuminating principal vehicles of poetic exegesis. One of the strongest features of this work is that it provides a variety of paradigms that structure the evolution *alaṃkāraśāstra* in different ways, thus avoiding the rigidity of interpretation found in Kane and De.

Among the Western scholars of Sanskrit poetics, Daniel H. H. Ingalls has been perhaps the most ambitious, particularly in his translation of the *Dhvanyāloka*, co-authored with Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and M. V. Patwardhan. Significantly, Ingalls' initial interest as a Sanskrit scholar was in the fields of *navyanyāya* doctine, though he later began to focus more attention to the study of poetry and poetics.[32] Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan's translation does an admirable job in clarifying the dynamic relationship between Indian poetic theories and philosophical doctrines, as these both contribute to the refinement of Indian semantic theory. Ingalls emphasizes the likely influences that Buddhist logic might have exerted in the development of *rasa/dhvani* theory, evidencing Ānandavardhana and Abinavagupta's interest in Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, and

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[32] Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951) was produced as a requirement for the Society of Fellows at Harvard University and was based on research on Navyanyāya logic that he conducted in Calcutta, in 1941 with Śri Kālīpada Tarkāchārya (see acknowledgment in this work).

considers the significance of Śaiva tantric philosophy (of which Abhinavagupta was a master) on his aesthetic theory.[33]

Ingalls introduction to this translation illuminates the rich socio-political context contributing to the evolution of aesthetic theories in Kashmir, remedying the unfortunate tendency to discuss Indian poetics as if it had evolved in an intellectual vacuum. Even those studies that consider the philosophical influences on Sanskrit poetic theories, do not regularly acknowledge the social and geographical factors that have shaped the development of Indian poetic theories. Changes in the patronage system and the migratory patterns of Indian pundits in the wake of foreign invasions must have certainly affected the development of poetic and other disciplines in different regions of India. Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan's work has enabled literary scholars and students coming from different linguistic backgrounds to engage in a preliminary inquiry into Sanskrit poetics, while still informing more serious students of Sanskrit literature and philosophy. The main limitation of this translation is that it is over-reverential toward Abhinavagupta, and in their footnotes, the authors fail to point out some ambiguous areas of Abhinavagupta's substantiation of verbal suggestion. In particular, it does not adequately acknowledge that Abhinavagupta has presented the distinction between indication and suggestion as far more clear cut than it actually is.

In recent years, Sheldon Pollock has perhaps written the most methodologically sophisticated and at times confrontational articles concerning Sanskrit poetics and culture. "Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*" (1998) investigates the *rasa* theory presented in one

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[33] Abhinavagupta was regarded to be a master of all the non-dual schools of Śaiva-tantra in the Kashmiri tradition. Ingalls, Introduction to *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1990).

of the sadly neglected classics of the Sanskrit poetics tradition. In this article, Pollock provides solid textual evidence from Bhoja's work, which refutes the common notion that Abhinagupta's interpretation of *rasa/dhvani* exerted universal sway over future explanations of *rasa* in *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s. He argues that while Abhinavagupta discusses *rasa* primarily as an experiential entity whose primary locus is in the audience, Bhoja primarily discuses *rasa* as it pertains to the actual character in a drama or work of literature. According to Pollock, "Bhoja nowhere in the ŚP [*Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*] ascribes stable emotions to the reader, or factors the reader's memory-traces into the process of *rasa* production (on the contrary they are typically described in terms of the hero…)"[34] Through these arguments, Pollock effectively refutes the assumption that a monolithic view of *rasa* prevailed in medieval India.

Unfortunately, Pollock's article neglects to compare Bhoja's view with that of Śri Śaṅkuka who states that the *sthāyibhāva* is located in the character.[35] Pollock may desire to avoid obscuring the independence of Bhoja's position through a comparison with one of the participants the *rasa* debate as it is presented by Abhinavagupta, yet many of the same criticisms apply to both Śaṅkuka's and Bhoja's positions. Pollock himself quotes Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha, a commentator on the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* who states: "*Rasa* in the primary sense of the term is what is located in the character (*pātragata eva mukhyo rasaḥ*); the prevailing sense of the word [*sāmayika*] [i.e., with respect to the audience] is only a secondary meaning." Of course, whereas Śaṅkuka speaks of the *sthāyibhāva* in the character, In Pollock's Bhoja claims that the *rasa* itself is experienced by the character.

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[34] Pollock (1998), 130.

[35] I have already briefly summarized Śaṅkuka's psoition that *rasa* exists in a character who is portrayed as experiencing a specific emotion on page 56.

Nevertheless, the same difficulty considering how the experience or emotion of the actor is to be authentically experienced by the audience arises in both cases.

An Oscillation of Tides: Waves of *Alaṃkāra*-based Poetic Theories

Earlier in this chapter I mentioned the limitation inherent in Kane's and De's evolutionary models for the development of Sanskrit poetic. Certainly the tradition evolves, but it did so through opposition and dialectic rather than a linear stream of natural selection in which positive developments automatically perpetuated and propelled the tradition. One of the important dialectics at work in the evolution of Sanskrit poetic theory concerns the opposition between *alaṃkāra* based poetic theory and *rasa* based poetic theory. While the latter eventually exerts dominance in the tradition, this was not immediately the case. The earliest *ālaṃkārika*-s did not appreciate that *rasa* itself independently could be the source of charm. Rasa *was* conceived as an *alaṃkāra* (*rasavat*) and hence its value understood as a special type of ornamenting function whereby language is cloaked by emotion. Only with the later development of the theory of verbal suggestion (*vyañjanā*) is *rasa* differentiated from ornamental charm.

In order to better understand how the *Candrāloka* interfaces within the oppositional model of the evolution of *alaṃkāraśāstra*, it is useful to consider four waves of *alaṃkāra*-based poetic theories. Figures of speech are of concern within all modes of Indian poetic exegeses, but in the systems of certain authors, *alaṃkāra* becomes the dominant feature of poetry, and hence its analysis becomes the prime vehicle of poetic exegesis. The first of these waves was ushered in by Bhāmaha, the Kashmiri *ālaṃkārika*

whose treatise, the *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, is the earliest text known to have been solely devoted to the investigation of poetics. The title of the work itself indicates its approach to poetry. While this work addresses other topics in poetry such as style (*rīti*) and the nature of verbal signification (*śābdabodha*) it does so in a rather dismissive fashion. Bhāmaha states that the distinction between the styles of *gauḍī* and *vaidarbhī* is perpetuated only by scholars who blindly follow tradition.[36] He seems to be equally dismissive of the value of semantic inquiry within poetic exegesis, stating that the understanding of what constitutes the word and what constitutes its meaning is an exceedingly difficult path to traverse, and that the Alaṃkārika-s should pay homage to those who are the authority regarding the question of whether words are transient or eternal.[37] Considering that Bhāmaha, at this point in the chapter, has already refuted practically every existing semantic theory (*samudāyavāda*, *kūṭasthavāda*, *sphoṭavāda*, *apohavāda* etc.[38]), the previous statement appears to be sarcastic. After rejecting the purpose of semantic theory, Bhāmaha states that his own purpose in discussing language is to distinguish those words that function properly in the circuitous language that constitutes poetry, and those that do

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36 vaidarbham anyad astîti manyante sudhiyo 'pare
tad eva ca kila jyāyaḥ sadartham api nāparaṃ

gauḍīyam idam etat tu vaidarbham iti kiṃ pṛthak
gatānugatikanyāyān nânākhyeyam amedhasām (*KA*, 1.31-32)

("Other scholars say: " one style is known as *vaidarbha*, and this alone is excellent. The other style (*gauḍī*), while having a suitable meaning, is not (excellent). [As for the idea that] this is *gauḍī* and that *vaidarbha*, what is the difference [here]? The fact that this is not unsaid is [only] because of the tradition among unwise people of blindly following others.")

37 *ke śabdāḥ kiṃ ca tad vācyam ity aho vartma dustaram* (*KA*, 6.20cd). *vinaśvaro 'stu nityo vā sambandho 'rthena vā satā / namo 'stu tebyo vidvadbyaḥ pramāṇaṃ ye 'sya niścitau* (*KA*, 6.15).

38 Respectively, the theory that the combination of phonemes constitutes the word, the theory that the form of the word is eternal, the theory that the true nature of the word is eternal and that the sequence of phonemes is necessary only because of ignorance, and the theory that words signify meaning through negative attribution (*atadvyāvṛtti*).

not.[39] Thus Bhāmaha's priority lies within the technical rather than theoretical evaluation of language. This priority is the polar opposite of that established later in the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana.* At the end of the third chapter of his work, Bhāmaha metaphorically indicates the primacy of *alaṃkāra* in his system:

> girām alaṅkāravidhiḥ savistaraḥ
> svayaṃ viniścitya dhiyā mayôditaḥ
> anena vāgarthavidām alaṃkṛtā
> vibhāti nārîva vidagdhamaṇḍanā (*KA*, 3.58).
>
> ("Having ascertained the operation of the ornaments of language on my own, I have explained this is great detail. Poetry that is adorned with these by someone who understand the meaning of words radiates like a women with charming ornaments.")

Daṇḍin, another early *ālaṃkārika* believed by most scholars to have been relatively contemporaneous with Bhāmaha,[40] applies a strong focus to ornaments, but without investing the same theoretical primacy in these as had Bhāmaha. Both De and Gerow comment that Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin write as if they were cognizant of one another's thoughts, though if it is impossible to substantiate that the two ever had a correspondence.[41] Early in his first chapter, Daṇḍin states that former scholars have explained what is the body and what are the ornaments of poetry, and that in their view

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[39] *vakravācāṃ kavīnāṃ ye prayogaṃ prati sādhavaḥ / prayoktuṃ ye na yuktāśca tadviveko 'yam ucyate* (*KA*, 6.23). Bhāmaha's use of the expression *vakravācām* in this verse to characterize poetic language is significant as it anticipates the thesis of Kuntaka some three centuries later in the *Vakroktijīvita.*

[40] Kane writes: " . . . he appears to have belonged to Deccan or to some part south of the Narmadā." (*HSP*, 90). Gerow indicates that "a tradition associates Daṇḍin with Vidarbha (Berar)" (*IP*, 228). Peterson (2003) states: "The critic Daṇḍin (7th-8th centuries) was himself a *kāvya* poet attached to the Pallava court at Kanchipuram in the Tamil region of South India (p. 23).

[41] See De, p. 62 – 63. Gerow writes. "It is as though a dialogue had developed between the two authors, a difficult assumption perhaps, but one that would account both for their fundamental agreement and the acerbity of their disagreements." (Gerow, 228).

the body of poetry is a sequence of words expressing the desired meaning.[42] He does not specify that the ornaments are the soul or self of poetry, though one might conjecture that he meant this. He also does not categorically state that he follows the view of former scholars. Instead he immediately launches into a discussion of the different forms of poetry, a tactical decision suggesting that that in his view stylistic factors are more important for the classification of poetry than specific verbal operations such as ornamentation. Moreover, in verse 1.70, Daṇḍin provides[43] an illustration of a verse of poetry lacking both a profound meaning as well as ornaments that nevertheless gains ascendancy over the heart on account of its tenderness.[44] Such a view seems to imply that style is the most significant underlying feature in poetry. [45] Interestingly, in his discussion of ornaments, Daṇḍin places greater emphasis on ornaments based on sound (*śabdālaṃkāra*) than does Bhāmaha.[46]

While Daṇḍin exhibits inclinations toward a theoretical approach centered around distinction in style, Vāmana, who lived less than a century later, has no hesitation in

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[42] *taiḥ śarīraṃ ca kāvyānām alaṃkārāś ca darśitāḥ / śarīraṃ tāvad iṣṭārthavyavacchinnā padāvalī* (*KĀ*, 1.10).

[43] Kane explains: "Daṇḍin's examples bear the stamp of originality and, except in two or three case, which will be discussed below, it has not been possible to point out that he borrows his examples from others" (*HSP*, 92).

[44] *ity anūrjita evârtho nâlaṃkāro 'pi tādṛśaḥ / sukumāratayaîvaîtad ārohati satāṃ manaḥ //* (*KĀ*, 1.71).

[45] Certainly, Kane and De have both interpreted Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* in such a fashion. "Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* is to some extent an exponent of the Rīti school of poetics and partly of the Alaṃkāra school" (Kane, *HSP*, 89). "Indeed, the marked emphasis laid on the Mārga, which is almost equivalent to Vāmana's Rīti, and on its constituent excellences, known as Guṇas, to which the Alaṃkāra school is apparently indifferent, is a distinct feature of Daṇḍin's work, and places Daṇḍin in his fundamental theoretic attitude in the Rīti school" (De, *SP*, 78).

[46] Edwin Gerow writes: "There is no disagreement on the central place occupied by figures of speech (*alaṃkāra*), although Daṇḍin gives far more space to those figures that are defined as regularities of phonetic or phonemic features (*śabdālaṃkāra*) e.g., rhyme (*yamaka*), than does Bhāmaha...(*Indian Poetics*, 229).

revealing the centrality of this purpose in his *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra.*[47] In the sixth sūtra of his work he unabashedly states that style, or diction, is the animating force in poetry, akin to what the soul is to the body.[48] At the beginning of the third chapter he distinguishes the purpose of the poetic virtues from that of poetic ornament, stating:

> Qualities are those characteristics that create or constitute the charm of poetry. The ornaments on the other hand are such characters as serve to enhance the charm (already produced by the qualities).[49]

Vāmana clearly states that *guṇa*-s are more fundamental to poetic charm than the *alaṃkāra*-s, although it is uncertain whether he truly believe that ornaments are expendable in poetry.

Rudraṭa's reassertion of the primacy of *alaṃkāra* in his own *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, which was probably composed in the middle of the ninth century,[50] is a direct response to Daṇḍin and Vāmana's forays into poetic theory emphasizing style as the centralizing feature. While Rudraṭa mentions three styles (*pāñcālī, lāṭīyā, gauḍīyā*) and briefly explains these in three verses early in the second chapter of the work, unlike Vāmana he does not use the styles in organizing his subsequent discussions of the other features of poetry.[51] The greater part of this text is devoted to the detailed examination and

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[47] Gerow confidently dates Daṇḍin between 700 and 750 (*IP*, 228) and Vāmana at the cusp of the ninth century (*IP*, 233).

[48] *KAS*, 1.6.

[49] *KAS*, 3.1-2.

[50] Kane provides solid textual evidence from authors whose dates are more readily established, particularly the Kashmiri Śaiva author Utpala, who apparently quotes from Rudraṭa, and the famous commentator Vallabhadeva, who mentions Rudraṭa in a comment to the *Śiśupālavadha* (see *HSP*, 154-5).

[51] *pāñcālī lāṭīyā gāuḍīyā cêti nāmato 'bhihitāḥ / laghumadhyāyataviracanasamāsabhedādimās tatra // dvitripadā pāñcālī lāṭīyā pañca sapta vā yāvat / śabdāḥ samāsavanto bhavati yathāśakti gauḍīyā //*

systemization of the ornaments, which are divided into classes according to the central principle through which they operate. [52] Nine of the sixteen chapters of the work are concerned with the enumeration and explanation of ornaments, and of these, five are devoted to the explanation of a single division of ornaments such those based on comparison (*aupamya*).[53] In many ways Rudraṭa has taken the individuation and systematization developed by Vāmana with respect to style and applied these most directly to the investigation of ornaments, thus reinstating the figures of speech as the most significant aspect of poetry and poetic exegesis.

Another feature of Rudraṭa's text worth mentioning is his accommodation of *rasa* into the repertoire of worthy independent topics of investigation. He states that for rather practical purposes, poetry should be invested with the *rasa*-s so that people will not be intimidated or discouraged by poetry as they are by the *ṣāstras*.[54] According to his commentator, Namisādhu, Rudraṭa considers the *rasa*-s to be necessary in poetry because their charm is more innate than that of the ornaments.[55] It is unlikely Rudraṭa believed that *rasa* constitutes a more indispensable feature of poetry than ornament, given the greater proportion of text devoted to the investigation of ornaments, but he seems to

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ākhyātāny upasargaiḥ saṃsṛjyante kadācdt arthāya / vṛtter asamāsāyā vaidarbhī rītir ekâikâiva // (Rudraṭa, *Kāvyālaṃkāra* 2.4-6).

[52] Kane, *HSP*, 153-4.

[53] Ibid.

[54] *tasmāt tat kartavyaṃ yatnena mahīyasā rasair yuktam / udvejanam eteṣāṃ śāstravad evānyathā hi syāt//* (Rudraṭa, 12.2). (" That which is created with great effort (i.e., poetry) is invested with the *rasa*-s. "Otherwise there would be a fear of these texts as there is for the Śāstras.")

[55] *ucyate – Kāvyasya hi śabdārthau śarīram. Tasya ca vakroktivāstavādayaḥ kaṭakakuṇḍalādaya iva kṛtrimā alaṃkārāḥ. rasās tu saundaryādaya iva sahajā guṇāḥ iti* (Namisādhu, *Kāvyālaṃkāraṭīkā* 12.2). ("It is said: word and meaning are the body. *Vakrokti* and *Vāstava* etc., are the ornaments of this (body). But the *rasa*-s are innate virtues just as is beauty [to the physical body]").

indicate that *rasa* is the most seductive aspect of poetry, and as such, that which is most responsible for drawing readers to poetry. A similar view toward the co-utility of ornament and *rasa* is seen in Jayadeva's *Candrāloka,* acknowledges the greater intensity of *rasa* as an aesthetic experience, yet insists that ornamentation is the most essential defining feature in poetry. Jayadeva states that *rasa* is that "dissolving all other experiences even in the hearts of intelligent people, and magnifying the delight as does the smearing of sandlewood paste." (*CĀ*, 6.2). *Alaṃkāra,* on the other hand, is that which "thrills the connoisseur, like the necklace of a woman." (*CĀ*, 4.11). In Jayadeva's view, while *rasa* has something of an anesthetizing affect when it delights, *alaṃkāra* has a stimulating effect.

Scarcely half a century after the appearance of the Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṃkāra,* a major transformation occurred in the understanding of poetry. Most likely this transformation unfolded over a period of time beginning before Rudraṭa himself. The earliest extant textual manifestation of this transformation is the *Dhvanikārikā* or *The Root Verses on Dhvani*, which are better known as the root verses within the *Dhvanyāloka.* Here I have distinguished the two texts because it is still largely undecided whether Ānandavardhana, the author of the *Dhvanyāloka,* is also the author of the *Kārikā*-s. In any case, both the *Kārikā*-s and the *Dhvanyāloka* develop systems of poetics that center around the operation and experience of verbal suggestion. The first *dhvani* sūtra begins: *kāvyasyâtmā dhvanir iti budhair yaḥ samāmnātapūrvas*....[56] ("That extraordinary soul of poetry that wise men understand by way of tradition to be

[56] *DhvĀ*, 1.1.

dhvani[57]...”). The rest of the treatise is devoted to demonstrating how suggestion, the mysterious power of language that is the root of *dhvani*, differs from other operations of language and how specifically this operation functions in an enormously wide variety of poetic expressions. Suggestion transcends the causal mechanisms involved in denotation and indication, and as we have indicated earlier, it can be explained only contradistinctively with respect to these other operations of speech.[58] Ānandavardhana elucidates *dhvani* mostly through examples that give rise to suggestive meanings, but he also appeals frequently to the affirmation of connoisseurs of poetry as the ultimate proof for the existence of verbal suggestion.[59]

While *dhvani*, according to Ānandavardhana, is an operation of speech, its elucidation depends on the investigation of cognitive facilities, since these are engaged in the apprehension of linguistic meanings. Certain varieties of *dhvani* are defined according to manner in which the suggested meaning is apprehended. The varieties of

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[57] The exact meaning of the expression *dhvani* is not specified in this verse, but is left intentionally ambiguous. In the current context it most likely embraces a variety of meanings associated with the term, as Ingalls effectively explains in a note to his translation: “the key word of the book, *dhvani*, is used in many different senses. Of the senses used by literary critics, as opposed to the grammarians...Abhinava specifies the following (1.13 *Locana*): (a) *śabdaḥ*: a word which gives rise to suggestion; (b) *arthaḥ:* a meaning which gives rise to a suggestion; (c) *vyāpāraḥ*: the operation, the suggesting of the implicit meaning; (d) *vyaṅgyam*: the suggested meaning itsef; (e) *samudāyaḥ*: the group; or a poem which embodies all the above factors...It is not immediately clear in which sense *K* [the *dhvanikārikā*] is here using the word.” (Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, note 1, p. 47-8).

[58] *uktyantareṇâśakyaṃ yat tac cārutvaṃ prakāśayan / śabdo vyañjakatāṃ bibhrad dhvany ukter viṣayībhavet //* (*DhvĀ*, 1.15). (“A word revealing a unique charm that cannot be designated by any other statement, bearing suggestive power, become the referent of the expression *dhvani*”).

[59] *pratīyamānaṃ punar anyad eva vācyād vastv asti vāṇīṣu mahākavīnām. yat tat sahṛdayasuprasiddhaṃ prasiddhebhyo 'laṃkṛtebhyaḥ pratītebhyo vā 'vayavebhyo vyatiriktatvena prakāśate lāvaṇyam ivâṅganāsu. yathā hy aṅganāsu lāvaṇyam pṛthaṅ nirvarṇyamānaṃ nikhilāvayavavyatireki kim apy anyad eva sahṛdayalocanāmṛtaṃ tattvāntaraṃ tadvad eva so 'rthaḥ* (*DhvĀ*, vṛtti to 1.4). (It is a matter within the speech of great poets, which is understood apart from the literal meaning, and which reveals a beauty distinct from that the individual parts, and from the well known ornaments, as is the charm of women. Just as the charm of women is perceived as something apart and bears a distinction from the sum of the individual parts, being some other entirely unique essence which is nectar to the eyes of the connoisseurs, so is the [suggested] meaning").

atyantatiraskṛtavyaṅgya ("suggestion where the literal meaning is entirely discarded") and *asaṃlakṣakramavyaṅgya* ("suggestion where the [sequence of transformation] is indiscernible") exemplify how the analysis of suggestion appeals to the cognitive experience of the audience of poetry. Though Ānandavardhana asserts that the power of suggestion exists in language alone, his argumentation demands that poetic investigation expand to include the cognitive response of the audience to poetry. This demand becomes more pronounced in Abhinavagupta's commentary, the *Locana*, where he specifies that, though suggestion is charming in itself, its most essential function is in the manifestation of *rasa.* Whereas Ānandavardhana had considered *dhvani* to be the soul of poetry, Abinavagupta maintains that *rasa* arising from power of suggestion, is the soul of poetry. Abhinavagupta's investigation of poetry incorporates not only the semantic apprehension of the audience, but also the complex psychological transformation that takes place within the experience of *rasa.*[60]

In Ānandavardhana's and Abhinavagupta's theories of poetry, the individual technical features that earlier *alaṃkārika*-s investigated as the source of charm in poetry are reinterpreted according to their specific agency within the process of suggestion and the production of *rasa.* In the view of the *Dhvanikāra*, *alaṃkāra*-s attain their most

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[60] Pollock (1998) writes:

> What is certain, at all events, is that the perspective attribute to Lollaṭa, where primacy is granted to characters in the analysis of literary production (writer-centered, descriptive theory) brought with it a growing concern with the affective response to literary representations, whereby the principal locus of *rasa* – the site of its effect and the realm of its investigation – was transferred from the text to the reader. The beginnings of this epistemic shift can be detected in the new concerns of Ānandavardhana (ca. 850). In the *Dhvanyāloka* emphasis was for the first time placed on how readers understand a literary text, which for its part was now regarded as an entity whose parts are in fact parts of a whole, the dominant *rasa* (p. 124-5).

valuable function in poetry when they become the object of suggestion.[61] While such a theory of poetry provided a more pronounced philosophical satisfaction to connoisseurs, it provided less immediate technical information to aspiring poets. Hence Ānandavardhana's and Abhinavagupta's poetic theories may have broadened the critical appreciation of connoisseurs, but they may have been less successful in the education of future generations of poets.

Resistance to the Theory of Dhvani

The theories of Anandavardhana in particular set off waves of defensive reactions, in which literary theorists loyal to the semantic position of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā orthodoxies defended the view that denotation (*abhidhā*) and indication (*lakṣaṇā*) account for the entirety of linguistic signification. One of the most famous of such defenses was Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita* (ninth –tenth centuries), a text which presented an alternative unifying principle of poetic charm known as *vakrokti* (circuitous speech) which accounted for the surprising charm of poetry without requiring a third operation of speech. While Abhinavagupta's *Locana* is frequently portrayed as putting to rest all objuections to Anandavardhana's theory of suggestion, rebuttals of the dhvani theory continued to be composed in the wake of his *Locana.* Most notable of these is Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka* (eleventh century), a text which went to great lengths to

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[61] *Vyajyante vastumātreṇa yad alaṃkṛtayas tayā / dhruvaṃ dhvanyaṅgatā tāsām kāvyavṛttis tad āśrayā //* (*DhvA*, 2.29) ("when figures are suggested by a mere fact or situation, they invariably form a variety of *dhvani*") (Trans. Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, 355).

demonstrate that the verbal understanding Ānandavardhana attributed to suggestion (*vyañjanā*) is in reality obtained through inference (*anumāna*).

Despite the overwhelming success of the *Dhanyāloka* and the *Locana* as evidenced by their ascent to the summit of the canonical hierarchy, we should resist the view that all later theorists subscribed to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta's theories of poetry. Certainly there were authors who continued to focus on the more formal and technical considerations that characterize the earliest works in *alaṃkāraśāstra.*. Other authors, while acknowledging the significance of *dhvani* and *rasa* in the experience of poetry, persevere in the independent technical evaluation of more formal categories of poetry: *doṣa*, *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra.* Foremost of these are Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, though these two authors are quite distinct in their approaches. Mammaṭa's strategy is to extol the aesthetic charm produced by *dhvaṇi* and *rasa*, explaining their operation and enumerating the varieties, but to enumerate and explain separately the poetic virtues and ornaments. Strangely enough, Mammaṭa does not absolutely require *rasa* or *alaṃkāra* in his definition of poetry.[62] One may infer the necessity of *rasa* on account of the required *guṇa*-s (virtues), since Mammaṭa later defines the *guna*-s to be "those [features] that are properties of the primary *rasa*, which are stably situated and are the cause of excellence, like loveliness in the self."[63] Reinterpreting Mammaṭa's definition in the light of this subsequent verse, *guṇa* could not be required in poetry if its substrate, *rasa*, were not also present. As for his statement that poetry might be unornamented, Mammaṭa qualifies this in his auto-commentary to the verse, when he explains that the adjective *analaṃkṛtī*

[62] *tad adoṣau śabdārthau saguṇāv analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* (*KP*, Sūtra 1, p. 13).

[63] *Ye rasasyâṅgino dharmāḥ śauryādaya ivātmanaḥ / utkarṣahetavas te syur acalasthitayo guṇāḥ //*(*KP*, sūtra 87, p. 462).

("unornamented") means that sometimes ornaments in poetry are unmanifest (*asphuṭa*), that is, they exist in a suggested form.[64]

Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* presents a rather encyclopedic if sprawling treatment of poetry. The distribution of the analysis is equally weighted among the different topics of poetry, though it may be lacking in the overall systemization found in Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* or Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkārasarvasva.* It is clear that Mammaṭa believed that both *rasa* and ornament can serve as independent sources of poetic charm, even if he has not thoroughly worked out the relationship between the two. Mammaṭa defines *alaṃkāra* as "those features that at times refine (*upa√kṛ*) an existing *rasa* by means of word and meaning as necklaces and so forth [refine the beauty within the self]".[65] Govindaṭhakura, author of the commentary the *Kāvyaprakāśapradīpa*, attributes to Mammaṭa the view that it is possible for poetry to exist without *rasa* and without manifest ornaments, i.e., having only suggested ornament(s).[66] According to this interpretation, Mammaṭa's holds ornaments to be more essential to poetry than *rasa.* Govinda is critical of the position that he attributes to Mammaṭa, and subsequently states his own view that when *rasa* is not present in poetic expression, expressed ornament(s)

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[64] *kvapîty anenâîtad āha yat sarvatra sālaṃkārau kvacit tu sphuṭālaṃkāravirahe 'pi na kāvyatvahāniḥ* (*KP*, *vṛtti* to sūtra 1, p. 17). ("by the statement 'sometimes...' the author intends that poetry has ornaments at all times, but when on occasion the ornaments are unexpressed [i.e., suggested,] there is no loss of poetry."

[65] *upakurvanti taṃ santaṃ ye 'ṅgadvāreṇa jātucit / hārādivad alaṃkārās te 'nuprāsopamādayaḥ //* (*KP*, sūtra 88, p. 465). ("Those [features] that at times refine an existing *rasa* by means of the body [of poetry] like a necklace, are known as *alaṃkāra*-s such as alliteration and simile.")

[66] *nīrase 'py asphuṭālaṃkāre kāvyatvam iṣtham eveti.* (*Kāvyaprakāśapradīpa* in Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaprakāśa, with the Pradīpa of Govindaṭhakkura accompanied by the Udyota of Nāgojibhaṭṭa* (Varanasi: Chaukhamba, 1994) p. 10.

must be present.[67] As we shall see later in this work and in the translation section as well, Gāgābhaṭṭa, one of the commentators to the *Candrāloka*, asserts that even when ornaments are suggested in poetry, they are still manifest (*sphuṭa*).[68] Still, in Mammaṭa view, if an expression has *rasa*, ornaments can exist in a suggested form, but if an expression is without *rasa* an expressed ornament must be present. While Mammaṭa's definition is in a certain way more realistic than earlier definitions, traditional scholars were troubled by thepossibility that the poetic principles could have a variable substrate: that in some cases poetry can be determined by the presence of *alaṃkāra* and in other cases by the presence of *rasa*.

Shortly after Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka again revived a more unilateral approach to poetics based on *alaṃkāra*. Despite his appreciation of *rasa/dhvani* theory, for reasons of utility Ruyyaka innovates an even more systematized theory of *alaṃkāra*-centric interpretation than that conceived by Rudraṭa. He justifies this approach in the post-*Dhvanyāloka* era of Sanskrit poetics by developing a more historically based vision of poetic theory. Ruyyaka's treatise, the *Kāvyālaṃkārsarvasva*, opens with a pithy but precise overview of the evolution of Kashmiri poetic theory to his date, describing the theories of almost all prominent *ālaṃkārika*-s from this region to his time: Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, *Kuntaka* – to whom he refers as the *Vakroktijīvitakāra*,

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[67] *vayaṃ tu paśyāmaḥ. nīrase sphuṭālaṃkāravirahiṇi na kāvyatvam. yato rasādir alaṃkāraś ca dvayaṃ camatkārahetuḥ. tathā ca yatra rasādīnām avasthānaṃ na tatra sphuṭālaṃkārāpekṣā* (Ibid). ("But we say, when [an expression] is without *rasa* and without expressed ornaments, it does not have the property of being poetry. And similarly, where there is the establishment of *rasa* etc., there is not a dependence on expressed ornaments").

[68] *alaṃkāravyañjake 'py alaṃkārasya sphuṭatvam eva* (*RĀ*, 1.8) ("Even when there is the suggestion of a poetic ornament, such an ornament is precisely manifest"). In shifting the understanding of the term *sphuṭa*, Gāgābhaṭṭa undermines Mammaṭa justification for the optionality of ornaments in his definition of poetry.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, the *Dhvanikāra,*[69] Mahimabhaṭṭa – whom he designates the *Vyaktivivekakāra*. Oddly enough, Ruyyaka does not mention Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta or Mammaṭa by name in this introduction, although he most certainly refers to their theories on poetry.[70]

In providing this historical overview of poetics, Ruyyaka demonstrates that *alaṃkāra* is the most persistent topic of investigation throughout the evolution of *alaṃkāraśāstra,*[71] and in innovating a more historically cognizant method of poetic investigation, he deploys *alaṃkāra* as the template for explaining the function and beauty of poetry. As Gerow points out, Ruyyaka's understanding of the relationship between *alaṃkāra* and *dhvani* is far more cogent than that of Mammaṭa:

> His concern in dealing with a vast range of figures (over 80) is to show each one as involving essentially some aspect or element of the distinctive charm that differentiates poetic utterance generally. He uses the term vicchitti[72], recalling the doctrine of Kuntaka. While this distinctive charm is not itself a form of suggestion (*dhvani*) nor based upon it…, a link is here being forged between the ideal of figuration in Mammaṭa, the *dhvani* of the Dhvanyāloka and the *vakrokti* of the Vakrotijīvita…. But in every figure, if properly so called, some remarkable comprehension must result that differs from the plain sense of the word, and marks the intellection as different from inference.[73]

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[69] The fact that Ruyyaka does not mention Ānandavardhana but only the Dhvanikāra (author of the Kāraka verses in the *Dhvanyāloka*) would seem to support the single authorship of both the *Dhvanikārikā* and the *Dhvanyāloka.*

[70] The enumeration of varieties of *dhvani* in the introduction is modeled after that in the Ānandavardhana's *vṛtti* in the *Dhvanyāloka.* Ruyaka's statement *rasādayas tu jīvitabhūtā* (Ruyyaka, *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, ed. Durgāprasād and Pāṇḍuraṅg Parab {Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1982}12) typifies Abhinavagupta's interpretation of the *Dhanvyāloka*: *rasacarvaṇātmanaḥ prādhānyaṃ darśayan*…(*DhvĀLoc*, 1.1, p. 40). The statement *vyaṅgyasyâsphutatve 'laṃkāravattvena cittrākyaḥ kāvyabhedas tṛtīyaḥ* (*AS*, p. 14) is in accordance with the view of Mammaṭa, who acknowledges *citrakāvya* as a full-fledged category of poetry, whereas Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta hold this to be the semblance of poetry.

[71] The title of the work itself suggests this attitude, particularly if we interpret *alaṃkārasarvasva* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound: "that whose essence (or entirety) is the ornaments."

[72] "separating"

[73] *IP*, 275.

While Ruyyaka clearly supports the understanding that *dhvani* and *rasa* present the most sources of beauty in poetry, he maintains that the *alaṃkāra*-s are what distinguish poetic from non-poetic speech usages. In other words, in the case of poetry, the *ātmā* (self or soul), i.e., *rasa/dhvani*, is not the same as the *viśeṣana* (distinguishing property), i.e., *alaṃkāra.* Again, *dhvani* and *rasa* are what distinguish the experience of poetry, while *alaṃkāra* is what distinguishes the speech that comprises poetry. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta privilege the experience of poetry over its technical execution, and hence their theory is centered around *dhvani* and *rasa.* Mammaṭa tries to give both concerns equal emphasis in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, but this equal weightedness does not sufficiently establish the relationship between these two aspects of poetry. In the *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, Ruyyaka returns the emphasis to technical execution where it had rested in the earlier *Alaṃkāraśāstra*-s. In Ruyyaka's case, however, the investigation of the operation of *alaṃkāra* is tempered by the understanding of ultimacy of *dhvani* and *rasa* in the range of poetic experience.

A Reconsideration of Post-Abhinavagupta *Alaṃkāraśāstra*

As is evident in the emerging dynamic within Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkārasarvasva,* the evolution of Indian poetic theory did not calcify into a frozen doctrine in the wake of the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana.* While the brilliance of the aesthetic theories in these texts may never have been equaled in the Sanskrit tradition, subsequent *ālaṃkārika*-s

continued to develop new methodologies for poetic interpretation. De's bleak characterization of the subsequent era in Sanskrit poetics is hence unwarranted:

> This period ends with the ultimate standardization of a more or less complete scheme of Poetics, outlined in the *Dhvanyāloka*, in which an attempt is made to bring into a definite focus the scattered ideas of previous speculation. The period which followed this and with which we are concerned in this and following chapters, is necessarily a state of critical elaboration, the chief work of which consists in summarizing, and setting forth, in the concise form of textbooks, the results of earlier speculations. The stage is marked by great scholastic acumen, if not by remarkable originality or creative genius, but it denotes also a progressive deterioration of the study itself. [74]

While De does recognize a certain degree of scholarship in the field of post-Mammaṭa poetics, his general diagnosis of this genre is one of decline and hairsplitting futility. This judgment is strongly over-determined, however, by his assumption that the evolution of Indian poetic theories in the first millennium ensued for the single over-arching purpose of developing the unified theory of poetry found in the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana*. As John Epling (1989) notes:

> It is this unusual situation that I would posit underlies one of the most extensive fallacies found in the contemporary literature: the essentially "revisionist" view that 1) assumes the quest for an absolute, inherent principle of kāvya is the valid critical methodology; 2) that (given this) this was in fact an invariable concern of all the traditional writers, and thus that they may be grouped according to various "theoretical" positions or "schools"; and 3) that this quest was only fully realized by the later dhvani theorists (as epitomized by Ānandavardhana in the Dhvanyāloka [9th century], and Abhinavagupta in the Kāvyālokalocana [10-11th centuries]), whose position is thus conceived as the evaluative standard by which all other (and especially earlier) writers are to be judged.[75]

Epling's criticism is to the point. In De's view, once this evolution has reached its terminus, Sanskrit poetics loses its motivation for adaptation.

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[74] De, *HSP*, 215.

[75] Epling, 14-15.

What De fails to appreciate in his own zealousness to discern a unified principle in the evolution of Sanskrit poetic theory is that this tradition did not evolve in a closed system, but rather as part of a complex and interactive network of intellectual disciplines. When *dhvani* theorists encroached on the domain of semantic theory, their interaction with *alaṃkāraśāstra* and other the intellectual disciplines only intensified. To a large degree, the subtle modification that unfolded within poetic doctrines throughout the second millennium represented the adaptation of poetic theory to a greater sphere of intellectual engagement to which it was now exposed. Moreover, in the first millennium, the majority of renowned *alaṃkārika*-s worked in Kashmir. With the dispersal of the Kashmiri literary center that ensued in the turbulent political climate at the end of the twelfth century,[76] poetic works were more frequently composed in Eastern and Southern regions of India.[77] The migrations of authors, manuscripts and theories would have similarly encouraged a cross fertilization of *alaṃkāraśāstra* and other disciplines. Such an interaction reaches its apex in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, who in a homage to his father cites a genetic-pedagogical pedigree in the subjects of *vedānta*, *nyāya-vaiśeṣika* (logic and atomism), *mīmāṃsā* (Vedic exegesis), and *vyākaraṇa* (grammar).[78] The relentless bifurcation of varieties of poetic constitutents which De sees

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[76] [In "The Death of Sanskrit," *Comparative Studies in History and Society*, 43(2)], Sheldon Pollock (2001) posits that the turbulent and degenerate political climate of Kashmir at the time, which is described in a chronicle by the author Jonarāja, may have been the root cause of this decline: "But the picture we get from his account of the period is one of near total dissolution of orderly life in urban Kashmir. Transitions in power were more often than not marked by usurpations, insurrections, civil war (the one exception being the reign of Rāmadeva, AD 1252-73). Each next ruler is described as more idiotic than his predecessor, and though most were able to maintain power for a decade or two, it is power alone that seems to have interested them. As noted, Jonarāja mentions not a single poet in all these reign…" (399).

[77] We need only mention such authors as Vidyādhara (Orissa Region) Viśvanātha (Orissa Region), Appayadīkṣita (Velur – South India) and Jagannātha (of South Indian lineage, but writing in Varanasi).

[78] śrīmajjñānendrabhikṣor adhigatasakalabrahmavidyāprapañcaḥ
kāṇādīr ākṣapādīr api gahanagiro yo mahendrād avedīt

reason to denigrate, may partially be the result of a more scientific perspective that germinated within poetic discourse.

There were still other more productive aspects to the poetics of this period that De and Kane neglect to mention. Certain routinely exercised functions within poetic texts, such as definitions of poetry and statements of the cause and purpose of poetry, were now conducted with higher standards of logical precision. This is most obviously seen in Jagannātha's application of the rigorous methods of *navya-nyāya* logic to the delimitation (*avacchedana*) of poetry.[79] The application of such a methodology leads him to be highly critical of earlier definitions, particularly that of Mammaṭa.[80] Such tendencies can be observed in earlier texts as well, albeit in a more formative state. The

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devādevādhyagīṣṭa smaraharanagare śāsanaṃ jaiminīyaṃ
śeṣāṅkaprāptaśeṣāmalabhaṇitir abhūt sarvavidyādharo yaḥ.
pāṣāṇād api pīyūṣaṃ syandate yasya līlayā
taṃ vande perubhaṭṭākhyaṃ lakṣmīkāntaṃ (*RG*, p. 2).

("I prostrate to the great teacher known as Perubhaṭṭa (the father of Jagannātha), the husband of Lakṣmī, on account of whom nectar flows even from rocks, the one who acquired the expanse of the wisdom of *brahma* (i.e., *vedānta*) in its entirety from the venerable monk Jñānendra, and who also learned the profound words of *kaṇāda* and *akṣapāda* (the founders, according to tradition, of the *vaiśeṣika* and *nyāya* schools) from Mahendra, who acquired the instruction on Jaimini's system (*mīmāṃsā*) from Deva, and who became a locus of all knowledge having acquired pure speech (grammar) from Śeṣāṅka.").

[79] *ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam // -- ramaṇīyatā ca lokottarāhlādajanakajñānagocaratā. lokottaratvaṃ câhlādagataś camatkāratvāparaparyāyo 'nubhavasākṣikojātiviśeṣaḥ. kāraṇaṃ ca tadavacchinne bhāvanāviśeṣa punaḥpunaranusaṃdhānātmā* (*RG*, *kāvyalakṣaṇa*, p. 4-5). ("Poetry is sound that produces a charming meaning. And the property of being charming is the property of being the object of an experience that produces an otherworldly delight. And the otherworldliness that pertains to delight is a particular generic property that is the producer of a direct experience that has the synonym 'charmingness'. And the cause of what has been delimited by this is a contemplation of which the essential nature is repeated reflection").

[80] *Yat tu prāñcaḥ adoṣau saguṇau sālaṃkārau śabdārthau kāvyaṃ ity āhuḥ* (*RG*, *kāvyalakṣaṇa*, p. 6). While Mammaṭa would be the most lost likely target of Jagannātha's criticism here, it should be noted that if this is the case, Jagannātha misquotes the first half of Mammaṭa's definition, which reads --- *tad adoṣau śabdārthau saguṇāv analaṃkṛtī kvāpi* (*KP*, sūtra 1, pg. 13). Otherwise, it is possible that Jagannātha criticises Hemacandra's definition of poetry in the *Kāvyānuśāsana* -- *adoṣau sagunau sālaṅkārau ca śabdārthau kāvyam* (*KāvyĀnuśāsana*, 1.11, pg. 11) . Hemacandra's definition more closely resembles the definition that Jagannātha's cites as faulty in the *Rasagaṅgādhara.*

Candrāloka is one such text, and although this treatise emerges in the early portion of this era, we should understand it as a product of the aforementioned intellectual dynamic.

On first perusal, the *Candrāloka* might appear to be an anomalous work for such an era. Arrayed in ten symmetrical chapters and written in a seemingly simple lucid style, the work appears to be tailored for effortless enjoyment. As mentioned earlier, the text lacks an auto-commentary in which rigorous logical examination might be occassioned, and a good half of the work consists of skillfully presented illustrations of the explanations of different poetic features. Despite the friendliness of its presentation, however, the the *Candrāloka* imparts subtle but not insignificant critiques as well as modifications of earlier poetic doctrines, and contributes to the development of a more logical methodology in Sanskrit poetics.

The *Candrāloka* initiates the fourth wave of *alaṃkāra*-based poetic theory. While it emerges in a similar context as does the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* of Ruyyaka, it provides a different emphasis in its resuscitation of the *alaṃkāra*-s as the defining constituent of poetry. Whereas Ruyyaka promulgates that *alaṃkāra* provides the criterion for poetic language even though *rasa* and *dhvani* are responsible for the most striking beauty, Jayadeva genuinely believes that ornamentation is the chief source of excellence in poetry, in addition to serving as its differentiating element. In his view, ornaments are the sovereign feature not because of their historical role in *alaṃkāraśāstra* and the distinction that they provide to poetic language, but rather because they are responsible for the most unique charm arising from poetry. Perhaps such a view stems from the understanding that *rasa* may arise in a plurality of art forms, whereas *alaṃkāra*, as it is defined in Indian treatises of poetry, is specific to poetic expression. Still Jayadeva clearly intends for

alaṃkāra to replace *rasa* as the centralizing function in his poetic system. In the second verse of the poem, Jayadeva states:

> haṃ ho cinmayacittacandramaṇayaḥ saṃvardhayadhvaṃ rasān
> re re svairiṇi nirvicārakavite māsmat prakāśībhava
> ullāsāya vicāravīcinicayālaṃkāravārāṃnidheś
> candrālokamayaṃ svayaṃ vitanute pīyūṣavarṣaḥ kṛtī[81]

> O you who possess moonstones full of consciousness for hearts! Cause the *rasa*-s to expand! But you, unfaithful wench! Undiscerning poesy! Do not illuminate yourself through me! The skillful Pīyūṣavarṣa bestows his own *moonlight* (*Candrāloka*) for the expansion of the ocean of poetic ornaments that has mental reflection as its series of waves.

Here, Jayadeva states that he has written the *Candrāloka* for the expansion of the ocean of poetic ornaments. The implication is that his treatise the Moonlight (*Candrāloka*) causes the moonstones metaphorically constituting the hearts of literary connoisseurs to exude with the *rasa*-s (erotic, comical, etc.). The word *rasa* also refers to water or sap, and hence the *rasa*-s ("waters") that exudes from the moonstones are intended to increase the ocean, which is said to have the nature of *alaṃkāra.*

The verse cited in the previous paragraph conveys a complex series of relationships that inform Jayadeva's visions of poetics, in addition to the purpose of his text. The dominant metaphorical sense is that *rasa* expands the collection of ornaments. This can by understood in a different ways. We might discern that the presence of the *rasa*-s causes the charm of *alaṃkāra* to increase, or that *rasa* is at the service of poetic ornamentation, or we might assume that his image conveys a more practical meaning: that the advent of *rasa* theory has occasioned an increase in the number of *alaṃkāras.*

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[81] *CĀ*, 1.2, p.3.

This last theory would explain why Jayadeva has expanded the number of ornaments found in the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* of Ruyyaka.

In this same verse, the ocean of *alaṃkāra* is said to have waves of *vicāra* ("mental reflection or discernment"), implying that the increase of the ocean of *alaṃkāra* through the infusion of *rasa* has occasioned waves of mental reflection. This concept may similarly be interpreted in a variety of ways. *Vicāra* may refer to the successive rumination of a poetical subject that is characteristic of the experience of *rasa/dhvani*. *Vicāra* may also refer to mental discernment, in which case we should understand that the application of *rasa* to the ornaments has necessitated increased mental deliberation in the sphere of poetic contemplation. More specifically, we might understand that the increase in poetic ornamentation that has been occasioned by *rasa* requires the connoisseur to investigate his poetic experience with greater mental discernment in order to produce the most precious rewards of poetry.

The final interpretation in the previous paragraph is supported by the following verse in the *Candrāloka*:

> yuktyāsvādyalasadrasaikavasatiḥ sāhityasārasvata-
> kṣīrāmbhodhir agādhatām upadadhat sevyaḥ samāśrīyatām
> śrīr asmād upadeśakauśalamayaṃ pīyūṣam asmāj jagaj-
> jāgradbhāsurapadmakeśarayaśaḥśītāṃśur asmād budhāḥ
>
> The ocean whose milk is poetic eloquence is the single locus of reasoning and savorable shining *rasa*. It possesses unfathomability and [hence] should be resorted to. Gods and scholars! Acquire wealth from this [ocean], nectar, which is skillful instruction, and the moon, which is fame, [white[82]] as the gleaming filament of the lotus expanding into the world![83]

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[82] This compound *jagajjāgradbhāsurapadmakesarayaśaḥśītāṃśur* expresses an elliptical simile between the whiteness of the moon of fame (*śītāṃśu*) and the whiteness of the filament of the lotus, such a lotus as is said to expand into the world. The filament of the lotus when cracked opened reveals a brilliant white color. The beginning of the compound, *jagajjāgrad*, "expanding as the world," refers to the popular use of the lotus as a symbol for the universe itself.

Jayadeva once again presents his text in the image of an ocean, this time comprised of the "the milk of poetic eloquence." Here the ocean, which is said to be both unfathomable and useful, is stated specifically to be "single locus" of *rasa* and reasoning. The verse clearly alludes to the *Mahābhārata* legend concerning the churning of the ocean for the nectar of immortality. In the current context, however, gods and worldly scholars are urged to churn the ocean for aesthetic treasures which in their own way parallel the benefits that the gods received during the original churning of the ocean: wealth/ jewels, nectar of instruction/ nectar of immortality, fame / the moon.[84] The last of these three parallels refers to the common practice in Sanskrit literature of presenting fame in the image of the moon. Whereas the original ocean was churned using Mount Meru as the churning stick, here the implication is that scholars should churn the ocean with their intellects, using rational methods. Such a churning is understood to produce a solidification of the bliss that is the distinct province of poetry. In Jayadeva's view, only through reasoning (*yukti*) does such a bliss become firm in one's heart.

Summation

The variegated aesthetic concerns within Sanskrit poetry and the diversity of methods used by Sanskrit poets to achieve poetic charm precipitate a similar diversity of responses within the interpretive approaches of different *alaṃkārika*-s through the eras.

[83] *CĀ*, 1.3.

[84] In the legend from the *Mahābhārata*, the gods acquire the moon, the sun, the Goddess Śrī, the nectar of immortality, gems, poison and medicinal herbs (Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, *Hindu Myths: A Sourcebook Translated from the Sanskrit* {Baltimore: Penguin, 1975} 274-280).

The earliest known *alaṃkārika*-s, such as Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, set for themselves the task of classifying and enumerating poetic forms and what they perceived to be the most significant characteristics of poetic language. The efforts of subsequent generations of *alaṃkārika*-s to refine this method of analysis gradually led to the identification of more essential and universal components of poetry such as style (*rīti*), circuitous language (*vakrokti*), suggestion (*dhvani*) and ultimately to subordination of all the elements of poetry to the production of *rasa*. Nevertheless, the deliberation over the technical elements of poetry has continued, throughout, to be a persistent and valuable component of the discourse within Sanskrit poetic treatises. In the second millennium, the complex balancing of these two theoretical concerns is most clearly epitomized by the vacillations between *alaṃkāra* based and *rasa/dhvani* based poetic discourse.

We might easily understand why earlier modern scholars of Sanskrit poetics such as P. V. Kane and S. K. De resorted so fully to an evolutionary model in their histories of this discipline. The overall historical progression of interpretive perspective leading to Ānandavardhana's and Abhinavagupta's unified theories of poetry does on the surface accommodate a teleological interpretation. On the other hand to ascribe full causality to such a teleological doctrine is an unfortunate simplification of the complex network of concerns that contributed to the evolution of Sanskrit poetics. Moreover, the fact that post-Abhinagupta poeticians continued to resort to the investigation and enumeration of technical methods within poetry, and their allegiance to the fundamental concerns of earlier *alaṃkārika*-s should not be glibly dismissed as decadent or anachronistic. One should resist the comfortable summation the Abhinavagupta's *rasa* theory was an *a priori* truth, initially obscured by the misguided distractions of his predecessors, and that this truth was progressively revealed by a series of *alaṃkārika*-s gradually penetrating

the kernel of poetry as they gradually relinquished their attachments to external specifications. It would be more realistic to conceive of this evolution as a dialectic between enumerative and essentializing strategies of poetic interpretation. In this way, the resuscitations of *alaṃkāra* based poetic doctrine in Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkārasarvasva* and Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* should not be perceived as retrograde responses, but recognized instead to be a catalytic measure within a tradition that might have otherwise stagnated in its complacency with *rasa/dhvani* theory. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that the investigation of *Alaṃkāra* executed by Jayadeva in the *Candrāloka* is informed by intellectual currents that had not yet actively stirred during the era of earlier *alaṃkārika*-s.

As has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, Ānandavardhana's presentation of the theory of verbal suggestion incited a widespread curiosity into just how the different levels of semantic response configure in the production of aesthetic sentiment. Initially, this excitement may have resulted in a somewhat muted attention to the earlier categories of poetic exegesis such as *alaṃkāra*, *guna* and *rīti* and to the view these elements as subsidiaries to *dhvani* and *rasa.* Eventually, however, certain *alaṃkārika*-s resumed the more active investigation of *alaṃkāra* with renewed enthusiasm and a broadened theoretical perspective. In the poetic investigation of Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka and Jayadeva, there is a reconsideration of the relationship between *alaṃkāra* and *rasa.* Jayadeva, in particular, questions the assumption that *alaṃkāra* is subordinate in function and effect to *rasa*, and presents *alaṃkāra* as the central feature of Sanskrit poetry.

Chapter 2 - Structure and Purpose of the *Candrāloka*

In the previous chapter I have discussed how thematic emphasis in the *Candrāloka* can be understood in relation to certain patterns of evolution that have emerged throughout the history of *alaṃkāraśāstra* during the second millennium. In this chapter I will address the specific organization of the *Candrāloka*, and will discuss how some of Jayadeva's structural decisions reflect an original perspective on poetic theory and semantics.

The first part of the chapter reviews the structure and topics of the *Candrāloka* in greater detail, particularly in relation to Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Jayadeva emulates certain features of Mammaṭa's text in some places; elsewhere he attempts to exceed or directly oppose what Mammaṭa has done in the *Kāvyaprakāśa.* The second part of the chapter discusses the implications of Jayadeva's decision to treat the technical and aesthetic features of poetry before he investigates the semantic theory, when most other *alaṃkāra* treatises examine semantic theory as a foundation for their aesthetic discussion of language. The third part of the chapter offers some hypotheses concerning why Jayadeva chooses to sequence his discussion on the three individual powers of speech in the particular order that appears in the *Candrāloka*: 1) suggestion, 2) indication and 3) denotation, when such a sequence is the exact opposite of the convention in *alaṃkāra* treatises during the post Abhinavagupta era. I will argue that such such a sequence reflects an idiosyncratic understanding of the relationship between aesthetic theory and semantic theory, and that in Jayadeva's view, the former actually contributes to our understanding of the latter.

Topics in the *Candrāloka*

The *Candrāloka* is a metrical work in 294 verses arranged into ten chapters. With the exception of the first chapter, each chapter discusses a single discreet feature of poetic language. The first chapter attempts to specify what constitutes poetry by providing a generalized definition, by explaining the purpose of poetry and the cause of poetic capacity, and by delimiting the linguistic units that constitute the basic building blocks of poetry: words, sentences, sentence fragments and groups of sentences. The subsequent chapters discuss the following topics: chapter 2 - *doṣa* (the poetic blemishes); chater 3 - *lakṣaṇa* (the poetic distinctions); chapter 4 - *guṇa* (the poetic virtues); chapter 5 - *alaṃkāra* (the poetic ornaments); chapter 6 - *rasa* (aesthetic savor); chapter 7 - *dhvani* (poetic suggestion); chapter 8 - *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* (subordinate poetic suggestion); chapter 9 - *lakṣaṇā* (indication); chapter 10 - *abhidhā* (denotation). Jayadeva terms his chapters *mayūkha*-s ("rays"), the vectors of illumination that constitute the moonlight (*candrāloka*). As mentioned earlier, this appellation is both reminiscent of the term used by Mammaṭa to designate the ten divisions of his own work on poetics the *Kāvyaprakāśa.*

In his *Candrāloka*, Jayadeva demonstrates an ambivalent view toward the *Kāvyaprakāśa.* At one level, he has imitated a number of features that exist within Mammaṭa's text. He strives for a high level of comprehensiveness, and systemization, and emphasizes both *alaṃkāra* and *rasa* as important sources of poetic charm, just as Mammaṭa had done a century or two earlier. By the time the *Candrāloka* was written the

Kāvyaprakāśa had already become one of the most popular treatises on *ālaṃkāraśāstra*, and had inspired commentaries, at least one of which was written by a well known *ālaṃkārika.*[1] Though the *Candrāloka* takes issue with the *Kāvyaprakāśa* on a number of issues, Jayadeva must have been aware that Mammaṭa's treatise had set the standard for poetic compositions at his time. Perhaps somewhat rashly, he attempts to defy a number of prominent positions taken by the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, as well as ordering the topics of his work in a radically different sequence than that applied by Mammaṭa. Unlike Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* and Abinavagupta's commentary to the *Locana,* which had challenged a number of well-established positions in order to assert their theories on *dhvani* and *rasa,* Mammaṭa's work offered few startling innovations. It presented a more systematized and stabilized if less authentic vision of *rasa* and *dhvani* theories, which was undoubtedly more approachable for the average audience.

In a number of verses in the first chapter of the *Candrāloka*, Jayadeva evinces a rather competitive attitude to the *Kāvyaprakāśa.* His definition of poetry includes qualifications additional to those demanded by Mammaṭa,[2] and he criticizes Mammaṭa for allowing the absence of *alaṃkāra* in poetry. Furthermore, Jayadeva formulates a more complex type of causality responsible for the development of poetic capacity. While his work, lacking as it does a prose explanation to the verses, does not convey the same

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[1] Jyotsnā Mohan, in the introduction to the Nāg Prakāśaka edition of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*(1995), cites two commentaries that would have been written prior to the *Candrāloka*, both entitled *Saṃketa*: one by Maṇikyacandra and the other by Ruyyaka, the famous *ālaṃkārika.*

[2] Mammaṭa (*KP*, sūtra 2) states that poetry is speech and meaning possessing qualities, lacking blemish and sometimes not having [manifest] ornaments. Jayadeva (*CA*, 1.7) states that poetry is speech lacking blemish, but having qualities, styles, distinctions, *alaṃkāra*-s, *rasa*, and multiple levels of dictional ambience and modes of verbal signification.

exegetic detail as the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Jayadeva nevertheless attempts to span an even greater breadth of topics than did Mammaṭa.

Jayadeva's Chapter on Poetic Ornamentation

The fifth chapter, on poetic ornamentation or figures of speech (*alaṃkāra*), is traditionally the most highly regarded *mayūkha* of the *Candrāloka*, largely because this chapter provides the springboard for a more famous work, the *Kuvalayānanda* of Appayadīkṣita (sixteenth century). This topic is perhaps best suited to the style of the *Candrāloka*, and it provides Jayadeva with a diverse range of opportunities to display his ingenuity at fashioning illustrative verses. Jayadeva provides examples of his own creation for each variety of *alaṃkāra* and also for the varieties within the other topics that comprise the individual chapters of the work. The popularity of the *Candrāloka* in the modern era is largely due to these verses. The charm of these examples may well also have been a precipitating factor for Appayadīkṣita's decision to base his *Kuvalayānanda* on the content of Jayadeva's fifth chapter.[3] The explanations within Jayadeva's verses are equally lucid and cogent. Frequently, the explanation and illustration are integrated into a single expression, such that the explanation is itself an illustration of the figure of speech.

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[3] Citing a verse from the *Kuvalayānanda, yeṣāṃ candrāloke dṛśyante lakṣyalakṣaṇaślokāḥ/ prāyas ta eva teṣām itareṣāṃ tvabhinavā viracyante //* ("Generally the explanations of *alaṃkāra*-s that appear in the *Candrāloka* have been fashioned in a new form [here], along with [explanations of] others as well."), S. K. De substantiates Appaya's debt to Jayadeva, commenting: "Appayya himself indicates his indebtedness in one of the prefatory verses by saying that the definition-stanzas of the *Candrāloka* are borrowed in his own work." (*De*, vol. 1., 200).

There is no question that Jayadeva regards poetic ornamentation, the subject of the fifth chapter, as the most essential component in poetry. His major criticism of Mammaṭa, as we have previously explained, concerns the latter's claim that poetry may be lacking manifest ornamentation.[4] The *alaṃkāra* chapter contains 126 verses, more than twice the number of any other chapter.[5] While it may be argued that the excess of verses here simply corresponds to the excess of varieties of poetic ornamentation that had become features of a poet's repertoire during Jayadeva's era, the second half of verse 1.2 provides additional evidence that Jayadeva intends to priviledge *alaṃkāra* above the other features of poetry discussed in the *Candrāloka*:

> ullāsāya vicāravīcinicayālaṅkāravārāṃnidheś
>
> candrālokamayaṃ svayaṃ vitanute pīyūṣavarṣaḥ kṛtī
>
> The skillful Pīyūṣavarṣa bestows his own moonlight (*candrāloka*) for the increase of the ocean of poetic ornaments that has mental reflection as its series of waves.[6]

Given the pervasive recognition of *rasa/dhvani* theory throughout India at the time, one might have expected Jayadeva's ocean to be one of *rasa*, *dhvani* or even *vyañjanā* rather

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[4] See *KP*, sūtra 2.

[5] The verse counts in each of the individual chapter of the *Candrāloka* are indicated in the table below:

Chapter	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Topic	General Definit-ions	Faults	Distinct-ions	Vir-tues	Orna-ments	*rasa*	Sug-gestion	Subor-dinate Sug.	Indi-cation	Deno-tation
No. of verses	16	45	12	13	126	29	18	11	17	7

[6] *CA*. 1.2.

than *alaṃkāra.*[7] Yet, Jayadeva's emphasis on *alaṃkāra* is not motivated by a rejection of *rasa* or *dhvani*; he proceeds to elaborate on both these topics in separate chapters. Rather, through such an image he asserts that ornaments provide an independent source of beauty which merit study for their own intrinsic value.

The Question of Pedagogy in the *Candrāloka*

When contemplating the structure of the *Candrāloka* it is difficult to avoid the impression that Jayadeva intended the work at one level to serve as pedagogical manual of sorts. The symmetrical presentation of individually differentiated topics, each bounded within a single chapter, might easily serve as a poetic curriculum for students or aspiring poets. The sequence of chapters further reinforces the educational dimension, and also suggests an historical organization within the work. The initial topics are those raised by the earlier treatises in *alaṃkāraśāstra*, most of which continue as persistent features of poetic analysis throughout the later history of the tradition as well. The latter topics are those which were introduced into *alaṃkāraśāstra* during the era when a *dhvani*-centric poetic rose to the forefront. The first category embraces chapters one through five, treating the topics of the 1) the qualification of words suitable for poetry; 2) faults in poetic expression; 3) poetic distinction (*lakṣana*[8]); 4) poetic virtue (*guṇa*); and 5) poetic ornamentation (*alaṃkāra*). The second category includes the latter five chapters, the ones

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[7] Other medieval *ālaṃkārika*'s and dramaturgical writers utilize the "ocean of *rasa*" in their works, such as Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja in the title *Rasagaṅgādhara* and Śiṅgabhūpāla in the title *Rasārṇavasudhākara.*

[8] Once again we remind the reader to distinguish *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinction) from *lakṣaṇā* (verbal suggestion).

examining the topics: 6) *rasa*; 7) predominant suggestion (*dhvani*); 8) subordinate suggestion (*guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*); 9) indication (*lakṣaṇā*); and 10) denotation (*abhidhā*).

Comprehensive Organization of Topics

We can also organize these chapters into four groups, each of these having a distinct purpose. The first of these groups takes up only the first half of the first chapter, and encompasses two subgroups (for clarity referred to as 1a and 1b) of textual conventions. Here, the first group of conventions (1a) are those that apply to all śāstras: the statement of a benediction to a chosen deity (*iṣṭadevatā*), in this case Sarasvatī, followed by explanations of the purpose of the composition of the work and the purpose of studying the text. The second subgroup (1b) includes two conventions more specific to *alaṃkāraśāstra*: a statement of the cause of poetry and a definition of poetry itself. The second overall group (2) of the original four examines the formal and technical constituents (and non-constituents) of poetic expressions - those aspects of poetic language that both qualify (and potentially disqualify) poetic expressions and differentiate the different varieties of poetic expressions. This group in turn has five subgroups (2a-e) The first of these (2a), which takes up the remainder of the first chapter, is an examination of the qualifications of words that are suitable for use in poetry. The second (2b) is an explanation of the faults (*doṣa*) in poetic language and encompasses all of chapter two. The third (2c) is an examination of poetic distinction (*lakṣaṇa*) in chapter 3, while the fourth (2d) and fifth (2e) are explanations of the varieties of poetic virtue (*guṇa*) and poetic ornamentation (*alaṃkāra*) in chapters four and five respectively. The

third of the original groups (3) has the purpose of explaining those features of poetry that apply most directly to the psychological and metaphysical experience of the audience, and has three subgroups (3a-c): *rasa* (3a), which is detailed in chapter six; *dhvani* (3b), in chapter seven; and subordinate suggestion (3c) in chapter eight. The last of the more encompassing groups (4) investigates the operations of verbal signification and has two subgroups (4a,b). Subgroup 4a, in chapter nine, examines the specific operation of verbal indication (*lakṣaṇā*), and describes and illustrates the different varieties of this in poetry. Subgroup 4b, in the tenth and final chapter of the *Candrāloka*, describes the specific operation of denotation, and goes on to explain and exemplify six different varieties of denoted meanings. The following chart summarizes this organization of topics.

Group 1 Traditional Investigations	Group 2 Technical Investigations	Group 3 Psychological/semantic Investigations	Group 4 Analytical /semantic Investigations
1a : Benediction – Ch 1	2a: Examination of qualified words – Ch. 1	3a: *Rasa* – Ch. 6	4a: Indication – Ch. 9
	2b: blemishes – Ch. 2	3b: *Dhvani* – Ch . 7	
1b.i: Cause of poetry – Ch.1	2c: Poetic Distinction – Ch. 3		4b: Denotation-Ch. 10
	2d: Poetic Virtue – Ch.. 4		
1b.ii: Definition of Poetry -- Ch.1	2e: Poetic Ornament – Ch. 5	3c: subordinate suggestion — Ch. 8	

Figure 2.1 – Categories of Investigations

The sequence of these topics (1-4) does not reveal a linear trajectory. The text begins by providing certain explanations that are traditionally required in *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s (1a,b). Then it proceeds to explain the most technical aspects of composition: the selection and formation of correct words (2a), the errors in sound and meaning that are to be avoided (2b), and the meritorious features of poetic language that should be cultivated within poetry (2c-e). Jayadeva next shifts his attention to those feature of poetic language which operate in conjunction with the psychological response of the audience: *rasa*, *dhvani* and subordinate suggestion (3a-c). One might designate these topics as the metaphysical operations in poetry. At this point, Jayadeva shifts his attention in a surprising manner; he diverts the investigation from the realm of aesthetic metaphysics to the more analytical treatment of semantic operations.

We should acknowledge that this last transition involves a significant overlap. The sections on *dhvani* and subordinate suggestion already incorporate the examination of semantic operation, for it would be impossible to explain *dhvani* without some fundamental explanation of denotation and indication, from which verbal suggestion is differentiated. *Dhvani* itself is considered by those who subscribe to this tradition to be an independent operation of verbal signification (*śabdavṛtti*), but it is an operation of signification that cannot be easily explained as the result of a causal operation. The explanation of subordinate suggestion, poetry in which the suggested meaning bears less significant charm than the indicated or denoted meaning, similarly involves the examination of verbal signification. Yet the faculty through which one discerns a suggested meaning or distinguishes whether the charm of the suggested meaning or that

of the denoted or indicated meaning is predominant is essentially an aesthetic faculty. For these reasons I have classified these discussions as lying within the province of aesthetics rather than logic analysis.

The discussion of indication in chapter eight similarly engages both aesthetic and analytical processes. The operation of indication ensues when the literal meaning of expression leads to some form of contradiction,[9] necessitating the attribution of a related meaning to successfully complete the overall meaning of the original expression. Indication thus involves a clear causal mechanism. On the other hand, the purpose (*prayojana*) of using an indicative expression is that such an indirect expression carries into the ultimate meaning a suggestion that would not be conveyed through an alternate literal expression. In the standard example which is used to exemplify indication, the expression "a hamlet on the Ganges," itself leads to a contradiction, since the hamlet cannot literally exist "in the Ganges." Hence, we substitute the meaning "on the banks of" in order to produce a logical meaning through the expression. Even though the literal meaning "in the Ganges" is abandoned, the suggestion of the coolness and purity residing in the Ganges is carried over into our ultimate understanding. Such a suggestion would not be so vivid if we were to word the literal expression as "a hamlet on the banks of the river Ganges." Hence while indication does involve a causal mechanism, its effect is "acausal" -- that is, "suggestive."

For these reasons it is more accurate to understand the progression from the most psychological and aesthetically oriented topic (3a, *rasa*) to the most analytical topic (4b,

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[9] This contradiction here may result because the semantic connection of the literal meanings of the words in an expression produces a logical fallacy, or in a more subtle fashion, it may result because the literal meaning contradicts the intention of the speaker. This will be discussed in greater detail in fifth chapter of this dissertation, where Jayadeva's explanation of indication is specifically examined

denotation) as an incremental transition. The discussion of *dhvani* (3b) is more aesthetic than analytical, the discussion of subordinate suggestion (3c) is equally balanced in these respects, and the discussion of indication (4a) is more analytical than aesthetic. Such a transition of topics is somewhat unusual among *alaṃkāraśāstra* treatises composed after the advent of *rasa/dhvani* theory. In the *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana presents his more analytical investigation of suggestion in his comments to the first of four verses, and then proceeds to demonstrate the many different ways suggestion can operate within poetry.

Unraveling the *Prakāśa*: A Comparison of the Sequences of Topics in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and the *Candrāloka*

An interesting comparison can be drawn between the structure of Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* and that of the *Candrāloka*, both which are composed in ten chapters. Here, if we exclude the first chapters of both works we can observe an exactly opposite progression of the latter three of the four investigations previously identified (see chart in figure 2.1). After the first chapter, the *Candrāloka* embarks on the discussion of formal attributes and non-attributes of speech: the faults (*doṣa*), distinctions (*lakṣaṇa*), virtues (*guṇa*) and ornaments (*alaṃkāra*) of poetry. The same sequence of topics, excluding the *lakṣana*-s which are not mentioned in Mammaṭa's system, is discussed in chapters seven through in ten in the *Kāvyaprakāśa.* In the subsequent portion of the *Candrāloka* (chapters six through eight), Jayadeva discusses the more aesthetically and psychologically oriented topics in poetry: *rasa*, *dhvani* and subordinate suggestion. These same topics are discussed in chapters three through five of the *Kāvyaprakāśa.* The final

aim of the *Candrāloka* is the more analytical discussion of verbal signification, specifically indication and denotation, in chapters nine and ten. These topics are discussed in chapter two of the *Kāvyaprakāśa.* [10] Wheras the *Kāvyaprakāśa* discusses *citrakāvya*, the lowest grade of poetry not involving any degree of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) or *rasa*, in its sixth chapter, chapter six of the *Candrāloka* discusses rasa itself. Jayadeva discusses *Citra* as a form of *alaṃkāra* rather than as a separate category of poetry. It is impossible to say for certain that Jayadeva intentionally ordered his topics in a retrograde sequence to that applied by Mammaṭa in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Given the fact that he mocks Mammaṭa's definition of poetry so severely in verse 1.8,[11] however, it is possible that

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[10] Here I will quote Kane's description (Kane, *HSP*, 266-7) of the contents of the chapters of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*:

> The contents of the work are: -- I. the purpose of *kāvya, kāvyahetu* [caue of hetu], the definition of *kāvya*, its sub-divisions into *uttama* (where the suggested sense far excels the *vācya* sense), *madhyama* and *adhama*; II. word is *vācaka* [literal expressor], *lākṣaṇika* [indicator] and *vyañjaka* [suggestor] and sense also is *vācya* [literal meaning], *lakṣya* [indicated meaning] and *vyaṅgya* [suggested meaning]; some maintain a fourth sense called *tātparyārtha* [intended meaning]; explanation of these terms and the sub-divisions of *lakṣaṇā* [indication] and *vyañjanā* [suggestion]; III. how all kinds of senses may be *vyañjaka* and how the function in such cases is *vyañjanā*; IV. the two varieties of *dhvani* viz. *avivakṣitavācya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* and their subdivisions, the nature of *rasa*, of *sthāyibhāva*-s, of *vibhāva*-s and *vyabhicāribhāva*-s; various theories about *rasa*; V. the second variety of *kāvya* viz. *gunībhūtavyaṅgya* and its eight sub-divisions: VI. third kind of *kāvya* called *citra* (or *adhama*) and its two varieties, *śabdacitra* and *arthacitra;* VII. The *doṣa*-s of *pada, vākya, artha* and of *rasa* and how in some cases what is generally a *doṣa* may lend charm; VIII. distinction between *guṇa*-s and *alaṅkāra*-s and the position that there are only three guṇas *mādhurya, ojas* and *prasāda*; definitions of these; other *guṇas* are included under these or are really the absence of *doṣa*-s; the combination of certain letters is conducive to these *guṇa*-s; IX. the figures of *śabda*, viz. *vakrokti* (two varieties, *śleṣa* and *kāku*), *anuprāsa* (*chekānuprāsa* and *vṛttyanuprāsa*) and the three *vṛtti*-s (*upanāgarikā, paruṣā* and *komalā* which were designated *vaidarbhī, gauḍī* and *pāñcālī* rīti-s by Vāmana and others), *lāṭānuprāsa, yamaka* (with its numerous varieties), *śleṣa* (its varieties such as *khaṅgabanda, murajabandha*), *punaruktavadābhāsa*; X. sixty-one *alaṅkāra*-s of sense; the *doṣas* of *alaṅkāra* are included under the *doṣa*-s reated in the 7th *ullāsa.*

[11] *aṅgīkaroti yaḥ kāvyaṃ śabdārthāv analaṃkṛtī / asau na manyate kasmād anuṣṇam analaṃ kṛtī* (*CA*, 1.8). (Why does that wise person who consents that sound and meaning without ornaments is poetry, not believe that something without heat is fire?") (*CĀ*, 1.8).

Jayadeva has attempted to subvert the theory of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* by "unwinding" its structure within his own text.

On first consideration it is puzzling why Jayadeva decided to structure his text this way. In placing his explanation of semantic functions after his aesthetic discussion, he reverses a convention that is upheld not only by Mammaṭa,[12] but by the majority of important *ālaṃkārika*-s of the second millennium. Ānandavardhana, introducing verse 1.9 of the *Dhvanyāloka*, states:

> idānīṃ vyaṅgyavyañjakayoḥ prādhānye 'pi yadvācyavācakāv eva prathamam upādadate kavayas tad api yuktam evêti.[13]
>
> Even though the predominant interest of poets lies in suggested meaning and the suggested expression, if is only appropriate that [these poets] will first reflect upon the literal meanings and expressions in poetry.

Verse 1.9 goes on to draw the analogy of how a person desiring light will first concern himself with the flame of a lamp. Such advice is borne out in most *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s of the second millennium. It seems that most *ālaṃkārika*-s in the succeeding generations followed this principle. Explanations of the different operations of verbal signification (*śabdavṛtti*) occur in the second of ten chapters in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakśa,* in the

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[12] Mammaṭa consolidates his basic explanations of the operations of signification (*śabdavṛtti*) in the second chapter of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* beginning with the statement:

> syād vācako lākṣaṇikaḥ śabdo 'tra vyañjakas tridhā. vācyādayas tadarthāḥ syuḥ. tātparyārtho 'pi kesucit. (*KP*, sūtra 5-6, p. 25).
>
> Here, speech is threefold: that which denotes, that which indicates and that which suggests. The meanings of these [types of speech] are the literal meaning, etc. In the opinion of some, there is also an intended meaning.

[13] *DhvĀ*, intro. to 1.9.

seventh of thirty-six chapters of Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* (eleventh century),[14] the first of eight chapters of Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśasanam* (twelfth century), the second of eight chapters of Vidyādhara's *Ekāvalī* (early fourteenth century), and the second of ten chapters of Viśvanātha's *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (fourteenth century). Jayadeva does the exact opposite, placing his discussion of denotation and indication at the very end of the work, chapters nine and ten, long after he has discussed the ornaments, and after has discussed suggestion (*vyañjanā*). If Jayadeva had indeed composed the *Candrāloka* as a pedagogical work, it would be logical that he place his explanation of denotation and indication at the beginning of his work so as to provide a foundation in semantic theory in support of his explication of the *arthālaṃkāra*-s (poetic ornaments based in meaning) in chapter five, as well as his explanation of *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* in chapters seven and eight. Under such an assumption we might surmise that Jayadeva made a poor tactical decision merely for the sake of innovation. Jayadeva, however, states plainly and repeatedly that the *Candrāloka* is a work intended for scholars.[15] In view of the highly systematic structure seen elsewhere in the *Candrāloka,* it seems unlikely that Jayadeva would end the text in an arbitrary fashion.

Some Hypotheses on the Organization of Topics in the *Candrāloka*

It is commonly assumed that scientific and philosophical theories have greater application in works of aesthetics and literary theory than aesthetic and literary theories

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[14] V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* (Madras: Punarvasu, 1963) 18.

[15] As cited in the introduction, verse 1.3 ends with the vocative plural *budhāḥ* ("scholars"), and the verse repeated at the end of each chapter concludes with the aspiration that scholars should delight in the particular chapter of the *Candrāloka* for a long time (*ciraṃ candrāloke sukhayatu mayūkhaḥ sumanasaḥ*).

have in scientific and philosophical works. Scientific and philosophical theories are believed to inform aesthetics because their inquiry into the nature of phenomenal reality is applicable to aesthetics and literature, whereas the investigation of sentiment and beauty that characterizes aesthetic treatises is not believed to have direct relevance to the philosophical quest for truth and meanings. One can find examples of this prejudice in classical Greek, European, and Indian thought throughout history. Certain authors, to be sure, such as Aristotle (fourth century B.C.E.) and Giambattista Vico (eighteenth century) advocate a greater continuity between aesthetic and scientific/philosophical inquiry. Nevertheless, most philosophers in these cultures prefer to keep these methodological paradigms separate, even if they appreciate the value of aesthetic inquiry. Both Kant and Hegel, for example, write separate treatises for their rational inquiries and aesthetic inquiries.[16] This is not to say that scientists and philosophers discouraged the study of literature, but that that they were careful not to confuse the provinces of scientific and aesthetic inquiries. A less tolerant view toward aesthetics is expressed by both Plato[17] and Jayantabhaṭṭa,[18] who regard aesthetic concerns as detrimental to pure logical inquiry.

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[16] Kant separates the two inquiries within two works *Critique of Judgment* and *Critique of Pure Reason.* Hegel separates these into his *Aesthetics* and the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.*

[17] In the dialogue *Ion,* Plato, in his mockery of the rhapsodist Ion, makes it clear that while the poet may be able to mimic worldly knowledge through poetry, he does not himself possess this knowledge.

[18] In Jayanta's view, the investigation of *dhvani* does not benefit the more scientific discussion of verbal signification.

atha vā nêdṛśī carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate
vidvāṃso 'pi vimuhyanti vakyārthagahane 'dhvani
tad alam anayā goṣṭhyā vidvajjanocitayā ciram
paramagahanas tarkajñānām abhūmir ayaṃ nayaḥ...

(*Nyāyamañjarī,* 1st Ahnika, Refutation of *dhvani.* Vol. 1, p. 78-9). Located with the aid of Raghavan's citation in *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, p. 145.

("Or we can say, such a discussion with poets does not lead to benefit.

Jayadeva's structuring of the *Candrāloka* indicates a different understanding of this relationship. In placing his examination of verbal signification after his aesthetic explanations, Jayadeva intimates that aesthetic and literary discussions beneficially inform the more scientific aspects of semantic theory. Such an interpretation is also supported by the order in which Jayadeva discusses the three *śabdavṛtti*-s: he discusses suggestion first, indication second, and denotation last. Conventionally, *ālaṃkārika*-s as well as writers in other *śāstra*-s explain denotation first as the basis for the understanding of indication (*lakṣaṇā*) and suggestion (*vyañjanā*). Understandably, they explain denotation to reveal the primary meaning of a word, without which the other the operations would not be able to function. After denotation, indication is generally discussed, since this is the operation that functions when the denoted meaning of a word is inapplicable for some reason. Lastly, those authors who accept suggestion as a separate operation of language discuss its function in opposition to the other two operations previously examined. This is the case in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana*, and Viśvanātha's *Sāhityadarpaṇa*. Jayadeva, on the other hand, introduces his chapter on suggestion immediately after his chapter on *rasa* with two verses that mention neither *abhidhā* (denotation) nor *lakṣaṇā* (indication). Instead, he defines suggestion through two beautiful similes.

vṛttibhedais tribhir yuktā srotobhir iva jāhnavī
bhāratī bhāti gambhīrā kuṭilā saralā kvacit

sāmmukhyaṃ vidadhānāyāḥ sphuṭam arthāntare giraḥ

Even those who are knowledgeable [on such matters, i.e. *ālaṃkārika*-s] become perplexed on the dense (*gahana*) path of circuitous speech.
This is well enough left to the assembly of individual having the appropriate knowledge.
This extremely dense doctrine [of *dhvani*] is not in the sphere of logical knowledge.")

> katākṣa iva līlākṣyā vyāpāro vyañjanātmakaḥ[19]
>
> Just as the Ganges river is possessed of three types of currents
> Sometimes speech appears deep, [sometimes] sinuous, [sometimes] straight.
>
> When there is another meaning to a speech that clearly bestows a direct meaning, this speech has an operation that has the nature of suggestion (*vyañjanā*), just like the sidelong glance of a playful-eyed woman.

Here Jayadeva effectively "suggests" suggestion, rather than defining it in more formal linguistic terms. Even when he begins to differentiate the varieties of *dhvani,* Jayadeva avoids the use of an overly technical vocabulary. The varieties are distinguished according to the source from which the suggestion arises: sound, meaning, word, sentence, ornament, fact. To a certain degree, such decisions are based on the cognitive experience of the reader rather than structure the language. For instance in order to distinguish between *lakṣyakramadhvani* (suggestion where a sequence is discernible) and *alakṣyakramadhvani* (suggestion where the sequence is indiscernible), the critic must contemplate his own cognitive response to poetry in order to determine whether there is a discernible sequence between his or her apprehension of the literal meaning and apprehension of the suggested meaning.

Jayadeva's Definitions of the *Śabdavṛtti-s,* the Operations of Verbal Signification

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[19] *CĀ*, 7.1-2.

Even the opening verse of the subsequent (eighth) chapter, in which Jayadeva defines subordinate suggestion (*guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*), does not directly mention *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*. This is surprising, since in subordinate suggestion the suggested meaning is recognized as being subsidiary to the denoted or to the indicated meanings. Again, he describes the function evocatively, using the aesthetic response of the audience as the differentiating principle for this type of poetry:

> yad vyajyamānaṃ manasaḥ staimityāya sa no dhvaniḥ
>
> anyathā tu guṇībhūtavyaṅgyam āpatitaṃ tridhā
>
> *dhvani* is that suggesting a meaning that is conducive to a moistening of the heart. What is otherwise is subordinate suggestion (*guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*), which falls into three categories.[20]

Not until the fifth verse of this chapter does Jayadeva specifically mention the relation between the suggested meaning and the literal meaning, in the case of the variety of subordinate suggestion known as *vācyasiddhyaṅga* ("subordinate suggestion where the suggested meaning is the expedient of the literal meaning").[21]

At the beginning of the ninth chapter, Jayadeva begins to apply formal terms in his definition of indication (*lakṣaṇā*):

> mukhyārthasyâvivakṣāyāṃ pūrvārvācī ca rūḍhitaḥ
>
> prayojanāc ca sambaddhaṃ vadantī lakṣaṇā matā

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[20] *CĀ*, 8.1.

[21] *tathā vācyasya siddyaṅgaṃ naur artho vāridher yathā / saṃśritya taraṇiṃ dhīrās taranti vyādhivāridhīn* (*CĀ*, 8.5). ("Just as a meaning which is an expedient for the literal meaning is a boat for crossing the ocean, so the wise having taken refuge in the sun (*taraṇi*, also meaning boat) can cross the ocean of affliction.") Here the suggested meaning "a boat crossing the ocean of affliction" is an expedient for the more charming literal meaning "the wise crossing the ocean of afflictions by taking refuge in the sun."

> When there is not the desire that the literal meaning be expressed, *lakṣaṇā* (indication), which has prior and latter [varieties], is understood to convey a connected [meaning] through convention [in the prior variety] and through some purpose [in the latter].

This definition mentions both *vācya*, the literal meaning whose unsuitability becomes the primary motivation for the function of indication, and *prayojana*, the purpose (sometimes referred to as *vyañjanā*) for which the speaker has applied the indirect expression.[22] The expression *sambaddhaṃ* (a connected [meaning]) implies the *sambandha* (connection), another technical feature of indication, which describes the relation between the indicated and the literal meanings.[23] For instance, in the stock example of indication: "a hamlet on the river Ganges," the *vācya* (literal meaning) "on the river Ganges" is not intended because the human inhabitants would not literally be able to live on the current of the water, and hence, a related meaning "on the shore," which more successfully completes the sense of the expression, is understood to substitute for the literal meaning. In this case, the speaker has intentionally used an expression where the literal meaning is inapplicable, for the purpose of suggesting the qualities of coolness and holiness that characterize the hamlet. Jayadeva's definition of indication is rather unusual in comparison to other examples from the same time period, since it includes no mention of the concept of contradiction (*bādhaka* or *bādha*) or unsuitability (*anupapatti*). Instead it

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[22] In the latter variety of indication, an indicative meaning is desired because it carries over some suggestion into the target meaning. The expression "a hamlet on the Ganges," carries over the suggestion of coolness and holiness into the target meaning "the bank of the river Ganges." If the speaker had originally said "a hamlet on the bank of the river Ganges," the suggestion would not be as rich.

[23] In the case of the previous example, the *saṃbandha* is one of proximity. The indicated meaning "shore" is proximate to the literal meaning "Ganges."

states simply that the literal meaning is not intended to be expressed. We will discuss this idiosyncrasy in greater detail in the following chapter.

As mentioned earlier, denotation is the last of the operations of signification to be explained by Jayadeva, as well as the final topic of the treatise. This is surprising on two accounts: first, since denotation is fundamental to the operation of the other two *śabdavṛtti*-s; and second, because it is fundamental to the operation of so many of the other functions in poetry, including a number of the *lakṣaṇa*-s, guṇa-s and *alaṃkāra*-s. Jayadeva's definition is once again charmingly informal in its terminology:

> dharmaṃ kaṃ cit puraskṛtya prāyaḥ śabdaḥ pravartate
> yathārthaṃ spaṣṭam ācaṣṭe śabdas tām abhidhāṃ viduḥ

> Generally, a word signifies by bringing some property to the forefront. The [scholars] know that by means of which a word clearly conveys a meaning to be denotation (*abhidhā*).[24]

Without reference to formal linguistic terms, this definition is enormously precise and tactful at the same time. It succeeds in demonstrating how a word is capable of referring to all entities within the class that is defined by a word, yet it does not directly dismiss any of the views from the principal philosophical schools participating in the ongoing discourse concerning the function of denotation (*abhidhā*). This is something of a complex topic and requires some background.

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[24] *CĀ*, 10.1.

Classical Indian Inquiries into the Nature of Verbal Signification

Since Patañjali (third century B.C.E.), Sanskrit grammarians and other epistemologically oriented philosophers were troubled by the question of exactly how words are capable of expressing meanings. While it seems intuitive that a relationship or convention is established between a word and a type of entity allows a person to understand the entity to which a speaker refers through a specific word, when we consider that all speakers are able to refer to all entities of this type with the same words, we encounter conceptual difficulties. For instance, if we assume that there is a relationship between a word and the entity known as a tree, we must decide whether a connection or convention is established between the word "tree" and one specific entity that we know as a tree, or between the word "tree" and all entities that we know as trees. If we say that the connection is established between the word "tree" and a specific entity known as a tree then in the future when the same word is used to designate another entity known as a tree, the convention would have to be re-established with respect to this second entity, and hence there would be a wavering in the meaning of a word. On the other hand, if we say that a connection has been established between a word and all entities known as trees, then because there might be infinitely many trees, we will never truly know the meaning of the word "tree." since we will never know all trees. To overcome this dilemna, we apparently must consider another type of connection or convention that will more logically explain verbal reference.

A number of solutions have been suggested by the various schools of Indian philosophy throughout history. The *mīmāṃsaka*-s initially postulated that the word denotes only the generic property (*jāti*). A generic property is that property that is possessed only by members of a certain class of entities. According to *mīmāṃsā* theory, we recognized an entity through hearing a word because the word denotes precisely the generic property through which the entity is perceived as being a member of a specific class. This provides a possible explanation of how someone can use the word "tree" to refer to an apple tree from which we want to pick fruit as well as a Christmas tree on which we would like to place ornaments. In this case, the meaning of the word does not waver when the word is first used to refer to one tree and then to refer to another, because in both cases, the word denotes simply "tree-ness," the generic property. This theory avoids illogical proposition that a word denotes an infinity of meanings, because in this case the word has only one meaning, the generic property. Such a solution is attractive on account of its simplicity and directness, and it was accepted by certain scholars well into the second millennium. The main difficulty with this view is that it is not so easy to explain how the listener makes the connection between the generic property denoted by the word, and the specific tree that is being referred to by the speaker.

The early logicians (*naiyāyika*-s) responded to this difficulty by proposing that a word denotes the collection of the generic property, the shape, and the individual entity.[25] Such a view might seem to sow confusion because it appears to allow words to waver among these three possible meanings. The *naiyāyika*-s defend their theory by explaining

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[25] *vyaktyākṛtijātisannidhāv upacārāt saṃśayaḥ* (Guatama, *Nyāyasūtra*, Anantalal Thakur {Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997) 2.2.59}. ("There is doubt because there is use (of the word) in the sense of the entity, the shape and the generic property.")

that the generic property is only perceived in the entity possessing a specific shape, and the individual is only understood as being a member of a class on account of the generic property which is perceived through the shape. Nevertheless, according to Vātsyāyana,[26] the relative predominance of each of the three components depends on the individual use of the word. When the class of entities as a whole is referred to, the generic property bears predominance in the meaning. When a specific entity is to be distinguished from others, the individual bears predominance.[27] Certain logicians argued that the generic property can indeed be perceived, in which case there is not the aforementioned dependence on entity and shape.

The position of grammarians on this question is somewhat more complicated and variable. This is largely due to the fact that Pāṇini[28] presents two opposing views in two separate sūtras. According to Peter Sharf:

> The oldest extant systematic consideration of the question whether a word denotes an individual object or a generic property in India is in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini 1.2.64 *Sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau.* The *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.2.58, *Jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām*, selections from the Paspaśāhnika and elsewhere supplement this discussion. Patañjali is not, however, the first to address the topic. He himself discusses the question commenting on Kātyāyana's vārttikas on the two sūtra mentioned. Kātyāyana in turn records the views of Vājapyāyana (1.2.64, *vārttika* 35) and Vyāḍī (1.2.64, *Vārttika* 45) and their reasons for them.... Both Pāṇini's *sūtras* and Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* are exceedingly brief and can hardly be understood independent of Patañjali's explanations.[29]

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[26] Author of the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (fifth century).

[27] *Nyāya: Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra with Vātyāyana's Commentary*, trans. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya (Calcutta: Indian Studies, 1982) 167.

[28] The fifth century B.C.E grammarian held to be the founder of the most widely used system of Sanskrit Grammar.

[29] Peter M. Scharf, *The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy: Grammar, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃṣā* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1966) 2.

A further source of difficulty in characterizing the grammarians' view stems from the fact that Patañjali uses the same terms to represent different concepts in different contexts. For instance, *dravya* is at some times used to mean the material substance composing an entity, and at other times an individual entity itself.[30] The word *ākṛti* is used by Patañjali to mean the shape that a material substance assumes in a given entity, but in some places he uses it to mean "generic property of *jāti.*"[31]

We might interpret Patañjali's variable usages to have distinct tropological functions. The use of the word *dravya*, which more commonly means substance, to mean the entity itself can be viewed as that variety of synecdoche in which the word ordinarily denoting a compositional substance is used to indicate something composed by this substance. When the word *ākṛti*, which more commonly denotes shape, is used to indicate generic property, this can be understood as the type of metonymy in which a word denoting an instrument of knowledge is used to indicate the object known through this instrument. In this case the generic property is communicated by a word ordinarily denoting the concept of shape, which is the instrument for ascertaining the generic property. It would be interesting to investigate the manner in which these tropological associations expedite Patañjali's analysis of the complex topic of verbal signification, but this is beyond the scope of the present study.

Patañjali's deliberation on what constitutes the denoted meaning of a word involves a synthesis of a complex series of views presented in Kātyāyana's numerous *vārttika*-s to Pāṇini's sūtras 1.2.58 and 1.2.64. Some of these support the theory that the

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[30] Ibid, 23.

[31] Ibid.

word denotes the generic property, but others support the view theory that the word denotes the individual entity. The individual components of his argument are unfortunately too numerous to include in this work. One would do well to consult Peter Scharf's *The Denotation of Generic Terms* (American Philosophical Society, 1996) for a detailed account of both sides of this argument. Patañjali's investigation differs significantly from that in the *Nyāyasūtra* in that it occurs in the context of discussions of grammatical operations. After considering the full array of Kātyāyana's *vārttika*-s, Patañjali concludes that neither the view that the word denotes the generic property nor the view that the word denotes the individual entity can stand in isolation to the other. As Scharf summarizes:

> The view that a generic term denotes a class property must accept an individual substance as part of the meaning. Conversely, the view that a generic term denotes an individual substance must accept a generic property as part of the meaning. [32]

Patañjali's conclusion is similar to that in the *Nyāyasūtra* in that it recognizes the denoted object as a composite in which the individual components vary in predominance according to context. Unlike Gautama,[33] Patañjali does not acknowledge the contribution (*ākṛti*) within the meaning of a denoted word. Such an omission may demonstrate the separate concerns of the their professions. The logician, emphasizing the cognitive aspect of denotation, considers shape essential to the recognition of the generic property in the entity. The grammarian, concerned more with the grammatical rather than the cognitive

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[32] Ibid, 77.

[33] The author of the *Nyāyasūtra*.

specification of the entity, tropologically subsumes shape within the linguistic function of the generic property.

Jayadeva's Explanation of Denotation (*Abhidhā*)

Returning to Jayadeva's definition of denotation (10.1), we can observe that his description *dharmaṃ kaṃ cit puraskṛtya prāyaḥ śabdaḥ pravartate* ("generally a word signifies bringing some property into the forefront") might account for each of the previously explained positions: *mīmāṃsaka* (exegetical), *naiyāyika* (logical) or *vaiyākaraṇa* (grammatical). While it perhaps most directly conveys the orthodox *mīmāṃsaka "jātivāda"* interpretation whereby the word denotes the generic property specifically, such a wording does not exclude the *nyāya* or *vyākaraṇa* positions. Even if we accept that the word denotes a composite of the generic property, shape and individual entity or a composite of just the generic property and the individual entity, this does not exclude the possibility that "some property is brought into the forefront of awareness." Perhaps Jayadeva's use of the word *prāyaḥ* ("generally") is tactfully applied in order to accommodate these opposing views. This usage seems to acknowledge that denotation operates primarily through the communication of the generic property, but that in certain circumstances the individual or the shape may assume prominence in the intention of the speaker and the apprehension of the listener.

Jayadeva accomplishes this non-partisanship through a deft choice of an expression -- *dharmaṃ kaṃ cit puraskṛtya* – which allows for a range of operational possibilities. This definition invokes the metaphor of a procession whereby a word advances to a meaning using one of six properties as its guide or leader. Depending on

which leader or property is choosen, a different sort of meaning is arrived at. Moreover, Jayadeva's definition does not specify whether there may be other participants or contributors to this procession, i.e. a particular entity, shape, etc, or whether potential co-participants might not take over the lead. One could, therefore, charge Jayadeva with a lack of precision in delimiting the operation of denotation, but on the other hand one might commend him for devising a skillful literary image which effectively accounts for the different varieties of function that are encompassed by the operation of denotation. Each of the definitions offered by the principal philosophical schools involves a certain ambiguity. In the case of the orthodox Mīmāṃsā view that the denoted meaning is purely the generic property, there is a difficulty in explaining how the Vedic injunction that one should bind a goat is able to specify that one should bind only one goat when all other goats likewise possess the generic property. The original *nyāya* explanation that the denoted meaning is a composite of the generic property, the shape, and the individual entity involves an ambiguity in regard to the relative predominance of the three components. The same may be said in the case of Patañjali's definition. Jayadeva's solution to these ambiguities is aesthetic rather than logical. He chooses an analogy from ordinary observation: that when there is a procession from one place to another someone is usually chosen to lead the procession. The idea is that the person selected is the one who knows best how to arrive at the location.

In the case of words, the property that is selected to orient the verbal reference is the one that is best suited for leading to a particular type of meaning. In certain cases it is most efficient to communicate something by denoting the generic property possessed by that thing. This is particularly effective when individual things of different classes need to

be distinguished, a cow and a goat, for instance. However, if we need to distinguish between two entities belonging to the same class, i.e. two cows, than we might identify the entity through color, or through some activity, i.e., walking, eating etc. Similarly we might identify the cow by its name, or by the some relationship it has to another entity, such as the its possession of horns or a bell.

The concept of denotation needs to be considered more carefully at this point. The denotative meaning is commonly understood as the most direct expression of a word. In the Sanskrit tradition it is referred to as *mukhyārtha* ("primary meaning"), *saṃketitārtha* ("meaning determined through convention"), *vācyārtha* ("literal meaning"). It carries the sense of the original, true, and most authorized meaning of a word. Denotation is said to be that function of speech that functions directly (*sākṣāt*) and clearly (*spaṣṭam*). Still, denotation is absolutely direct only in the naïve transactional sense in which we imagine that we denote the objects that we desire. More realistically, at best we denote the meaning that most directly corresponds to the entity that we are referring to, but if we accept the explanations of the three philosophical *darśana*-s referred to earlier, even this cannot be so. If we are speaking about a cow, the most direct meaning of the word "cow" refers to "this particular cow." Unfortunately, if this were the denotative meaning of the word cow, than the denotative meaning would have to change when we use the word cow to denote a second cow. Hence (as we observed earlier) the theory that the denotative meaning corresponds to the generic property has been proposed. While this explains how the word "cow" is able to denote different individual cows, it creates a level of indirection in the signification. In this case when we use the word "cow," we denote the meaning "cow-ness" which relates to the property "cow-ness" possessed by the cow we

are referring to. According to this interpretation, denotation amounts to the trope synecdoche where a word signifying a property is used to refer to the thing that possesses this property.




Figure 2.2 - Denotation as Synecdoche

Potential Hypotheses for Jayadeva's Sequence of Topics

According to the model of denotation I have been discussing, the directness of denotation is a relative phenomenon. Denotation is truly only a direct function of speech in comparison to the more indirect functions, indication and suggestion. Indication is more indirect because it depends on a direct meaning that does not provide logical semantic connections within a system of other meanings, and hence leads to indirection. Suggestion is considered more indirect because, by definition, suggestion exists when the literal meanings of words in an expression run into no obstruction. The suggested meaning is an alternate meaning that arises even though the literal meaning succeeds in communicating an appropriate sense. It is the existence of a suitable corresponding literal

meaning that differentiates suggested meanings from indicated meanings. If such a literal meaning did not exist, then we would not be able to say that the alternative meaning is a suggested meaning rather than an indicative meaning. Whereas Ānandavardhana had characterized suggestion in contradistinction to denotation and indication, Jayadeva characterizes the directness of denotation in contradistinction from the indirectness of indication and suggestion. This is why he discusses denotation subsequently to indication and suggestion.

Gāgābhaṭṭa's Explanation for Jayadeva's Sequence of Topics

The above hypothesis is just one of a number of possible explanations as to why Jayadeva may have decided to present his chapters explaining the operations of the different operations of signification at the end of his work rather than in the beginning, where they might have served as a foundation for his aesthetic theory, and thus why he has chosen to sequence his explanations of the three *śabdavṛtti*-s (powers of speech) in a retrograde sequence. Gāgābhaṭṭa presents a simpler and more conventional explanation for Jayadeva's sequencing. As an introduction to the seventh chapter on suggestion he writes: "Having described the nature of *rasa*, because this (*rasa*) can only be accessed through suggestion, he defines suggestion with [these] two verses."[34] In Gāgābhaṭṭa's view such a transition is a matter of thematic continuity. The transition from the more psychologically oriented topic of *rasa* to the more linguistically oriented topic of

[34] *rasasvarūpaṃ nirūpya tasya vyañjanaikagamyatayā vyañjanāṃ nirūpayati ślokadvayena* (*RĀ*, 7.1).

suggestion is in his view simply a matter of necessity. According to Gāgābhaṭṭa, suggestion must be explained after *rasa* because this is the mode of signification whose chief purpose is to reveal *rasa*.

While such an explanation accounts for the transition between the sixth chapter on *rasa* and the seventh chapter on *dhvani*, Gāgābhaṭṭa has a more awkward time explaining why Jayadeva treats indication in the ninth chapter after he has discussed *dhvani* and subordinate suggestion in the seventh and eighth chapters:

> ... having described the varieties of subordinate suggestion with *dhvani* as a remembered subject through the description of suggestion as an operation of speech, he [now] defines indication in connection to the operations of speech which [now become] the subject of recollection. [It is said:] "When there is a reflection through an association with [another thought], once that [other thought] has finished, only the [new] reflection remains in the mind."[35]

Later, introducing Jayadeva's chapter on denotation, Gāgābhaṭṭa states: "having explained indication [Jayadeva] explains denotation, which is the actual cause of that (indication)." [36]

Gāgābhaṭṭa's interpretation might on some accounts explain Jayadeva's ordering of the final four chapters detailing modes of verbal signification, but it does not explain why Jayadeva presents these chapters at the end of the work rather than explaining these at the beginning of the work, as is the convention in most *ālaṃkāraśāstra*-s of the second

[35] *śabdavṛttivyañjanānirūpaṇena smṛtadhvaniguṇībhūtavyaṅgyabhedān nirūpya, yatprasaktyā yo vicāras tatsamāptau sa eva buddhistho bhavatītismṛtaśabdavṛttiprasaṅgena lakṣaṇāṃ nirūpayati* (*RĀ*, 9.1).

[36] *lakṣanām nirūpya taddhetutāṃ śaktim nirūpayati* (*RĀ*, 10.1).

millennium. If we accept Gāgābhaṭṭa's account, such a decision is largely a matter of default. Since Jayadeva describes suggestion after *rasa,* he then proceeds to describe the other *śabdavṛtti*-s according to the principle of thematic continuity explained in the previous paragraph. As we have mentioned, already, the *Candrāloka* is a highly systematic composition, and it does not exhibit signs of arbitrariness in other aspects of its structure. It seems unlikely that he would end his work with the subject of denotation simply because this is the one remaining topic of discussion.

Another possibility is that Jayadeva has presented his topics in a historical sequence. Initially, *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s did not investigate the technical features of the operations of signification. The examination of this topic was provoked by the theory of *dhvani* which differentiated a separate operation beyond denotation and indication: verbal suggestion (*vyañjanā*). While the precise evolution of suggestion remains mysterious, at one level the theory of verbal suggestion arises from the struggle to explain adequately how *rasa* is engendered in works of drama and literature.[37] According to this theory, the earlier topics in the *Candrāloka* -- faults, poetic distinctions, virtues and ornaments -- correspond to topics that originally appear in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and, with the exception of the distinctions (*lakṣaṇa*) continue to appear in the early treatises that purely concern *alaṃkāraśāstra.*

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[37] *Tena pratītis tāvad rasasya siddhā. sā ca rasanārūpā pratītir utpadyate. vācyavācakayos tatrâbhidhādivivikto vyañjanātmā dhvananavyāpāra eva* (*DhvĀLoc*, 2.4, pp. 198-199) ("Therefore it is now established that there is perception of *rasa.* Moreover, this perception in the form of aesthetic relishing is physically produced (*utpadyate*). And the verbal operation in bringing about this perception is the hinting (*dhvanana),* the suggesting (*vyañjana),* of the literal sense and denotative words, which is an operation different from *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā* "). (Trans. Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, 225).

Although such an explanation is plausible, Jayadeva has for the most part avoided historical discussion in this text. While he clearly critiques certain earlier *ākaṃkārika*-s,[38] he does not present the type of sequential overview of views that Ruyyaka provides in the *Alaṃkārasarvasva.* Instead, his stated concern is for his text to provide the integration of logical reasoning and aesthetics (*yuktyāsvādyalasad-rasaikavasatiḥ*).[39] It is therefore more likely that the structure of the *Candrāloka* is ordered by a desire to establish a relationship between aesthetics and logical reasoning as this manifests in the operation of poetic language.

Jayadeva's Six Types of Denotation: Further Evidence of a Tropological Understanding of Denotation

As we have intimated earlier, the idea that aesthetic examination of language in the *Candrāloka* provides a foundation for more logical investigation of language gains support from the tropological operation within denotation itself. The view that denotation involves a tropological component is supported by Jayadeva's explanations in the tenth chapter itself. Here Jayadeva's enumeration of six categories of words accompanied by six corresponding categories of denotation appends two new categories to the original four enumerated by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya* and reiterated by subsequent

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[38] *nāśaṅkanīyaṃ eteṣāṃ matam etena dūṣyate / kiṃtu cakṣur mṛgākṣīṇāṃ kajjalenêva bhūṣyate* (*CĀ*, 1.5). ("The opinions of [my] predecessors should not be suspected as being stained[38] by this [text]. Rather, they are ornamented by this, just as the eyes of doe-eyed ladies are [ornamented] with collyrium.")

[39] *CĀ*, 1.3.

grammarians and *ālaṃkārika*-s until Jayadeva's era.[40] To Patañjali's distinction of 1) generic properties (*jāti*), 2) qualities (*guṇa*), 3) action (*kriyā*), and 4) proper name (*yadṛcchā*[41]), Jayadeva adds "connection to thing" (*vastuyoga*) and "self reference through phonetic stipulation" (*nirdeśa*[42]).[43] As we shall see, both of these types of denotation involve significant tropes.

Before I examine the tropology of *vastuyoga* and *nirdeśa* specifically, I should emphasize that the properties introduced by Patañjali as analyzed by the logicians serve two related purposes in logical analysis: one for the speaker and one for the listener or reader. Generic properties, qualities, actions and names represent four different types of properties, which can qualify an entity in a determinate cognition (*savikalpajñāna*) such that the entity can be communicated through speech. Here a determinate cognition (*savikalpajñāna*) is generally understood as a cognition that can be verbalized as a

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[40] *catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttir jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā yadṛcchāśabdāś caturthāḥ* (*MBh*, 1.1.2.2). ("There is a fourfold operation to words, the quarters [of this] being words for generic properties, words for qualities, words for actions and words for names"). Patañjali's categorization is maintained by Bhartṛhari and *alaṃkārika*-s such as Mukulabhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa and Hemacandra. Of these latter, Mammaṭa's expression is most well known: *saṃketitaś caturbhedo jātyādir jātir eva vā* (*KP*, sūtra 10, p. 32). ("There are four types of meanings understood through convention – generic properties, qualities, actions and names or these are just generic property alone.").

[41] *yadṛcchā* literally means caprice. It refers to proper nouns, because the connection between the name and the one named is determined through the caprice of the namer, rather than through a convention, divine, human or otherwise.

[42] The word *nirdeśa* literally means "a pointing out" or "specification." From the illustration that Jayadeva provides, *kaṃ saṃhinasti kaṃsārir naraṃ ca kaṃ samāśritam* (10.3cd), it becomes clear that he intends this term to mean the property of self reference through a stipulation of phonetic composition. For instance, the word *kaṃsaṃ* may refer to the name of a tyrant killed by Kṛṣṇa, or it may refer to the phoneme "ka" and the phoneme "sa." The latter of these two is *nirdeśa*.

[43] *jātyā guṇena kriyayā vastuyogena saṃjñayā / nirdeśena tathā prāhuḥ ṣaḍvidhām abhidhāṃ budhāḥ //* (*CĀ*, 10.2)

proposition whose elements are properly synthesized.[44] For instance, someone having a determinate cognition of a particular cow can express his cognition as "that is a cow" or more precisely "that is something that possesses the generic property 'cow-ness.'" Because such a cognition can be expressed as a proposition it can be communicated to a listener.

We should take notice that the same property which is common to the cognitions of the speaker and the listener is the very property that allows for cognition to be verbalized. Such a property is called a *pravṛttinimitta* or "the cause for verbal signification." Thus in the traditional understanding of the *Mīmāṃsaka*-s, the listener, hearing the word "cow," cognizes the generic property "cow-ness" which the *Miṃāmsaka*-s hold to be the denoted meaning of the word "cow," and is capable of ascertaining the cow that was substrate of the original cognition by the speaker. Similarly, someone might have a determinate perception of a white cow -- or more formally, of something that possesses both the generic property "cow-ness" and the color white -- and hence is able to verbalize this cognition as "that is a white cow." He may then say to a speaker: "look at the white cow," and the speaker will be able to identify the object of his cognition through the understanding of the generic property "cow-ness" and the color white. The same process occurs if the speaker perceives a cow that is walking, or a cow that he knows to be named "Ḍittha." In these cases, the entity is referred to through the properties of 1) "cow-ness and 2) the action of walking or the property of having been adventitiously named "Ḍittha." According to most classical Indian language

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[44] Karl Potter, "Meaning and Truth" in *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, vol. 2 of *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977) 150.

theorists, these four types of properties – generic properties, qualities, actions, and names – allow for the determinate cognition and hence the verbalization of all phenomena.

Jayadeva, however, conceives of two additional types of verbal cognitions. In the first of these, Jayadeva notes that sometimes we form a determinate conception of a relationship to a thing, as in the case of someone holding a staff. In Sanskrit such a relationship can be expressed as a single word *daṇḍin* or "staff-possessor." In classical semantic theory such a cognition would be expressed through the generic property *daṇḍitva* or "the property of possessing a staff." In Jayadeva's view, however, such a generic property is distinguished from other generic properties in that it is intermediated by a relationship. In other words such a property does not pertains to a thing, but instead to a relationship to a thing ("*vastuyoga*").[45] The use of the word *vastu* (thing) does not denote any specific ontological category and hence even words such as *gotvavān* ("possession of the generic property 'cow-ness'") can be classified as *vastuyoga.*




Figure 2.3– *vastuyoga* as a trope

[45] *Yatra jātyādayaḥ sambandhena na vyavahitās tatra ta* <*sic*> *eva pravṛttinimittāni vācyā vā. yatra tu tena vyavahitās tatra vastuyoga eva tathā. Vastuno daṇḍāder yogaḥ saṃbandha iti tadarthaḥ* (*Ramā*, 10.2).

The second type of verbal cognition pertains to the self referentiality of words. Here, words signify their own phonetic basis, rather than a conventionally established meaning. We can consider an example of this phenomenon in English. If we wish to speak about the word house, we might say "the word 'house' begins with an 'h'," but we also might say simply "'house' begins with an 'h'" Because of the context of the sentence, we understand that the word 'house' does not denote a structure where people dwell, but rather that phonetic entity that begins with an h. According to Jayadeva, Sanskrit words have this same capacity to signify their own phonetic identities.

One way to understand self-reference is to think of a word as a sequence of phonemes. This sequence of phonemes can designate either the meaning to which this sequence has become associated through a verbal convention or it can signify its own sequence of phonemes. Hence there is the common example: "you can't go into a crowded movie theatre and shout fire." When we read this expression, there is no intonation that might suggest we should understand the word "fire" to mean "the word 'fire'" rather than a fire itself, but such an understanding arises naturally from the context of the sentence.

In Sanskrit, such self-reference is easier to explain than in English. This is because the name for each of the simple Sanskrit phonemes is exactly equivalent to the pronunciation of the phoneme in a word. Here I am referring specifically to the simple consonants -- *ka, ga, kha, gha nga... śa, ṣa, sa, ha* etc., and also the *anusvāra* -- *ṃ*. Each of these consonants and the anusvāra has the capacity to signify its own individual phonetic identity. Thus the word *haṃsa* can signify "goose," but it can also signify its constituent phonemes 1) *ha*, 2) *ṃ*, and 3) *sa.*

The most famous example of this in Sanskrit is the pun well known in the tradition: *kaṃ saṃ jaghāna*? ("Whom did [Kṛṣṇa] kill?"), which is, phonetically speaking, its own answer -- *kaṃsaṃ jaghāna* ("He killed the one whose name has the phoneme *kaṃ* and the phoneme *saṃ*, i.e., Kaṃsa"). Here the syllable *kaṃ* means the phoneme *ka* followed by an *anusvāra* and the syllable *sa* means the phoneme *sa*. *Kaṃsaṃ* is the accusative form of the word *Kaṃsa*, which is this view is a *dvandva* compound meaning "the phonetic construct *kaṃ* followed by the phoneme *sa*." From the context of the question, we understand that these phonemes pertain to the name of the person who is the answer to the question "whom did Kṛṣṇa kill?"

Of course one might argue that in this case *kaṃsa* directly denotes the proper name *Kaṃsa*, rather than denoting the phonemes that comprise this name. Considering this ambiguity, Jayadeva selects a more complex but precise example to illustrate *nirdeśa*: *kaṃ saṃhinasti kaṃsārir? naraṃ ca kaṃ samāśritam*[46] (Whom did the enemy of *Kaṃsa* kill? [The one whose name] makes use of the phoneme *na* and the *phonetic construct raṃ*, i.e., *Naraka*; [the one whose name has] the phonetic construct *kaṃ* joined with the phoneme *sa*, i.e., *Kaṃsa*). Just as in the case of the determinate cognition "cow-ness," the property which the cow is cognized though is a *Jāti* (generic property), in the current case, the victims of Kṛṣṇa are cognized through the phonemes that comprise their names.

It is not difficult to see how these two supplemented types of words highlight the tropological aspect of denotation. In the case of words that are *vastuyoga*, a connection is used to communicate the substrate of the connection. The word *daṇḍin* technically

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[46] *CĀ*, 10.3.

denotes the possession of a staff, but in practice it is used to designate the person who possesses the staff. Hence in this case a word referring to possession is used to communicate the possessor. In the case of words that are *nirdeśa*, the description of phonetic placement is used to refer to the meaning of the word formed from such a placement of phonemes.




Figure 2.4 - *nirdeśa* as a trope

The type of denotation Jayadeva has termed *nirdeśa* comes perilously close to being identified with a type of denotation that leads to a contradiction, and hence serves as the impetus for a variety of indication in which the relationship between the literal meaning and the indicated meaning is one of literal expresser to literal meaning. Jayadeva enumerates this type of indication, *vācyavācakasambandhalakṣaṇā* ("indication involving a relation of denoted meaning to denoted word"), in verse 9.9; as this one of the more confusing varieties of indication, both Pradyotanabhaṭṭa and Gāgābhaṭṭa have provided illustrations in their comments to this verse which help clarify its function. There is a tradition of wordplay in Sanskrit, whereby the word *śānta* ("tranquil" or "tranquility") is used to mean *kleśa* ("affliction"). The reason that *śānta* is able to convey such a meaning, which is the opposite to its conventional sense, is that phonemes are

capable of being the components of expressive words as well as expressers of their own phonetic entities. In the first case the word *śānta* simply denotes the meaning "tranquility." In the second case, however, the word *śānta* is analysed into two components *śa* and *anta.* In this case the word, *śānta* is understood to have meaning derived from the individual etymologies of the components *śa* ("the phoneme *ś*a") and *anta* ("end"). Therefore it is possible to understand the word *śānta* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound based on the components *śa* and *anta* leading to the meaning "that which has the phoneme *śa* as its end." From this denoted meaning we understand the meaning the word *kleśa*, since this word indeed ends with the phone *śa.* However, in the original context of the expression, we must assume that the meaning "the word '*kleśa*'" does not make sense semantically in the original sentence and hence the listener is motivated to presume a related meaning, in this case the meaning "affliction." Here, somewhat ironically, the relation (*saṃbandha*), between the indicated meaning and the literal meaning is one of denoted meaning to denoted word since "affliction" is certainly the denoted meaning of "the word *kleśa.*"

This type of indication illustrates an unusual aspect concerning the relationship between indicated meanings and denoted meanings. Ordinarily, we assume that an indicated meaning is dependent upon the denoted meaning, which on account of some unsuitability impels the attribution of the indicated meaning. In the example of *vācyavācakasambandalakṣana* ("indication having a relation of denoted meaning to denoted word") that we have explained in the preceding paragraph, there are two undesirable denoted meanings. The first one concerns the conventional denoted meaning of the word *śānta*, i.e., "tranquility," which is rejected in the current context. The second

undesired literal meaning of the word *śānta* is "the phonetic entity '*kleśa*'" which is understood through the etymological analysis of *śānta* into *śa* – *anta* i.e. "ending in *śa*", as the word *kleśa* ends in the phoneme *śa*. However in this hypothetical context, the word *śānta* is used in the sense of "affliction." Therefore, this second denoted meaning, "the phonetic entity '*kleśa*'" is also unsatisfactory and impels the attribution of an indicated meaning, "affliction." In this case the relation between the indicated meaning, "affliction," and the denoted meaning , "the word '*kleśa*'" is simply "literal meaning to literal expressor." Another way to put this is that the indicated meaning "affliction" is the denoted meaning of the signified meaning "the phonetic entity '*kleśa,*' which is itself signified by the original word *śānta.*

In the present model of indication we are presented with a word, *śānta*, which in in a certain context (i.e., when it is used in the sense of "affliction") has two undesired denotative meanings: 1) "affliction" and 2) the phonetic entity "*kleśa.*" Even though both of these meanings are ultimately unsuitable, only the second of these serves as the cause for indication that leads to the meaning "affliction." Therefore, in this case the indicated meaning ("affliction") determines which of the denoted meanings serves as the cause (*hetu*) of the indication. In an unsettling way, the result determines the cause.. A model of this signification is presented below.




Figure 2.5 - *vācyavācakasambandhalakṣaṇā* ("indication having the relation of literal expresser to literal meaning")

One might rightly ask why the word *śānta* is said to indicate the meaning *kleśa* ("affliction") if the expression *kaṃ samāśritam* is said to denote *kaṃsaṃ* ("*kaṃ* joined with *saṃ*") In the former case, we must assume that from context, a meaning other than a name or word is demanded of the word *śānta.* Hence the meaning "the word '*kleśa*'" is rejected in favor of a related meaning which just happens to be the denoted meaning of "the word '*kleśa*'" i.e., "affliction." In the case of the word *kaṃ samāśritaṃ*, this is the answer to the question *kaṃ saṃhinasti kaṃsāriḥ* ("who did Kṛṣṇa kill?"). Hence the meaning that is expected is a name, albeit the name of someone who is killed by Kṛṣṇa. Therefore the phonetic construction conveyed by the expression *kaṃ samāśritam* through *nirdeśa* serves (in Jayadeva's view) as an appropriate denoted meaning because the expected meaning is precisely a word, such a word that happens to be the name of a tyrant.

We should not let the complexity of these examples distract us from the main topic under consideration, *nirdeśa.* The main point is that in certain contexts a word is

said to denote its own phonetic entity rather than a meaning associated by convention. This is also a feature of the English language. Frequently when we want to express something about a word we simply use the word, as in the expression "house is a monosyllabic noun." The meaning of the word house in this expression is just "the word house." The fact that such a meaning is understood demonstrates that words have the capacity for self-reference. In Sanskrit, the capacity of words for self-reference is attributed to the capacity of phonemes for self-reference. Hence the word *kaṃsa* in addition to signifying the name of a tyrant killed by Kṛṣṇa can also be etymologized as a *samāhāradvandva*[47] analyzed as *kakāraḥ sānusvaraś ca sakāraś ca tau saḥ* ("the phoneme *ka* accompanied by an *anusvāra* and the phoneme *sa*"). Any word can potentially be etymologized as a composite of phonemes and hence can potentially denote its own phonetic composition. In such a way self-identification itself is understood as a trope whereby a word is used to convey the meaning of its most basic constituents, the phonemes by which it is composed, and hence ends up denoting itself.




Figure 2.6 - Self-Reference as a Trope

[47] A compound expression which is formed by stringing together nouns such that the collection is expressed as a singular entity, as in the case of *sukhaduḥkham* ("pleasure and pain").

Nirdeśa as a Separate Derivation of Meaning Apart from Etymology and Convention

One final complication regarding *nirdeśa* should be clarified. Words conventionally signify a meaning which has been associated with the word through convention. Various theories regarding the source of this convention have been proposed by the different schools of Indian philosophy, but it is not necessary to go into these in detail. It may suffice to say that the four predominant views are: 1) the convention between words and meaning is eternal, and hence uncreated (*mīmāṃsā*); 2) the convention between a word and its meaning is created by god according to his desire (*nyāya*); 3) the conventions between words and meanings is created according to desire (unspecified) (*navyanyāya*); 4) the convention between word and meaning is a creation of the innate potency of words (*vyākaraṇa*).[48] A word may be understood by a convention that applies to the word as a whole, or it may be understood through the conventions that apply to its parts. Application of convention to the parts can be understood in two ways. Either a compound word is understood according to the conventions that apply to the words from which it is composed, or an uncompounded word is understood through the conventions that apply separately to its base (*prakṛti*) and to its suffix (*prakṛti*). The first case is referred to as *tanmūlayoga* ("etymology based on the etymology of components").

In certain circumstances, a word that is ordinarily understood through the conventions applying to its parts is used in an expression where such a meaning is contradictory, and yet there exists another meaning, which is understood through a

[48] Madhav M. Deshpande, *The Meaning of Nouns: Semantic Theory in Classical and Medieval India* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992) 55-56.

convention that applies to the entire word and that produces a suitable meaning. The most famous example of this is perhaps *kṣīrasya nīradhiḥ*. *Kṣīra* means milk, and *nīradhiḥ*, when understood according to its parts *nīra* (water) and *dhi* (substrate), means substrate of water. Hence in the current expression, the understanding of *nīradhi* according to its parts leads to contradiction; a substrate of water cannot be of milk. It is still possible, however, to understand this expression by through a meaning for the *nīradhi*, ocean, which is derived through a convention applying to the word as a whole. Hence the original expression comes to mean an ocean of milk. The opposite phenomenon can also occur. If in the next sentence we were to read or hear *kūpo nīradhiḥ*, we would no longer be able to understand the meaning understood through the convention that applies to the whole word, since this would contradict the appositional meaning of the word *kūpaḥ*, "a well." Hence in this case we would need to revert to the meaning that is derived from the conventions applying to the parts, "a substrate of water," so that we can arrive at more reasonable sense "a well that is a substrate of water."

In the case when neither the meaning derived from a convention applying to the whole word nor any meaning derived from the conventions applying to the parts of the word provides a semantically suitable link in a given expression, the primary sense of the word is said to be contradictory or unsuitable, and hence it is necessary to replace this with a secondary or indicated meaning. We have already discussed this function extensively. This is the operation of signification that operates in expressions such as *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* ("a hamlet on the Ganges") and *agnir mānavakaḥ* ("the boy is fire"). This is the conventional understanding. If, however, we are to acknowledge the type of denotation that Jayadeva terms *nirdeśa*, then it is still possible for a word to denote a

meaning even if the convention applying to the whole word, the conventions applying to the component words, and the conventions applying to the base and suffix of the word or the component words do not produce a suitable meaning. Such a case is that in which a word is used to communicate its own phonetic constitution. Hence, in the expression *bhramaro dvirephavān*, no suitable etymological or conventional meaning of the word *bhramara* results in a semantic coherence with the qualification "having two *r*'s" (*dvirephavān*). Still, according to the theory of *nirdeśa*, we do not need to resort to indication in order to understand this expression. Instead, we should understand that in this context the word *bhramara* signifies its own phonetic composition *bh*, *ra*, *ma*, and *ra*, and this indeed possesses two *dvirepha*-s (two of the phonemes *ra*).

In view of the above, we should appreciate how *nirdeśa* along with *vastuyoga* broadens the inquiry into verbal signification, which becomes such a fertile area of discourse in the Indian philosophical traditions of the second millennium. Investigating the function of these two types of denotation, we find that the directness of denotation is a relative phenomenon that is best appreciated in relation to the other operations of verbal signification, indication and suggestion. According to the traditional Indian understandings, denotation is a complex function which involves its own indirections and stages. In particular, the idea that determinate concepts are the impetus and content of verbal expressions leads to the theory that language signifies entities through properties that qualify entities. In this respect denotation acquires its own tropological element. Denotation cannot be fully "direct" insofar as the cognitive channels through which denotation operates are not fully direct.

While the traditional theories attempt to establish directness through such principles as *śakti* ("inherent linguistic potency") and *saṃketa* (convention), which operate strictly within language, inevitably language use cannot be understood in isolation from the conceptual activities that motivate linguistic expression and determine the manner in which it is cognitively processed. As I have argued above, the cognitive patterns that arise in conjunction with language are inevitably tropological. Jayadeva's decision to sequence his chapters involving the aesthetic investigation on of language prior to those that detail more analytical semantic evaluation may well be grounded in the understanding that the semantic potential of language has a significant aesthetic basis.

Chapter 3 –Prophetic Moonlight: The *Candrāloka* and the Foreshadowing of Later Poetic and Semantic Theories

Kane and De's assessment of the *Candrāloka* is understandable on the surface. The *Candrāloka* does indeed involve a number of features that are remnants of far earlier poetic treatises: its presentation exclusively within verses (*kārikā*-s); its revival of *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinction) as a separate poetic constituent; its emphasis on poetic ornamentation - particularly those based in meaning; and in general, its categorization of poetry through the separate examination of different poetic operations rather than through the exploration of an integrating principle operating through different poetic features. Such circumstances support De's appraisal of the *Candrāloka* as a "convenient epitome."[1] Nevertheless, through a more careful examination of the work, one is struck by a number of verses that suggest surprisingly original viewpoints for a writer of Jayadeva's time. Some of Jayadeva's interpretations in the *Candrāloka* anticipate theories that appear much later in a more developed form, sometimes in *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s and sometimes in other *śāstra*-s. In this chapter we will examine four such examples, which demonstrate that the *Candrāloka* is a work that has one foot in the past and another in the future.

Jayadeva's statement early in the *Candrāloka* that his treatise is the single locus of reasoning and *rasa* demonstrates his desire to reconstitute poetics with more logically sound principles. Such a desire may be overlooked when one studies the text because the

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[1] De, *HSP*, 249.

Candrāloka does not include explicit logical argumentation. Rather, Jayadeva presents succinct explanations, followed immediately by charming examples of what has been elucidated. He does not hypothesize objections, or entertain alternate interpretations. Jayadeva's claim would seem to be more suited to Jagannātha Panditarāja's seventeenth century poetic treatise *Rasagaṅgādhara*, which specifically critiques the positions of earlier *ālaṃkārika*-s using logical methods refined by the *Navya-naiyāyika*-s during the preceding two centuries. Jayadeva, on the other hand, does not provide any clear cut evidence that he follows through on the agenda that he intimates in the aforementioned claim. On the other hand, the commentators of Jayadeva's treatise analyze the *Candrāloka* as if the verses have embedded a strong logical foundation. This is why Gāgābhaṭṭa has characterized the *Candrāloka* as *gahana* ("dense"). In light of Gāgābhaṭṭa's judgment, this chapter investigates Jayadeva's treatment of four specific issue in the *Candrāloka*: 1) the cause of poetic capacity, 2) the definition of poetry, 3) the explanation of indication (*lakṣaṇā*), and 4) linguistic self reference (*nirdeśa*). Jayadeva's treatment of the first two issues demonstrates a significant departure from earlier interpretations, and an orientation toward the modern poetic doctrines conveyed by Jagannātha in the seventeenth century. Jayadeva's wording within his explanation of indication reveals a remarkably similar attitude to that expressed by *navyanaiyāyika*-s such as Gaṅgeśa, beginning in the late thirteenth century. Lastly, Jayadeva's presentation of *nirdeśa* as an additional category of denotation anticipates the modern approach to semantic theory that emerges in the late medieval period within the school of the grammarians as well as the new logicians.

Evolution of Theories Concerning the Cause of Poetic Capacity

In verse 1.6, Jayadeva states: *pratibhaîva śrutābhyāsasahitā kavitāṃ prati/ hetur mṛdambusaṃbaddhā bījamālā latām iva //* ("Talent accompanied by study (of scripture and science) and practice is the cause of the property of being a poet, just as a row of seeds combined with earth and water is the cause of a creeping vine."). Such a definition for the cause of poetry at first seems hardly remarkable. The same three conditions -- talent, study, and practice -- are mentioned as being the causes, or collectively the cause, of poetry in almost all *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s beginning with Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* and Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa*.[2] Of all the *ālaṃkārika*-s who explain the cause of poetic capacity, Vāmana provides the definition closest to that of Jayadeva. Like that of Bhāmaha, Vāmana's definition is scattered among several verses in the third section (*adhyāya*) of the first chapter (*adhikaraṇa*)[3] of the *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra.* Here he specifically states *loko vidyā prakīrṇañ ca kāvyāṅgāni* (*KAS*, 1.3.1) ("worldly knowledge and science and assorted other things are the auxiliaries of poetry"), and proceeds to explain these three verses in the remaining thirty verses of the section -- which entails perhaps the most extensive discussion of the causes of poetic capacity in the annals of *alaṃkāraśāstra.*

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[2] The explanation of the causes of poetry is dispersed throughout four verses in Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra*: *gurūpadeśād adhyetuṃ śāstraṃ jaḍadhiyo 'py alaṃ / kāvyaṃ tu jāyate jātu kasyacit pratibhāvataḥ //* (*KA*, 1.5). *ato 'bhivāñchatā kīrtiṃ stheyasīm ā bhuvaḥ sthiteḥ yatno viditavedyena vidheyaḥ kāvyalakṣaṇaḥ*(*KA*, 1.8). *śabdaś chando 'bhidhānārthā itihāsāśrayāḥ kathāḥ / loko yuktiḥ kalāś cêti mantavyaḥ kāvyahetavaḥī //* (*KA*, 1.9). *śabdābhidheye vijñāya kṛtvā tadvidupāsanām / vilokyânyanibandhāṃś ca kāryaḥ kāvyakriyādaraḥ //* (*KA*, 1.10). Daṇḍin concentrates his explanation in a single verse: *naisargikī ca pratibhā śrutaṃ ca bahu nirmalam / amandaś câbhiyogo 'syāḥ kāraṇaṃ kāvyasampadaḥ* (*KĀ* 1.103).

[3] S. K. De explains Vāmana's archaic use of sectional terms: "Instead of having *adhyāyas* first and *adhikaraṇas* thereunder, Vāmana reverses the orderof older *sūtra*-writers and divides his work into five *adhikaraṇas*, each of which consist of two *adhyāyas* (excepting the first and fourth which contain three each), the whole work thus having five *adhikaraṇas* and twelve *adhyāyas* (De, *HSP*, vol 2, 88).

One of the subcategories explained within the class of "assorted other things" (*prakīrṇam*) is *pratibhānam* ("talent"), which in Vāmana's view is "a karmic imprint from a previous life."[4] While Vāmana has technically classified *pratibhā* as one of many auxiliaries that lead to the poetic capacity, in his specific clarification of this term he states *kavitvabījaṃ pratibhānaṃ* (*KAS*, 1.3.16) ("Talent is the seed of the property of being a poet {poetic capacity}"). As he states, this auxiliary is privileged to some extent, since "without this poetry will not be produced, or if it is produced [without this] it will be the locus of derision."[5]

Like Daṇḍin, Jayadeva presents the cause of poetry in a single verse, and to a certain degree presents a collection of conditions (talent, study and practice) as productive of poetry. On the other hand, like Vāmana, he privileges talent as the distinctive "seed" of poetry, through the use of the word *eva* in the expression *pratibhaiva*. Because of the use of the particle *eva*, talent becomes the true cause of poetry, though only when accompanied by study and practice, in the same way that a row of seeds is the true source of a creeping vine, but only when accompanied by earth and water. Surprisingly, the commentators of the *Candrāloka* interpret this verse along the lines of Mammaṭa's explanation rather than Vāmana's. Mammaṭa explains the cause of poetry, not specifically poetic capacity, as: *śaktir nipuṇatā lokaśāstrakāvyādyavekṣaṇāt / kāvyajñaśikṣayābhyāsa iti hetus tadudbhave*[6] ("talent, skill on account of the investigation of the world and of the sciences, and practice under the tutelage of someone

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[4] *kavitvabījaṃ pratibhānam* (*KAS*, 1.3.16, p. 32).

[5] *yasmād vinā kāvyaṃ na niṣpadyate. niṣpannaṃ vā hāsyâyatanaṃ syāt* (*KAS*, *vṛtti* to 1.3.16).

[6] *KP*, verse 3, pg. 11.

who understands poetry is the cause of the arising of it {poetry}"). The main thrust of Mammaṭa's explanation is that talent, investigation, and practice do not represent separate causes of poetry, but rather serve as a collective cause.[7] Jayadeva's statement *pratibhaîvaśrutābhyāsasahitā* ("talent alone accompanied by study and practice") also demonstrates a collective cause, but in addition it conveys the idea that talent is the distinctive cause. Such an understanding is absent in the explanation of Mammaṭa. Nevertheless, because of his desire to interpret the *Candrāloka* along the canonical lines established by the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, the commentator Vaidyanātha insists on an idiosyncratic usage of the word *eva*, by which it indicates that talent bears as much weight in the causation of poetry as do study and practice.[8]

Jayadeva's Preference of Vāmana's Explanation over Mammaṭa's

Because of the nature of the simile that Jayadeva has employed in his own explanation of the cause of poetic capacity, it seems rather clear that he favors Vāmana's explanation over that of Mammaṭa, and that genius is privileged as the distinctive cause of poetry. Like a seed which bears the genetic properties which distinguish the specific species of a germinating creeper, talent has been stated by Vāmana to be the specific imprinting of past life experience. As such, talent is related to the specificity that defines an individual karmic continuum, and therefore determines the particular type of talent

[7] *kāvyaṃ kartuṃ vicārayituṃ ca ye jānanti tad upadeśena karane yojane ca paunaḥ punyena pravṛttir iti trayaḥ samuditāḥ, na tu vyastās tasya kāvyasyôdbhave nirmāṇe samullāse ca hetur na tu hetavaḥ* (*KP*, *vṛtti* to verse 3, pp. 12-13).

[8] *evakāreṇêtarasamakakṣavyavacchedaḥ* (*Ramā*, 1.6, pg. 3). ("because of the word *eva*, there is a determination [that talent] has equal weigh as the others {study and practice}").

that is the basis of a particular poet's poetry. But even as a cause for the most general capacity for poetry, talent is more fundamentally associated with the imagination that produces poetic language. Study and practice can refine and ripen the poetic imagination that has already manifested itself, but they are not able to provide the raw conscious "material" comprising this imagination. Only talent, which as a *saṃskāra* is embedded in the *ātmā* of the poet,[9] is productive of such an imagination. This is why Vāmana states that poetry produced without genius is the locus of derision.

Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja's Explanation of the Cause of Poetry

Four centuries later, Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, equipped with more sophisticated techniques of analysis developed in the *navyanyāya* school of philosophy, reconsiders the causality behind poetry. In the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, Jagannātha establishes a far more radical position than Jayadeva's, although one established as an extension of the same logical trajectory. Jagannātha states: *tasya ca kāraṇaṃ kavigatā kevalā pratibhā*[10] ("And the cause of it (poetry) is talent *(pratibhā)* alone, which is inherent to the poet"). He then explains that sometimes the cause of talent itself is the karma,[11] which arises through the grace of some divinity or some holy person, and sometimes the cause of genius is

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[9] In the view of most traditional schools of Indian philosophy, *saṃskāra*-s are the seeds of future experience and activities; these are deposited in the *ātmā* (individualized consciousness) of the individual through the actions and experiences of previous lifetimes.

[10] *RG*, 1st *ānana*, *kāvyakaraṇa*, pg. 9.

[11] *adṛṣṭa*.

exceptional study and practice in the execution of poetry.[12] He specifies however, that the collection of all three is not the only cause of genius, and hence even in the absence of study and practice, talent may arise in children solely through the grace of a holy person.[13] This observation then begs the question whether study and practice conducted in previous lifetimes also serve as cooperating causes under these circumstances. Here Jagannātha states that this is not a valid consideration, because there is no way to prove such a theory, and because there is no guarantee that the study and practice in previous lifetimes would not come to fruition in some other fashion.[14]

Comparison of Jayadeva and Jagannātha's Explanations of the Cause of Poetic Capacity

Jayadeva's choice of simile in his explanation of the cause of poetic capacity demonstrates that he has not yet arrived at the view that Jagannātha presents in the *Rasagaṅgādhara.* While in Jayadeva's view talent depends on study and practice in order to actualize its potential as the cause of poetry, just as a seed depends on earth and water in order to actualize its potency in producing a plant, Jagannātha states that genius alone is the cause of poetry, although allowing that sometimes study and practice are the cause of genius. Hence the two authors present different relationships between genius on one

[12] *tasyāś ca hetuḥ kvacid devatāmahāpuruṣaprasādādi janyam adṛstaṃ* (*Ibid*).

[13] *bālādes tau vinâpi kevalān mahāpuruṣaprasādād api pratibhotpatteḥ* (*Ibid*).

[14] Jagannātha has specifically stated that study and practice are sometimes the cause of genius. Hence, there is no guarantee that the study of worldly matters and science will necessarily come to fruition in talent for poetry, only the possibility. Such study and practice might also result in some other endowment, such as facility in another *śāstra.*

side and study and practice on the other. For Jayadeva, study and practice are necessary but auxiliary causes to the potency of talent in the production of poetic capacity, just as knowledge of the meaning of a word is said, according to the *naiyāyika*-s, to be the auxiliary cause to *śakti* (semantic potency) in the production of verbal understanding.[15] For Jagannātha, study and practice are instead potential causes of talent itself. Jayadeva's view is actualized aesthetically through the use of the most common trope, simile, whereas Jagannātha's view is actualized through a higher order of logic, which allows for a more specific analysis of the operation of karma (*adṛṣṭa*). When confronted with the case of a child prodigy poet, Jayadeva's explanation, which requires study and practice to be auxiliary causes, is compelled to postulate study and practice in a former lifetime. Yet, as Jagannātha states, there is no guarantee that study and practice accomplished in a former life will result specifically in poetic capacity in a subsequent life. To avoid this logical ambiguity, Jagannātha demotes study and practice to a second tier of causality as potential causes, along with grace of a deity or holy person, of genius. This explains why sometimes study and practice are distinct components in the acquisition of poetic capacity, and sometimes, as in the case of child prodigies, they are clearly not.

While Jayadeva's explanation does not demonstrate the same logical precision as Jagannātha's, clearly it demonstrates an advance from the explanations of Vāmana and Mammaṭa. Vāmana presents talent as an auxiliary cause of poetry, on the same level as study and practice, while Mammaṭa presents talent as part of a collective cause along with study and practice where all three are necessary conditions for poetry. Jayadeva

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[15] Words are said to have an inherent potential to produce a meaning, but according to the *naiyāyika*-s, unless this is supported by the listener's knowledge of the meaning of the word, a word cannot produce verbal comprehension. This view is characterized by Gāgābhaṭṭā in the tenth chapter of the *Candrāloka*: *sākṣāc chabdajanyārthapratītisahakārijñānaviṣayatvaṃ vā. nanu śaktijñānasya sahakāritve kim bījam? agṛhītaśaktikaśabdād arthapratyayābhāva evêti gṛhāṇa* (*RĀ*, 10.1).

presents the same triad as Mammaṭa and Vāmana, but he privileges talent as the special cause of poetry, both grammatically, through the particle *eva*, and tropologically through the use of a simile comparing talent to a seed.[16] While Vāmana has also applied a similar simile, unlike Jayadeva he does not complete the simile by comparing study and practice to the earth and water supporting the causal potency of the seed; hence he does not express the hierarchy of causal potency established in the *Candrāloka.* It might be argued that Jayadeva's view relies on an aesthetic trope, so that he does not truly succeed in logically differentiating the causal agency of talent from that of study and practice. Without appealing to talent as a material cause, it would be difficult to categorically differentiate talent from study and practice.[17] Still, perhaps it is more realistic to understand the simile instrumentally, and in this way we can see that Jayadeva's explanation provides a useful transition between earlier formulations of the cause of poetry and the more logically succinct and watertight explanation found in Jagannātha's *Rasagaṅgādhara.*

Evolution of Definitions of Poetry in *Alaṃkāraśāstra*

A similar type of transition can be observed with regard to Jayadeva's definition of poetry. Here, Jayadeva departs from a longstanding tradition of defining poetry as a

[16] While Vaidyanātha has interpreted Jayadeva's explanation along the lines of Mammaṭa's explanation, Gāgābhaṭṭa clearly interprets Jayadeva's definition in the manner that we have stated: *evaṃ ca vijātīyakāvye 'dṛṣṭasya kāraṇatā, avijātīyakāvye pratibhāyāḥ* (*RĀ*, 1.6). ("And hence, in the unusual type of poetry, karma is the cause, and in the usual type of poetry talent is the cause.").

[17] If we accept the full constraints of the simile, then talent, study and practice are all equally indispensable to the production of poetic capacity in the same way as a row of seeds, earth, and water are all equally essential for the sprouting of a vine.

qualified form of speech and meaning. This tradition extends at least as far back as Bhāmaha, whose definition of poetry is simply: *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam*[18] ("words and meaning in association are poetry"). Here we should not underestimate the import of the word *sahitau* ("in association"). This does not merely refer to the semantic convention (*saṃketa*) between words and meaning that is held by tradition to be the basis of verbal signification. At a far more profound level, this word posits a deep aesthetic symbiosis between sound and meaning which provides the distinct qualification of poetry in Bhāmaha's view. Bhāmaha's definition does not provide any further qualifications for this sound-meaning complex within his definition, even though the perception clearly arises through the rest of the text that *alaṃkāra*-s are the most significant feature in his system of poetics. Even so, his definition provides the template for most future definitions of poetry in the *alaṃkāraśāstra* tradition. Rudraṭa, Kuntaka, Mammaṭa, Bhoja, and Hemacandra, among others, all define poetry through this complex of sound and meaning. Daṇḍin is the exception in this respect, since he defines poetry through a slightly different paradigm.

Rather than conceiving poetry as a united pair of equals, sound and meaning, Daṇḍin states that the body of poetry: "is a series of words qualified as [collectively] signifying a desired meaning."[19] Daṇḍin attributes this view to his predecessors, and it is not precisely worded as a definition of poetry, but rather as the definition of the "body" of poetry. Even so, by this statement he instigates an alternate trend of definitions for poetry, which is subsribed to by both Jayadeva and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja. While those

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[18] *KA*, 1.16.

[19] *śarīraṃ tāvad iṣṭārthavyavacchinnā padāvalī* (*KĀ*, 1.10, pg. 8).

unfamiliar with Sanskrit epistemology might assume these two presentations to be more or less synonymous, they demonstrate a significant difference. In Bhāmaha's definition, sound and meaning are conveyed as equal constituents, while in Daṇḍin's, meaning is described as a property pertaining to a series of words. Sound becomes the substrate of poetry, while a desired meaning becomes its qualification. Such a definition emphasizes that sound produces meaning, and hence is qualified by its own production.

Neither Bhāmaha nor Daṇḍin specifically delimits the operation of poetry through qualifications within their definitions proper, but instead provide as wide a perspective as possible for the functioning of poetic language. Yet, both authors state in other verses that poetry cannot support even a single faulty word.[20] Subsequently, authors such as Vāmana, Hemacandra, and Jayadeva incorporate the requirement of faultlessness into their definitions of poetry. While Vāmana (9th century) does not provide a single bounded definition of poetry in any verse, throughout his first chapter he has provided a number of statements that might be integrated as a definition. Three aspects are most central to his characterization of poetry. In the first verse he states that poetry is recognized on account of *alaṃkāra*.[21] Here the word *alaṃkāra* primarily refers to its more general sense ("making sufficient"), as Vāmana states in the very next sūtra, *saundaryam alaṃkāraḥ* (1.1.2) ("*alaṃkāra is beauty*"), but tangentially it may also apply to the individual figures

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[20] *sarvathā padam apy ekaṃ na nigādyam avadyavat / vilakṣmaṇā hi kāvyena duḥsutenêva nindyate //* (*KA*, 1.11). ("In all cases, not even a single defective word is to be uttered. One is censured on account of a poetry with bad characteristics just as one is on account of an evil son.") *tad alpam api nôpekṣyaṃ kāvye duṣṭaṃ kathaṃ cana / syād vapuḥ sundaram api śvitreṇaîkena durbhagaṃ //* (*KĀ*, 1.7). ("Not even that fault that is slight can be overlooked in any fashion in poetry. Even a beautiful body is thought to be inauspicious on account of a single spot of leprosy.")

[21] *kāvyaṃ grāhyam alaṃkārāt* (*KAS*, 1.1.1, pg. 3). ("Poetry is to be recognized because of beauty").

of speech.[22] Later, however, Vāmana states *rītir ātmā kāvyasya* (1.2.6). ("style is the soul of poetry"). Hence Vāmana suggests two separate ways to define poetry. The first of these is through the identification of poetry's most distinguishing characteristic - *alaṃkāra*. The second is through the identification of its most essential and profound property – style (*rīti*).

In his *vṛtti* to the first sūtra in the work, Vāmana suggests a third course of definition -- definition according to substance:

> *kāvyaśabdo 'yaṃ guṇā 'laṃkārasaṃskṛtayôḥ śabdārthayor vartate.*
>
> *bhaktyā tu śabdārthamātravacano 'tra gṛhyate.*[23]
>
> [Technically], the word *kāvya* signifies words and meanings adorned by virtue and ornament, but here it conveys simply words and meanings according to a secondary signification.[24]

In the first part of this *vṛtti*, Vāmana anticipates the type of definition of poetry that is popular in many poetic works of the second millennium, where poetry is expressed as sound and meaning possessing virtues and ornaments.[25] Still in deference to the definition originally propounded by Bhāmaha, he states that the true intention of his sūtra is that poetry be simply word and meaning, with the implication that these are symbiotically

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[22] At the beginning of the third chapter, Vāmana writes *kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ* // (*KAS*, 3.1.1) *tadatiśayahetavas tv alaṃkārāḥ* // (3.1.2). ("Those properties that create the charm of poetry are poetic qualities (*guṇa*). Those [properties] which are the source of the intensification of beauty are the ornaments"). To this extent, the individual ornaments may also be said to be that which is responsible for poetry's recognition.

[23] *KAS*, *vṛtti* to 1.1.1.

[24] *KAS*, 1.1.1, trans, Ganganātha Jha.

[25] The additional qualification of faultlessness is appended in the definitions of Mammaṭa and Hemacandra.

bound (*sahitau*).[26] Hence, cumulatively, Vāmana demonstrates three different ways to define poetry: 1) by identifying the principal substance of poetry; 2) by revealing its essence or "soul"; and 3) by indicating the properties which qualify the principal substance of poetry. The first of these types of definitions is found in the earliest works of the tradition that emphasize either *guṇa*, *alaṃkāra*, or both – works such as Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa*, and also in Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṃkāra*; the second is found in Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* and in Abhinavagupta's *Locana*; the third in later more encylopedic works such as Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* and Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana.*

Ānandavardhana also identifies three types of characterizations of poetry in the *Dhvanyāloka*, two of which are similar to ones identified by Vāmana. The first of these is the one accepted by the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, and is identified in the very first *kārikā* itself, where the author writes: "….[The understanding that] 'the soul of poetry is *dhvani*' which has been passed down by scholars….."[27] This is an identification of poetry through its essence. Whereas Vāmana determines this to be "style" (*rīti*), the author of the *Dhvanikārikā* identifies this as *dhvani* ("suggestion"). In the *vṛtti* to this verse, Ānandavardhana hypothesizes an objection based on Bhāmaha's definition, as it is interpreted by Vāmana: that poetry is the symbiosis of sound and meaning which becomes the substrate of charm through figures of sound and meaning, the *guṇa*-s, *vṛtti*-s

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[26] Vāmana skillfully pays homage to Bhāmaha's opinion, while stating his own interpretation. This pattern of deference is similarly observed in the *Candrāloka*, verse 1.5.

[27] *kāvyasyâtmā dhvanir iti budhair*…(*DhvĀ*, 1.1, pg 8).

(in the sense of phonetic ambience), and the styles (*rīti*).[28] Here Ānandavardhana compresses two of Vāmana's types into one. The third type of characterization, which follows in the same section of the *vṛtti*, states the view that "the definition of poetry is just that which possesses sound and meaning delighting the hearts of 'sensitive readers.'"[29] This type of definition characterizes poetry according to its effect, and to a certain degree it is a merging of the definition and purpose of poetry. A variation of this is used by Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja in the *Rasagaṅgādhara.*[30] As the *Dhvanyāloka* is most concerned with establishing a unified theory of poetry, the first type of definition, the identification of essence, is most appropriate to its purposes, and hence the statement that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry serves as the *Dhvanyāloka*'s definition of poetry.

Mammaṭa's Problematic Definition of Poetry and Jayadeva's Critique

Mammaṭa takes up the definition that is originally suggested by Vāmana, that "poetry designates word and meaning adorned by ornaments and virtues," qualifying the

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[28] *Tatra kecid ācakṣīran śabdārthaśarīraṃ tāvat kāvyaṃ. tatra ca śabdagatāś cārutvahetavo 'nuprāsādayaḥ prasiddhā eva. arthagatāś côpamādayaḥ. varṇasaṃghaṭanādharmāś ca ye mādhuryādayas te 'pi pratīyante. Tadanatiriktavṛttayo vṛttayo 'pi yāḥ kaiś cid upanāgarikādyāḥ prakāśitāḥ tā api gatāḥ śravaṇagocaram.... Rītayaś ca vaidarbhīprabhṛtayaḥ. tadvyatiriktaḥ ko 'yaṃ dhvanir nāmêti.* (*Ibid*, *vṛtti* to 1.1, pg. 17).

[29] *sahṛdayahṛdayāhlādiśabdārthamayatvam eva kāvyalakṣaṇaṃ* (*Ibid*, 1.1, pg. 23). Here I have used Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan translation of the word *sahṛdaya*.

[30] *ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam* (*RG*, 1st Ānana, *kāvylakṣaṇa*, pg. 4). ("Poetry is sound that is productive of a charming meaning"). Unlike his Kashmiri predecessors and later *ālaṃkārika*-s such as Bhoja, Jagannātha adamantly states the substrate of poetry to be sound alone, albeit sound that is productive of a charming meaning. In this respect he can be seen as a successor to Daṇḍin who states: *śarīraṃ tāvad iṣṭārthavyavacchinnā padāvalī* ("the body [of poetry] is a series of words specified by a desired meaning.")

requirement of ornamentation and adding the requisite of faultlessness. Mammaṭa thus states that poetry is word and meaning, devoid of fault, possessing *guṇa*, but on occasion lacking *alaṃkāra*.[31] In the *vṛtti* to this verse he clarifies that the absence of *alaṃkāra* in his definition refers only to the absence of manifest ornaments, and the expression *analaṃkṛti* refers to ornaments that exist in a suggested or unmanifest state. As we shall see, the wording of his definition draws criticism from Jayadeva, who sees such a statement as particularly misleading.

Mammaṭa's wording of his definition is indeed puzzling. It is uncertain whether he states *analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* ("sometimes also without [manifest] ornaments") rather than *vyaṅgyālaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* ("sometimes also with suggested ornaments") for metrical or dictional reasons or whether, for reasons of precision, he wishes to avoid the inclusion of the logically treacherous issue of *vyañjanā* in his definition.[32] Nevertheless, in avoiding one liability he acquires others. As we have mentioned earlier, Jayadeva rebukes Mammaṭa rather disdainfully for such an opinion: "Why does that wise person who consents that sound and meaning without ornaments is poetry, not believe that something without heat is fire?" According to the tradition initiated by Vāmana, ornaments represent the most distinctive feature by which poetry is recognized.[33]

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[31] *Tad adoṣau śabdārthau sagunāv analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* (*KP*, Sutra 1, pg. 13).

[32] One should recall the earlier citation from Jayantabhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, which in as many words states that the "dense path" of *dhvani* is not a suitable locus for logical inquiry. (see chapter 2, note 18, p. 107) Because both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta acknowledge that that the only true means of knowledge for *dhvani* is the ascertainment of the connoisseur, the delimitation of *dhvani* is at best characterized as prolix. Ānandavardhana defends the assertion of *dhvani* by demonstrating that the refutations of *dhvani* are themselves illogical.

[33] *kāvyaṃ grāhyam alaṃkārāt* (*KAS*, 1.1.1, pg. 3).

For Vāmana, the main purpose of the poetic ornaments is that they provide the most perceivable effect. Hence Vāmana also states: *tadatiśayahetavas tv alaṃkārāḥ*[34] ("ornaments are the cause of the enhancement of it {beauty of poetry}"). Should ornaments be unmanifest, they would lose their primary function of providing poetry with its most recognizable sign of beauty. For such reasons, Jayadeva compares Mammaṭa to a man who believes there can be a fire that doesn't have heat. According to *vaiśeṣika* theory (as well as common sense), heat is the defining characteristic of fire.[35] Jayadeva's commentator Gāgābhaṭṭa further criticizes Mammaṭa's view by stating: "Even when there is a suggestion of an ornament, the ornament is still manifest."[36] Such a statement may allude to etymological principles as well, for the verbal root denoting "suggestion," √*vyañj*, also denotes "revealing" or "manifestation." It would be illogical for Mammaṭa to suggest that an ornament can be revealed and yet unmanifest in the same instance.

Mammaṭa's definition also contradicts the aesthetic principles formulated in the *Dhvanikārikā* and the *Dhvanyāloka*. The *Dhvanikārikā* 2.33 states:

> sarveṣv eva prabhedeṣu sphuṭatvenâvabhāsanam
>
> yad vyaṅgyasyâṅgibhūtasya tat pūrṇaṃ dhvanilakṣaṇam

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[34] *Ibid*, 3.1.2, pg. 70.

[35] *tejasa uṣṇatā*. (*Vaiśeṣikadarśana*, 2.2.4, Ed. Kashi Nath Sharma (Mandi: Kashi Nath Sharma, 1972) p. 125). Gaekwad's edition reads *tejasy uṣṇatā* ("heat is [situated] in fire"). Here the commentators explain that heat is situated only in fire, it does not migrate into water.

[36] *alaṃkāravyañjake 'py alaṃkārasya sphuṭatvam eva* (*RĀ*, 1.8, pg. 5).

> In all the varieties [of *dhvani*], the appearance[37] of suggested meaning in a manifest state as the predominant sense [of expressions] is the [most] complete sign[38] of *dhvani.*

The *Dhvanikāra* makes it quite clear that in all cases of *dhvani*, the suggested meaning must be manifest, or technically, it must be accompanied by the property of being manifest (*sphuṭatva*). Mammaṭa's claim, on the other hand, is that poetry must possess ornaments, but that sometimes ornaments can be in an unmanifest state, which, as he clarifies, means that they may be suggested. Mammaṭa hence equates the opposition of expressed (*vācya*) versus suggested (*vyaṅgya*), with the opposition of manifested (*sphuṭa*) versus unmanifested (*asphuṭa*). The Dhvanikāra, however specifically states that in the case of *dhvani*, the suggested meaning must not only be the predominant sense, but that it must possess the property *sphuṭatva* (that is, it must be *sphuṭa*), and hence he does not equate "suggested-ness" with "unmanifested-ness." Therefore Mammaṭa's original position does not find support in the original presentation of suggestion by the Dhvanikāra. Since the Dhvanikāra states that in *dhvani* (predominant suggestion), a suggested ornament must have the property of being *sphuṭa* (manifest), there is no place admittance for the unmanifest ornaments proposed by Mammaṭa.

Someone might argue that this is the case only in *dhvani* (the type of poetry where the suggested meaning is predominant). Since the Dhvanikāra acknowledges two full-fledged grades of poetry, *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* (poetry where the suggested meaning is subordinated to the expressed sense), it might still be possible for the

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[37] *avabhāsana*.

[38] *lakṣaṇa*. In the *Locana*, Abhinavagupta glosses this word in two ways: *svarūpaṃ* ("the true nature") and *pramāṇaṃ* ("means of knowing").

ornaments to exist in a suggested but unmanifest state in the type of poetry known as *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya.* Such an argument is subverted by an earlier statement of the *Dhvanikāra* in *kārikā* 2.29 that "when poetic ornaments are suggested by mere facts, these ornaments are adjuncts[39] of *dhvani.* The operation of poetry has these [ornaments] as its basis."[40] Suggested ornaments, stated to be accessories of *dhvani*, connote the operation of *dhvani*, and furthermore, since the existence of *dhvani* requires that the inherent suggested meaning be manifest, suggested ornaments must in all cases be manifest. It is still possible that Mammaṭa interprets the word *sphuṭa* in different fashions than had the *Dhvanikāra,* and that therefore Mammaṭa is exonerated in his view that suggested ornaments can be *asphuṭa* in poetry. It is also possible that he intentionally departs from the principles of the Dhvanikāra in this view. Still, Mammaṭa in general accepts the tenets of the *Dhvani* theory as presented in the *Dhvanyāloka.* His only significant departure is in his greater tolerance for *citrakāvya*[41] (puzzle poetry) as a legitimate independent category of poetry.

Despite its potential logical flaws, from a practical standpoint Mammaṭa's definition provides more effective guidance for the poet as well as the aspiring connoisseur. While conserving Bhāmaha's view that poetry is the allegiance of sound and meaning, it offers specific guidelines as to what is to be avoided and what is to be

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[39] Literally "these ornaments have the property of being adjuncts of *dhvani.*"

[40] *vyajyante vastumātreṇa yadālaṃkṛtayas tayā / dhruvaṃ dhvanyaṅgatā tāsām kāvyavṛttis tadāśrayā* (*DhvA*, 2.29, pg. 301). Ānandavardhana explains that poetry is said to have such suggested ornaments as its basis, because poetry is undertaken with these types of suggested meanings as the its ultimate goal (*tatra tathāvidhavyaṅgyālaṅkāraparatvenaîva kāvyaṃ pravṛttam*) *DhvĀ*, *vṛtti* to 2.29.

[41] Poetry lacking any suggested meaning and *rasa*, but instead relying on ornaments in the form of clever word puzzles or pictograms that are generated by the words in the verse. These commonly take the form of swords, flowers, umbrellas, flags and geometric arrays, as well.

implemented in such an allegiance. In this respect, it does not say anything particularly new, but rather consolidates the points that were presented more diffusely in earlier *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s.

Jayadeva's Definition of Poetry

Jayadeva, not to be outdone by Mammaṭa, presents an even more comprehensive definition of poetry along these lines. In addition to the prohibition of faults and the requirements of *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra*, he adds the additional requisites of *lakṣaṇa* and *rīti*, as well as the requirement of variegation of *rasa*-s, operations of verbal signification (*vṛtti*), and dictional ambience (*vṛtti*[42]). Jayadeva thus incorporates into his definition all the significant categories of poetic constituents that are discussed in *alaṃkāraśāstra*. In some measure, this definition is similar to a view which Ānandavardhana ascribes to certain critics, and which he uses to explain a hypothetical objection to the existence of *dhvani*. In the *vṛtti* to the first *kārikā* he states:

> Here some might contend that poetry is nothing more than what is embodied in word and meaning. The means of beautifying this pair that lie in sound, such as alliteration, and those that lie in meaning, such as sweetness, which possess certain properties of phoneme and arrangement. The *vṛtti*s, which have been described by some writers under such names as *upanāgarikā*, and which are not different in function from these [figures and qualities] also have reached our ears. So also the styles (*rīti*s) such as the Vaidarbhī. What is this thing called *dhvani* that it should differ from these?[43]

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[42] All three principal commentators agree that Jayadeva refers to *vṛtti* both as the operations of verbal signification and as the dictional ambiences such as the sweet mood (*madhurā*).

[43] *DhvĀ*, *vṛtti* to 1.1, trans. Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan. The original Sanskrit for this portion of the *vṛtti* has been earlier cited in note. *ṛtti*.

In this section of the *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana identifies a class of critics who understand poetry as a substrate, specifically a body, qualified by several types of properties that are responsible for its charm. Jayadeva's own definition is quite similar to this view, except that it defines the substrate of poetry to be sound alone rather than sound and meaning, and that it includes the additional properties 1) *lakṣaṇa* (poetic distinction); 2) presentation of different *rasa*-s; and 3) use of varied operations of verbal signification, i.e., denotation, indication and suggestion. We should note that Jayadeva's definition of poetry effectively differentiates the full gamut of topics that are discussed in the chapters of this work: the faults in chapter two, *lakṣaṇa* in chapter three, *guṇa* in chapter four, *alaṃkāra* in chapter five, *rasa* in chapter six, *rīti* (style) and *vṛtti* (dictional ambience) as subsidiaries of *rasa* in chapter six, and the operations of verbal signification in chapters seven through ten.

For the purpose of our present discussion, the most important feature of Jayadeva's definition is the absence of the word *artha* (meaning). With such an omission, Jayadeva emphasizes that the properties delimiting poetry pertain to speech alone. Had he included meaning in his definition, the properties that delimit poetry would necessarily apply to both speech and meaning, and in this case speech acquires the dual locus of both poetry and meaning. Several centuries after Jayadeva, Jagannātha critiques Mammaṭa's definition of poetry on account of its presentation of such a dual locus. Both Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha justify Jayadeva's view as follows: the word poetry designates speech qualified by certain properties, because the expression "he recites poetry" is stated only in regard to such speech.[44] The sense is that a person recites a speech, not a meaning. The

[44] *tena viśiṣṭaśabdaniṣṭham eva kāvyatvam. kāvyaṃ karotīti prayogasya tatraiva darśanāt* (*RĀ*, 1.7). ("Accordingly, poetry-ness is based in qualified speech alone because of the observation that the expression

meaning is signified by speech itself, and therefore is an indirect product. According to Jayadeva's semantic position, which is explained in the tenth chapter of the *Candrāloka*, the most direct way that a person can refer to an entity through speech is by designating the chief qualifier (*prakāra*) that resides in the entity. The chief qualifier only resides within a specific category of things. In this view, when we want to identify a pot, we say the word "pot" which designates the chief qualifier "pot-ness" that resides only in pots. According to different theories, the word pot may also signify the individual pot, or the individual pot may be known through some other means of knowledge such as inference or presumption.[45] Hence, when Gāgābhaṭṭa states that "the word 'poetry' is used only in reference to a qualified form of speech," he states that the chief qualifier "poetry-ness" resides only in such a qualified form of speech. Hence, according to this logic, poetry is just a qualified form of speech.

If Jayadeva had included meaning in his definition of poetry, then the various properties that he had listed in this definition would qualify meaning as well as sound. Such a definition would have represented two types of predication, one for sound and one for meaning, and this would lead to the property poetry-ness residing in multiple substrates, i.e., both sound and meaning. A definition of poetry postulating that poetry has such a dual substrate leads to an undesirable variability. For this reason, Jayadeva states that poetry is a qualified form of speech rather than a conjunction of speech and

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'he creates poetry' is applied only with respect to this [type of speech]"). Such a explanation appears to rely on a human convention , but it has a deeper meaning as well. In the *navyanyāya* tradition, the most direct way that a word refers to an entity is by designating the chief qualifier that resides in that entity.

[45] This is a very broad assessment of a vast variety of theories explaining this process. For a concise explanation of the varieties of Indian theories of semantic identification, one may refer to Kunjunni Rāja's *Indian Theories of Meaning* (Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963). For a more detailed and exhaustive explanation, one should consult Madhav M. Deshpande's *The Meaning of Nouns* (Kluwer, 1992) which includes an annotated translation of the *Nāmārthanirṇaya* of *Koṇḍabhaṭṭa.*

meaning, even though some of the properties listed by Jayadeva necessarily imply that poetry has a meaning. Both Vaidyanātha and Pradyotanabhaṭṭa hold that Jayadeva's definition acquires "meaning" through the qualification "faultless-ness," because, as they argue, if poetry were to lack a meaning, it would surely have fault.[46] Here Vaidyanātha again demonstrates his desire to understand the *Candrāloka* as being in accord with the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Gāgābhaṭṭa is more cognizant of the cases where Jayadeva clearly disagree with Mammaṭa, and recognizes the difference of their interpretations in the present case. While he acknowledges that other *ālaṃkārika*-s have stated poetry to exist in both sound and meaning, he does not attribute such a view to Jayadeva. Instead he presents Jayadeva's view to be just what Jayadeva has stated in the verse: "That speech possessing these [properties] is poetry. Therefore [the property] poetry-ness is only based in qualified speech alone."[47] Mammaṭa's position here seems to be less biased and more sound than that of Vaidyanātha.[48] When Jayadeva has gone to the trouble to directly state so many features of poetry as requisites in his definition, it would seem implausible that he should express the meaning of the word *artha* ("meaning") elliptically. While many of the properties that qualify poetry in his definition themselves involve meaning such as

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[46] *artho 'nyatra kāvyatayâtra katham upekṣita iti cen na. nirdoṣatvenaîva sārthakatvalābhāt* (*ŚĀ*, 1.7). ("If someone objects: 'when in other [definitions of poetry] meaning has the property of being poetry, why is meaning is excluded here (in your definitions)' we say: 'this is not the case because there is an acquiring of the property of having meaning on account of the property of being without fault." *nanu śabdārthayor vyāsajyavṛtti kāvyatvam iti prakāśādiḥ śabdaprādhānye sārthaśabdavṛttiḥ arthaprādhānye viparītam ity anye, tat katham atra sarvathârthasya tyāgaḥ? iti cet* <sic>*, na, nirdoṣatvenaivārthavattvalābhānnirarthakasya duṣṭatvāt* (*Ramā*, 1.7).

[47] *tadyuktā vāk śabdaḥ sa kāvyam ity arthaḥ. tena viśiṣṭaśabdaniṣṭham eva kāvyatvam* (*RĀ*, 1.7, pg. 4).

[48] Vaidyanātha similarly refuses to acknowledge that Jayadeva criticizes Mammaṭa in the subsequent verse: *aṅgīkaroti yaḥ kāvyaṃ śabdārthāv analaṃkṛtī / asau na manyate kasmād anuṣṇam analaṃ kṛtī* (*CĀ*, 1.8). Such a view seems particularly illogical. As we will explain later, Vaidyanātha's interpretation of the *Candrāloka* may be influenced by the fact that his teacher, Nageśabhaṭṭa, composed a commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa*.

rasa, *alaṃkāra*, and *lakṣaṇa*, this does not justify that we should understand meaning to be part of the substrate that is qualified. Rather, the understanding is that speech is qualified by *rasa* and *alaṃkāra*, because it produces a meaning that becomes the object of a contemplation that leads to *rasa*, and that speech is qualified by a meaning that serves as an ornament to speech.

By declining to express poetry as inhering in the dual complex of speech and meaning, Jayadeva recalls the definition of Daṇḍin, who stated that the body of poetry is a series of words qualified by a desired meaning. More significantly, however, he anticipates the definition provided by Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, who in the seventeenth century states: *ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam*[49] ("sound which is productive of a delightful meaning is poetry"). While Jagannātha does mention *artha* (meaning) in his definition, he does so only as a qualification of sound. As he explains later in the commentary to this sūtra: "the union of word and meaning is not designated by the term 'poetry', because there is an absence of proof for this…because only qualified speech acquires the property of being the meaning of the word poetry."[50] This is to say that the word poetry refers specifically to qualified speech.

Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja's Definition of Poetry

While Jagannātha utilizes a similar principle of defining poetry through qualified speech as opposed to qualified speech and meaning, he differs from Jayadeva in that he

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[49] *RG*, 1st Ānana, pg. 4.

[50] *śabdārthyugalaṃ na kāvyaśabdavācyam mānābhāvāt…kāvyapadārthatvapratipatteśca* (*RG*, 1st Ānana, pg. 6).

rejects the utility of using the features of *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra* as the properties that qualify poetry. Such a qualification, in his view, would present an over-restriction of the term 'poetry' and would prevent the term *kāvya* ('poetry') from being applied to expressions that are clearly poetic, in his view.[51] To illustrate this point, he provides two examples, *uditaṃ maṇḍalaṃ vidhoḥ* ("the disc of the moon has risen")[52] and *gato 'stam arkaḥ* ("the sun has set"),[53] both of which he determines are poetic on account of their suggestive agency, even though they are devoid of *alaṃkāra* and *guṇa.* Jagannātha explains that the suggestion of meaning in these verses depends upon who we envision to be speaker. In the first example, "the sun has set," if we envision the speaker to be a servant, than this suggests a reminder for a scheduled romantic engagement. In the second case example, "the orb of the moon has risen," if the speaker is imagined to be a messenger, than the suggestion is that a romantic engagement must be cancelled, because they will risk being discovered in the moonlight. In the same example, if the speaker is imagined to be a woman separated from her lover, then the expression suggests disappointment. The moon rays, which serves as a kindling determinant for the erotic sentiment are said to torment separated lovers.[54] He thus indicates that the pleasure in hearing such expressions does not derive from the tropological features or properties of diction, but rather from suggestive meanings that arises when we imagine the expression to be uttered by individuals in different contexts. Jayadeva, on the other hand would be critical of of such an interpretation, since in his view poetry must have a clear presence of *alaṃkāra.*

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[51] *lakṣaṇe guṇālaṃkārādiniveśo 'pi na yuktaḥ* (*RG*, 1st ânana, pg. 7).

[53] (*Ibid*).

[54] *dūtyābhisārikāvirahiṇyādisamudīrite 'bhisaraṇavidhiniṣedhajīvanābhāvādipare* (*Ibid.*)

On the other hand, according to Jagannātha's interpretation, Jayadeva's definition constitutes an excessive restriction of poetry. Jayadeva demands the presence of *lakṣana*, *guṇa*, *alaṃkāra*, *rīti*, as well as varieties of ambient diction (*vṛtti*) and *rasa*, and the co-functioning of denotation, indication and suggestion. It seems unlikely that many verses of poetry would possess each and every property mentioned in this definition simultaneously, or in any even it is certain that many verses are missing one or another of these features. Jagannātha had criticized Mammaṭa for over-restricting his definition of poetry. In all likelihood, he would be equally dismissive of Jayadeva's definition.

Comparison of Jayadeva's and Jagannātha's definitions of Poetry

When we carefully examine the evolution of definitions of poetry throughout second half of the first and the second millennium, we can discern that Jayadeva's definition, though problematic, demonstrate a transitional stage between Mammaṭa's definition, which qualifies the twin substrates of sound and meaning, and Jagannātha's definition which qualifies sound alone. Jayadeva's definition is ultimately unsuccessful on account of his over-zealousness to delimit poetry through all the potential categories of poetic merit and hence produces too restrictive a gauge for poetry. Jagannātha, in ameliorating this limitation, goes to the opposite extreme, defining poetry as being qualified solely by the property of conveying a meaning that produces aesthetic charm, Moreover, in qualifying aesthetic charm, as something that becomes the object of an other worldly (*alaukika*) pleasure,[55] such a definition qualifies speech through the

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[55] *ramaṇīyatā ca lokottarāhlādajanakajñānagocaratā* (*RG*, pg 4). ("The property of being delightful is the property of being the object of an cognition that produces otherworldly pleasure").

aesthetic response to that meaning which the speech is said to produce. Jagannātha is able to construe an inordinately precise definition of poetry without resorting to the excessive restriction that had compromised Jayadeva's definition.[56]

One may well wonder what possible connection there can be between the straight forward characterization of poetry found in the *Candrāloka*, and the definition found in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* which is based on such a complex system of delimitation (see preceding footnote). Both Jayadeva and Jagannātha are concerned with avoiding the proposition of multiple substrates for poetry. Both of these authors correctly notice that the word poetry is commonly applied to a speech found to be charming, and hence base their definitions on the qualification of speech alone. Moreover, both of these authors implicate *rasa* in their definitions: Jayadeva by stating that poetry must have more than one type of *rasa*; Jagannātha by stating that poetry produces an otherworldly delight, on account of being the object of the special type of experience known as *rasa.* Jagannātha defines poetry as speech qualified solely by the fact that it produces a meaning resulting in other worldly pleasure, and hence avoids two counts of ambiguity: like Jayadeva's definition it avoids the ambiguity of a dual substrate by defining poetry as a qualification of speech alone, and second, it avoids the ambiguity of presenting alternative sources of poetic charm, not specifically delimiting the source of this charm.

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[56] *itthaṃ ca* [1] *camatkārajanakabhāvanāviṣayārthapratipādakaśabdatvaṃ*, [2] *yatpratipāditārtha-viṣayakabhāvanātvaṃ camatkārajanakatāvacchedakaṃ tattvaṃ*, [3] *svaviśiṣṭajanakatāvacchedakārtha-pratipādakatāsaṃsargeṇa camatkāratvavattvam eva vā kāvyatvam iti phalitam* (*RG*, 1st Ānana, p. 5-6) ("Thus poetry is established to be either 1) the property of being a word producing a meaning that is the object of a contemplation resulting in aesthetic delight, 2) words that produce a meaning which becomes the object of a contemplation delimited by the property of being productive of charm, or 3) the property of possessing charming-ness on account of being coupled with the property of producing a meaning which is the delimiter of the property of giving rise to poetry.

While Jayadeva recognizes the advantage of formulating a definition of poetry based on the qualification of speech alone, unfortunately he does not fully realize potential of such a formulation. Instead he attempts to make his definition precise by imposing a series of qualification on this speech. The result is that he demands that poetry accomplishes too many poetic features at the same time. Jagannātha, one the other hand, formulates a definition whereby speech is qualified by meaning itself, or more accurately by the property of giving rise to a meaning that leads to otherworldly light. Poetry-ness is thus said to reside in speech, even though the meaning produced by this speech is that which becomes the object of a contemplation leading to otherworldly delight. Jagannātha's definition specifies that poetry is speech qualified by the property of producing a meaning that is a suitable object for such delight. Poetry is thus defined by the capacity to produce a special type of meaning. By stating that poetry resides specifically in speech, Jagannātha is able to qualify speech by the capacity to produce this special type of meaning. Ultimately, poetry, in Jagannātha's view becomes that speech which is qualified by its own capacity, such a capacity that is akin to the poetic insight of its creator.

Jayadeva's Definition of Indication (*lakṣaṇā*)

One of the more subtle and unusual innovations within *Candrāloka* is found in Jayadeva's definition of *lakṣaṇā* (indication or metaphorical identification). We may recall Jayadeva's definition, which was already cited in the previous chapter:

mukyārthasyâvivakṣāyāṃ pūrvārvācī ca rūḍhitaḥ

prayojanāc ca sambaddhaṃ vadantī lakṣaṇā matā[57]

When there is not the desire that the literal meaning be expressed, indication which has prior and latter [varieties], is understood to convey a connected [meaning], either through convention [as in the prior variety] or through some purpose [as in the latter].

While this definition is perhaps more lyrically expressed than other definitions of indication, even those in *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s, it conveys the essential components of this indirect semantic operation. As was explained earlier, these are 1) a cause (*hetu*); 2) a purpose (*prayojana*),[58] sometimes referred to as a suggestion (*lakṣanā*); and 3) a relationship (*sambandha*) between the literal and indicated meanings. What concerns us here is Jayadeva's rather unusual expression of the cause (*hetu*) of indication, *mukhyārthasya avivakṣā* ("the non-desire for the literal meaning").

The most popular and concise statement of indication is found in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* (eleventh – twelfth century) which states:

mukyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito 'tha prayojanāt

anyo 'rtho lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā[59]

When there is a contradiction in the literal meaning, another meaning is indicated according to some relationship with this literal meaning, [either] through convention or through [some] purpose; such an operation is termed *lakṣaṇā* (indication).

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[57] *CĀ*, 9.1.

[58] In the case of indication through convention, a convention in speech usage replaces the function of the convention. This is to say that the related meaning is not motivated by a specific purpose or suggestion, but rather by an association that is firmly established by convention. The expression "dead end" is a clear example of such an indication.

[59] *KP*, sūtra 12, p. 40.

Mammaṭa'suse of the word *bādha* is reiterated in most definitions of indication (*lakṣaṇā*) that appear in *alaṃkāraśāstra*–s in the succeeding few centuries. In the *Kāvyānuśāsana*, Hemacandra divides the secondary operation of signification into two operations, *gaunī* and *lakṣaṇā*. He defines these two in sequence as: *mukhyārthabādhe nimitte prayojane ca bhedābhedābhyām āropito gaunaḥ // mukhārthasambaddhas tatvena lakṣyamāno lakṣyaḥ//* [60] ("When there is the cause [in the form of] a contradiction in the literal meaning as well as a purpose, a dependent meaning (*gauna*) is attributed either through difference or non-difference, an indicated meanings which is connected to the literal meaning is attributed through some nature").

In the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Viśvanātha states: *mukhyārthabādhe tadyukto yayā anyo 'rthaḥ pratīyate*[61] ("When there is a contradiction in the literal meaning, that by which another meaning connected to literal meaning is understood [is indication]"). In the *Ekāvalī*, Vidyādhara states: *mukhyārthānupapattau tadyoge rūḍito 'thavâpi phalāt / anyo 'rtho yadi lakṣyo bhavati tadā lakṣaṇābhimatā*[62] ("When there is an unsuitability of the literal meaning and when another meaning having some relation to this (literal meaning) is manifested either through convention or because of some purpose, then in this case indication is understood ").

Because the idea of a contradiction in the literal meaning is so common to *alaṃkāraśāstra*-s in the post-Abhinavgupta period, it would be easy to assume that the contradiction of the literal meaning is the universally accepted cause of indication.

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[60] *Kāvyānuśāsana*, 1.17-18.

[61] *SD*, 2.9ab.

[62] Vidyādhara, *Ekāvalī*, 2.5.

However, there is some dissent in this tradition. Rāghavan writes in his monograph on Bhoja's *Śṛgāraprakāśa*:

> Mukulabhaṭṭa, in his *Abhidhāvṛtti-mātṛkā*, defines Lakṣaṇā in such a way as to avoid the element of incompatibility of the primary sense,[63] Mukhyārthabādha. He calls the Mukhya-śakti [primary power of signification] only the Vyāpāra of Śabda [operation of speech] par excellence. Compared to it, Lakṣaṇā is the Vyāpāra [operation] more of Artha [meaning] than of Śabda [speech], it is Abhidheya-sāmarthya-ākṣipta [that which is transferred by the power of the denoted meaning].[64]

Here, we should take into consideration that, unlike Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and Viśvanātha, Mukulabhaṭṭa has no vested interest in differentiating suggestion from indication, and for this reason it is not necessary for him to demand that the literal meaning be contradicted in the case of indication.[65] Bhoja's explanation of *lakṣaṇā* similarly neglects to mention that contradiction of the literal meaning is the cause: *abhidheyāvinābhūtapratītir lakṣaṇôcyate /* [66] ("That which provides an understanding related to the literal meaning is called *lakṣaṇā*"). Even though Bhoja recognizes the function of suggestion, he still prefers to leave the cause of indication undisclosed. As Raghavan states, Bhoja has borrowed this definition from Kumārilabhaṭṭa, the renowned

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[63] *śabdavyāpārato yasya pratītis tasya mukhyatā / arthāvaseyasya punar lakṣyamāṇattvam ucyate //* (*Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā*, 1).

[64] V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* (Madras: Punarvasu, 1963) p. 144.

[65] Here, the reader should recall that in the case of suggestion, the literal meaning still stands even though another meaning is revealed. By stating that the literal meaning is contradictory when another meaning is attributed by indication, pro-suggestion authors are able to conveniently differentiate between these two operations of speech.

[66] Cited in Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, pg. 129.

Mīmāmsā scholar (generally believed to have lived sometime around the beginning of the eighth century), who certainly preceded Ānandavardhana.[67]

In the early definitions of *lakṣanā* that are based on the viewpoints in the traditional *śāstra*-s, there is no mention of the contradiction of a literal meaning. It is traditionally understood that the *mīmāṃsaka*-s were the first to analyze indication in order to explain why certain injunctions from the Veda do not make sense when interpreted literally. The understanding of an indicative power of speech preserves the view of the infallibility of the Veda as the ultimate authority of knowledge. Nevertheless, the early definitions of *lakṣaṇā* in both the *nyāya* and *mīmāṃsā* tradition emphasize only that indication conveys a meaning related to denoted meaning. This is all that is necessary for their purposes. In the examples "a hamlet on the Ganges" and "the umbrellas are walking," it is still possible to explain that indication conveys a meaning related to the indicated meaning, even if we do not specifically state that the literal meaning is contradictory. The need to qualify this understanding with the additional condition of a contradiction or impossibility in the literal meaning does not arise until the advent of the theory of verbal suggestion in the treatises of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. At this point it becomes imperative to differentiate the phenomenon of suggestion from that of indication by demonstrating that only the latter involves a contradiction with the literal meaning.

Abhinavagupta goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the blockage of literal meaning is a fixture within *lakṣanā*, and largely accomplishes this through engaging in a detailed etymology of the word *bhakti* ("secondary " or "dependent") in his comment to

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[67] Ibid, 130, note 1.

the first verse of the *Dhvanyāloka*. Here he specifically comments on the Dhvanikāra's observation that some [opponents to the theory of *dhvani*] claim suggestion to be merely an associated (*bhākta*) meaning:[68]

> [Abhinava now gives four different etymologies to explain the meaning of the word *bhākta*.] (1) *Bhakti* ("association") is a property that is associated (*bhajyate*), or is in company with, or is regarded [by the speaker] as commonly recognized in, a word-object [let us say, river bank] –e.g., a property such as proximity to the direct object of the word [here, river]. Now the relational secondary sense *(lākṣaṇiko 'rthaḥ*) that derives from [i.e., that is made possible by] this property is called *bhākta* ("associated") meaning. [Thus, river-bank is an associated or relational meaning of "river," as may be seen in the phrase "a village on the river."].... (2) *Bhakti* ("portion") is a portion (*bhāga*) of the meaning of such a word as is used of a group of properties, e.g., the portion of the word "lion" that means fierceness. Now a metaphorical meaning (*gauṇo 'rthaḥ*) that arises thus is called a *bhākta.* ("partial") meaning. Such a meaning may be seen in the sentence "the boy is a lion," meaning that the boy is fierce. (3) *Bhakti* (attachment, love, affect") is the intense desire one may have to express such a concept as proximity [to a holy river] or fierceness [in a young man]. The meaning that arises from such eagerness is called a *bhākta* ("affective") meaning and may be either a metaphorical (*gauṇa*) or a relational (*lākṣaṇika*) meaning. (4) *Bhakti* is the breaking or blocking (*bhaṅga*, from *bhañju āmardane*[69])- of the primary sense is a *bhākta* meaning.
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> These etymologies will show that the presence of three factors forms the seed from which secondary usage (*upacāra*) arises. They are: the blocking of the primary meaning; a cause [e.g., proximity to or similarity to the primary object]; and a purpose [e.g., one's eagerness to express forcefully this proximity or similarity].[70]

Here, in this long commentarial passage, Abhinavagupta does something very clever. He cites a common objection to Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion – that suggestion is just dependent (*bhākta*), i.e., an indicated meaning. Abhinavagupta then etymologizes

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[68] *bhāktam āhus tam anye* (*DhvĀ*, 1.1, pg. 8).

[69] "The verb *bhañj* in the sense of squeezing."

[70] Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, trans, pg. 65.

the word *bhākta* and thereby arrives at four different meanings of the word: 1) "association" ; 2) "portion"; 3) "attachment"; and 4) "blocking." Out of these different meanings of the word *bhākta*, Abhinavagupta then proceeds to demonstrate "the presence of the three factors" which provide the necessary conditions for the secondary operation of signification:[71] 1) a blocking of the primary meaning; 2) connection or a similarity, in other words a relation; and 3) a desire to express some purpose. In the next section of his *vṛtti*, Abhinavagupta uses these very three factors supporting the secondary operation of speech to demonstrate the *dhvani* cannot be a secondary operation of speech, thus turning the argument of the opponents on its head.

The first factor that Abhinavagupta explains to be a necessary support for the secondary operation of speech is the blocking of a literal meaning. This becomes the linguistic basis for the expression of *mukhyārthabādha,* ("a contradiction in the literal meaning.") The appearance of this expression is so pervasive that most people assume that it has always been a component of definitions of indication. Yet the origin of this basis lies in relatively modern interpretation of *lakṣaṇā.* Moreover, this interpretation is itself based on a secondary derivation of the word *bhakti.* While it is true that the verb √*bhañj* has the meanings of breaking and interrupting, the most common conventionally determined meanings of the word *bhakti* are "separation," "division," "attachment," and "possession." In order to arrive at the meaning of "blocking," Abhinavagupta needs to resort to a less common etymological derivation employing the verbal root √*bhañj*. A similar etymology can be used to derive the Kumaunī word *bhãcī* which has the sense

[71] Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta divide the secondary operation of verbal signification into two types of operations: metaphorical operation (*gauṇa*), and relational operation (*lākśaṇika*). In views of certain other scholars, including Jayadeva, both of these are understood to be indication (*lakṣaṇā*).

"interruption" or "obstacle."[72] Despite the fact that this is a less common etymology for the word *bhakti*, Abhinavagupta emphasizes operations of "breaking" and "obstructing" prominently in his explanation of *lakṣaṇā*.

As we have seen, Jayadeva interprets the operation of *lakṣaṇā* in a slightly different manner. He states that indication takes places when there is a desire that the literal meaning not be expressed.[73] While this desire for non-literalness produces the same semantic resuilt as does the blocking of the literal meaning, the agencies and processes producing this result are different these two cases. By stating that the cause of indication is the desire that the literal meaning be unexpressed, Jayadeva places the causal agency of indication in the will of the speaker, rather than the linguistic potential of the words themselves. As we shall see, such an explanation of indication is related to a more modern view of indication that was developed by the logicians shortly after Jayadeva's era.

While the requirement of a contradiction in the literal meaning is found in most of the definitions of indication in *alaṃkāraśāstra* after Abhinavagupta, another related concept develops among the *naiyāyika*-s beginning at this time. As we have indicated earlier, some two to three centuries after Abhinavagupta, the *nyāya* school began to innovate highly complex but powerful methods of delimitation which allowed them to formulate precise definitions and explanations of phenomena, that were previously considered out of the scope of logical analysis. While the founder of this new system is

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[72] R. L. Turner, *A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 532.

[73] *mukhyārthasyāvivakṣāyām pūrvārvācī ca rūḍhitaḥ / prayojanāc ca sambandhaṃ vadantī lakaṇā matā* (*CĀ*, 9.1).

generally held to be Gangeśa (thirteenth – fourteenth century), a number of prominent modern scholars of *nyāya* believe that many of the new developments were traceable to the earlier theories of Udayana, the author of the *Kiraṇāvalī* and the *Nyāyakusumāñjalī,* who lived in the eleventh century.[74] One of the important innovations in *navyanyāya* theory pertains to human agency in the formation of verbal conventions, which in the old school were held to be the creation of God alone. Along similar lines, there was a modification of the explanation of indication. The old school defined the motivating factor of indication to be *anvayānupapatti* (" an unsuitability within the semantic connections of an expression"). This theory explains why indication operates in expression such as "the umbrellas walk," but it does not necessarily explain why there is indication in the expression "the spears enter." In this case, it is possible for there to be a semantic connection between the subject "spears" and the verb "entering," provided that someone has thrown the spears, and that the spears enter bodies or a fort. According to the theory of the old school, there would not be indication in such an expression. Thus the *navyanaiyāyika*-s altered the original explanation ever so slightly, stating *tātparyānupapattir lakṣaṇābījam* ("The unsuitability of the intended meaning is the seed of *lakṣaṇā*").[75] According to this view, a speaker will intentionally denote an unsuitable literal meaning such as "the spears enter," so that the listener will more vividly comprehend the meaning "the men holding spears enter" through an indirect mode of signification. As we have explained earlier, such an expression conveys a suggestion, in

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[74] See Ingalls (1951, pg 5), and Bannerji (1989, pg. 96).

[75] *lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhas tātparyānupapattitaḥ* (*BhP*, 82, p. 158) ("indication is that by which [a meaning] that has a relation to the literal meaning is conveyed on account of the unsuitability of the intended [literal] meaning of the speaker.")

this case, the ominousness suggested by the motion of the spears. According to the new definition, the fact that an alternative suitable meaning ("the spears enter [having been thrown]") can be found does not prevent the indication from taking place, because the "seed" of indication is defined to be the unsuitability of the intended literal meaning (*tātparya*) ("the spears enter [of their own accord]") alone, and not the unsuitability of semantic connections (*anvaya*).[76]

As we have seen earlier, Jayadeva applies a different statement of the "seed" of indication than do Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha. Mammaṭa defines the cause of indication to be *mukhyārthabādha* ("a contradiction in the primary meaning") and the other *ālaṃkārika*-s define this in similar terms as well. Jayadeva, on the other hand, states the cause of indication to be *mukhyārthasyâvivakṣā* ("the desire that the literal meaning not be expressed"). The effect of this definition is almost identical to that of the *navyanyāya* definition of the cause of indication *tātparyānupapatti* (an unsuitability of the intended meaning). Both Jayadeva's and the *navyanaiyāyika*-s definitions imply that a speaker or author intentionally applies a primary meaning that is unsuitable, and that such an unsuitable primary meaning impels the attribution of the indicated meaning, which is related in some way to this unsuitable meaning. I have not discovered a precedent to Jayadeva's definition of *lakṣaṇā* within the *alaṃkāraśāstra* tradition. At present, I can only deduce that Jayadeva was extremely aware of the developments that were taking place in the field of Indian logic and that he saw reason to apply these innovations into his own theory.

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[76] *Paras tu yady anvayānupapattir lakṣaṇābījaṃ syāt tadā. yaṣṭīḥ praveśayet yatra lakṣaṇā na syāt, yaṣṭiṣu praveśānvayasyânupapatter abhāvāt* (*NSM*, *vṛtti* to 82, pg. 335).

While it is clear that Jayadeva's explanation of indication resemblance to the definition later provided by the *navyanyāya* tradition, it also demonstrates another feature of modernity. Jayadeva's definition emphasizes that the seed of indication lies in the intention of the speaker rather than the semantic properties of the words in the sentence. For this reason, Jayadeva is seen as emphasizing the human agency within verbal signification, even at the indicative level. Such a perspective also accords with the *navyanyāya* view that human beings can also create verbal conventions (*saṃketa*). [77] According to this logic, not only can human intention establish denotative potency, but human intention establishes the particular denoted meaning that operates with respect to a group of words, when more than one such denoted meaning exists. In certain cases of indication, it is observed that human intention determines that an unsuitable literal meaning should be considered, even though another suitable literal meaning is available in a sentence, so that a desired secondary meaning may be instigated. Such is the case in the expression "the spears enter,"[78] Whereas earlier definitions emphasized that indicatory capacity resides solely in language, Jayadeva's definition demonstrates that human desire determines when a language gives rise to an indicative sense, and that this agency is more fundamental than that located within the linguistic expression itself.

Nirdeśa and *Varṇasphoṭa*

[77] *navyās tu īśvarecchā na śaktiḥ, kintv icchaîva tenâdhunikasaṅkete 'pi śaktir asty evêty āhuḥ* (*NSM*, *vṛtti* to 81, pg. 299). ("But in the *navyanyāya* view, *śakti* is not the desire of God, but desire alone. Accordingly, there is *śakti* even for those things that have only recently been established as conventions.").

[78] We have similarly observed human intention to have this capacity in chapter two when we discussed the case of *vācyavācakasambandhalakṣaṇā* (indication based on a relation of literal meaning to literal word) [see chart 2.5].

As a coda to this chapter, I should like to propose the need for a future study exploring the relationship between Jayadeva's categorization of a sixth variety of denotation, known as *nirdeśa* (phonetic self reference), and latter medieval grammatical analysis of the linguistic phenomenon known as *varṇasphoṭa.* In the seventeenth century, some four centuries after Jayadeva, Koṇḍabhaṭṭa -- perhaps the most distinguished Sanskrit grammarian of his generation -- challenged the previously accepted view regarding the role of the phonemes in producing the awareness of the meaning of words and sentences. While Koṇḍabhaṭṭa maintains the traditional understanding upheld by grammarians since Bhartṛhari (seventh century), that a linguistic utterance conveys meaning as an indivisible whole (*vākyasphoṭa*). Koṇḍabhāṭṭa, however, challenges the opinion of many grammarians by postulating that such a meaning is not to be held as distinct from the meaning that emerges from the individual sounds that are perceived by listeners.[79] While this is an exceptionally deep and complex topic that merits separate treatment by a specialist in Sanskrit grammar, here I would like to emphasize that Koṇḍabhaṭṭa's view is supported by a more vigorous theoretical investigation of what constitutes phonetic sound and how individual phonetic sounds are perceived. As S. D. Joshi explains:

> The diversity in knowledge such as "this is the phoneme *k*," "this is the phoneme *j*," can be justified simply by assuming a diversity in the delimiting property of production (*utpatti*) or revelation (*abhivyakti*) of various phonemes, residing in the conjunction of the wind (generally), accepted as giving rise to the various sounds….Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa points out that breath wind comes into contact with the different vocal organs, and it

[79] S. D. Joshi., "Koṇḍa or Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa" in *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, ed ,Vol. 5 in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990) 303.

> assumes the form of different phonemes. The diversity belonging to the airwaves (*vāyusaṃyoga*) that comes into contact with the different articulatory points is superimposed upon sounds that are modifications of airy substances. [80]

In Koṇḍabhaṭṭā's view, a physiological interpretation of the production of speech buttresses the metaphysical position that the meaning of utterances is constituted in an indivisible whole, *sphoṭa*, which in its deepest sense is identical to the eternal nature of speech as well as the true nature of all phenomenon.

While this integration of metaphysical and physiological explanations is not found in Jayadeva's discussion of *nirdeśa* in the *Candrāloka*, Jayadeva observes that in certain linguistic expressions, individual phonemes themselves demonstrate their own linguistic potential, and that in these cases, such expressive capacity corresponds to self-reference. It is this phonetic self-reference that Jayadeva designates by the word *nirdeśa.* In certain expressions, such Jayadeva's own illustration of *nirdeśa* -- *kaṃ saṃhinasti kaṃsārir naraṃ kaṃ ca samāśritam*, this denotative self-reference (*nirdeśa*) amounts to the denoted meaning of certain words. For instance, in Jayadeva's example, the word *kaṃ* directly signifies its own phonetic entity i.e. the phoneme *ka* followed by an anusvara.

At one level, we may understand that all words have the capacity for self-reference. Thus we are able to use the same word to denote a meaning as well as the word itself, as in the command "never say never." In one interpretation, all linguistic expressions can be understood to convey the sequential sum of their own phonemes. In this case, the letters comprising a word or sentence are understood to progressively reveal the structure of a word or a sentence enabling faithful recognition by the listener. Most grammarians prior to Koṇḍabhaṭṭa, however, vehemently objected to the view that the

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[80] Ibid , 302.

meaning of a word or a sentence is actually revealed by a sequence of phonemes. Frequently, sūtra 1.73 from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* is cited to substantiate this objection.

> pade na varṇā vidyante vaneṣv 'vayavā na ca
>
> vākyāt padānām atyantaṃ praviveko na kaścana[81]
>
> There are no phonemes in the word nor are there parts in the phoneme.
>
> There is no absolute difference of the words from the sentence.[82]

Bhartṛhari's verse posits the sentence as the fundamental linguistic entity, which conveys a meaning solely in its unity. The division of the sentence into constituent parts such as words as sentence is in this view an artificial analysis that is useful only to present a meaning to those incapable of ascertaining a meaning of the entire sentence on their own. These same objectors argue that words and sentences cannot be perceived through sequences of phonemes, stating that the separate phonemes exist only for the instant that they are enunciated and hence do not form a true collection. Moreover, they argue that the recollection of these phonemes as a collective unity, is also impossible, because we do not recollect things in the sequence that they are experienced.[83] Citing the implausibility that a sequence of phonemes can convey a meaning, grammarians

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[81] Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, Sarasvatībhavana-Granthamālā, vol 91 (Varanasi: Sampurnānanda Sanskrit University, 1988) 1.73, p. 126.

The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, trans. K. A. Subramania Iyer (Pune: Decacan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1995) 1.73, p. 77.

[83] S. D. Joshi., "Koṇḍa or Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa" in *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, ed Vol. 5 in *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990) 304.

postulated the necessity for a separate and "indivisible meaning bearing unit" known as *sphoṭa* which is responsible for the conveyance of meaning in all linguistic expressions.[84]

Koṇḍabhaṭṭa, interpreting Bhartṛhari's theory in a different manner, does not hold that the existence of *sphoṭa* is necessarily conditioned by the implausibility of a sequential ascertainment of sentence meaning through words and phonemes. As S. D. Joshi summarizes:

> Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa disagrees with the Grammarians' view that the main justification of the *sphoṭa* entity stems from the fact that the combination of the sequence of phonemes that constitute the word cannot be explained. Following the theory of association, he maintains that each succeeding phoneme progressively reveals the substructure of a word in the form of a certain sequence, and all of these substructures directly or indirectly reveal the word, which is an aggregate of phonemes *p*, *a*, *ṭ*, a. Now at the time of perceiving the second phoneme, not only is the phoneme cognized, but the substructure *pa* is cognized at the time of perceiving the last phoneme *a*. Each subsequent sound reveals the substructure of the preceding and the succeeding sounds, and thus we can establish the co-existence of phonemes. Therefore, Koṇḍabhaṭṭa argues, the main reason for accepting the *sphoṭa* theory is not unaccountability of the idea of sequence, but the experience that the word is single and unitary.[85]

In other words, phonemes reveal the structure of the word in the same way that individual contours reveal the structure of a form. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa's view finds strong justification in another verse from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*:

> na varnavyatirekeṇa padam anyac ca vidyate
>
> vākyaṃ varṇapadābhyāṃ ca vyatiriktaṃ na kiñcana[86]
>
> There is no word over and above the phonemes nor is there any sentence over and above the phonemes and words.[87]

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[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, Sarasvatībhavana-Granthamālā, vol 91 (Varanasi: Sampurnānanda Sanskrit University, 1988) 1.72, p. 125.

According to Koṇḍabhaṭṭa, sentences, words and even phonemes are in essence just *sphoṭa* and hence are capable of revealing meaning. The difference is that whereas a sentence reveals meaning as a unified whole, phonemes disclose meaning by sequentially illuminating the substructure of words and sentences.

In Jayadeva's conception of *nirdeśa*, phonemes are able to signify their own phonetic entities. Because of this potential, in certain sentences, a combination of phonemes and verbs is capable of a meaning which is nothing beyond the phonetic composition of words. Jayadeva provides the example *naraṃ kaṃ ca samāśritam* ("the phones *na* and *ra* which have taken recourse to the phoneme *ka* [i.e., *naraka*]"). The disclosure of a word through such a phonetic "riddle" is no doubt a highly artificial way to convey a word, nevertheless the existence of words such as *dvirepha* ("that which has two *repha*-s[88]," by convention "a large black bee"[89]) demonstrates that the Sanskrit tradition recognized that at a conventional level, it is possible to reveal meaning through the disclosure of phonetic structure. Jayadeva does not actively state whether the six varieties of denotation enumerated in the tenth chapter of the *Candrāloka* (words for universals, words for qualities, words for actions, words for names, words for connections to things and words for phonetic self-reference) are truly existent categories or whether these are artificial expedients. Nevertheless, the identification of such a semantic potential within phonemes provides an interesting reference point for Koṇḍabhaṭṭa's position that

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[87] *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, trans. K. A. Subramania Iyer (Pune: Decacan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1995) 1.72, p. 76.

[88] *repha* signifies the Sanskrit phoneme *r*.

[89] The word *dvirepha* actually signifies the word *bhramara*, which has two *repha*-s, but by convention it has come to designate the meaning of *bhramara*, i.e., "a large black bee").

varṇasphota, i.e., the linguistic potential within phonemes, is not to be understood as separate from the linguistic potential that operates in words and sentences.

Summation

While a number of formidable scholars in the past have judged the *Candrāloka* to be a convenient and systematic reiteration of previous poetic doctrines, a close reading of the text reveals that the author indeed possessed a sophisticated and innovative understanding of both poetics and language theory. Because, in the utility of his presentation, Jayadeva does encapsulate a significant portion of the theory of his predecessors, it is easy to overlook the more original elements within this treatise. Nevertheless, this inadvertence is unfortunate since a number of Jayadeva's ideas demonstrate the formative stages of poetic and semantic theories that become significant in the work of later *ālaṃkārika*-s and philosophers. Jayadeva's highlighting of *pratibhā* (talent) as the distinctive cause of poetry foreshadows Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja's more striking theory that *pratibhā* is the sole cause of poetry. Such a position demonstrates a more advanced understanding of causality in comparison to that exhibited by other *ālaṃkārika*-s of this era. Jayadeva's presentations of *lakṣaṇā* and the variety of denotation known as *nirdeśa* similarly reveal a strikingly modern approach to language theory and a keen awareness of germinating theories within the disciplines of logic and grammar. In utilizing such incipient theories within his poetic treatise, Jayadeva not only substantiates that analytical discourse plays a welcome role in aesthetic theory, but

suggests that *alaṃkāraśāstra* itself provides an important forum for the development of classical Indian theories of language.

Part II

Translation of the First Mayukha of Jayadeva's *Candrāloka*

Followed by Explanations of the Verses and Translations of three commentaries: the *Śaradāgama* of Pradyotanabhaṭṭa, the *Rākāgama* of Gāgābhaṭṭa and the *Ramā* of Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa

Introduction to Translation

The following translation of the first *mayūkha* of *Candrāloka* was prepared as part of an ongoing project to translate the entirety of the *Candràloka* as well as its three major commentaries. My original intention was to present this full translation as my dissertation, but with time it became clear that it would be more useful to translate a portion of this work and provide more extensive explanations of the verses and commentaries including references to other works in *alaṃkāraśāstra* as well as other *śastras.* A text may be seen to have two lives. The first constitutes the text itself as an embodiment of the author's own personal understanding of a topic. The second comprises the influence that this text engenders in the thinking of subsequent generations. As I have discussed in the previous section, there is a significant hiatus between these two lives of the *Candrāloka*, though the reason for this hiatus remains somewhat unclear, considering that Jayadeva's other known work, the *Prasannarāghava*, attracted more immediate recognition. While verses from the *Prasannarāghava* are cited in dramaturgical treatises from the ealy fourteenth century, the the *Candrāloka* is not commented upon until the mid sixteenth century. Though it is likely that renewed interest in the *Candrāloka* was motivated by Appayadīkṣita's *Kuvalayānanda*, since Appayadīkṣita's popular tratise states that his text is based on the *Candrāloka*, it is also probable that the sixteenth century commentator Pradyotanabhaṭṭa had initiated interest in the *Candraloka* with his commentary the *Śaradāgama* even before the composition of the *Kuvalayānanda.*[1] We should consider, therefore, that Indian intellectuals in the sixteenth and

[1] As we have cited earlier, Appayadīkṣita most likely mentions the *Śaradāmama* in the concluding verse of the *Kuvalayānanda*: *candrāloko vijayatāṃ śaradāgamasaṃbhavaḥ / hṛdyāḥ kuvalayānando yatprasādād abhūd ayaṃ //* (*Kuvalayānanda*, 172).

seventeenth centuries were more receptive to the poetic theories of the *Candrāloka* than those in the fourteenth and fifteen centuries.

Interestingly, the three major commentaries to the *Candrāloka* were written by authors whose principal interests lay in philosophy rather than poetry and poetics. This suggests that the poetic theory in the *Candrāloka* appealed to those scholars who maintained more analytical epistemological sensibilities. From a critical perspective, the distribution of three commentaries among authors having distinct philosophical orientations is also significant. By constrasting these commentaries we may observe the extent to which philosophical and sectarian training in the later Indian medieval period effected poetic interpretations. While we cannot draw universal conclusions to this inquiry from such a limited test field, the fact that the commentaries vary so little along classical sectarian lines suggests that by the latter medieval period, the traditional distinctions in epistemological views did not have as significant an effect on poetic interpretation as they did at the turn of the millennium when early *dhvani* theorists encountered antagonism in the circles of logicians and exegetists, and greater support among grammarians.

This is not to say that the commentaries to the *Candrāloka* are equivalent in all respects. In a number of verses, some of which have already been pointed out, they do indeed differ. Nevertheless, these differences are primarily of aesthetic consideration and do not reinforce sectarian positions regarding ontological and epistemologic issues. For instance, one might expect Gāgābhaṭṭa, as a *mīmāṃsaka*, to interpret Jayadeva's definition of poetry to concern the complex of speech and meaning, as this would support the traditional *mīmāṃsā* view concerning the eternal relation between the two. Yet Gāgābhaṭṭa is the commentator

who most emphatically states that Jayadeva's definition concerns a qualified form of speech.[2] Vaidyanātha, the grammarian, subsequently reiterates this position.

The relative autonomy of the commentators' interpretations from their sectarian influences suggests a more scientific spirit within the aesthetic inquiry of the period during which these commentaries were composed -- the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. This period of Indian intellectual history is characterized by an increased instrumentalism in the theoretical perspective of philosophers and thinkers. This attitude can be perceived in the works of grammarians such as Koṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nageśabhaṭṭa, new-logicians such as Gadādhara, as well as more modern exegetists such as Gāgābhaṭṭa. Such authors demonstrate a far more interdisplinary perspective than the earlier authors in their respective traditions. Hence the disagreements that are found between the different *Candrāloka* commentaries more typically concern questions of aesthetic and semantic utility rather than doctrinal matters.

This translation was prepared through the use of three printed editions and a manuscript. The printed editions consultedare the following:

1. The second Chaukhamba edition of the *Candrāloka* with the *Śaradāgama* commentary of Pradyotanabhaṭṭa, edited by Ganga Sagar Rai and printed in 1985. This edition is also accompanied by Ganga Sagar Rai's own commentary in both Sanskrit and Hindi, entitled the *Alokavardhinī.*
2. The Chaukhamba edition of the *Candrāloka* with the *Rākāgama* commentary of Gāgābhaṭṭa, edited by Ram Ananta Shastri Vetal and printed in 1938.

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[2] *Tena viśiṣṭaśabdaniṣṭam eva kāvyatvam* (*RA*, 1.7).

3. The Gujarati Printing Press edition of the *Candrāloka* with the *Ramā* commentary of Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa edited by Mahādeva Śarma and printed in 1939.

A photocopy of a manuscript stored in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute collection in Pune of the *Ramā* commentary of Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa incorporating the root verses from the *Candrāloka* as well was also used in the preparation of this translation. In general, the commentaries collectively acknowledge and debate the merits of most of the variant readings that are possible with respect to the verses in the *Candrāloka*. Thus for the sake of this study it has not been necessary to prepare a critical edition.

As for the commentaries to the *Candrāloka* themselves, the available editions of these have less textual integrity, and still require significant editorial work. Unfortunately, the available descriptive catalogues of manuscripts do not reveal a significant quantity of manuscripts for either the *Rākāgama* or the *Ramā*. More manuscripts are available for the *Śaradāgama*. The *Rākāgama* in particular would merit a careful job of re-editing, as this commentary includes some particularly cogent analysis of semantic theory in its comments to the first and tenth *mayūkha*-s. Much of this parallels the investigation within Gāgābhaṭṭa's treatise on Mīmāṃṣā theory, the *Bhaṭṭacintāmaṇi.* The analyses within the *Candrāloka* is particularly targeted toward the semantic and epistemological issues that concern poetic theory, and presents a quite useful synopsis of the different theories under consideration in the late medieval period.

The text of the *Ramā* is sufficiently mangled in a number of locations, and yet has not been re-edited since the initial Gujarati Pritning Press edition was printed nearly ninety years prior. This is surprising, given Vaidyanātha's status as Nāgeśa's prized pupil. The fact that

neither the *Rākāgama* or the *Ramā* has been re-edited despite the insufficiency of these initial editions illustrates the unfortunately complacent attitude that has characterized scholarship on the *Candrāloka*. While Sanskrit educators appreciate the utility of this work as an enjoyable reference on *alaṃkāraśāstra*, they have not adequately scrutinized the text in the light of the commentaries, nor have they appreciated the scholarly value of the commentaries themselves.

It is also for this reason that I have chosen to translate all three commentaries to the first *mayūkha* of the *Candrāloka*, despite the fact that the latter commentaries significantly reiterate the analyses within the prior ones. Of particular interest in these commentaries is the manner in which the *Candrāloka* encourages the individual commentators to review poetic themes in a more historically conclusive fashion, even though the *Candrāloka* itself presents a seemingly dehistorized poetic doctrine. This seems to indicate that the *Candrāloka* has situated itself at a provocative perch with respect to the evolution of *alaṃkāraśāstra* compelling the attentive reader to ponder just how Jayadeva has arrived at his distinctive view. Perhaps the very historical flatness in the *Candrāloka* has encouraged the commentaries to remedy what they perceive as a methodological insufficiency. Still, it is also possible that the *Candrāloka* somehow triggers the historical consciousness of the commentators though skillful veiled assusions to earlier poetic treatises and śāstras.

There is no question that some of the historical reconsideration in the commentaries concerns the relationship between the poetic theory expoused by the *Candrāloka* and that found in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa.* As I have discussed in the first part of this study, Vaidyanātha feels compelled to establish a consistency between these two doctrines, whereas Gāgābhaṭṭa is more sensitive to the subtle distinctions between these two doctrines. However,

Gāgābhaṭṭa also perceives a thematic continuity between certain interpretations found in the *Candrāloka* and those seen in the most dynamic poetic treatise contemporary to their eras, the *Rasagaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja. Hence in his responses to Jayadeva's theory as to the cause of poetic capacity, Gāgābhaṭṭa considers the agency of karma in the arising of poetic capacity, even though this issue is not specifically raised by Jayadeva, since the role of karma in the production of poetry was of significant concern for Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, who had composed his *Rasagaṅgādhara* just a few decades before the Gāgābhaṭṭa had written his *Rākāgama.* Gāgābhaṭṭa, who lived and wrote in Benares, would certainly have been cognizant of Jagannātha's ourspoken theories on poetry and demonstrates such a familiarity in his comments to the *Candraloka.* Hence in Gāgābhaṭṭa's view, Jayadeva's interpretations in the *Candrāloka* are relevant not only to earlier treatises on *alaṃkāraśāstra* such as the *Kāvyaprakāśa* but also to more modern treatises as well. For this reason, Gāgābhaṭṭa frequently applies *Navyanyāya* methods of reasoning in his exegesis of verses from the *Candrāloka*, even though Jayadeva himself does not apply such advanced methods of reasoning.

In my translations of the commentaries, I have endeavored as much as possible to preserve the formal structure of argumentation. In many cases this means that I have literally translated abstract constructions and generic properties, rather than converting these into predications. For instance, I have translated Gāgābhaṭa's statement in verse 1.1 *sūryasya padmavikāsakatvād* as "because the sun has the property of causing lotuses to blossom" rather than "because the sun causes lotuses to bloom" or "because the sun is that which causes lotuses to bloom." While it may be simpler to understand the meaning of the Sanskrit expression when expressed as a predication, the original Sanskrit expression conveys a

concept that is based on a certain substrate (the sun) being qualified as possessing a specific property (the property of causing lotuses to bloom). Such an expression is preferable to Sanskrit logicians than the type of simple predication that we are accustomed to in English because it expresses the delimitation of a general field through the possessions of a discreet property.

The reader may apply a basic formula in understanding such statements. A translation that takes the form "X possesses the property of Y-ness" or "X possessing the property of being Y" to a certain degree implies that "X is Y" or "X is an incident of Y." On the otherhand, the reader to also understand that the Sanskrit author intends that this concept be understood as qualification of the substrate X by the property Y-ness.

A similar form of expression that appears in this translation takes the form "the property Y-ness is based in X." An example of this is found in Gāgābhaṭṭa's comment to verse 1.7 *tena viśiṣṭaśabdaniṣṭham eva kāvyatvam*. I have translated this as "accordingly, the property of being poetry is based in qualified speech alone," rather than as "poetry is precisely qualified speech" because as before this preserves the structure of Gāgābhaṭṭa's original concept, which specifies the precise substrate (qualified speech) of a specific property (the property of being poetry, or "poetry-ness"). Once again, the reader should understand that because "poetry-ness" is based only in qualified speech, qualified speech is the only substrate possessing the property "poetry-ness," and hence we can determine that "qualified speech alone is poetry," Still, the reader should endeavor to understand the original concept which is based on a certain property being based in a certain substrate. While such a preservation frequently leads to some awkwardness in English syntax, I believe

it is important to emphasize the conceptual structure inherent in the Sanskrit expressions because this is most often essential to the import of commentators' argumentation.

Translation of the Candrāloka
First Mayukha

Verse 1.1.

uccair asyati mandatām arasatām jāgratkalaṃkai'[3] rava-

dhvaṃsaṃ hastayate ca yā sumanasām ullāsinī mānase

duṣṭodyanmadanāśanârciramalā lokatrayīdarśikā

sā netratritayîva khaṇḍaparaśor vāgdevatā dīvyatu

Delighting[4] in the minds of scholars[5], she banishes stupidity and savorlessness[6] and removes the loss of speech caused by public disgraces. May the stainless goddess of speech in whose flame there is the destruction of the burgeoning fault of pride, who is the revealer of the threefold world, shine forth[7] like the three eyes of Śiva.[8]

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[3] One should understand this compound as having a third case plural termination, i.e *jāgratkalaṃkaiḥ*. Because of *saṃdhi* (rules of phonetic coalescence), the original final *visarga* in *kalaṃkaiḥ* changes to an *r* since it precedes the soft consonant, *r*, that is the initial of *ravadhvaṃsaṃ*. The adapted final *r* of *jāgratkalaṃkair* is then elided before the initial *r* of *ravadhvaṃsam* since it is impossible to have a double *r* in Sanskrit. We may also analyze this collection of words as *jāgratkalaṃ kaiḥ avadhvaṃsam* ("that man with supreme talent of whom there is scorn by no-one"), in which case the original final visarga of *kaiḥ* changes to a final *r* and is elided for the same reasons as indicated above (see chart in explanation of verse below).

[4] *ullāsinī.* The goddess of speech is understood to both *delight in* and *delight* the minds of scholars.

[5] *sumanas.* Literally, those with good minds. As the commentators explain, this indicates both scholars and gods depending on how the verse is interpreted.

[6] *arasatām.* The property of being deficient in *rasa,* the most highly esteemed production in poetry that provides an otherworldly (*alaukika*) pleasure. While such a pleasure is intense and overpowering, it is described as liberating.

[7] *dīvyatu* from the fourth class verbal root √*div.* The commentators gloss this word with three varieties of actions: 1) *sarvotkarṣena vartatām* ("may she reside with all her splendour"), 2) *modatāṃ* ("may she be delighted," or "may she provide delight") and 3) *krīḍatām* ("may she sport"). I have chosen to translate the verb

Explanation 1.1:

For the sake of clarity and economy, I have translated only the primary literal meanings within this verse. The reader, however, should be aware that a secondary stratum of literal meanings is layered through *śleṣa*[9] within this verse. These meanings should be understood simultaneously since they clarify the central comparison within the verse. They may be summarized as follows:

1) Sarasvatī [like the eye of Śiva having the form of the sun] banishes (*uccair asyati*) the property of being a dull lotus (*manda-tāmarasatām*), i.e., she causes lotuses to blossom.

√*div* to mean "shine," which is a more primary meaning of this root, as it accords more fully with the simile of Śiva's three eyes taking the form of the sun, the moon and the sacrificial fire. The meanings suggested by the commentators agree more faithfully with the Goddess of Speech (Sarasvatī) on her own terms who is said to dance in the lotus mouth of Brahmā.

[8] *khaṇḍhaparaśu.* Literally, *having a broken axe*. The commentators all agree that this refers to Śiva. This epithet is difficult to trace. It is conceivable that it stems from Epic and Puranic legends concerning Śiva's disruption of Dakṣa's sacrifice, and the subsequent attack that Śiva's weapon wages against the Nārāyaṇas. The following excerpt from Maṇi's *Purānic Encyclopedia* summarizes these events effectively:

> Once Śiva was not invited for a Yāga conducted by Dakṣa . An angered Śiva threw his spike into the Yāgaśālā (sacrificial hall). The spike spoiled the Yāga and smashed the hall and after roamed about aimlessly for sometime and then turned towards Badryāśrama where at that time Naranārāyaṇas were engaged in penance. The spike went straight to the heart of sage Nārāyaṇa. Nārāyaṇa made the defiant sound 'hum' (huṅkāra) and the spike turned away. Śiva felt angry for thus showing disrespect to his spike and he attacked the sage. At once, Nararṣi plucked a grass and reciting a mantra threw it at Śiva. The grass became a Paraśu (axe) and it attacked Śiva. Śiva broke it into two. Then Nara-Nārāyaṇas bowed before him and worshipped him. Thereafter the two pieces of the Paraśu remained with Śiva . It was one of these that Śiva gave to Paraśurāma. (p. 569).

[9] A poetic technique by which alternate meanings are to be discerned within a single verse by understanding certain words to have more than one meaning or by dividing in different ways the individual words that combine to form larger units (*see figure 1*).

2) Sarasvatī [like the eye of Śiva having the form of the moon] takes away (*hastayate*) the wilting (*dhvaṃsa*) of water lilies through her expanding skill/digits (*kalā*[10]).

3) Sarasvatī [like the eye of Śiva having the form of the sacrificial fire] has a ray that is the devourer (*āśana*) of the god of love (*madana*) who is the burgeoning of error.

The first series of meanings, those initially translated, pertains to Sarasvatī as the benefactress of poets. Sarasvatī to this day is the beneficiary of supplications from aspiring South Asian poets and even rock stars! Daṇḍin states, rather optimistically, in the *Kāvyadarśa* that even those aspiring poets without genius, intellectual prowess or even latent traces of poetic experience (from previous lives), through ardent study and worship of the goddess of speech, may gain her grace and hence earn acceptance into the assembly of poets.[11] The second series, translated here in the explanation, pertains to Sarasvatī when she has assumed the form of Śiva's threefold eye. The different divisions of words within combinations that produce the two strata of meanings are shown in the following table:

Fig. 1 Goddess of Speech	Śiva's Eyes
uccair asyati mandatām arasatām banishes stupidity savorlessnesss	uccair asyati manda-tāmarasatām banishes dull lotus-ness
jāgrat - kalaṃkai(r) - rava-dhvaṃsam hastayate public disgrace speech - loss removes	jāgrat -kalaṃ kairava - dhvaṃsaṃ hastayate expanding digits water lilies wilting removes
duṣṭa - udyan - mada - nāśana - arcir - error burgeoning pride destruction ray	duṣṭa - udyan - madana - āśana - arcir error burgeoning god of love devouring ray

[10] Here the expression *jāgratkalaṃ* is used adverbally. *Kalaṃ* is derived from the word *kalā* meaning skill or lunar digit.

[11] na vidyate yady api pūrvavāsanāguṇānubandhi pratibhānam adbhutam
śrutena yatnena ca vāgupāsitā dhruvaṃ karoty eva kamapy anugraham.
tad astatandrair aniśaṃ sarasvatī śramād upāsyā khalu kīrtim īpsubhiḥ
kṛśe kavitve 'pi janāḥ kṛtaśramā vidagdhagoṣṭhīṣu vihartum īśate (Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa*, ed. Rangacharya Raddi Shastri {Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1970} 104-5).

There are additional literal meanings that may be read within this verse though these are less successfully integrated, syntactically, into the verse. Nonetheless these may add to the suggestive flavor of the verse, and are worth mentioning:

1) Sarasvatī blesses (*hastayate* - lit. 'touches with her hand') the man who has ascending talent (*jāgrat-kala*) and who is not censored (*avadhvaṃsa*) by anyone (*kaiḥ*).
2) Sarasvatī blesses that speech that is clear (*jāgrat*) and melodious (*kala*) and that is not censored by anyone.

The diverse imagery within this verse emphasizes the different functions that are attributed to Sarasvatī, the goddess of speech. First and foremost, she is the goddess who extends the boon of skillful speech to those she deems morally worthy. *Ṛg Veda* 10.72.6, states that a man that one who abandons a friend is no longer possesses a share of speech.[12] The acquisition of perfect speech is thus intrinsically related to moral purification, and for this reason Jayadeva states that Sarasvatī removes the pride that leads to error. According to the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, however, moral perfection itself is achieved through correct speech: *yas tu prayuṅkte kuśalo viśeṣe śabdān yathāvad dhy avahārakāle / so 'nantam āpnoti jayaṃ paratra vāgyogavid duṣyati câpaśabdaiḥ //* ("A man who, in his dealings, uses words in their correct sense, being cognizant of the nice distinctions in sense, becomes always victorious in the next world (heaven), as he knows verily the proper use of words; if he, however, uses incorrect words, he incurs fault."[13] Bhartṛhari is perhaps more specific in this respect: *tad dvāram apavargasya vaṅmalānāṃ cikitsitam / pavitraṃ sarvavidyānām*

[12] *yasti tyāja sacividaṃ sakhāyam na tasya vācy api bhāgo asti* (*ṚV*, 10.71.6).

[13] Patañjali, *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya – (Navāhnikī)*, fasciculus 1 "Āhnikas, 1 and 2", trans. M. M. Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar, ed. Abhyankar and Jayadev Mohanlal Shukla (Pune: Sanskrit Vīdyā Parisaṃṣthā, 1969) 1.1.1., pg. 11.

adhividhyaṃ prakāśate // [14] ("It (grammar) is the door to salvation, the remedy for all the impurities of speech, the purifier of all the sciences and shines in every branch of knowledge").[15] Since *alaṃkāraśāstra* is aligned most directly with the metaphysical positions of grammarians, we may well assume that a reciprocal causality between skillful speech and moral perfection operates in this verse. Sarasvatī bestows skillful speech by purifying the faults of pride, and she is said to bestow moral perfection by extending the gift of skillful speech.

In keeping with Sanskrit literary convention, this opening verse of the *Candrāloka* is benedictory in nature. The author extols Sarasvatī as the source of intellectual purification and as the illuminating force of the universe. By entreating the goddess to shine forth like the eyes of Śiva, Jayadeva bequeaths to her the ontological, epistemological and soteriological agency commonly reserved for the supreme divinity. Such an attibution finds support in *Ṛg Veda* 10.125, where speech boasts: "...one eats, has insight, and hears what is said because of me...the one that I love, I make great, desireable, a seer, a bhahmin. I created the father who is foremost in the world."[16] Her ontological agency is demonstrated by her role as the blossoming force of lotuses, the lotus being the most common symbol for the universe. Such an attribution is similarly emphasized in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari who equates the principle of speech (*śabdatattva*) with brahma, the primordial and eternal source of all

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[14] Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya.* Ed. Subramania Iyer (Pune: Deccan College Posgraduate and Research Institute, 1966) 47.

[15] Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya. Chapter 1*, Ed. and trans. K. A. Subramania Iyer (Pune: Deccan College, 1995) 21.

[16] *mayā so annamatti yo vipśyati yaḥ prāṇiti ya īṃ śṛnoty uktam* (*ṚV*, 10.125.4). *yam kāmaye taṃ tamugraṃ kṛṇomi tam brahmāṇaṃ taṃ ṛṣiṃ sumedhām* (*ṚV*, 10.125.5) *ahaṃ suve pitaram asya mūrdhan* (*ṚV*, 10.125.7). Translations modified from those of Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty in *The Rig Veda: An Anthology* (London: Penguin Books, 1981).

worldly manifestations.[17] As Sarasvatī is presented in this verse as the revealer (*darśikā*) of the threefold world, she is understood here to be the source of knowledge as well as phenomenal manifestation. In the sphere of *alaṃkāraśāstra* this expression finds its precedent in Daṇḍin's *Kāvyadarśa* 1.4: *idam andhaṃ tamaḥ kṛtsnaṃ jāyeta bhuvanatrayam / yadi śabdāhvayaṃ jyotir āsaṃsārān na dīpyate* ("This entire three fold world would be [in] darkness and ignorance if the light known as speech did not shine through worldly existence").[18] The statement that her radiance consumes the god of love, *Madana*, the most persistent of all obstacles to spiritual emancipation, demonstrates that Sarasvatī has acquired the soteriological agency of Śiva in as well.

Through this projection of power, Jayadeva in effect raises Sarasvatī's status to that of an *iṣṭadevatā*. In so doing, Jayadeva intends to optimize the efficacy of his benediction. Because his work concerns poetry, is it only appropriate that he invoke the goddess of speech, who has the power to inspire and empower poets and indeed all users of language. By attributing to her the powers associated with the supreme deity, he simultaneously invokes Śiva's power to remove obstacles. The agency of eloquence and the agency of removing obstacles are both essential to Jayadeva's purposes, and thus he solicits both these powers within the form of goddess of speech.

Still, perhaps the most essential agency attributed to Sarasvatī in this benedictory verse is her capacity to delight. The commentators interpret this action (*ullāsinī*) both irreflexively and reflexively, and hence she both delights and finds delight in others. The commentators interpret the locus of this delight, *sumanasām*, to be both gods and scholars. Once again we

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[17] *anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram.*
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ (*VP*, 1.1).

[18] *KĀ*, 1.4, pg. 4.

find evidence for this view in the same hymn from the *Ṛg Veda* (10.125) where speech boasts: *ahaṃ eva svayam idaṃ vadāmi juṣṭam devebhir uta mānubhiḥ* ("I alone say what is enjoyed by the gods as well as men.") Poetry is distinct from other types of language use in that it requires language to do more than signify a meaning. Poetic language has as its goal a distinctive form of aesthetic pleasure. As a poet and *ālaṃkārika* striving to delight as well as provide literary charm to his audience, Jayadeva beseeches the goddess of speech to delight in the minds of scholars. Jayadeva's use of the word *mānase* in the sense of consciousness unmistakably alludes to the bliss of Śiva's meditations that are performed at Lake Mānasa on Mount Kailāsa.[19]

Śaradāgama commentary of Pradyotanabhaṭṭa1.1:

[This commentary begins with its own series of auspicious verses.]

1. "The earth is not wide enough for my feet, and the sky bears not the loftiness for my head. There is not even enough space in the ten directions for me to cast out my hands. What can I do? Where can I perform the dance of the triple-city conqueror?" Bhairava, fervent with such a thought, is the source of creation. May he and the host of gods be beneficent.
2. Because the god of love[20] shared her escalating affection, thinking "the one[21] who has broken Śiva's bow has conquered my innate enemy,"[22] the shower of

[19] Lake Mānasa believed, by tradition, to be the favorite breeding grounds for the wild goose (*haṃsa*), one of which serves as Sarasvatī's mascot.

[20] Love personified as the god Kāma is said to have this thought.

[21] Rāma breaks Śiva's bow at Sītā's *svayaṃvara* (groom selection ceremony), thus winning her affection.

glances from the daughter[23] of Janaka, which had been lovingly offered to Rāma like a garland of blue lotuses,[24] remains victorious.

3. Because of Rāma's presence, the city of Ayodhyā was complete. With time the clan known as Baghela became victorious, surpassing even the lineage of Raghu.[25]
4. A king was born in that lineage named Vīrabhadra, whose ability to conquer enemies was as famous as Indra's.
5. Just as Rāma followed Daśaratha, so King Vīrabhānu followed this one,[26] and thus the causeway of righteousness was fashioned over the earth as well as the ocean.[27]
6. His son was famed for his stainless diplomacy[28]....the source of the Ganges river. Victorious is his son[29] who, amongst the assembly of poets was like Rāma amidst the Gods.[30]

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[22] Because he incinerates Kāma (the god of love) with his third eye when the latter impudently tries to distract him in from his meditation, Śiva is said to be love's innate enemy.

[23] Sītā.

[24] In this case the tenor of this simile, the garland of lotuses, is that which is presented to Rāma for his victory at Sītā's *svayaṃvara* (contest of suitors). The pupils of Sīta's eyes are conceived as streaming out in her glances like the series of blue lotuses that composes this garland.

[25] The solar lineage of Rāma.

[26] It is unclear whether, this refers to Vīrabhadradeva, in which case we should understand that there were two Vīrabhadradevas: one who would have founded the Baghela dynasty and a subsequent one who was the patron of Pradyotanabhaṭṭa.

[27] Pradyotanabhaṭṭa alludes to the causeway to Lāṅkā that Hanumān built for Rāma.

[28] The editor of the Chowkhambha edition acknowledges a missing portion of the text here, and thus it is not possible to construe the full meaning at present. The editor suggests that originally there was a verse describing a king named Rāmacandra at the site of the lacuna. Aufrecht also states that Rāmacandra, of the Vaghela dynasty, was the father of Vīrabhadradeva.

7. By his command, this *Candrālokaprakāśa* (Illumination of the *Candrāloka*) has been composed with great care by the celebrated teacher.[31]

[Here the explanation of the *Candrāloka* begins]. The author has created his dedicatory verse because of his desire to remove obstacles to the text and has included it [in the text] for the instruction of pupils.[32] [If we interpret the verse] as referring to the eyes of Śiva, the eye that has the form of sun, banishes the property of being a dull lotus, because the sun has the property of delighting lotuses. When the sun is present, it is not possible for dullness to exist in lotuses. Since the eye having the identity of the moon has manifested its increments,[33] so it removes the wilting of water lilies, because the delight of water lilies has arises when there is a moon. When the eye is [interpreted as having the form of] the [sacrificial] fire, the offering[34] is the god of love who is burgeoning insolence. [If we understand these qualifications] as referring to the goddess of speech, she removes dullness and savorlessness, because the goddess of speech is keen and possesses *rasa*. Just as there is a loss of speech on

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[29] From the verses in the colophon, we can determine that this last king who commissioned the composition of the Śaradāgama is Vīrabhadradeva.

[30] The point seems to be that Vīrabhadradeva, as a benefactor, was the savior of poets. Pradyotana may also be praising his benefactor's literary ability, as Vīrabhadradeva was the author of a treatise on *kāmaśāstra* ("erotic science") entitled *Kandarpacūḍāmaṇī*, which Khiste dates at 1576 CE, citing a verse from this text: *haralocanaharalocanarasaśaśibhir viśrute samaye / phālgunaśuklapratipadi pūrṇo granthaḥ smarasmeraḥ* (*Kandarpacūḍāmani*, 7.2.49 cited in Khiste, p. 7). Aufrecht dates the text to 1577 CE. From this evidence, we can be reasonably assured that Pradyotanabhaṭṭa wrote during the latter half of the sixteenth century. The reader will also notice that Pradyotanabhaṭṭa glorifies the lineage of kings leading to his benefactor by comparing their deeds to the exploits of the most famous king of Ayodhya, Rāma.

[31] Referring here to himself.

[32] Since auspicious verses are composed in order to remove obstacles toward the completion of the text, they are necessarily composed prior to the composition of the work. Nevertheless, as Pradyotanabhaṭṭa explains, such auspicious verses are also educational to readers, and hence authors generally include these as an introduction to the text itself. Gāgābhaṭṭa states that such verses are included because they bring auspiciousness to readers and commentators of texts.

[33] *kalā.* The most basic sense is "a sixteenth part." In the current context, this refers to the portions of the moon that become visible each new day when the moon is waxing, and which disappear each day the moon wanes. It is also commonly used to denote a division of time, skill or any practical craft.

[34] *aśana.*

account of [the performance] of public errors, [the goddess of speech is said to] dispel this, because having removed [one's] faults through her grace one gains the capacity of correct speech. When one does not understand the faults [of speech] nor the means to extricate these, there is a fear that faulty speech will arise [and] there is no capacity for speech. When there is knowledge of both of these through the grace of the goddess of speech, the capacity for speech has no constraint. Those impertinent ones whose pride is burgeoning are necessarily devoid of [this] knowledge. Her flame is the destroyer of those who have a mountain of pride. The sense is that there is a removal of these [proud] ones because of the power of this flame. [It has been said:]

> Stainlessness and the property of illuminating the world are equally present both in the goddess of speech and in Śiva.

[If we interpret the verse] as referring to the goddess of speech, she is one who delights in the mind of each and every scholar. When the sun rises, there is a performance of sacrifice etc.[35] Furthermore, all the gods are said to be delighted by the moon on account of the offering of ghee into the sacrificial fire.

Rākāgama commentary of Gāgābhaṭṭa 1.1:

> May that young blue cloud[36] sporting over the courts and gardens
> of Ayodhyā on the banks of the Sarayū[37] river remain forever in my heart.[38]

[35] The implication is that speech delights both the gods and the scholars. The gods are presented with smoke of the sacrificial offering and also because of the recitation of Vedic speech and the scholars are delighted by the benefits of the sacrifice.

[36] In India, the clouds of the newly arriving monsoon have dark vibrant hue and are a source of great joy, since they signify that the parching heat of early summer will soon be alleviated. This verse makes a clear reference to the childhood of Rāma, the most beloved of Ayodhyans, who as an avatar possesses the dark blue hue of Viṣṇu, and who spent his charmed childhood and youth in the city.

Despite many previous efforts, this difficult text is still not well understood, [and hence] there is mockery of my own effort toward this [goal]. Even so my heart is entrusted with devotion at the feet of Yaśodā's[39] and Kauśalyā's[40] sons. Grace accomplishes the fruit of labor, even that which is difficult [to achieve].

May this composition by the wise Gāgābhaṭṭa, son of Dinakara, be so that there will be delight for scholars in the elucidation of the *Candrāloka.* May the composition [known as] the *Candrāloka* be polished by this *Rākāgama*[41] becoming, like the moonlight, the source of bliss for connoisseurs.[42]

This benedictory verse, which takes the form of the recollection of [his] customary principal deity,[43] is created for the destruction of obstacles. The author includes it [as part of the text] so that there might be the instruction of students and so that there might be auspiciousness for commentators and readers [of the *Candrāloka*]. May the goddess of speech shine forth, i.e., may she preside with all her excellence, may she sport or may she

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[37] A river running through Ayodhyā.

[38] *adhisarayūtaṭinītaṭam adhisāketāṅgaṇam adhitadudyānam / khelan nīradanīlo bālo me mānase sadā bhūyāt//* This identical auspicious verse also appears at the opening of Gāgābhaṭṭa's commentary to Jaiminī's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra,* the *bhāttacintāmaṇi.*

[39] Foster mother of Kṛṣṇa.

[40] Mother of Rāma.

[41] The title of this work can be translated as the *Arrival of the Full Moon.*

[42] *Rasika.*

[43] *iṣṭadevatā,* literally, desired deity.

delight, like the threefold eye having the form of the sun, the moon and the sacrificial fire belonging to the one bearing a broken axe (*khaṇḍaparaśu*), that is of *Mahādeva*[44]. Or may she reside with all excellences, may she sport and may she delight. [If we interpret the verse] as referring to the eyes, [the goddess speech] banishes the distressed condition of those lotuses that lack radiance. The sense is that she banishes the dullness of lotuses, because the sun has the property of causing lotuses to blossom. When increments of the moon[45] are manifesting, [she] removes the wilting of water lilies. [The verbal form *hastayate*] is a denominative (*ṇic*) because of the *vārtika* *hastān nirasane*.[46] The meaning [of this verb] is "causing it to go far away." This is because the moon causes the expansion of lilies.[47] The word *sumanasām* refers to the gods, because all of the gods are said to make offerings to Śiva and possess a share of ambrosia. The god of love is burgeoning error. The eye having the form of the sacrificial fire has such a ray that consumes the god of love, because this eye has the property of incinerating lust. [If we interpret this verse with respect] to the goddess of speech, she banishes foolishness and the absence of *rasa*. She removes the absence of speech that is a public flaw and which is due to public disgraces. Because she destroys the pride that is a serious[48] flaw for scholars, she is like the flame of a

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[44] Śiva.

[45] *Kalā.* This word can have a variety of meanings. Its most basic sense is that of a sixteenth part. When referring to the moon, it refers to portion that the moon increases in each succeeding day when the moon waxes.

[46] *ṇiṅaṅgānanirasane* (Pāṇini, *Aṣṭhādhyāyī*, Gana sūtra, 393). The *Siddhāntkaumudī* to this verse comments: *aṅgavācinaḥ prātipadikān nirasane 'rthe ṇiṅ syāt hastau nirasyati hastayate. pādayate* (Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita, *Siddhāntakaumudī*, vol II, part 1, ed. Śrīśa Chandra Vasu, Book 2, chapter 10, verse 2574, [comment to Gaṇa sūtra 393] [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962], pg. 504) ("The affix *ṇiṅ* comes after a noun denoting a bodily organ, when the sense is 'moving' or 'removing.' Thus *hastau nirasyati* = *hastayate*.") (*SK*, trans. Śrīśa Candra Vasu, book 2, chapter 10, verse 2574, [comment to Gaṇa sūtra 393] [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962] pg. 504).

[47] Hence making the contracted state go far away.

[48] *udyan.* Literally *rising.*

fire. She is the revealer of the triple world because she is capable of describing the threefold world.

Ramā commentary of Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa 1.1:

The one (Kṛṣṇa) who has fashioned [himself] earrings of lotus blossoms sports with Rādhikā[49] in Vṛndāvāna[50] causing the secretly descended moon to attain his spot.[51] May Mādhava[52] protect us.

Having prostrated to the Guru, the one renowned as Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa[53] composes his spirited[54] commentary to the *Candrāloka,* known as the *Ramā.*

The poet known as Jayadeva composes a benedictory verse in the form of a resume for the shining goddess of speech in order to pacify resistance to the completion of the text, because a benedictory verse [involving] a deity other than ones chosen deity is prohibited

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[49] *Rādhā,* the famous cowherdess of Vṛndavāna who became the beloved of *Kṛṣṇa.* The same name indicates the lunar mansion known as *viśākhā* that is considered to be the wife of the moon, hence the pun in the verse.

[50] Site of Kṛṣṇa's *lila* (sporting), in contemporary Uttar Pradesh.

[51] The moon has descended secretly to spy on Kṛṣṇa on account of his courtship with Rādhā. Seeing Kṛṣṇa sporting with Rādhā whom he identifies with his wife having the same name, the moon becomes stained with envy. This envy is compounded by the fact that Kṛṣṇa has fashioned earrings of lotus blossoms, the rival of the moon.

[52] A name for Kṛṣṇa.

[53] A name of somewhat mysterious origin. It is probably of non-Sanskrit origin, though one might attempt to trace it etymologically to water (*Pāya*) and fragrant grass (*guṇḍa*).

[54] *vilāsinī.* This word also refers to a desirous woman. Hence the pun implicit in the phrase *candrāloke vilāsinīṃ* ("a desirous woman in the moonlight.")

and because [an auspicious verse involving the goddess of speech] is suitable since [she] is the cause of everything.[55] He includes this [as part of the text] so that there might be the instruction of pupils and so that there might be auspiciousness for commentators and auditors[56] [of the text]. May that goddess having the form of speech, who is famous or who is to be described, shine forth, that is, may she preside with all her excellences, may she sport, and may she delight. Here we should supply the understanding *in the mouth of her devotee.* [57] Like what should she shine? Like the threefold eye, the eye having three constituent parts whose collection is no other than the eye having the forms of the sun, the moon and the sacrificial fire, of the one bearing a broken axe, that is the one whose axe was broken in the battle with Gadāsura, or the one bearing an axe that cleaves. [58]

Here, there is the question: what is the goddess of speech like or who is she? Again, just as in the beginning, [we should understand that] she casts into the distance (here *uccair* has the meaning *into the distance* because there is no intention to express the meaning "upwards") dullness (stupidity), and savorlessness (absence of exhiliration). Here we may also read *alasatām* [for *arasatām*] because of the equivalence of the phonemes *r* and *l.* The

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[55] The goddess of speech (Sarasvatī, or Vākdevatā) is said to be the cause of everything, because in accordance with Bhartṛhari's philosophy of linguistic monism, speech in its most fundamental nature (*śabdatattva*) is no other than brahma.

[56] In the sense of "listeners."

[57] While Jayadeva, earlier in the verse, states *sumanasām mānase ullāsini* ("delighting in the minds of scholars/gods"), Vaidyanātha states that the unexpressed location for the action expressed by the verb *dīvyatu* ("may she shine forth") is *bhaktavadane* ("the mouths/faces of her devotees"). Perhaps this opinion is encouraged by a similar image appearing in Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita* (10th century): *vande kavīndravaktrendulāsyamandiranartakīm* ("I salute [the goddess] dancing in the temples that are the faces of the sovereign poets"), or even that in Daṇḍin's auspicious verse from the *Kāvyādarśa*: *caturmukhamukhāmbhojavanahaṃsavadhūr mama / mānase ramatām nityaṃ sarvaśuklā sarasvatī* ("May the completely pure goddess of speech (Sarasvatī), the female wild goose [delighting] in the cluster of Brahma's [four] lotus faces, delight eternally in my mind").

[58] See footnote 2. Since in the battle with the Nārāyaṇas at Badaryāśrama, Śiva is at once the breaker of the axe (conjured out of a blade of grass by Nararṣi) as well as the owner of this broken axe, which remained in his possession after the battle.

word *asyati* means to cast off (*kṣipati*). The verb √*as* in the sense of *casting off* is a fourth class verb. The word *sumanasām*,[59] should be connected to both the previous and latter portions of the verse in the fashion of a crow's eye.[60] Because of this there is the expression [of the following ideas]. [The goddess of speech] overpowers and makes distant the absence of speech whose cause is non-terminated public disgrace. Through her grace, the performance of faultless speech is easily achieved. Or otherwise, the absence of speech is due to the fear of emitting faulty speech. Still others say that *jāgratkala* means "those who have clear talent" or "those whose speech is soft and deep,"[61] and that [the goddess of speech] touches with her hand or provides assistance to such a man because of the dissapearance of his stupidity on account of the previous qualification.[62] What sort of man [does she assist]? Such a man who is censored by no [other] man. According to the opinion of Bhāguri, the word *vadhvaṃsa* is a correct form.

What else is [the goddess of speech] like? She is one whose behavior is to delight in the consciousness of scholars.[63] Furthermore she is one whose flame is the destruction, i.e., the devouring etc., of lust, which is the burgeoning of error.[64] Or, when there is the

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[59] This may be understood in the sense of *scholars* or *gods* depending on how the verse is interpreted.

[60] The crow was popularly believed to have a single eyeball that alternates between two sockets depending on which side it wants to see. Hence the origin for this metaphor which indicates that an expression that appears only once, should be construed with two separate portions of a sentence.

[61] The Bhandarkar manuscript of the *Ramā* reads *kecit [t]u* [sic] *jāgratī kalā asya jāgratkā*[sic]*lo manda gambhīraḥ asya vā saḥ.* (folio 1), whereas the Gujarāti Printing Press edition reads *kecid tu jāgratyaḥ asya jāgratkalo mandagambhīraḥ śabdo 'sya vā* (2). Because of the of the visarga at the end of *gambhīraḥ* in the manuscript reading, it is likely that the scribe neglected to copy the word *śabda.*

[62] The idea is that because Sarasvatī removes stupidity and savorless, she makes an individual the suitable vessel for her blessings, that is, she provides such a person with the gift of skillful speech and a deep and gentle voice.

[63] *yā sumanasāṃ paṇḍitānāṃ mānase 'ntakaraṇe ullāsinī ullāsanaśīlā.*

[64] Here, Vaidyanātha emphasizes that aspect of the goddess of speech that is akin to Śiva's third eye, which destroys, metaphorically consumes, the body of the god of love (Kāma) when he attempts to disrupt Śiva's

destruction of pride, she is a precisely the flame. Or the word *arcir* signifies that [she] is like a flame, because [she is] the destruction of faultiness and the word *mada* [serves] as a qualification [of this faultiness].[65] If the reading is *dhṛṣṭodyan,*[66] the meaning is "the arrogant ones having burgeoning pride." Being without knowledge, they possess great arrogance. As for what comes earlier in the verse, [the understanding] is as before. Moreover [the goddess of speech] is stainless and therefore she is the revealer of the threefold world. She is responsible for the appearance of the collection of three parts that are no other than the world in the form of the earth, the atmosphere and the heavens. In other words, she has the power of describing this. But others insist that the word *amalā* (stainless) is the final word [in the compound *duṣṭodyanmadanāśanārciramalā*].[67]

[Up till now, this verse has been interpreted] with respect to the goddess of speech. [If we interpret the verse] with respect to the threefold eye, this casts into the distance the dullness of lotuses or their contractedness. By this, the property of being the sun is indicated, because this has the property of expanding lotuses. Furthermore, [the etymology of the word] *kerava* is "one that cries out in the water in the midst of flowers." Because of Pāṇini's rules 3.6.1 *halantāt* and 6.3.14 *tatpuruṣe kṛti,* [the word *kerava*] is [understood as] a seventh-case *aluk* compound.[68] The word *kairava* means that which is the beloved of

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meditation. Kāma's body is reduced to ashes in the process of this destruction. Hence, while Kāma is the embodiment of love and lust, he become "bodiless" (*anaṅga*) on account of his reckless attempt to distract Śiva meditation.

[65] Acording to this understanding, the goddess of speech is compared to the eye of Śiva having the nature of the sacrificial fire, because she destroys faultiness. The word *mada* qualifies that the faultiness that she destroys is that of intoxication or lust.

[66] This is the reading accepted by Pradyotanabhaṭṭa.

[67] This provides the meaning *she whose stainless flame...* or *she who is like a stainless flame...*

[68] A compound where a word does not drop its case ending. Here *ke* is in the seventh case in the sense of *jale* (in the water).

[such] a wild goose [that cries in the water amidst flowers]. Just as there is the destruction of the wilting of water lilies when there is the increasing of [lunar] increments, so there is the qualification that has been previously stated. Therefore, the statement of this word (*kairava*) is in the middle of the compound. Similarly, [the meaning of the word] *hastayate* is to overpower with the hand. With this [image], the property of being the moon is indicated, because this has the property of expanding water lilies.

Moreover, the goddess of speech is those things whose behavior is to delight in the consciousness of the gods or of the scholars. Accordingly, the property of being the moon is also indicated, along with the property of being the sun and the property of being the sacrificial fire, because the moon produces delight for the gods and because [the delight of the gods] becomes perceivable on account of the moon,[69] because there is a performance of ritual when the sun rises and because [the sun] has the nature [of producing the happiness of the gods], and furthermore because the sacrificial fire is worshipped daily and because the maintenance of the sacrificial fire is stated in the Veda.[70] Or alternatively, [the goddess of speech is said to have these three identities because] there is a nurturing of the intended meaning through this qualification and because there would be the untenability of [the activity] *devana* ("residing with all excellence," "sporting," "delighting") without this [qualification].[71] In the very same way, even according to the previous interpretation, this

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[69] The moon is identified with *soma* which is said to intoxicate the gods, and hence reveals their delight.

[70] Taking the form of the sacrificial fire, the goddess of speech is delighted with scholars on account of their daily worship of the sacrificial fire, and because scholars reciting the veda proclaim the maintenance of the sacrificial fire.

[71] The argument is that if the goddess of speech were not qualified as having the identities of Śiva's three eyes, the sun, the moon and the sacrificial fire, it would not be appropriate to request that she "shine forth."

qualification is efficacious.[72] Furthermore, [the goddess of speech] is one whose fire is the consumption, the devouring etc.,[73] of the god of love who is burgeoning error and who [becomes] the fuel. On account of this [qualification], the property of being like the sacrificial fire is indicated because the eye having this form (the sacrificial fire) incinerates the god of love. For the same reason, [the goddess of speech having the identity of the eye having the nature of the sacrificial fire] is stainless.[74] Some say that here, also, the understanding is as it was before. The qualification "illuminator of the threefold world" should be understood as a qualification of the collection of the three eyes, whereas the previous [qualifications] should be understood as applied the three eyes separately.[75]

Verse 1.2.

haṃ ho cinmayacittacandramaṇayaḥ saṃvardhayadhvaṃ rasān

re re svairiṇi nirvicārakavite mâsmatprakāśībhava

ullāsāya vicāravīcinicayālaṃkāravārāṃnidheś

candrālokamayaṃ svayaṃ vitanute pīyūṣavarṣaḥ kṛtī

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[72] Even if we conceive the goddess of speech to be just the goddess of speech, it is appropriate that she be qualified as possessing the identity of the sun, the moon and the sacrificial fire, because she is requested to "shine forth."

[73] *bhasmādi.*

[74] Because her flame has destroyed lust, she is understood to be stainless.

[75] The qualification "she is the illuminator of the three fold world" is understood collectively with respect to the sun the moon and the sacrificial fire, whereas the earlier qualifications – she whose flame is the deverouring of the god of love," "she who delights in the minds of gods and scholars" etc., - are understood individually with respect to the sun, the moon and the sacrificial fire.

O you who possess moonstones full of consciousness for hearts![76] Cause the *rasa*-s to expand! But you, unfaithful wench![77] Undiscerning poesy! Do not illuminate yourself through me![78] The skillful Pīyūṣavarṣa bestows his own *moonlight* (*Candrāloka*) for the expansion of the ocean of poetic ornaments that has mental reflection as its series of waves.

Explanation 1.2:

This verse forms a pun out of the title of the text. Jayadeva boasts that he himself will provide moonlight through the composition of his treatise the *Candrāloka* and advises connoisseurs to engage in this so as to expand their *rasa.* Here, Jayadeva metaphorically identifies the aesthetic response, i.e. *rasa,* of connoisseurs to the *Candrāloka* with the perspiration of moonstones on account of the moonlight (*candrāloka*).[79] Here *rasa* refers to both the nine varieties of aesthetic savor (erotic, comic, ferocious, pitiful, disgusting, terrifying, heroic, wondrous and tranquil) and to liquid [in general]. By their respective responses, *rasa* and perspiration, both the connoisseurs and the moonstones are said to expand the ocean of poetic ornamentation (*alaṃkāravārāṃnidhi*). The cause of these

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[76] *cinmayacittacandramaṇayaḥ.* The form of this compound is surely dictated by the author's desire to express alliteration. Nevertheless, the metaphor is aptly chosen and this compound can be interpreted in a variety of fruitful ways. See explanation of verse.

[77] *svairiṇī.* The term usually refers to a loose woman. *sakalajanasādhāraṇe* (*RĀ*, 1.2, p. 2).

[78] *māsmat prakāśībhava.* As the Gāgābhaṭṭa explains, because of the *cvi* formation, the sense should be *abhūtatadbhāva* (becoming as it was not before). In this case, the sense would be, "having revealed yourself, become one who is not revealed because of me." Because of the word *svairiṇī* ("loose woman!"), we should also understand this expression as a pun: "do not illuminate yourself (your body) because of me!"

[79] Moonstones were commonly portrayed as perspiring in the moonlight.

responses is in both cases *candrāloka*: in the first case Jayadeva's treatise and in the second the actual moonlight.

In the second line of the verse, Jayadeva personifies undiscerning poetry as an unfaithful woman who bestows her affection commonly among many men, and requests that she not reveal herself in his "moonlight." Gāgābhaṭṭa cites two different readings of this portion of the verse: 1) *mā sma prakāśībhavaḥ*[80] ("do not become illuminated/revealed!) and 2) *mā asmat prakāśībhava*[81] ("do not illuminate yourself through me"). In either case, the meaning becomes "do not become revealed by the moonlight which I provide through this text." This warning, in its most active sense, is directed toward those poets or poeticians whose mediocrity would be exposed by the true light of the *Candrāloka*. As a pun, this applies to an amorous woman of loose virtue (*svairiṇī*) who is requested not to reveal her body or her affections. This pejorative metaphor may be contrasted with the personification of speech in a simile from the "Paspaśāhnika" of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*: "*tadyathā jāyā patye kāmayamānā suvāsāḥ svam ātmānaṃ vivṛṇuta evaṃ vāg vāgvide tv ātmānaṃ vivṛṇute* ("just as a wife, warm in her love, dresses finely and exposes her form to her husband, similarly, speech exposes her real form to a person who knows the real nature of words."[82] Just as Patañjali commends correct speech by comparing it to a beautifully adorned woman suitably for her one husband, so Jayadeva scorns undiscerning poesy by equating it to a woman of loose virtue whose lack of integrity is exposed by correct understanding, and who is to be rejected by men of virtuous men, i.e., discerning connoisseurs.

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[80] The use of of the particle *sma* before the imperfect in the sense of the imperative is sanctioned by Pāṇini 3.3.176: *smottare laṅ ca* ("when the word *māṅ* is followed by *sma*, the affix *laṅ* as well as *luṅ* may be employed after a verbal root.") (Trans. Vasu).

[81] In this case the verbal form in the the imperferative (*loṭ*) rather than the imperfect (*laṅ*).

[82] Trans. Abhyankar, 17.

Jayadeva's use of the word *prakāśī* may very well indicate that at one level this metaphor should be understood as a rebuke to the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. If Jayadeva truly compares Mammaṭa's work to a woman of loose virtue, this would be rather disdainful evaluation of a text that was quickly becoming the most popular work on poetics, and reveals something of a competitive spirit within Jayadeva's work.[83] Certain features of the *Candrāloka* correspond closely to those in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Like the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, this work is arranged in ten chapters, the chapters themselves designated as a form of light: Mammaṭa's chapters are termed *ullāsa*-s and Jayadeva's called *Mayūkha*-s ("rays"). Both works similarly incorporate a form of light in the title - *prakāśa* and *āloka.* While such titles are hardly uncommon for works in *alaṃkāraśāstra*, it is important to note that Jayadeva's title beckons to the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana rather than to the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. The allegiance of the titles is paralleled in certain places by a greater faithfulness is theory as Jayadeva tends to favor Ānandavardhana's interpretations over those of Mammaṭa. While Vaidyanātha frequently strives to establish a concordance between the views of Jayadeva and Mammaṭa, in many places it is clear that Jayadeva asserts the independence of his opinion, as is the case in his definition of poetry and its cause (1.7 and 1.6).

As in the previous image of this verse, this metaphor alludes to the causality of the moonlight. The elliptical fancy here is that mediocre poets or poeticians should not subject their work to the illumination of the *Candrāloka* because there mediocrity will be exposed in the same way that a woman who has arranged an illicit rendezvous should not venture forth with her plan when the moon is shining because she will expose her wanton nature. Similarly, if we understand this verse to be a critique of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, the *Kāvyaprakāśa*

[83] Special thanks to Yigal Bronner, who is responsible for this insight and who has been most generous in sharing his understanding of the fifth *mayūkha* of the *Candrāloka* and its relation to the *Kuvalayānanda* of Appayadīkṣita.

is advised to not to become revealed, the cause for this being that Jayadeva has now provided genuine illumination with his own text which will expose the inconstancies in Mammaṭa's, should this text not conceal itself from public view.

Through these two initial personifications, Jayadeva states the uniqueness and superiority of his own work in relation to the common variety of poetic treatises by virtue of his superior audience. In the first line of the verse, he identifies his own audience as elite connoisseurs, those who have moonstones full of consciousness as hearts (*cinmayacittacandramaṇayaḥ*), whose hearts are as responsive to *rasa* as moonstones are to moonlight. Such a characterization would stand in direct contrast to the personification of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* as an unfaithful woman (*svairiṇī*), which as mentioned earlier might reveal Jayadeva's resentment toward the popularity of this text. With such a representation, he suggests that this popularity is due to the commonness or "easiness" of Mammaṭa's work, and boasts, rather self-righteously, that his work avoids such popular exposure, instead appealing to a small audience of intellectual luminaries.

Some variation is possible in the interpretation of this compound *cinmayacittacandramaṇayaḥ*. It seems likely that this compound is a *bahuvrīhi*[84] designating connoisseurs who possess hearts or intellects (*citta*) that are identified with moonstones, on account of their propensity to produce *rasa.* Still, it is possible that this compound is a *tatpuruṣa* identifying the thoughts or minds of the poets or connoisseurs. The word *citta* can

[84] In the present case the literal meaning of the compound is *moonstones that are just hearts that are full of consciousness.* If the compound is understood as a *bahuvrīhi*, then we understand the meaning to be *those who possess moonstones that are just their hearts that are full of consciousness.* The compound might be understood as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, in which case it refers to the moonstone hearts directly.

be interpreted to mean "consciousness," "thought," "mind" or "heart."[85] The first choice proves repetitious in relation to the word *cinmaya*, but the other three are possible and worthy of consideration. The understanding "heart," seems most appropriate because the connoisseur must be exceptionally receptive to poetic sentiment (*bhāva*). Still the understandings "mind" and "thought" are also valid and are consistent with Jayadeva's desire to formulate a more rationally oriented mode of poetic interpretation.[86] Another intriguing interpretation might be that the word *cinmaya* means "pure consciousness" and that the compound as a whole means "you who have moonstones that are pure consciousness for your hearts". Such an interpretation would portray the connoisseur of poetry as having a certain variety of purified consciousness, one in which emotional traces (*saṃskāra*) are not eradicated – as this would preclude his response to poetic sentiment – but rather polished or purified so that they respond fully and appropriately to aesthetic stimulus. Such an interpretation is supported by the statement of Abhinavagupta: *yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśād viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā* ("persons who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished by constant study and practice of poetry, and who respond to it sympathetically with their own hearts").[87] In reading poetry, such a connoisseur does not respond with binding emotions, but rather with detached universalized sentiment that give way to *rasa*, producing a temporarily liberating experience. The *sahṛdaya* cannot be said to be a true *jīvanmukta* -- one who attains spiritual

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[85] In the traditional Indian view, there is no differentiation between the heart as the seat of emotion and the intellect. Both emotions and thoughts are experience through the conceptual organ *citta*, in the same way that color is experienced through the visual organ, the eye.

[86] In verse 1.3, Jayadeva states that the milk ocean of poetics is the single locus of "reason and shining savorable *rasa*" (*yuktyāsvādyalasadrasaikavasati*).

[87] *DhvĀLoc* 1.1, *trans* Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan.

emancipation while still living -- since the liberation experienced through *rasa* is temporary. Nevertheless the *sahṛdaya* repeatedly gains a rare and privileged glimpse into beatitude by virtue of the purity of his heart.

Because of his confidence that the work will provoke *rasa* in the connoisseur, Jayadeva states that he composes the *Candrāloka* for the expansion of the ocean of poetic ornamentation (*vārāṃnidhi*). The word *ullāsa* here primarily designates "increase" but it also suggests that the connoisseur should "delight" in the ocean of poetic ornamentation, alluding to the use of the word *ullāsinī* in the previous verse (1.1). The use of the word *ullāsa* also alludes to the theory of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, one of the most influential figures in the development of *rasa* theory and whose works are sadly unavailable to us. In his commentary to the previously cited verse of the *Dhvanyāloka,* Abhinavagupta paraphrases Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view that *rasa* involves an aesthetic savor having the nature of "melting, expansion and radiance"[88] (*drutivistaravikāsātmani bhoge*[89]). While this reference occurs in the context of a critique of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view, Abhinavagupta provisionally accepts this threefold characterization of aesthetic pleasure in his own interpretation. The word *ullāsa* expresses both radiance and expansion, thus covering two of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's three bases of aesthetic enjoyment. The understanding of the third base, melting (*druti*[90]), is provided, elliptically, through the perspiration of the moonstones that is said to be the cause of this expansion (*ullāsa*).

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[88] *Ibid,* 225.

[89] *DhvĀ,* 200.

[90] *druti.* Lit. becoming liquid.

The fact that the ocean is composed of poetic ornaments (*alaṃkāra*-s) demonstrates the centrality that *alaṃkāra*-s assume in Jayadeva's vision of poetics. According to this image, these are expressed as the primary substance of poetry, akin to water within an ocean. Furthermore, Jayadeva's view that increased *rasa*-s of the connoisseurs expand the ocean of ornaments conveys an unusual parity between *alaṃkāra* and *rasa*, in contrast to the Ānandavardhana's conviction that these occupy different strata in the hierarchy of poetic components:

> rasabhāvatadābhāsatatpraśamalakṣaṇaṃ mukhyam artham anuvartamānā yatra śabdārthālaṃkārā guṇāś ca parasparaṃ dhvanyapekṣayā vibhinnarupā vyavasthitās tatra kāvye dhvanir iti vyapadeśaḥ[91]
>
> Wherever the words together with the *alaṃkāras* (ornaments, figures) of sound, the meanings together with the figures of meaning and the qualities (*guṇas*), all variously arranged so as to be kept distinct from suggestion, subordinate themselves to the main suggested sense which consists of *rasa*, *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, or *bhāvapraśānti*, one may apply the term *dhvani* to that poem.[92]

While the image in Jayadeva's verse suggests that the addition of *rasa* increases the ocean comprised of poetic ornaments, more precisely Jayadeva indicates a causal relationship between two entities. To this degree, a verse by the Dhvanikāra[93] becomes significant:

> vācyavācakacārutvahetūnāṃ vividhātmanām
>
> rasādiparatā yatra sa dhvaner viṣayo mataḥ.[94]

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[91] *DhvĀ*, 201.

[92] *DhvĀ*, trans. Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, 220.

[93] The author of the root verses that are incorporated into the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana. While a number of scholars equate these two authors, such a view is by no means unanimous.

[94] *DhvĀ*, 189.

> Wherever the varied word, meaning, and their causes of beauty are subordinated to *rasa*, etc., this is considered the domain of *dhvani.*[95]

The origins of this more conventional hierarchy can be trace back to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, where Bharata states that use of the ornaments is dependent on *rasa.*[96] In the current verse, however, the *rasa*-s are subsumed, imagistically, within the ocean of poetic ornamentation. Rather than conceiving poetic ornaments as vehicles for the expansion of *rasa*, Jayadeva has expressed the converse, stating the *rasa*-s expand the ocean of poetic ornaments.

At one level, the expansion of the ocean of ornaments is a straightforward image. Jayadeva has increased the number of varieties of poetic ornaments from that enumerated by Ruyyaka, the most prominent of his immediate predecessors in Alaṃkāraśāstra. Ruyyaka lists eighty-two *alaṃkāra*-s[97] while Jayadeva enumerates some one hundred thirteen *alaṃkāra*-s. Still it should be remembered that at another level, the increased *rasa*-s of the connoisseurs are responsible for the expansion of the ocean. Accordingly, it is conceivable that in Jayadeva's view the advent of *rasa-dhvani* theory, particularly through the compositions of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, has necessitated an expansion of the number of poetic ornaments. Similarly, it may well be true that Jayadeva intends that experience of poetic ornamentation has been expanded by the experience of *rasa*, and this is part of his impetus for the composition of the *Candrāloka*.

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[95] *DhvĀ*, trans. Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan, 220.

[96] *evam ete hy alaṃkārā guṇā doṣāś ca kīrtitāḥ / prayogam eṣāṃ ca punaḥ vakṣyāmi rasasaṃśrayam.* (*NS*, 16.114.)

[97] Ruyyaka, *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, ed. Durgāprasād and Kāśināth Pāṇḍuraṅg Parab (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1982).

The reader should also appreciate that the author's alias, *Pīyūṣavarṣa,* also reinforces the image of expansion. This name refers to the moon, designating this as "that which provides a shower of ambrosia". Ambrosia, like *rasa,* bestows bliss to its recipients. In this way, the ocean of poetic ornaments further increased by three factors: 1) the increased *rasa* of connoisseurs affected by the text, 2) the perspiration of moonstones caused by the moonlight, and 3) the rain of ambrosia suggested by the author's pen name. Ultimately, all three of these agents are to be metaphorically identified in the verse. Perhaps it will be sobering to mention that Jayadeva's image is grounded in a certain geophysical reality. The tides of the ocean do indeed waver according to the cycle of the moon.

Jayadeva moreover qualifies this ocean as having "mental reflection" as its series of waves (*vicāravīcinicayā...*), reiterating the importance of contemplation in the aesthetic process. This series of wave (*vīcinicaya*) having the form of mental reflection provides an apt metaphor for *dhvani,* both in the sense of "linguistic resonance" and the "poetic suggestion" that incites a self-reflexive contemplation in the audience of poetry or drama. According to another interpretation, the series of waves suggests that a type of discursive analysis is necessary for both the production of great poetry as well as the genuine experience of its sublimity. To this effect, Bhāmaha (aptly noticed by Abhinavagupta) comments:

> *Poetry comes to the man of talent, and at that only sometimes;*[98] still, it increases in a thousand ways if that man will keep considering his poem carefully thinking, "this should be like this," i.e., "I should say such and such,

[98] This is a citation of Bhàmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* 1.5.

not such and such," in this way always seeking the suggestive word and sense.[99]

Here, Bhāmaha compares the aesthetic process to metaphysical recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), whereby penetration into the truth is achieved by continual reflection upon an object.[100]

Śaradāgama 1.2:

Those who possess knowledge and are full of consciousness, who have moonstones in the form of hearts[101], [are told] "expand your *rasa*". Undiscerning poetics! unfaithful wench! Because [you have] the property of being common to several people, "do not reveal yourself." Both of these statements [serve as] reasons. Because when the moon rises, there is perspiration of the moonstone and there is an abandoning of their ventures by women who have arranged trysts.[102] [The author] states the purpose of the text – "for the increase…." That [ocean] in which the series of waves is precisely mental reflection pertains to such an ocean of poetic ornaments. By this [image] the subject of the work [is stated to be] poetic ornaments (*alaṃkāra*) along with poetic distinction (*lakṣaṇa*) [etc.], the purpose of the work is revealed to be the increase of *rasa* etc., and the relationship between the subject and the

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[99] Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan, 125.

[100] *Ibid*, p. 125.

[101] Once again this word (*citta*) can be understood also as "mind" or "thought."

[102] When the moon has risen, women who go out on rendezvous risk being discovered and hence, if they are intelligent, abandon their plans.

purpose is identified as the relation between what is to be expressed and that which expresses this.[103]

Rākāgama 1.2:

He includes his own name and that of the text within the work for the purpoes of [securing] fame. The words *ham* and *ho* are used as vocative particles. The word *cinmaya* should be understood in the plural and means "full of awareness[104]" or "taking the form of awareness" because the mind has the property of having the form of awareness. Or this [expression] might be understood to mean "possessed of consciousness." The expression *cittacandramaṇayaḥ* means "moonstones having the form of the mind." The word *rasa* refers to the nine *rasa*-s or to "the waters." *Saṃvardhayadhvaṃ* means to cause to attain increase. The words *svairiṇi* ("unfaithful one") and *nirvicārakavite* ("undiscriminating poetics") refer to the poetics that is common to every man. [The command] *mā sma prakāśībhavaḥ*[105] means "do not become illuminated." [Here] there is a *laṅ*[106] [affix because of Pāṇini's sūtra 3.3.176] *smottare laṅ ca.* Or the reading might be *mâsmat prakāśībhava.* In this case the word *asmat*

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[103] *pratipādyapratipādakabhāvaḥ.* These three features, the subject (*abhidheya*), the purpose (*prayojana*) and the relation (*sambandha*) are three of the four *anubandha*-s which are traditionally identified by authors with regard to their compositions. One may refer to Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* pg. 52 n. 1. for a concise explanation of the *anubandha*-s.

[104] *jñāna.* It is always problematic to differentiate *jñāna, cit, citta* and *manas* since these terms refer to slightly different enitities and processes in different philosophical and religious systems. Here I have translated *jñāna* as "awareness" as opposed to "knowledge", *cit* as "consciousness" and *citta* as "heart" or "mind". I acknowledge, however, that there are many other effective ways that one might translate these terms.

[105] Here, Gāgābhaṭṭa assumes a different reading than do Pradyotanabhaṭṭā and Vaidyanātha - *Mā sma* instead of *mā asmat* and *bhavaḥ* (*laṅ*) instead of *bhava* (*loṭ*).

[106] The verbal ending of the imperfect is applied to the verb √*bhū* in the expression *mā sma prakāśībhavaḥ* because of the Pāṇini 3.3.176 *smottare laṅ ca.*

(first person pronoun) should be understood in the fifth (ablative) case. In other words, *asmat* [should be understood to have the meaning] *asmattaḥ* ("from us"). The *cvi*[107] formation has the meaning "becoming that which it was not before" because the property of being indiscriminate does not exist in the [author's] own poetics by its own nature.[108] Therefore, the poet known as Pīyūṣavarṣa expands his text called the *Candrāloka* in order to increase the ocean whose waters have poetic ornaments as their object of comparison and whose collection of waves take the form of mental reflection. [The osean expands the *rasa*-s] because when there is moonlight, moonstones perspire and there is an absence of venturing forth on the part of women on trysts.

Ramā 1.2:

Indicating the purpose [of his text], i.e. for his own fame etc., and enjoining the name of the text (*candrāloka*), the author declares *ham ho cinmaya*... demonstrating the superiority of his own treatise in comparison to other works on poetics. *Haṃ* and *ho* should be understood as two [separate] words. Here, *ham* has the meaning of salutation. A maxim from the *Haima*[109] states: "the word *ham* is used in expressions of anger and conciliation." A

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[107] A verbal formation combining an adjective whose final vowel is replaced by the vowel *ī* with the verb √*bhū* (to become) or the verb √*kṛ* (to make) as in the verb *prakāśībhava* where the adjective *prakāśa* (visible) is modified to *prakāśī* and is followed by the verbal form *bhava* (become) from the verb *bhū*. The sense is that something becomes or is made to be some way, i.e., illuminated/visible, that it was not before.

[108] The point is that indiscriminate poesy is not found in Jayadeva's own poetic theory, and hence the author commands mediocre poetics not to reveal herself on account of his work, which is named after the moonlight.

[109] Probably referring to the *Siddha-hemacandra,* a grammatical treatise by the famous Jain scholar Hemacandra, who was born at end of the 12th century CE and who also composed a notable work on *alaṃkāraśāstra* entitled *Kāvyānuśāsana*) (see De. 189-191).

maxim from the *Viśvaprakāśa*[110] states that the word *haṃ* is used when there is a conciliation of expressions of anger. The word *ho* is used as a [form of] vocative address. The opinion of both these works (*Haima* and the *Viśvaprakāśa*) is that the combination of these words (*ham* and *ho*) is used when there is the idea of vocative address and summons, as in the case of the word *bho.* The meaning is "o you who have moonstones full of consciousness for hearts." [The idea] is that these [moonstones] are full of consciousness or are the substrate of consciousness. By this, insentience is rejected, because insentience does not have the property of having a connection to *rasa* and because such an idea (insentience) would be counterproductive.[111] Those moonstones, gems for whom the moon is beloved, take a form similar to that of the inner consciousnesses (*antaḥkaraṇa*) [of connoisseurs]. Or [this refers to] those moonstones that are replete with consciousness, those gems whose beloved is the moon, who take the form of the mind, or those who possess these forms. [The author refers to these in the second person]: "You! Expand the erotic *rasa* etc." By this [command] these [moonstones] also have the property of increasing *rasa* in the form of water.

[The author commands]: "You undiscerning poesy, do not reveal yourself from us." The word *asmat* should be understood in the fifth case [as in]: "you who [would become] visible from us, who are not [yet] visible from us [but who would] become visible from us." To the extent that it might [become visible], there is the use of the expression *prakāśībhavaḥ.* There is a *cvi* formation, because the property of being undiscerning is not found in the author's poesy by its own nature.

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[110] A dictionary attributed to Maheśvara Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭacārya (probably 12th cent.). [see *Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Collections of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,* volume VI, *Vyākaraṇa Manuscripts* (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1931) cxxxiii.]

[111] *vaiyārthya.* The idea of insentience would be counterproductive to the simile expressed in this verse.

Accordingly, [the expression] "unfaithful one" [means] "you who are common to several men." The expression *nirvicāra*...refers to one who is indiscriminate, one for whom discrimination -- that discrimination that takes the form of a worthy person who is suitable for lodging -- has departed. Accordingly, the expression *re* marks a derogatory vocative address. The repetition [of this term] is for the purpose of indicating intensity.

He states the reason for both [of these requests - 1.2a and 1.2b], "the moonlight" (*candrāloka*).[112] Pīyūṣavarṣa, [who is described as] *kṛtī*, is [thus] well known, meritorious, skillful or wise. Pīyūṣavarṣa is one who showers nectar, i.e., the moon. The one possessing this name is Jayadeva. Because his illumination cannot be compared to that of others, and just as his poetry cannot be compared to that of others, his illumination is associated with the moon. Hence the name of his text (the *Candrāloka*). He composes this text with great subtlety, not merely with great expansiveness, because [we observe] that when the moon rises, moonstones perspire and there is an absence of surreptitious departure on the part of women who have arrange [illicit] trysts.[113] [Someone might question]: "when other treatises [on *alaṃkāraśāstra*] exist, how can you say that this text is composed without precedent?" Therefore, the author states: "for the purpose of increase," that is, the increase or nurture of such an ocean whose collection of waves has the form of mental reflection, such an ocean whose form is that of poetic ornaments. We should understand the compound *vārāṃnidhi* to be a sixth-case *aluk*[114] compound. When there is an increase in the illumination of the moon, there is an expansion of the ocean. Similarly, when this treatise is composed by Jayadeva,

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[112] Moonstones to perspire in the moonlight, increasing *rasa* ("liquid"), and unfaithful women abandon their trysts on account of the likelihood that they will be discovered in the illumination.

[113] As mentioned earlier, these points are the elliptical causality supporting the statements in the verse half of the verse.

[114] A compound where the case ending of one of the constituent words is not elided.

there is an increase in poetic ornaments. This [increase] does not occur in other texts. The import is that this text is efficacious. Even though other things are explained in this text besides poetic ornaments, because ornaments have the porpoerty of being explained in greater detail [by this text] they are said to be predominant. Thus, the subject (*viṣaya*) -- poetic ornaments etc., the purpose (*prayojana*) -- scholarship of these subject, the connection (*saṃbandha*) -- the relation between what is to be explained and that which explains this, and the audience (*adhikāra*) -- those who desire knowledge of these subjects, are indicated [in this verse].

Verse 1.3.

yuktyāsvādyalasadrasaikavasatiḥ sāhityasārasvata-

kṣīrāmbhodhir agādhatām upadadhat sevyaḥ samāśrīyatām

śrīr asmād upadeśakauśalamayaṃ pīyūṣam asmāj jagaj-

jāgradbhāsurapadmakeśarayaśaḥśītāṃśur asmād budhāḥ

The ocean whose milk is poetic eloquence is the single locus of reasoning and savorable shining *rasa*. It possesses unfathomability and [hence] should be resorted to. Gods and scholars! Acquire wealth from this [ocean], nectar, which is skillful instruction, and the moon, which is fame [and is white[115]] as the gleaming filament of the lotus expanding into the world![116]

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[115] This compound *jagajjāgradbhāsurapadmakeśarayaśaḥśītāṃśur* expresses an elliptical simile between the whiteness of the moon of fame (*śītāṃśu*) and the whiteness of the filament of the lotus, such a lotus as is said to expand into the world. The filament of the lotus when cracked opened reveals a brilliant white color. The beginning of the compound, *jagajjāgrad*, "expanding as the world," refers to the popular use of the lotus as a symbol for the universe itself.

Explanation 1.3:

In this verse, Jayadeva reiterates the image of the ocean of poetics. In this case, he qualifies that the ocean is made of milk, clearly alluding to the legend from the *Mahābhārata*[117] where the gods and demons churn the ocean, which subsequently transforms into milk and eventually after great effort on behalf of the gods yields gems, medicinal herbs and the unfortunate by-product poison.[118] While in the previous verse, Jayadeva mentioned

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[116] In the *maṅgalācaraṇam* (auspicious opening verse) of the *Amarakoṣa* (fourth century), Amarasiṃha provides an image of considerable similarity: *yasya jñānadayāsindhor agādhasyânaghā guṇāḥ / sevyatām akṣayo dhīrāḥ sa śriye câmṛtāya ca //* (Amarasiṃha, *Amarakoṣa*, ed. Brahmananda Tripathi (Varanasi: Caukhamba Surbharati Prakashan, [copyright not indicated]) 1. ("The virtues of this fathomless ocean of speech are stainless. Wise men! This inexhaustible ocean should be resorted to for wealth, beauty and ambrosia.")

[117] 1.15.5-13, as cited in O'Flaherty (see next following note for full citation).

[118] An excellent summary of this legend can be found in Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty's compilation *Hindu Myths: A Sourcebook Translated from the Sanskrit* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1975) 274- 280. From this, I have excerpted the following:

> Then a great roar, like the thunder of a great cloud, came forth from the ocean as it was churned by the gods and demons with Mount Mandara; for various water creatures, crushed by the great mountain, were dying by the hundreds in the salt water, and the mountain destroyed many kinds of aquatic beings living in the subterranean levels of hell. The mountain whirled about so that great trees filled with birds spun off and fell from the mountain peak. As the trees were crushed against one another, a fire born of their friction blazed forth into flames and enveloped Mount Mandara, which looked like a dark cloud charged with lightning...Then Indra, the best of immortals, put out that burning fire everywhere with water from his clouds. But the various saps exuded from the great trees and the juices from many herbs flowed into the water of the ocean. And from these juices, which had the essence of ambrosia, and from the exudation of liquid gold mixed with the water, the gods obtained immortality. Then the water of the ocean turned to milk as it became mixed with those supreme juices, and from that milk there arose clarified butter...Viṣṇu replied, 'I grant strength to all who are engaged in this action. Churn the ocen-pot all together; twirl Mount Mandara.' When they heard the words of Nārāyaṇa they became strong, and all together violently stirred the milk of the great ocean once more. Then from the ocean there arose Soma, the calm moon, with its cool rays, and the sun of a hundred thousand rays. And immediately after this the goddess Śrī, dressed in white, appeared from the clarified butter...
>
> But as they continued to churn excessively, the terrible Kālakūṭa poison came forth and immediately enveloped the universe, blazing like a smoky fire; the poison paralyzed the triple world with the smell of its fumes. The lord Śiva took the form of a sacred chant and held that poison in his throat, and from that time forth he has been known as Blue-throated; thus it is traditionally told. At the request of Brahmā and for the sake of protecting all people,

an ocean of poetic ornaments in order to characterize the subject of poetics as a whole, in the present verse the author uses the image of an ocean to represent his own treatise, the *Candrāloka.* This ocean is qualified by three entities: "milk" (*kṣīra*), "eloquence" or "speech" (*sārasvata*), and "poetics" (*sāhitya*). The compound formed of these three words (*sāhityasārasvatakṣirāmbhodhiḥ*) might be understood in a variety of ways according to the principles of identity and inherence. The basic idea seems to be that the ocean is made of milk, and that this milk is identified with the eloquence found in poetics, or the eloquence that is poetics. Like the more famous ocean from the *Viṣṇupurāna*, the milk ocean of poetic eloquence possesses hidden treasures that are yielded upon the application of the correct effort. The fact that this ocean possesses "unfathomability" suggests the concealed nature of many poetic expressions in which the true aesthetic treasure lies beneath the literal expression of the verse. Such a depth alludes to the operation of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) which is symbolized by the deep (*gambhīra*) course of the Ganges river in verse 7.1 of the *Candrāloka.*[119]

The most important qualification of the milk-ocean of poetic eloquence, however, is that it is "the single locus of reasoning and savorable shining *rasa.*" We might also understand this qualification as "the single locus of shining *rasa* which is to be savored with

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Śiva swallowed the poison and from it there arose the Eldest [Jyeṣṭhā, the goddess of misfortune] her dark form adorned with every kind of gem.

[119] *vṛttibhedais tribhir yuktā srotobhir iva jāhnavī*
bhāratī bhāti gambhīrā kuṭilā saralā kvacit. (*CĀ*, 7.1)

Just as the Ganges river possesses three types of currents
Sometimes speech appears deep, [sometimes] sinuous, [sometimes] straight.

Here Jayadeva identifies the three modes of verbal signification -- denotation, indication and suggestion -- with the three types of currents assumed by the Ganges rivers: straight, sinuous and deep.

reasoning." In either case, Jayadeva indicates that aesthetic experience cannot be divorced from proper analytical reasoning, challenging the frequently assumed bifurcation of these two forms of mental engagement and the popular view that logic is an inappropriate means to appreciate *rasa*.[120] The verse suggests that imagery and poetic ornaments must be conceived with great precision, and are not to be merely savored impressionistically. Just as the milk ocean was churned by the gods for its riches and herbs, so the ocean of poetics must be intellectually churned by connoisseurs through methods commonly reserved for metaphysical and logical discourses: proof, refutation and the application of corrects means of knowledge.

In the second half of this verse, Jayadeva draws parallels between the original rewards acquired through the churning of the milk ocean, and those to be gained through resorting to the milk ocean of poetics. He states that from the ocean one can obtain *śrī*, that is, wealth and beauty, the nectar comprised of skillful instruction and the moon of fame. Though not explicitly stated, this verse conveys Jayadeva's understanding of the goals of poetry. In this respect, his view is far more modest than that of Mammaṭa who lists fame, wealth, worldly knowledge, the destruction of inauspiciousness, supreme bliss, and instruction in the manner of a beloved.[121]

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[120] Abhinavagupta writes:

> Again, aesthetic enjoyment (bhoga) is not produced by the words of poetry...Aesthetic enjoyment, which is a melting, expansion and radiance, otherwise known as relishing (āsvāda), comes about rather from the cessation of that obscuration [of the true nature of the self] which is caused by the thick darkness of ignorance. In bringing this cessation to its superlative degree it is suggestiveness that should be given the place of honor (*Dhvanyālokalocana*, trans. Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan 225-6).

Throughout the *Locana*, Abhinavagupta reiterates that poetic suggestion (*dhvani*), as the supreme vehicle of aesthetic savor, defies cognition through inference.

[121] *Kāvyaṃ yaśase 'rthakṛte vyavahāravide śivetarakṣataye / sadyaḥ paranirvṛtaye kāntāsaṃmitattayôpadeśayuje //* (*KP.* 1.2, pg. 6.).

Śaradāgama 1.3:

He inspires scholars to engage in his treatise by stating its purposes in the verse beginning *yukti*...[It is a single locus] of two things: "reasoning and savorable shining *rasa.*" There is not the same kind of reasoning in other treatises on *alaṃkāraśāstra.* The milk [of the ocean] is precisely that eloquence that is associated with poetics. With the word *agādhatām*, [the author] states the depth [of his own text] in relation to that of other treatises. Therefore, for this reason, it should be resorted to. He states the rewards of resorting to this type of [ocean/text] – wealth etc. [One attains] wealth and beauty from familiarity with what is charming. By studying this text, one also becomes the teacher of others, and thus he states *upadeśa*... Because of the nectar of ones instruction the engagement of students is stated. Even though in other texts the moon is said to be fame, in resorting to this treatise [this statement] becomes true.

Rākāgama 1.3:

He states the purpose of his text, for the encouragement of scholars [to read his text]. The phrase *yuktyāsvādya*... means "the single substrate of two things: reasoning and savorable shining *rasa.*" The point is that in other treatises on *alaṃkāraśāstra* there is not [this type of] reasoning. Or the word *yuktyā* has the third case (instrumental) suffix and the word *āsvādya* is a gerund construed with the verb (*samāśrīyatām*).[122] The ocean whose milk is precisely that verbal eloquence associated with poetics bears unfathomability, that is,

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[122] In this case the meaning would be: "having savored this milk ocean of poetic eloquence, one should resort to this."

depth. Here, the depth is in relation to other texts. In this view, the word *sevyaḥ* means "to be entered gradually," "to be realized,"' "suitable" and "to be savored with [great relish]". [The imperative] *samāśrīyatām* means "resort to this" through study, instruction and investigation." We should understand the word *bhavati* ("arises") throughout the entirety [of the second half of the verse].[123] Wealth [arises] along with nectar in the form of the skill in instruction. Because of the word 'nectar,' [the author] suggests the third mode of instruction among the three types of instruction – 1) that resembling [instruction by a] master, 2) that resembling [instruction by a] friend and 3) that [resembling instruction by a] beloved woman – because the first two types of instruction do not have the property of being the object of aesthetic savor on account of the predominance of word and meaning, while the instruction resembling [that by a] beloved woman does have the property of being the object of aesthetic savor on account of the predominance of *rasa* and on account of the equivalence of this type of instruction to nectar.[124] From this text there also arises the moon, taking the form of fame, such a fame that on account of the property of being widely spread[125] is like the filament of that lotus which is expanding, shining or famous[126] and which is no other than the world.

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[123] Vaidyanātha disagrees with this interpretation, and suggests instead that the nominatives in the second half of the verse should be construed with the passive imperative *śrīyatām*.

[124] Like nectar, instruction from one's beloved produces bliss. This simile is mentioned repeated in the *Dhvanyāloka* and later in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Abhinavagupta attributes it originally to Bharata, the author of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*: *munibhir iti -- bharatādibhir ity arthaḥ. Etac ca prabhumitrasammitebhyaḥ śāstretihāsebhyaḥ prītipūrvakaṃ jāyāsammitatvena nāṭyakāvyagataṃ vyutpattikāritvaṃ pūrvam eva nirūpitam asmābhir iti na punar uktabhayād iha likhitam* (*Dhv*, *Loc.* 3.30). In the *Kāvyaprakāśa* we find: *kāvyaṃ yaśase 'rthakṛte vyavhāravide śivetarakṣataye//sadyaḥ paranirvṛtaye kāntāsaṃmitatayôpadeśayuje*. (*KP*, 1.2. Ed. Jhalakikar. p. 5.) ("Poetry is for the purposes of fame, the achievement of wealth, knowledge of worldly affairs, destruction of inauspiciousness, instantaneously produced supreme bliss, acquisition of that sight of instruction that is suitable in a beloved woman").

[125] *prasṛtatvena.* Gāgābhaṭṭa suggests that the property which that associates fame with the lotus filament is the property of being spread out rather than the property of being exceptionly white. Both whiteness and diffuseness are apt qualifications of fame in the context of Sanskrit literature.

[126] As mentioned earlier, lotus filament was famous in Sanskrit literature for its extreme whiteness.

Accordingly, the impetus for [the study of] this text, which has as its purpose the knowledge of poetry and whose goal is the attainment of wealth and instruction, is indicated. In extension, these three additional purposes should be understood, those having the form of worldly knowledge, cessation of inauspiciousness and supreme bliss.[127]

Ramā 1.3:

[Someone might question]: Even though there exists a purpose for the composition of this text, expansion [of the ocean of poetic ornaments], there might not be any impetus for others to [study] this text because there is no purpose in studying [this] treatise. Proficiency in poetic ornaments etc., cannot be the purpose because these do not have the property of being one of the goals of man. [To counter such a challenge] the author, by stating the purposes of *alaṃkāraśāstra* generally in the verse beginning *yukti*..., demonstrates that the rewards of studying this [text] are such that [its study] is worthy. The expression *he budhāḥ* [addresses] scholars and gods. The ocean [here] has the form of that milk associated with Sarasvatī who is [herself] associated with *alaṃkāraśāstra*. [Such milk] takes the form of the text called the *Candrāloka*. Or, the ocean is one of such milk that is precisely the eloquence associated with *alaṃkāraśāstra*. Or that ocean whose milk is no other than *alaṃkāraśāstra* should be resorted to by [that type of] churning that takes the form of perfect study, teaching and investigation. It is not [to be churned] in just any sort of way. Here the word *sevyaḥ* is a

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[127] As illustrated above, these are the three additional purposes stated by Mammaṭa. While Gāgābhaṭṭa, unlike Vaidyanātha, mentions significant differences between the *Candrāloka* and the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, he still uses the *Kāvyaprakāśa* as a template for interpreting the *Candrāloka*. This demonstrates the extent to which the *Kāvyaprakāśa* had become the mainstay of poetic interpretation in the medieval period.

qualification that is the origin of a reason.[128] The sense is because of this [qualification], [the milk ocean of poetic eloquence] is a receptacle for your use, which is to be "entered slowly," or in [another] view, "understood." The meaning is that it is to be savored, that is, relished. Here the cause for this is specified: [the ocean] possesses unfathomability, i.e., the property of depth, and the property of being a concealed substrate. We should supply the understanding *hence* here.[129] Here, the depth is in relation to other texts. The word *yuktyā* is also a qualification of the origin of a cause. Because, those shining or excellent *rasa*-s[130] such as *śṛṅgāra* ("the erotic"), etc., water[131], [and other things such as] dejection (*viṣāda*[132]), jewels,[133] and excitement (*harṣa*), not those that are sordid or those that produce merely the expansion of a text, are to be made savorable by means of logical arguments, which are to be applied through proofs, refutations and through correct means of knowledge, and not randomly.[134] [The ocean] is said to be the one, meaning the "principal" or "solitary,"

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[128] The ornament *hetu* (reason) pertaining to the word *sevyaḥ*, relates to the depth of the ocean/*Candrāloka*. Because the ocean is deep, and hence dangerous, it is to be entered slowly. Because the *Candrāloka* is deep, that is, profound, it is to be understood carefully.

[129] The meaning is "hence it is to be resorted to."

[130] Here *rasa* is understood in its broadest sense to include the meanings "water" as well as the subsidiary components of *rasa* such as the *vibhāva*-s and *vyabhicāribhāva*-s.

[131] The word *śṛṅgāra* means "shining" in addition to "erotic." Water is also shiny, when it reflects the sun or the moon.

[132] I have substituted *viṣāda* for *viṣādayaḥ* as it appears in both the Gujarati Printing Press edition as well as the manuscripts held in the Bhandarkar institute. *Viṣāda*, as a transitory sentiment, seems better suited for the qualification *lasat* ("shining") than *viṣa* ("poison"). Even so, the meaning *viṣa* is possible since poison was one of the products of the original churning of the ocean at the hands of the gods and demons. In the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (6. 107) *Viṣāda* is classified as a *vyabhicāribhāva* (transitory sentiment) rather than a *sthāyībhāva* (stable sentiment). Here, however, it may possibly be used to exemplify the *sthāyībhāva*-s.

[133] Jewels were a product of the original churning of the milk ocean. In this context, jewels indicate the determinant (*vibhāva*) of wealth, which provokes the transitory sentiment excitement.

[134] In a somewhat loose analysis of this simile, Vaidyanātha characterizes the ocean as the substrate of the main components of *rasa*: *rasa*, determinants (*vibhāva*-s) such as jewels, and transitory sentiments such as excitement dejection (*viṣāda*) and excitement (*harṣa*).

substrate of these [*rasa*-s]. Or, alternatively, [we should understand the word] *yuktyā*, ending in the third case suffix, and [we should understand] the word *āsvādya* to end in the gerund affix (*lyap*) and to be syntactically connected to the verb. [The understanding "having savored"] accompanies the understanding "resorting to". Or [the ocean] is the single locus of two things, reasoning and savorable shining *rasa.* In this case, *reasoning* is the form of concentration explained above. The sense is that [such] reasoning does not exist in any other treatise on *alaṃkāraśāstra.*

Thus, because it has the property of being something one should resort to on account of its unfathomability, resorting to this is suitable. He states the rewards of resorting to this [ocean]: *śrīḥ*... The correct syntax is "Oh gods and scholars! From this ocean having the form of a text, wealth should be enjoyed." Therefore, the word *samāśrīyatām* [should be construed] as the median [of the two halves of the verse].[135] But an explanation [made] by supplying the understanding "there is" is pointless.[136] [In the case of the ocean] wealth is obtained through churning, and beauty is obtained by resorting to [poetry] that has *rasa.* The understanding is that [one will get wealth] from kings [and other powerful people]who will be delighted when they have read this text. Because of its aforementioned properties, this instruction will awaken others and hence one will becomes the teacher of others. Because skill in instruction has the property of being nectar, there will be incitement for students [to study this text]. [By this] the author suggests that [type of instruction offered by] a beautiful women. Or *upadeśa* means "supreme wisdom" and [the attainment is one of] that speech having the form of the nectar that is replete with skillfulnes in this [supreme wisdom]. [This

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[135] According to this interpretation, *samāśrīyatām* should be construed with both halves of the verse. Hence we should understand the meanings "the ocean should be resorted to" and "wealth, etc., should be enjoyed. "

[136] He dismisses Gāgābhaṭṭa's explanation on how to understand the second half of the verse.

speech] is the direct object of the verb [*samāśrīyatām*] as before. [As for the final matter] the moon, the one having cool rays, not hot, [such a moon] having the form of fame which is like the shining filament of the lotus expanding throughout the universe, not just one place. The verb and its object are the same as before.[137] Or that moon having the form of fame that, on account of the property of being spread out, is like the filament of the lotus that is precisely like the world. The expression *jāgradbhāsura* [should be understood] as a qualification of the lotus, fame and the moon [simultaneously], through [the principle of] *tantra*.[138] For this same reason, this [comparison] has been proclaimed previously. Even though fame is the moon according to other texts [as well], by relying on this text [this identification] becomes true. The point is that engagement is suitable in this text whose purpose is knowledge of poetry, the rewards of which are wealth, instruction and fame. It is to be also understood that there are other purposes [to *alaṃkāraśāstra*] which have been made clear in the beginning of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*.

Verse 1.4:

taṃ pūrvācāryasūryoktijyotistomodgamaṃ stumaḥ

yaṃ prastūya prakāśante madguṇās trasareṇavaḥ

We praise the expanding assemblage of lights that are the statements of the suns that are [the] former masters. Praising these, the dust motes that are my own qualities are illuminated.

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[137] The structure is the same as in the previous cases. "From this resorting, the moon is attained."

[138] When a subordinate thing simultaneously serves several purposes.

Explanation 1.4:

In a somewhat misleading display of humility, Jayadeva states his utter reliance on the wisdom of former masters. In the previous two verses of this chapter, he has already indicated the surpassing depth (*agādhatām*) of his own text in comparison to other poetic treatises, as well as its uniqueness due to the integration of reasoning (*yukti*) and of aesthetic savor. He also has boasted that he will provide his own moonlight in the form of the text of the *Candrāloka*, and accordingly provides his own illustrations of poetic ornaments, *dhvani* and *rasa* throughout the entirety of the text rather than citing the verses of former masters. In actuality, this somewhat obliging display of respect is a prolegomena for a direct challenge to the statements of Mammaṭa, which he instigates in verses 7 and 8 of this chapter.[139]

While the simile of the verse requires little explanation, it should be mentioned that according to *Vaiśeṣika* perceptual theory, a dust mote is the minutest visible entity. In praising the statements of former masters as a rising collection of lights, Jayadeva perhaps alludes to the offering of lights in certain *pūjā*-s. The identification of former masters with suns may well allude to the immortalization of famous sages as stars as in the case of the *saptarṣi*-s, the seven sages who comprise the constellation commonly known as the Big Dipper.

[139] nirdoṣā lakṣaṇavatī sarītir guṇabhūṣaṇā
sālaṅkārarasānekavṛttir vāk kāvyanāmabhāk

aṅgīkaroti yaḥ kāvyaṃ śabdārthāv analaṅkṛtī
asau na manyate kasmād anuṣṇam analaṃ kṛtī (*CĀ*, 1.7-8)

Śaradāgama 1.4:

[The author] avoids arrogance [with the verse beginning] *tam*....The sense is that even a single dust mote is illuminated in a sunray which has entered through an eyehole.

Rākāgama 1.4:

[The author] wards off his own arrogance. Because former masters have the property of being like the sun, their statements have a similar brilliance. There is no *ṣ* here [in the word *jyotistoma*] because this does not have the property of being a definition.[140] The author's intent is "my own capacity is due only to the investigation and practice of the statements of my predecessors."

Ramā 1.4:

At this point, the author wards off [suspicions of] his own arrogance with the verse beginning *tam*....[The author states]: "We praise that expanding collection of sentences from those former masters who are like suns, such a collection that is equivalent to an assemblage of lights. How is this [assemblage]? Having relied completely on this [assemblage], my own virtues, which are like dust motes, become manifest. Just as when the sun rises, dust motes become manifest in the rays of light that have entered through eye-holes, so my own virtues are illuminated only by relying on this [assemblage of statements], not by their own [power]. There is no *ṣ* in the word *jyotistoma* because this is not a proper noun.

[140] Gāgābhaṭṭa thus distinguishes Jayadeva's expression *jyotistoma* in verse 1.4 with the more commonly used word *jyotiṣṭoma*, which designates a particular type of sacrifice to Soma.

Or, alternatively, [we might understand] that there is a relationship of vehicle to tenor between the statements and the sun.[141] The author's intent is: "my own capacity [is gained] only by studying and praticing their (former master's) statements."

Verse 1.5:

nāśaṅkanīyaṃ pūrveṣāṃ matam etena dūṣyate

kiṃtu cakṣur mṛgākṣīnāṃ kajjalenêva bhūṣyate

The opinions of [my] predecessors should not be suspected as being stained[142] by this [text]. Rather, they are ornamented by this, just as the eyes of doe-eyed ladies are [ornamented] with collyrium.[143]

Explanation 1.5:

Through the use of a euphemism, the author provides a justification for his criticism of his predecessors. Denying that their views have in any way been stained (*duṣyate*) by his criticism, he proffers instead that these have been "ornamented." Just as ornamentation is essential for the expression of a woman's inherent beauty, investigation of faults is essential

[141] According to this interpretation, the tenor of the verse is the sun, which is compared to statements of former masters. In this case, the author would be stating that he gains power only by relying on the sun, just as one gains power by relying on the wisdom of former masters. This interpretation is far less plausible.

[142] *duṣyate*. The target meaning here is "criticized."

[143] Bhāmaha uses a similar simile in *Kāvyālaṃkāra* 1.55: *kiñcid āśrayasaundaryād dhatte śobhām asādhv api / kāntāvilocanāny astaṃ malīmasam ivâñjanam* ("Sometimes even a [word] lacking excellence bestows beauty on account of the loveliness of its context, just as staining collyrium applied to the eyes of beautiful women.")

for the vitality of tradition. When a woman applies collyrium to her eyes, a potentially staining substance is transformed into ornamentation. In the same way, Jayadeva claims that potentially staining criticism, when applied with skill and the correct motivation, becomes ornamentation for a tradition. As the commentators explain, such "ornamenting" criticism encourages the rapid growth of tradition. Jayadeva claims that because his text leads to the expansion of *alaṃkāraśāstra*, he has "ornamented" rather than "stained" tradition. As was the case in the previous verse, Jayadeva provides a cue that he will indeed soon engage in a critique of his predecessors.

Śaradāgama 1.5:

With the understanding "although my own reasoning could be immediately advanced through the staining of former masters, even so this would result in the inappropriateness[144] [of my own view]," the author states: "It should not be suspected that their views have been stained by this, because in this respect investigators [of tradition] have the property of producing the blossoming of tradition through the consideration of faults.

Rākāgama 1.5:

Even though it appears to be stained,[145] the [author's] own view has the property of being acceptable because it has the property of ornamenting the views of old [masters].

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[144] *anaucitya.*

[145] On account of criticizing the views of former masters.

Ramā 1.5:

[Someone might criticize:] "this text is unacceptable because the views conceived by the [author], contradict [the views of] former masters. Even thought the faults [may] belong to [previous masters], because he (Jayadeva) is associated with these faults, there is the unwarranted repercussion of [his own] faultiness." [Therefore, the author] states [the verse beginning] *nāśaṅkanīyam*... "It should not be said: 'the views of former masters are stained by this text." Therefore, even though the [author's] own view has the appearance of possessing the stain,[146] because it has the property of ornamenting [the views] of past [masters], it has the properties of being acceptable and unstained. [In the verse beginning *nāśaṅka*... the author] states: "Although my own view at first appears to have the property of being the refutation of the views of former masters, in reality it is not inappropriate." The sense is that [his text is not inappropriate] because through the provision of criticism by investigators, there is an instantaneous blossoming of tradition.

Verse 1.6:

pratibhaîva śrutābhyāsasahitā kavitāṃ prati

hetur mṛdambusaṃbaddhā bījamālā latām iva

[146] Because it points out the faults of texts to which his own text is connected.

Talent[147] accompanied by study (of scripture and science) and practice is the cause of the property of being a poet, just as a row of seeds combined with earth and water is the cause of a creeping vine.

Explanation 1.6:

Jayadeva presents a triad of factors – talent, study of scripture and science, and practice -- as the cause of the property of being a poet. Jayadeva's understanding of the cause of poetry echoes the content of Bhāmaha's explanation of poetry's cause which is dispersed over four verses in the first chapter of the *Kāvyālaṃkāra*,[148] though it most closely resembles that of Vāmana in the *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra.* The current verse can be interpreted in slighted different ways, depending on how we understand the generic property *kavitā* ("poet-ness") and in consequence to how we understand the word *eva.* The generic property *kavitā*, can be understood either as a universal generic property, i.e., that property possessed by all poets, or

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[147] *pratibhā.* In the *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra*, Vāmana states: *kavitvabījaṃ pratibhānam* ("talent is the source of the property of being a poet"), *KAS*, 1.3.16.

[148] *gurūpadeśād adhyetuṃ śāstraṃ jaḍadhiyo 'py alam*
kāvyaṃ tu jāyate jātu kasyacit pratibhāvataḥ... (*KA*, 1.5).

> ato 'bhivāñchatā kīrtiṃ stheyasīmā bhuvaḥ sthiteḥ
> yatno viditavedyena vidheyaḥ kāvyalakṣmaṇi
> śabdaś chando 'bhidhānārthā itihāsāśrayāḥ kathāḥ
> loko yuktiḥ kalāś cêti mantavyā kāvyavaikharī
> śabdābhidheye vijñāya kṛtvā tadvidupāsanam
> vilokya anyanibandhāṃś ca kāryaḥ kāvyakriyādaraḥ (*KA*, 1.8-10).

("Even a person having a dull intellect can learn science with the help of a teacher. Poetry is produced only on occasion, by someone [qualified] by talent//...Therefore effort should be applied by one who has learned the sciences and who yearns for fame that is stable as the earth with respect to the principles of poetry//The sources of poetry should be understood as grammar, meters, denotative and other meanings, stories from the histories (*itihāsa*), worldly affairs, logic and the arts//Having studied the definitions of words, practiced under the supervision of one who understands poetry, and investigated the compositions of others, careful attention to the composition of poetry should be exercised.") [This translation was prepared in reference to the translation of P.V. Naganatha Sastry. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991.]

a specific generic property, i.e., that property that is possessed only be a specific poet such as "Kālidāsa-ness" or "the property of being Kālidāsa." If we understand the latter then it would be appropriate to say that *pratibhā* ("talent") is the single cause of poetry. According to most Indian philosophical systems, *pratibhā* is defined as a constantly expanding mental facility that arises from the imprints of previous actions and experiences on consciousness, particularly of those of previous lives. We can understand *pratibhā* to be a universal capacity, i.e., "that property possessed by all individuals with talent," or an individual capacity, i.e., "that property that is particular to a specific talented individual." If we understand the latter, it is appropriate to say that Jayadeva intends talent (*pratibhā*) alone (*eva*) to be the cause of poetry to the extent that talent produces a specific intellectual outflow, i.e., the poetry which is appropriate to a specific poet, in the same way that a seed of barley gives rise to the sprout of a barley plant and a seed of rice produces the sprout of a rice plant. Even so, just as a barley seed will not produce a barley sprout unless it is accompanied by the indispensable conditions of a soil environment and the provision of water, a particular genius will not lead to particular poet-ness without the indispensable conditions of study and practice. While the seed, soil and water are equally indispensable for the formation of a sprout, the seed is said to be the cause because it provides the sprouts specification. Similarly, even if we say that talent, study and practice are equally indispensable for the emergence of "poet-ness," individual talent is said to be the cause because it provides a poet's specific poet-hood. This interpretation is favored by Pradyotanabhaṭṭa.

Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha, however, believe Jayadeva intends to define the cause of the universal rather than specific "poet-ness." Hence, in their view, Jayadeva intends the expression *pratibhaîva śrutābhyāsasahitā* to mean that "talent," "study" and "practice"

contribute equally to form a single unit, which becomes the cause of "poet-ness." This interpretation is consistent with the view of Mammaṭa, who presents a collection of three equally weighted factors – 1) talent, 2) skill [acquired] from the study of worldly sciences and poetry and 3) practice according to the instruction of one who understands poetry – as the cause of poetry.[149] Such an interpretation rests on an unusal interpretation of the word *eva* which is placed immediately after *pratibhā.* Vaidyanātha states that the word *eva* determines that talent (*pratibhā*) should bear an equal weight with study and practice in causing poetry-ness.[150] Even so, it is far more likely that the word *eva* bears the more common meaning "only" or "precisely," and hence it is more probable to think that Jayadeva truly privileges talent above the other two factors because it provides something akin to a material cause. Should this be the case, Jayadeva would be anticipating the view of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, who presents talent (*pratibhā*) as the single cause of a poet, while claiming that study and practice are the cause of genius.[151]

In their explanation of how this collection operates as a cause, the Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha contrast two related collections of causes: 1) the collection of friction sticks, dried grass, and a focusing gem which is a cause of fire, and 2) a potter's wheel and the stick

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149 śaktir nipuṇatā lokaśāstrakāvyādyavekṣaṇāt
kāvyajñaśikṣayābhyāsa iti hetus tadudbhave (*KP*, 1.3. p. 11).

Talent, skill [resulting] from the investigation of the world, the sciences and poetry, and practice under the guidance of teachers knowledgeable in poetry [are collectively] said to be the cause [of poetry].

150 *evakāreṇêtarasamakakṣavyavacchedaḥ* (*Ramā,* 1.6, pg. 3). ("because of the word *eva*, there is a determination [that talent] has equal weight as the others {study and practice}").

151 *tasya ca kāraṇaṃ kavigatā kevalā pratibhā* (*RG*, p. 9). *tādṛśānekasthalagatādṛṣṭadvayakalpanāpekṣayā kḷptavyutpattyabhyāsayor eva pratibhāhetutvakalpane* (*RG*, p. 10). As I have mentioned in part I, the *Candrāloka* seems to present a number of views that foreshadow the interpretations found in Jagannātha's sixteenth century poetic work, the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, which utilized more the more advanced logical methods of the *navyanaiyāyika*-s (new logicians).

used to turn the wheel which is the cause of a pot. Since in the first collection, either the friction sticks or the focusing gem is independently capable of generating the heat required to ignite the dried grass, all three elements of the collection do not need to be simultaneously present. In the second collection, however, both constituents – the wheel and turning stick – are indispensable for the production of the pot. According to Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha, the triad of circumstances presented in Jayadeva's definition is equated with the second of these collection, since in their view talent, study and practice are equally required to produce "poet-ness." Concerned with the logical requirements of their eras, these two commentators are particularly concerned that the cause of poet-ness should be precisely delimited and have no variability. If poet-ness were said to have causes (genius, study and practice), rather than a collective cause (the triad of genius study and practice), than in certain cases genius might be the cause, in others study might be the cause, and in still others practice might be the cause. Hence, the simile of the collective of a potter's wheel and the stick used to turn the wheel is used to demonstrate the invariability the causality of poet-ness.

There are further concerns that contribute to the interpretation of Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha. Both of their commentaries were written subsequently to the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, and as they both lived in Benares, they would certainly have been familiar with this controversial and highly influential work on poetics, which was also composed in this most famous of literary cities. As mentioned earlier, Jagannātha states that while talent is the only cause of poetry, study and practice are the cause of talent (see footnote 151). Someone might argue, however, that study and practice (in a former life) are the cause of poetry only to the extent that these result in the specific imprinting (*saṃskāra*) responsible for poetic talent.

Hence we should really say that karma (*adṛṣṭa*)[152] is the cause of talent since this is a more immediate cause. Such a view leads to variability, since it is observed that sometimes someone without genius writes a good poem, and in this case the cause of his being a poet would be said to be karma rather than talent. Gāgābhaṭṭa avoids this problem by stating that talent is the cause of the principal type of poetry whereas karma is the cause of another anomalous type of poetry. Someone might also argue that if one is to state that the cause of talent is study and practice, one should also state that the cause of study and practice is karma, and hence karma is also the cause of poetry. Still, if one says that karma is the cause of poetry, this is more or less inconsequential, because karma is the cause of everything. Furthermore, one might just as well say that desire is the cause of poetry, because desire is a more tangible cause of study and practice than karma.

In reality, Jayadeva avoids all of these difficulties by his skillful choice of simile. Study and practice are to talent what soil and water are to a seed: indispensable and cooperating conditions. Unlike Jagannātha, Jayadeva does not indicate that study and practice are the cause of talent but rather that study and practice are the cause of talent coming to fruition in an individual poet. Whereas study and practice conducted in previous lifetimes can still, in the classical Indian view, be a cause of talent, soil and water must be present alongside of the seed in order to produce a sprout. Hence, we can restate Jayadeva's position as follows: talent alone is the cause of poetry when it is qualified by presence of soil and water. In this way, it should be understood as an intermediary position between that of Mammaṭa where talent, study and practice are a collective cause of poet-ness, and that of

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[152] This is explained in various ways in accordance with the ontological theories of different philosophies and religions. At the most basic level, it corresponds to the destiny that is conditioned by ones actions in previous lives and, according to some schools, the quality of one's ritual performance. The translation of this term, "karma," should be understood in the colloquial sense of the word, i.e., fate as conditioned by past actions.

Jagannātha where talent alone is the cause of poet-ness while study and practice are the cause of talent.

Śaradāgama 1.6:

He states the cause of poetry [in the verse beginning] *pratibhā*... .Talent is a particular imprint[153] of the self[154] that is the proper cause of the property of being a poet. Precisely this [talent] accompanied by study and practice produces the property of being a poet just as a seed accompanied by earth produces a vine.

Rākāgama 1.6:

He states the cause of poetry. [In the verse beginning] *pratibhā*.... The word *śrutam* [refers to] the sciences, those that have the status of the *vidyā*-s,[155] such as the *purāṇa*-s, and [those that have the status of] the four *upaveda*-s[156] such as medical science (*ayurveda*). Accompanied by these, talent, which is a particular type of intellect, is precisely the cause

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153 *saṃskāra*. This designates the traces or imprints deposited in the *ātmā* in consequence of all activities and experience. These traces in time produce as their fruition particular conditions, experiences and actions. The operation of *saṃskāra*-s is not unlike that operation which is popularly and misleadingly referred to in Western culture as "karma."

154 *ātmā*.

155 According to Apte's *Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, the *Vidyā*-s most commonly refer to fourteen subjects of knowledge: the four Vedas (*Ṛg*, *Sāma*, *Yajur* and *Atharvaveda*), the six *vedāṅgas* (*śikṣā* - "phonetics," *chandas* – "metrics," *vyākaraṇa* – "grammar," *nirukta* – "etymology," *jyotiṣa* – "astronomy," *kalpa* – "ritual"), *dharma* – "customs," *mīmāṃsā* - "vedic exegesis," *tarka* – "logic," and the *purāṇa*-s -- "traditional history". (Āpte, 1440).

156 Once again, according to Apte the four *upaveda*-s are *āyurveda* (medicine), *dhanurveda* (military science), *gandharvaveda* (musicology) and *sthāpatyaśāstraveda* (architecture). These are respectively associated as subsidiaries to the four Vedas, *Ṛg*, *Yajur*, *Sāma* and *Atharva*.

with respect to a poet's particular "poet-ness" just as a row of seed combined with earth and water is the cause with respect to a vine. Sometimes, the reading is *bījasya phalatām iva*. In this case the understanding is "just as the property of being earth combined with water is the cause with respect to a seed's property of taking the form of fruit, that is the seed's property of taking the form of a sprout."[157] [My] use of the word *śāstra*[158] indicates in extension texts by scholars of poetics, as well as texts describing things such as litigation, elephants, horses, swords.[159]

When in the absence of such talent, [someone] still has the experience of being the creator of poetry, then let the cause be karma.[160] But [karma is not the cause] of all cases of poetry, because there is an absence of proof [for this] and because of the unwieldy number of terms necessary[161] in the conception of karma. Nor should it be questioned: "why is it that poetry does not arise [sometimes] when talent is present?" because this occurrence (the non arising of poetry in the presence of talent) is due to the absence of other causes that take the form of desire etc.[162] Hence, in the ordinary type of poetry, talent has the property of being the cause, [while] in the unusual type of poetry, karma has the property of being the cause. Therefore, [in this case] there is no variability in the property of being the cause as there

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[157] According to this reading, talent accompanied by study and practice are the cause of "poet-ness" just as earth and water are the cause for the germination of a seed.

[158] This is a strange statement, since the word *śāstra* does not directly occur in this verse, but is to be inferred from the word *śrūta*.

[159] These are listed in the definition of poetry in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*.

[160] *adṛṣṭa*.

[161] *gauravat*.

[162] Even if an individual has talent, if he does not have the desire to write poetry, poetry will not arise from him.

might be within the combination *tṛṇāraṇimaṇi*... [which is said to be the cause of fire].[163] Nor should it be said: "Since poetry exists only as an effect, poetry is delimited by the property of being an effect, and in this case we should let the cause of what is delimited by this (effectness) be karma,"[164] because there is an absence of proof for such a restriction.[165] This gist of the argument is "in that case, [we might as well] say the cause of poetry is desire.[166]" Accordingly, something perceivable has the property of being the cause of poetry alone, and the statement of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*[167] to the effect "the property of being the cause [of poetry] belongs to karma, practice and talent as in the combination of a stick and a wheel... *daṇḍacakrā*"[168]... is refuted.

Ramā 1.6:

[163] This was described in the explanation to the verse. This states the variability of causality with respect to a fire that is due to the fact that either friction sticks (*araṇi*) or a focusing gem (*maṇi*) can produce the heat that ignites the tinder independently of the other.

[164] A rather convoluted challenge, which states that since poetry exists only as an effect, poetry should be delimited by the property of being an effect (*kāryatva*), and this being the case, we should say that the cause of poetry is the cause of effectness, or more simply the cause of an all effects, that is karma.

[165] While all poems are effects, not all effects are poems. Hence, it is not proper to equate the cause of effectness with the cause of poetry.

[166] The fact that karma is the cause of poetry does not add to our understanding of poetry because karma is the cause of everything. One could just as easily and inconsequentially state that desire is the cause of poetry because desire in the cause of all human undertakings.

[167] A reference to the maxim concerning the potter's wheel and stick is not found in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* proper, though several of the commentators refer to this in their comments to Mammaṭa's explanation of the cause of poetry. For instance, in the *Vistarikā*, Paramānanda Cakravartin writes: *trayaḥ śaktivyutpattyabhyāsāḥ| samuditāḥ daṇḍādinyāyena parasparasāpekṣāḥ na tu vyastās tṛṇāriṇimaṇinyāyena pratyekaṃ kāryārjakāḥ|* (*Vistarikā* in Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, vol. 1 (Delhi: Nāg Publishers, 1995) 72).

[168] This is the case example referred to earlier where each member of a collection serving as a cause, in this case a potter's wheel and the stick used for turning the potter's wheel etc., is essential to the production of an effect, in this case a pot.

He states the cause of poetry [in the verse beginning] *pratibhā*.... The word *śruta* [refers to] the *Veda*, the *Vedāṅga*, and the sciences, [and thus] has eighteen forms. When accompanied by these two things, 1) hearing these [eighteen types of texts], that is proficiency in these through study, and 2) practice that is performed under the instruction of one who understands poetry, talent, which is a particular intellectual facility that has constant expansion, is precisely the cause of poetry. Because of the word *eva*, there is the specification [that talent] has the property of being equally weighted with the other [causes].[169] [It is a cause similar to a] seed, which when combined with earth and water becomes the cause of a vine. With respect to the [alternate] reading *bījavyaktiḥ*, the sense is "the manifestation having the form of seeds." This is agreeable. Sometimes, however, the reading is *bījasya phalatāṃ iva*... In this case is the meaning is "just as the cause with respect to a seed's property of taking the form of a sprout is combined with earth and water." Here this is to be understood. Talent etc. has the property of being a cause according to the logical maxim *daṇḍacakrādi*...([a potter's] stick and wheel), not according to the maxim *tṛṇāraṇimaṇi*... (dried grass, friction sticks and a focusing gem). Hence the author states *hetu* (a cause) not *hetavaḥ* (causes). This has been clarified in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*.[170] Accordingly, there is a refutation of the idea that "[although] sometimes talent has the property of being the cause and sometimes karma has the property of being the cause, there is no deviation of [the property of being the cause] because these [two types of causes] pertain to different

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[169] Talent, study and practice each contribute equally to the production of "poet-ness."

[170] *kāvyaṃ kartuṃ vicārayituṃ ca ye jānanti tadupadeśena karaṇe yojane ca paunaḥ punyena pravṛttir iti trayaḥ samuditāḥ na tu vyastās tasya kāvyasyôdbhave nirmāṇe samullāse ca hetur na tu hetavaḥ* (*KP*, vṛtti 1.3, p. 13). Mammaṭa is concerned that there should be no wavering (*vyabhicā*ra) with respect to the cause of poetry, hence genius, study and practice as a collective are said to be the cause of poetry. If genius, study and practice were said to be causes of poetry, than in certain cases, genius would be the cause and in others study or practice, and in this case, the cause of poetry would be said to waver.

classes [of poetry]".[171] Statements to the otherwise are not fruitful here, because the author of the text would not consent to these.

Verse 1.7:

nirdoṣā lakṣaṇavatī sarītir guṇabhūṣaṇā

sālaṅkārarasānekavṛttir vāk kāvyanāmabhāk

That speech that is without fault, possesses poetic distinctions (*lakṣaṇa*[172]) as well as style (*rīti*), is adorned with poetic virtues (*guṇa*), and exhibits poetic ornaments (*alaṃkāra*), *rasa*-s and different modes (*vṛtti*)[173] should be designated as *kāvya* (poetry).

Explanation 1.7:

Here Jayadeva outlines what he holds to be the essential constituents and the one essential non-constituent of poetry. That which is termed poetry must in his view be devoid of faults, and must possess poetic distinctions, styles, poetic virtues, poetic ornaments, *rasa*-

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[171] This idea is stated by Gāgābhaṭṭa in his commentary to the same verse.

[172] The reader should be careful to distinguish this term from the term having the same spelling but having the meaning "definition." This word should also be distinguished from the term *lakṣaṇā* which refers to the second mode of verbal signification, "indication." The *Nāṭyaśāstra* originally lists 36 *lakṣaṇa*-s, four of which -- *akṣarasaṃhati*, *śobhā*, *hetu*, and *siddhi* -- are included in Jayadeva's enumeration of ten. While Daṇḍin mentions the *lakṣaṇa*-s within his explanation of *alaṃkāra* (*KD* 2.367), these are more or less abandoned by the mainstream poetic tradition (see De, p.4). *Lakṣaṇa*, as a separate category of poetic features, is for the most part abandoned by Sanskrit poeticians until Jayadeva resuscitates it as as a full fledged category in the *Candrāloka*.

[173] *vṛtti*. This can be understood in two ways. Either it refers to the mood produced by the pattern of sound in a verse or it refers to the different modes of verbal signification - denotation (*abhidhā*), indication (*lakṣaṇā*) and suggestion (*vyañjanā*). The reader should be careful to distinguish these terms from the poetic feature termed *vṛtti* by Bharata and Vāmana, which is equivalent to the feature that Jayadeva terms *rīti*.

s, different modes of phonetic consonance and different modes of verbal signification. The sequence of this absence followed by these series of constituents closely parallels the sequence of topics covered in the nine subsequent chapter of the *Candrāloka,* as illustrated in the following table.

Chapter	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Topic	Faults *doṣa*	Distinct-ions *lakṣaṇa*	Virtues *guṇa*	Orna-ments *alaṃkāra*	*Rasa*	Sugges-tion *dhvani*	Subordin-ate Sug-gestion *guṇībhūta-dhvani*	Indication *lakṣaṇā*	Denotation *abhidhā*

The only terms that deviate from this sequence are *rīti* (style) and *vṛtti* (understood in the sense of "phonetic consonance"). These are discussed in the sixth chapter on *rasa.* As for the other class of *vṛtti*-s, the three modes of verbal signification, these are discussed within the last four chapters. These three modes are discussed in four chapters because a variety of suggestion, that where the suggested sense is subordinated to the sense established by either denotation or indication, is discussed in a separate chapter of its own, the eighth.

As a first consideration, one might notice that Jayadeva defines poetry through the qualification of speech alone as opposed to the qualification of speech and meaning. In so doing, he clearly differentiates his view from that of Mammaṭa who states *tad adoṣau śabdārthau saguṇāv analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi*[174] ("[poetry is] sound and meaning without fault, with poetic virtues, and sometimes lacking poetic ornamentation.") The tradition of considering poetry as the union of sound and meaning goes back to the *Kāvyālaṃkāra* of Bhāmaha: *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam*....[175] ("Poetry is word and meaning together"). Jayadeva's description of poetry through the qualification of sound, however, bears a greater

[174] *KP*, sū 1.

[175] *KA*, 1.15.

resemblance to the earlier definition of Daṇḍin (8th cent.) - *taiḥ śarīraṃ ca kāvyānām alaṃkārāś ca darśitāḥ // śarīraṃ tāvad iṣṭārthavyavicchinnā padāvalī*[176] ("The body and the ornaments of poetry have been described by these [scholars of poetry]. [Accordingly] the body is a sequence of words that is qualified by the desired meaning [of the poet]") – and to the subsequent definition of Jagannātha (17th cent.) - *ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam*[177] ("poetry is sound communicating a charming meaning.") Still, Jayadeva's definition, in omitting any direct mention of meaning (*artha*), is perhaps more polarized than those of Daṇḍin and Jagannātha which at least qualify sound as communicating a meaning. Vaidyanātha justifies this omission, explaining that Jayadeva necessarily implies "meaning" through the qualification of speech as "without fault", since speech must present a meaning to avoid the fault of being "meaningless."

While the debate concerning whether poetry should be defined through the qualification of speech alone or through the qualification of speech and meaning together may seem pedestrian, this minor dispute reveals some interesting features in medieval Indian theories of language. In everyday practice, we operate under the assumption that words are inextricably connected to meaning. It seems natural enough that in poetry beauty would be produced through the qualifications of both words and their meanings. If the beauty of poetry were truly independent of meaning, poetry would be akin to music without lyrics, and even what in jazz is referred to as "scat" might be considered poetry. Moreover, the majority of poetic distinctions, poetic ornaments, *rasa*-s and the operations of the three modes of verbal

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[176] *KD*, 1.10.

[177] Jagannātha, *Rasagaṅgādhara*, ed. Bhaṭṭa Mathurānātha Śāstri (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983) 4.

signification – including *dhvani* – pertain to verbal meanings. Should poetic beauty be restricted to speech alone, their effect would be inconsequential.

While it is impossible to deny the importance of meaning in poetry, certain *ālaṃkārika*-s – most notably Daṇḍin and Jagannātha – deliberately define poetry as speech qualified by a particular type of meaning. This type of definition subordinates meaning to the speech that produces it, and emphasizes the lyrical aspect of poetry. In this view, the definition of poetry becomes "word with beautiful sound that is qualified by a certain meaning." In Daṇḍin's case this meaning is that which is desired by the poet. For Jagannātha, the meaning that qualifies the speech that is called poetry is that which produces savor, i.e., an otherworldly pleasure distinct from that experienced in the fulfillment of personal desires.[178] In Daṇḍin's definition, it is essential that meaning be understood as that which qualifies the speech that is its progenitor. The beauty of a meaning is consequential only in so far as this qualifies the speech that produces this meaning. Such a definition reinforces the fact that verbal meanings are dependent on speech. A word can refer to itself, as in the sentence "somebody says cow," but meaning can never signify itself. According to this principle, it is legitimate to conceive speech, as the producer of a desired or a charming meaning, as the source of poetic beauty.

There is another aspect of this controversy that might escape our modern sensibility. In classical India, poetry was most commonly experienced in live recitations. To this extent, the word *kāvya* ("poetry") was directly associated with a particular type of speech. When a

[178] *ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam // ramaṇīyatā ca lokottarāhlādajanakajñānagocaratā | lokottaratvaṃ câhlādaś camatkāratvāparaparyāyo 'nubhavasākṣiko jātiviśeṣaḥ | kāraṇaṃ ca tad avachinne bhāvanāviśeṣaḥ punaḥ punar anusaṃdhānātmā | 'putras te jātaḥ,' 'dhanaṃ te dāsyāmi' iti vākyārthadhī janyasyâhlādasya na lokottaratvam* (*RG*, 5).

speech of certain aesthetic qualities was recited, this would be described as *kāvya.*[179] For this reason, speech qualified by certain properties was understood to have the property of being poetry (*kāvyatva*). The understanding that *kāvyatva* is possessed by meaning itself, while seemingly evident, was not directly affirmed by any such common designation. Meaning as a locus is far more elusive than is speech. Such an understanding can only be grasped through the association of meaning with a form of speech designated as poetry. Some Indian scholars claimed that the property of being poetry is a property that is simultaneously located in speech and meaning. Gāgābhaṭṭa explains their reasoning as follows. Even though we do not directly perceive meaning to be the substrate of poetry-ness in the same fashion that we perceive speech to be its substrate, we can still understand meaning to be its locus by way of the perception of a quality that pertains to meaning or some relationship that pertains to meaning.[180]

Jagannātha's definition of poetry as speech qualified as the producer of a charming meaning provides a further advantage. Jagannātha, having assimilated the priorities of the *navyanyāya* tradition, is particularly concerned with precisely delimiting what constitutes poetry. By defining poetry as speech rather than speech and meaning, he is able to posit the charming meaning produced by poetic speech as the very qualification of poetic speech, and hence gains precision without the addition of extra terms in his definition.[181]

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[179] *kāvyaṃ karotîti prayogasya tatrâiva darśanāt* (*RĀ*, 1.7, p. 4).

[180] *vyāsajyavṛttidharmajñāne yāvad āśrayaviṣayakajñānasya hetutayā arthāviṣayakajñānenâpi tadgrahasambhavāt saṃyogapratyakṣe yāvad āśrayaguṇapratyakṣe vā tasya hetutvād ity āhuḥ* (*RĀ*, 1.7, p. 4).

[181] More than any other author of original poetic works, Jagannātha Panditarāja, whose active literary career extended well into the sixteenth century (see Kane, *HSP*, p. 323-4), demonstrates the stamp of *navyanyāya* influence. A dominant concern in his work is to remedy the insufficient delimitation of literary features in earlier poetic works through the application of more advanced logical methods.

Unfortunately, Jayadeva's motivation for defining speech solely through the qualification of speech is not as clear as that of Daṇḍin or Jagannātha. He does not directly qualify speech as the producer of meaning, but rather views speech as the substrate of a series of poetic features many of which pertain either partially or exclusively to meaning. In this respect, he foregoes both the economy demonstrated by Daṇḍin and the precision of delimitation gained by Jagannātha. Even so, it may be possible to infer the qualifications established by Daṇḍin and Jagannātha through Jayadeva's own definition. As we have mentioned earlier, Vaidyanātha states that the speech in Jayadeva's definition of poetry necessarily produces the meaning desired by the poet, since otherwise it would involve fault. Similarly, in possessing *rasa*, speech would necessarily produce meaning conducive to otherworldly delight. It is difficult to understand why Jayadeva has consciously omitted the word "meaning" from his definition, despite the fact that the understanding of this is essential to the logic of his definition. Perhaps, again, he is trying to differentiate his view from that of Mammaṭa, who overtly states that poetry is speech and meaning.. Little, however, is gained by such an omission, one which merely compels the reader to establish this meaning through inference.

Perhaps what is most striking about Jayadeva's definition of poetry is its comprehensiveness. His definition requires the active function of all poetic features that had become significant topics in *alaṃkāraśāstra* to his date, and reflects the comprehensiveness of the work as a whole. This is particularly evident in his recuperation of the *lakṣaṇa-s* (poetic distinctions), a poetic/dramatic feature described at length by Bhamaha, but ignored for the most part by earlier poeticians. Such an inclusion may well suggest an aspiration on the part of Jayadeva's to surpass the scope of earlier works on *alaṃkāraśāstra*. While other

authors have discussed a similar breadth of topics in their works, they do not devote individual chapters to each as Jayadeva does. Nor do these others see the need to identify all the elements of poetry in their definitions. Rather they attempt to capture the essence of poetry by isolating its most distinctive feature. While Jayadeva does indeed indicate in other places that ornamentation is in his view the most essential component of poetry,[182] he neglects such a statement in the definition of poetry itself.

Śaradāgama 1.7:

[The author] states the definition of poetry in the verse beginning *nirdoṣa*.... Someone might object: "why is 'meaning' [which appears] in other places alongside of the property of being poetry, disregarded here?" [To this we counter]: this is not true, because there is an understanding that meaning is possessed [by poetry], because of the [mention] of the property "faultlessness."[183] Because [speech] without meaning would have the property of having fault. Modes have two groupings. There are the five varieities of modes taking the form of the sweet mode (*madhurā*) etc.,[184] and there are the three varieties of modes [of verbal signification] having the form of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) etc. While there may be manifoldness to the *vṛtti*-s of Baudhāyana,[185] the manifoldness [in this case] is a qualification

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[182] See verses 1.2 and 1.8.

[183] The argument is that speech without meaning would be faulty, and hence by stating that poetry is without faults, Jayadeva indicates that it is not without meaning.

[184] While the modes come into full prominence as poetic features in the works of Daṇḍin and Vāmana, their origin can be traced at least as far back as the *Nāṭyaśāstra*: *kiṃtu nānā deśaveṣabhāṣācāro loka iti kṛtvā lokānumatena vṛttisaṃśritasya nāṭyasya vṛttīnāṃ mayā caturvidhatvam abhihitaṃ bhāratī sāttvatī kāiśikī ārabhaṭī cêti* (*NŚ*, Vṛtti to 13.37).

of the faults etc., and the constituents of poetry and should be understood individually [with respect to each].

Rākāgama 1.7:

He states the nature of poetry [in the verse beginning] *nirdoṣā*.... The faults such as *cyutasaṃskṛti*, *kliṣṭa*, and *pratikūlavarṇatva* are those things that obstruct the ascertainment of verbal signification and obstruct *rasa*. The absence of these things is what is intended [in the verse], not the absence of the universal "faultiness,"[186] because certain faults, even though they have the property of degrading poetry, do not have the property of causing the destruction of "poetry-ness." Hence in verses such as

> kṛtam anumataṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vā yair idaṃ gurupātakam
> manujapaśubhir nirmaryādair bhavadbhir udāyudhaiḥ
> narakaripuṇā sārdhaṃ teṣāṃ sabhīmakirīṭinām
> ayam aham asṛṅmedomāṃsaiḥ karomi diśāṃ balim[187]

("Those who along with Kṛṣṇa performed, permitted or allowed this terrible crime, those animals born of men having no restraints, "noble ones" brandishing weapons -- from their blood, fat and flesh, and that of Bhīma and Arjuna as well, I will make an auspicious offering into the ten directions")

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[185] It is unclear precisely which Baudhāyana is referred to here. Perhaps this is the author of the *Baudhāyanakalpasūtra*.

[186] Gāgābhaṭṭa states that Jayadeva refers to the absence of specific technical flaws rather than the absence of the abstract principle "faultiness." Vaidyanātha opposes this view (see *Ramā* 1.7).

[187] Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, *Veṇīsaṃhāra*, ed. Śivarāja Śāstrī (Merath: Sāhitya Bhaṇḍār, 1967) 3rd aṅka, 24th verse.

even though there is the fault of tautology, some people say there is suggestion of the ferocious *rasa.* Still, others say that within a single [passage], there can be [both] "non-poetry-ness," through a determination that part of the poem has a fault and "poetry-ness," on account of a different determination. Poetic distinctions (*lakṣaṇa*) are things that are desirable to express, such as *akṣarasaṃhati*[188] and *śobhā.*[189] The styles are *pāñcālī, gauḍī* and *vaidarbhī.*[190] Poetic virtues (*guṇa*) are things such as *śleṣa* and *prasāda.* Some say that these are properties (*dharma*) of sound,[191] but [in reality] these are just the properties of being *rasa*, sentiment (*bhāva*), apparent *rasa*[192] and apparent sentiment, the tranquilization of sentiment (*bhāvaśānti*), the rising of sentiment (*bhāvodaya*), the joining of sentiment (*bhāvasandhi*) and the mixture of sentiment (*bhāvaśabala*). The *Kāvyaprakāśa* states: through the secondary operation of signification (indication), the operation of these [poetic virtues] is understood in both sound and meaning.[193]

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[188] *alpākṣarā vicitrārthakhyātir akṣarasaṃhati* (*CĀ*, 3.1). ("When a statement involving few phonemes produces a charming meaning this is known as *akṣarasaṃhati*").

[189] *śobhā khyāto 'pi yaddoṣo guṇakīrtyā niṣidhyate* (*CĀ*, 3.2) ("When the fault of something, even though it is stated, is removed by a well known virtue, this is [the distinction] *sobhā*").

[190] The first mention of regional styles is in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Kane dates this work, somewhat haphazardly, to before 300 CE, see Gerow, n. 34, p. 225-6). Here, Bharata originally classifies these as *vṛtti*-s rather than *rīti*-s, and enumerates these as *bhāratī, sāttvatī, kaiśikī,* and *ārabhaṭī* (*NS, vṛtti* to 13.37). Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, citing predecessors, use the term *rīti* to designate the regional styles.

[191] A strange claim, because almost all poeticians and aestheticians ranging back to Bharata acknowledge that certain *guṇa*-s beautify sound, while others enhance meaning. The point seems to be that even those *guṇa*-s that beautify sound ultimately have a deeper purpose which is to enhance specific *rasa*-s.

[192] *tadābhāsa* refers to *rasābhāsa* and *bhāvābhāsa.* Things that provide the appearance of *rasa* and sentiment, but in their essence are not, such as the description of an extra-marital erotic encounter.

[193] *guṇavṛttyā punas teṣāṃ vṛttiḥ śabdārthayor matā. KP*, 8.71, ed. Jhalkīkar, 477. Here, Mammaṭa explains that only through metaphorical identification do we understand that the poetic virtues (*guṇa*) concern meaning in addition to sound, in the same way that the virtues of the self (*ātmā*) are understood through the stalwartness of someone's body. While the poetic virtues are literally expressed as properties of sound such as clarity, evenness, sweetness etc., because they pertains to *rasa* we infer that they pertain to meaning. Mammaṭa must

The poetic ornaments are things such as simile (*upamā*). The *rasa*-s are the erotic (*śṛṅgāra*) etc. Here there is [the understanding in] extension of the sentiments (*bhāva*-s). According to this [requirement], expressions such as *a fire blazes on the mountain* do not have the property of being poetry.[194] The modes are the sweet (*madhurā*), the bold (*prauḍhā*), the abrasive (*paruṣā*), the playful (*lalitā*) and the beautiful (*bhadra*). The modes are also the three [modes of verbal signification]: denotation, indication and suggestion. That speech that is endowed with these things is poetry. Accordingly, the property of being poetry is situated in a qualified [form of] speech, on account of the observation that the expression "[he] composes poetry" addresses precisely this [type of speech]. But some say that because the root of poetry involving suggestion (*vyañjanā*) pertaining to sound or poetic ornamentation of sound is the power of sound, here poetry-ness pertains to sound as qualified by meanings, because meaning has the property of being the qualification [here], but when suggestion or poetic ornaments pertain to meaning, the poetry-ness pertains to meanings as qualified by sound. Hence, they say that poetry-ness resides in both [sound and meaning]. But others say that poetry-ness must inhere [simultaneously] in multiple substrates,[195] because as knowledge of a property inhering in multiple substrates simultaneously is caused by a knowledge whose object is a such a [multiple] substrate, it is also possible to perceive [that poetry-ness inheres is sound and meaning simultaneously] through a knowledge that has something other than meaning as its substrate, since there is direct perception of contact or since there is direct perception of a quality belonging to such [multiple] substrates, because

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clarify this fact, because he has stated in his definition of poetry *śabdārthau saguṇau*... ("poetry is sound and meaning having poetic virtues...").

[194] Since such statements do not produce *rasa*, they cannot be poetry.

[195] Just as the property of " "three-ness" can only exist if it occurs simultaneously in three things which are identified as a group. By this idea, "poetry-ness" must exist in both sound and meaning at the same time.

these [perceptions] have the property of being the cause of this [understanding that poetry-ness inheres in sound and meaning simultaneously]. Others believe that because the word poetry is commonly used with respect to verses composed in dialect (*prākṛt*)[196] even though here there exist faults such as *cyutasaṃskṛti*,[197] the properties such as "faultlessness" are not the qualification [of poetry] but rather properties in extension (*upalakṣaṇam*).[198]

Ramā 1.7:

[The author] states the definition of poetry [with the verse begning *nirdoṣā*...]. Here he states *nirdoṣā* in the beginning because [this conveys] the property of something to be abandoned. Fault will be explained [in the next chapter] by the [verse] *syāc cetoviśatā*....[199] The etymology of this word (*doṣa*) will also be explained in the same [section]. Here, the absence of the generic property "faultiness," is intended.[200] The sense is that "poetry-ness" is only a partially inhering property.[201] He will explain the poetic distinctions with the verse

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[196] Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin in his wake acknowledge that a certain class of poetry is composed in dialect: *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam gadyaṃ padyaṃ ca tad dvidhā / saṃskṛtaṃ prākṛtaṃ cânyad apabhraṃśa iti tridhā* // (*KA*, 1.16).

[197] The fault of deviant formation. *Bhavec crutikaṭur varṇaḥ śravaṇodvejane paṭuḥ / saṃvid rate vyākaraṇaviruddhaṃ cyutasaṃskṛti//* (*CĀ*, 2.2).

[198] As when someone who was captain in the navy is called captain even after his retirement from active duty. Technically, he is not the captain of anything, but he still has the property of being captain in extension of his past duty.

[199] *CĀ*, 2.1. *syāccetoviśatā yena sakṣatā ramaṇīyatā / śabde 'rthe ca kṛtonmeṣaṃ doṣam udghoṣayanti tam //.* ("When delightfulness might be damaged by something entering the heart, the experts proclaim such a thing, which might expand in sound or meaning, to be a fault.")

[200] Here, Vaidyanātha disagrees with Gāgābhaṭṭa who stated that Jayadeva intends the absence of specific (*viśeṣa*) faults, not the generic property "faultiness."

[201] This refers to the understanding that a work may be considered poetry even if part of it possesses a fault, if other parts preserve the qualifications of poetry.

akṣarasaṃhatiḥ....The styles (*rīti*) are *pāñcāli* etc and will similarly be explained [in a future section]. The poetic virtues are *śleṣa*, etc. [Poetry is] that which has adornment because of these [virtues], that is, it is adorned by these, it is resplendent and becomes the object of enjoyment for kings because of these [virtues]. The word *bhūṣaṇāḥ*[202] has the meaning of [the passive present participle] *bhūṣyamāṇāḥ* in the sense of "resplendent with." [Here] the *lyuṭ* suffix (*an*) is understood in the sense of the passive as in the case of expressions such as *rājabhojanāḥ*.[203] The poetic ornaments are simile, etc. The *rasa*-s are the erotic, etc. Here there is [understanding by] extension of the sentiments as well. The modes are the sweet, etc., and also denotation etc. Hence, the qualification "manifoldness" (*anekatvam*) is understood here alone and not in other parts [of the verse]. Manifoldness should be understood inherently with respect to each of these [other entities].[204] The [overall] sense is that the property of being poetry pertains to such speech since the common usage "he writes poetry" is observed with respect to precisely this [type of speech].[205] The property of being poetry is situated only in speech that is qualified by the properties stated [in the verse]. [Someone might object]: "The *Kāvyaprakāśa* and other texts [state the idea that] poetry-ness

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[202] Here, Vaidyanātha analyzes the word *bhūṣanāḥ* because Jayadeva uses the word *bhūṣaṇam* in verse 4.11 -- *tilakādyam iva śrīṇāṃ vidaghdha hṛdayaṅgam / vyatiriktam alaṃkāraṃ prakṛter bhūṣaṇam girām* --as a means to differentiate *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra*.

[203] *karmaṇī ca yena saṃsparśāt kartuḥ śarīrasukham*. ("the affix' is added to a root, when the name of an action is expressed in the neuter gender; provided that the verb has in construction with it, such a word in the accusative case, as indicates the thing, from the contact with which, there arises a pleasant sensation corporally to the agent. (*Pāṇ* 3.3.116. Trans. Vasu).

[204] The point is that adjective *anekatvam* qualifies *vrittiḥ* alone. As for the other poetic features mentioned in the verse (*doṣa*, *lakṣaṇa*, *rīti*, *guṇa*, *alaṃkāra* and *rasa*), these should be understood as being manifold by force of their own terms alone. Here, the reading in the Bhandarkar manuscript differs from that of Mahādevaśarma's edit in the Gujarati Printing Press edition. The manuscripts reads: *ata eva anekatvam atra viśeṣaṇām nānyatra tāsām anekatvaṃ ca svata eva jñeyaṃ* as opposed printed edition which reads: *ata eva anekatvam atraîva viśeṣaṇaṃ nānyatra teṣāṃ prayekam anekatvaṃ ca svata eva jñeyam.*

[205] This provides an explanation as to why Jayadeva has expressed poetry as a qualification of speech. People use the word poetry to identify a speech having these qualities.

has multiple substrates,[206] [existing] in both sound and meaning. It exists in sound that is accompanied by meaning when the predominance lies in sound, and the opposite is true when meaning is predominant. Why is it that in this text you have in all cases rejected meaning?" To this we respond: "[this is] not [the case]. Because there is the understanding of the property of possessing meaning on account of the property "faultlessness" since the property of being without meaning [would itself have] the property of being faulty." Similarly, there has previously been a statement of the cause [of poetry], and what is contradictory to this cause is not desirable.[207]

Verse 1.8:

aṅgīkaroti yaḥ kāvyaṃ śabdārthāv analaṃkṛtī

asau na manyate kasmād anuṣṇam analaṃ kṛtī.

Why does that wise person who consents that sound and meaning without ornaments is poetry, not believe that something without heat is fire?

Explanation 1.8:

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[206] *vyāsajyavṛtti.*

[207] Since Jayadeva has stated in the previous verse that the study of various subjects is a component of the cause of poetry, this implies meaning configures in the definition of poetry. To argue that the meaning of the text is otherwise, in this view, would invalidate Jayadeva's explanation of the cause.

The pun in this verse is accomplished through the figure of speech known as *yamaka*, in which the same sequence of sounds occurs more than once producing different meanings each time.[208] In the first half of the verse, the expression *analaṃkṛtī* is used in the meaning "not possessing poetic ornaments" and is the qualifier of *śabdārthau* ("word and meaning"). In the second half of the verse, the same sequence of sound is separated into two words: *analaṃ* ("fire") and *kṛtī* ("wise one"). The sense is that someone who is so unreasonable as to say that poetry can be without ornamentation might just as well say that fire can be without heat.

This sarcastic jab is leveled either at Mammaṭa, who for his definition of poetry writes *tad adoṣau śabdārthau saguṇāv analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi*[209] ("speech and meaning that is without fault, possesses poetic virtues and sometimes may be without poetic ornaments"), or at those who would improperly interpret his *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Here, Jayadeva more emphatically indicates what he had suggested in verse 1.2 through the image "the ocean of poetic ornaments" (*alaṃkāravārāṃnidhi*). The simile in the current verse implies that ornamentation is the essential defining characteristic of poetry, just as heat within a fire.[210] One who suggests that poetry can exist without ornamentation is only laughable in his view. Jayadeva does not mention whether the other defining constituents listed in the previous verse (1.8) are equally indispensable. Significantly, however, he does not criticize Mammaṭa for failing to mention *dhvani* or *rasa* in his definition even though these were regarded by

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[208] *tulyaśrutīnāṃ bhinnānām abhidheyaiḥ parasparam / varṇānāṃ yaḥ punar vādo yamakaṃ tan nigadyate* (*KA*, 2.17).

[209] *KP*, sū 1, ed. Jhalkīkar, 13.

[210] *tejasa uṣṇatā*. (*Vaiśeṣikadarśana*, 2.2.4, Ed. Kashi Nath Sharma (Mandi: Kashi Nath Sharma, 1972) p. 125). Gaekwad's edition reads *tejasy uṣṇatā* ("heat is [situated] in fire"). Here the commentators explain that heat is situated only in fire, it does not migrate into water.

many as the most precious features of poetry, or as Ānandavardhana states, "the soul of poetry."[211] While Jayadeva, in the beginning of the eighth chapter, states that *dhvani* (poetry where the suggestive sense is predominant) is the higher grade of poetry,[212] nowhere in the text does he state the indispensability of *dhvani* or *rasa*. This provides significant evidence that in Jayadeva's view, ornamentation is the most important feature of poetry.

While it is almost certain that Jayadeva ridicules Mammaṭa in this verse, Vaidyanātha, oddly, states that Jayadeva engages in jest in order to substantiate Mammaṭa's view in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*: *prakāśoktisamarthanaṃ sūcayitum upahāsadvārā tām āpātato dūṣayati*[213] ("In order to indicate the adequacy of a statement from the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, he initially criticizes this through mockery"). Vaidyanātha's argument is that while Mammaṭa states that poetry is sometimes without ornaments (*alaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi*), his true intention is that sometimes ornaments are not directly expressed by a poem, but are to be suggested. This interpretation is supported by the *vṛtti* to the *sūtra* providing the definition of poetry, where Mammaṭa states: *kvāpîty anenaîtad āha yat sarvatra sālaṃkārau kvacit tu sphuṭālaṃkāravirahe 'pi na kāvyatvahāniḥ*.[214] ("By the word *kvāpi*, the author [referring to himself] states that "here word and meaning have ornaments everywhere [in poetry], though there is not damage to the property of being poetry when [poetry] is devoid of manifest ornaments"). In Vaidyanātha's view, Jayadeva's verse should not be understood as a criticism of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, but rather as a critique of those who would improperly

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[211] *budhaiḥ kāvyatattvavidbhiḥ kāvyasyâtmā dhvanir iti saṃjñitaḥ paramparayā yaḥ samāmnātapūrvaḥ samyak āsamantād mnātaḥ prakaṭitaḥ*...(*DhvĀ*, Vṛtti to 1.1, pg 9).

[212] *yad vyajyamānaṃ manasaḥ staimityāya sa no dhvaniḥ* (*CĀ*, 8.1) ("That poetry through which there is a suggestion of meaning conducive to a moistening of the heart is what we call *dhvani*.")

[213] *Ramā* 1.8.

[214] *KP*, ed. Jhalkīkar, *vṛtti* to *sūtra* 1, p. 17.

interpret the the second sūtra of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, without considering the clarification in the *vṛtti*.

Gāgābhaṭṭā does not share Vaidyanātha's approbation of Mammaṭa's admission of unamnisfest ornaments in poetry, and instead argues the exact opposite: *alaṃkāravyañjake 'py alaṅkārasya sphuṭatvam eva*[215] ("Even when there is a suggestion of a poetic ornament, the poetic ornament has the property of being precisely manifest.") In fact, he takes issue with the *Kāvyaprakāśa* itself, citing the same verse (*yaḥ kaumaraharaḥ*...see verse in the *Rākāgama* below) that Mammaṭa had cited as an illustration of poetry with unmanifest ornaments and states that in fact the ornaments in this verse are manifest.[216] Hence, Gāgābhaṭṭa understands Jayadeva's view to be a corrective for Mammaṭa's erroneous acceptance of unmanifest ornaments in poetry since in his view both directly expressed ornaments and suggested ornaments are nothing other than manifest.

This divergence in the interpretations of Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha may be related to the interpretation of certain verses from the *Dhvanyāloka* which examine the suggestion of ornaments in poetry. While the *Candrāloka* does not maintain the *dhvani*-centric perspective advocated in the *Dhvanyāloka*, it does, however, reserve a significant role for suggestion in poetic compositions as an independent mode of verbal signification responsible for substantial poetic charm. In this respect, it upholds the basic premises found in the *Dhvanyāloka* regarding the function and classification of suggestion, and the gradation of poetry according to the relative predominance of the suggested and expressed meanings.[217]

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[215] *RĀ*, 1.8, p 5.

[216] *ity ādau vibhāvanādayo 'rthālaṃkārā 'haro vara' ityādau śabdālaṃkārāś ca sphuṭā eva* (*RĀ*, 1.8, p. 5).

[217] *yad vyajyamānaṃ manasaḥ staimityāya sa no dhvaniḥ / anyathā tu gunī bhūtavyaṅgyam āpatitaṃ tridhā //* ("That poetry through which there is a suggestion of meaning conducive to a moistening of the heart is what we

In this respect, Jayadeva accommodates the view of the *Dhvanyāloka* by stating that where the suggested meaning in a poem is an ornament, the suggestor in this case may either be a fact (*vastu*) or another ornament (*alaṃkāra*).[218]

In his interpretation of verse 1.8 of the *Candrā*loka, Vaidyanātha postulates that Jayadeva and Mammaṭa have the same basic view regarding the necessity of ornaments in poetry. As evidence, he cites Mammaṭa's statement in his Vṛtti to sūtra 1 of the *Kavyaprakāśa*, which states that sometimes poetry can possess ornaments in an unmanifest form.[219] By this, Mammaṭa refers to poetry involving ornaments that are suggested rather than directly expressed, and specifically to those ornaments that are suggested by facts rather than other (directly expressed) ornaments. This type of suggestion of ornaments in poetry is highly commended in a root verse of the *Dhvanyāloka* : *vyajyante vastumātreṇa yadâlaṃkṛtayas tayā / dhruvaṃ dhvanyaṅgatā tāsām kāvyavṛttis tadāśrayā*[220] ("where poetic ornaments are suggested by mere facts, these ornaments are adjuncts[221] of *dhvani*. The operation of poetry has these [ornaments] as its basis"). These statements would seem to vindicate Vaidyanātha's position that Mammaṭa's view does not suffer scorn from

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call *dhvani*. Poetry that is otherwise is said to be *guṇībhūtavyaṅgyaṃ* and falls into three categories."). (*CĀ*, 8.1). In this verse, Jayadeva speaks of only two grades of poetry: that where the suggested meaning is predominant, and that where the suggested meaning is not predominant. While he does not directly reject *citrākāvya* – poetry devoid of suggestion and relying purely on clever pictorial arrangements of phonemes for its charm – this type of poetry is exclusive since it cannot be classified as being poetry with subordinate suggestion.

[218] *catvāro vastvalaṃkāram alaṃkāras tu vastu yat / alaṃkāram alaṃkāro vastu vastu vyanakti yat //* (*CA*, 7.7). *aṅgitvena vyaṅgyatāyām api alaṃkārāṇāṃ dvayī gatiḥ -- kadācid vastumātreṇa vyajyante kadācid alaṃkāreṇa* (*DhvĀ*, intro to 2.29).

[219] *kvapîty anenâitad āha yat sarvatra sālaṃkārau kvacit tu sphuṭālaṃkāravirahe 'pi na kāvyatvahāniḥ* (*KP*, ed. Jhalkīkar vṛtti to sū. 1).

[220] *DhvĀ*, 2.29.

[221] Literally "these ornaments have the property of being adjuncts of *dhvani.*"

Jayadeva's sarcasm. Still a subsequent root verse in the *Dhvanyāloka*, substantiates Gāgābhaṭṭa's interpretation that Mammaṭa's view is indeed the object of Jayadeva's scorn. The final verse in the second chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka*, detailing the varieties of suggested meanings, states: *sarveṣv eva prabhedeṣu sphuṭatvenâvabhāsanam / yad vyaṅgyasyâṅgibhūtasya tat pūrṇaṃ dhvanilakṣaṇam //*[222] ("In all its varieties, the appearance of the suggested meaning in a manifest form as the predominant thing is the complete sign of *dhvani.*"). Even though the *dhvanikāra* concedes that the premier variety of poetry may consist of ornaments suggested by facts, these ornaments are qualified as being manifest (*sphuṭa*), thus invalidating both Mammaṭa's statement that no harm is done to poetry when ornaments exist in an unmanifest state and Vaidyanātha's statement that Jayadeva's position regarding the absolute necessity of ornaments in poetry is consistent with Mammaṭa's statement that poetry can have unmanifest ornaments. One might argue that the *Dhvanikāra*'s statement applies only to poetry of the premier variety, i.e., *dhvani*, and that unmanifest suggested ornaments can make an appearance in the second tier of poetry (*guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*) where the suggested meaning appears as subordinate to the expressed sense. Still, such an objection is ruled out by the previous statement of the *Dhvanikāra* that poetry possessing ornaments that are suggested by mere facts is invariably classified as the highest grade of poetry (*dhvani*) (see quotation above). Hence Gāgābhaṭṭa's interpretation is far more thoroughly grounded in the reasoning of the *Dhvanikāra* than that of Vaidyanātha.

In his insistence that Mammaṭa and Jayadeva present the same overall view, Vaidyanātha may be attempting to establish a continuum between his own commentary to the

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[222] *DhvĀ*, 2.33. In his commentary to this verse in the *Locana*, Abhinavagupta writes: *dhvanilakṣaṇaṃ dhvaneḥ svarūpaṃ pūrṇam, avabhāsanaṃ vā jñānaṃ tad dhvaner lakṣaṇaṃ pramāṇaṃ, tac ca pūrṇaṃ, pūrṇadhvanisvarūpanivedakatvāt* (*Dhvanyālokalocana*, 2.33). (" The*lakṣana* of *dhvani* refers to the complete nature of *dhvani* or to perception, that is experience, that is the means of knowning *dhvani*, and this is said to be complete (*pūrṇa*) because this has the property of completely revealing the nature of of *dhvani*").

Candrāloka, the *Ramā*, and a sub-commentary to the *Kāvyaprakāśa* written by his teacher, Nāgeṣabhaṭṭa. Nāgeṣa's work, entitled the *Udyota*, comments on the *Pradīpa*, Govindaṭhakkura's commentary to the *Kāvyaprakāśa*.[223] In this work, Nāgeṣa reaffirms Mammaṭa's tolerance for the absence of ornaments in poetry. Nageṣa explains this position pithily: *camatkāranidānasyaîva kāvyatvād iti bhāvaḥ...alamkāranirapekṣam ity artha.*[224] ("The term "poetryness" applies specifically to that which supplies a charming experience. Hence there is no dependence on ornaments"). Nageśa seems to support Govinda's interpretation that the charm in poetry can come from two sources, *rasa* and poetic ornaments, and hence poetry does not have an absolute dependence on manifest ornamentation. Of course, we cannot be certain if Nāgeṣa truly supported Govinda and Mammaṭa's positions here or if he is merely restating Govinda□s position in his sub-commentary. Still, Nāgeṣa was not a timid scholar and he raises no objection to their position.

Gāgābhaṭṭa's position also has a stronger etymological justification than that of Vaidyanātha. Vaidyanātha, in reiterating Mammaṭa's position, states that suggested ornaments can exist in an unmanifest state as a way to vindicate Mammaṭa's definition that

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223 Govindaṭhakkura's *Pradīpa* provides some clarity on the current question: *nīrase 'py asphuṭālaṃkāre kāvyatvam iṣṭam evêti ṛjuḥ panthāḥ. vayaṃ tu paśyāmaḥ. nīrase sphuṭālaṃkāravirahiṇi na kāvyatvam. Yato rasādir alaṃkāraś ca dvayaṃ camatkārahetuḥ. tathā ca yatra rasādīnām avasthānaṃ na tatra sphuṭālaṃkārāpekṣā* (Govindaṭhakkura, *Pradīpa*, {Varanasi: Chaukhamba Vidybhavan, 1994} 10). ("The most direct interpretation is that even in the case when there is no *rasa*, something can be poetry if there exist unmanifest ornaments. But we perceive that if there is no *rasa* and manifest ornaments are lacking, there can be no poetry. Hence, *rasa* (and its derivatives) and poetic ornaments are the two causes of charm in poetry, and hence where there is an abiding of *rasa,* there [poetry] does not have a dependence on manifest ornaments.") Mammaṭa, however, does not state that *rasa* must be present in poetry lacking manifest ornaments. In contrast, in Jayadeva's system, poetic ornaments are the dominant cause of charm in poetry, and hence manifest ornaments may well be necessary in his view.

224 Nāgojibhaṭṭa, *Udyota* in *Kāvyaprakāśa* (Varanasi: Chaukhamba, 1994) comment to sū. 1, p. 10. Nāgojibhaṭṭa is an alternate name for Nāgeṣabhaṭṭa.

sometimes poetry can be "without" ornaments. Yet the verbal root most commonly used to designate suggestion, √*vyañj*, most directly denotes the meaning "manifestation." Another frequently used verb for suggestion is *pra√kāś*, which more commonly denotes "illumination." Mammaṭa and Vaidyanātha would be hard pressed to explain how ornaments can be manifested or illuminated and remain unmanifest at the same time.

Gāgābhaṭṭa's interpretation that Jayadeva requires manifest ornamentation in poetry gains further support from Vāmana's *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra*, which clearly influenced Jayadeva in his composition of the *Candrāloka*. In the first vere sūtra of this work, Vāmana writes: *kāvyaṃ grāhyam alaṃkārāt.*[225] (Poetry is recognized through *alaṃkāra*). While Vāmana clearly intends the word *alaṃkāra* to convey the more universal sense of *alaṃkāra*, i.e., beauty, in the *vṛtti* to the second sūtra, he also intends that this word convey the figures of speech: *karaṇavyutpattyā punar alaṃkāraśabdo 'yam upamādiṣu vartate.*[226] ("Here the word *alaṃkāra* also signifies the figures of speech such as simile because of the derivation of the cause [of charm]"). To a certain degree, Vāmana presents ornaments to be the most recognizable feature of poetry. Should ornaments be unmanifest in poetry, they would no provide poetry with this service.

Śaradàgama 1.8:

[225] Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkārasūtrāṇi*, ed. Ratna Gopal Bhūpāla (Benares: Braj B. Das, 1908) 1.1.1, pg. 3.

[226] *KAS*, 1.1.2, pg. 7.

[Here] poetry [is said to be] sound and meaning.[227] He refutes someone's idea that: "sometimes, even though [poetry has] the property of not having ornaments, there is no fault." Why does that wise person who consents that words and meanings without ornamentation can be poetry, not consent that something without heat can be fire? The sense is that this acceptance [of sound and meaning] without ornament as poetry is akin to accepting fire to have the property of not having heat. Only that [sound and meaning] that possesses ornaments is poetry. The truth, however, is that even if these ornaments are not manifest, there is no damage with respect to the property of being poetry.[228]

Rākāgama 1.8:

By mocking the statement of a predecessor, he censures [this statement in the verse beginning] *aṅgīkaroti*....The statement "if there were an acceptance that sound and meaning devoid of ornaments could possesses the property of being poetry, then the acceptance that something devoid of heat could possess the property of being fire would also be appropriate" has the property of being mockery. The sense is that the property of being poetry is entirely dependent on the ornaments etc. Hence in verses such as

yaḥ kaumāraharaḥ sa eva hi varas tā eva caîtrakṣapās
te cônmīlitamālatīsurabhayaḥ prauḍhāḥ kadambānilāḥ
sā caîvâsmi tathâpi tatra suratavyāpāralīlāvidhau
revārodhasi vetasītarutale cetaḥ samutkaṇṭhate[229]

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[227] The definition of poetry in the previous verse directly qualifies speech alone, while the commentators explain that meaning should be inferred from the qualification "faultlessness." In this verse, Jayadeva directly refers to poetry as "sound and meaning" (*śabdārthau*). One might argue, however, that Jayadeva here is paraphrasing Mammaṭa's definition in order to critique this.

[228] This statement indicates that Pradyotanabhaṭṭa, like Vaidyanātha , interprets this verse to mean that Jayadeva accepts poetry having ornaments that are unmanifest.

[229] A popular Sanskrit verse, included in many anthologies including the *Subhāśitaratnakoṣa*. Mammaṭa cites this verse in his *vṛtti* to the first sūtra in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* where he provides his definition of poetry. His

> Her husband is the same man who took away her virginity; these are just those spring evenings and those ripe Kadamba winds [bearing] the sweet fragrance of Malatī blossoms. And I am just she. Even so my heart longs for that time when there was playfulness to our lovemaking in the cane bowers at the Narmadā's bank.

the poetic ornaments of meaning such as *vibhāvanā*[230] and the poetic ornaments of sound such as [the alliteration in the expression] *haro vara*, are precisely manifest. Even where there is suggestion of an ornament, the ornament has the property of being manifest. Therefore, that which is devoid of ornaments does not have the property of being poetry. But some people say that poetry is speech that is the instrument of a specific type of happiness through the means of listening. Because the means to this pleasure is said to be listening, there is an exclusion of Vedic injunctions, which are a means to happiness through means of karma.[231] According to this [view], [speech] can have the property of being poetry even if it is devoid of *rasa* and poetic ornaments.[232]

Ramā 1.8:

In order to indicate the adequacy of a statement from the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, he initially criticizes this through mockery in the verse *aṅgīkaroti....*"Why does that wise person who thinks 'sound and meaning without ornament can be poetry' not think that something without

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purpose is to illustrate a case of poetry where ornaments are not manifest. Gāgābhaṭṭa disagrees, saying that the ornaments, though suggested, are still manifest.

[230] A poetic ornament where an effect is expressed without its cause. *vibhāvanā vinâpi syāt kāraṇaṃ kāryajanma cet* (*CĀ*, 5.76). Here the persona's longing is expressed as if it has no reasonable cause. While there is no reason to reject such an expression, there suggestion is that indeed there is such a cause.

[231] *adṛṣṭa.*

[232] From his earlier statements, it is clear that Mammaṭa himself does not attribute this view to Jayadeva.

heat is fire?" Even though there is a division of the statements [from the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and the *Candrāloka*], it is not impossible for there to be an agreement in this division because [such an agreement] has the property of being seen in many cases.[233] For someone who concedes that speech and meaning without ornamentation has the property of being poetry, the concession that something without heat can have the property of being fire would also be appropriate. And as such a thing is not seen observed through direct perception, [this] is laughable. Only that which possesses the ornaments etc., is poetry, but sometimes, even though these ornaments have the property of being concealed, there is no damage [done] to the property of being poetry. This is the truth [of Jayadeva's statement].

Verse 1.9:

vibhaktyutpattaye yogaḥ śāstrīyaḥ śabda iṣyate

rūḍhayaugikatanmiśraiḥ prabhedaiḥ sa punas tridhā

It is desired that speech should conform to grammatical science in order for there be a generation of declensional and conjugational suffixes.[234] [Such conforming] speech is threefold according to the varieties [of] words: those [derived through] convention, those [derived from] etymological roots, and those that are [derived through] a combination of these [processes].

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[233] *vacanabhede 'py abhedānvayasya bahuśo dṛṣṭatvān nânupapattiḥ.* Gāgābhaṭṭa seems to be claiming that even though Mammaṭa and Jayadeva express different opinions, ultimately they have the same view. In this view, Vaidyanātha departs from the earlier interpretation of Gāgābhaṭṭa.

[234] *vibhakti.*

Explanation 1.9:

As the commentators explain, the qualifications that comprise the definition of poetry in verse 1.7 all qualify speech. Therefore, to clarify this strategy, the author here defines that speech that is suitable to be qualified by these. He states that the words chosen by a poet must be suitable for the generation of declensional and conjugational endings.[235] In order to fulfill this requirement, a word has to conform to the *śāstra*, in this case the treatises on grammatical science such as Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, the *Vārttikas*,[236] as well as the etymological treatises such as Yāska's *Nirukta*.[237] Jayadeva then goes on to explain that such a correct word may have a derivation through convention, or a derivation from etymological roots; or it may be derived through a combination of these processes. Convention here does not refer to an evolution, but rather to the transmission of a word and its meaning through the lineage of correct users of Sanskrit speech. Etymological derivation refers to the understanding of a word's meaning through the meaning of a word's constituent parts, when these may be traced back to the meanings of the verbal roots or nominal bases that legitimately serve as original bases for these constituent parts. When this is not at all possible, a word is said to be derived through convention. When this is possible for part of a

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[235] The following statement of Bhāmaha provides an interesting reference point to this: *kramāgataṃ śrutisukhaṃ śabdam arthyam udīrayet* ("One should speak words possessed of sense that are pleasurable to listen to and that have come down through tradition") [*KA*, 6.28.]

[236] Supplementary statements explaining cases that cannot be explained by Pāṇini's sūtras.

[237] Once again Bhāmaha provides some clarity: *siddho yaś côpasaṃkhyānād iṣṭyā yaś côpapāditaḥ / tam ādriyeta prāyeṇa na tu yogavibhāgajam//* ("As a rule you may have recourse to words got by *Upasaṃkhyāna* or *Iṣṭi*, but not to words got by *Yogavibhāga*.") *KA*, 1.29, trans. Naganatha Śastri, 121.

Abhyankar's *Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar* translates the term *iṣṭi* as follows: " a word generally used in the statements made in the *Mahābhāṣya*, similar to those of the Sūtrakāra and the Vārttikakāras, which are 'desired ones' with a view to arrive at the correct forms of words..." Of *upasaṃkhyāna*, he explains: "The word is often found at the end of statements made by the Vārttikakāra..."

word, and not possible for another part of the word, the word is said to be derived through a combination of etymology and convention.

Unsurprisingly, Jayadeva indicates that for speech to have aesthetic potency in poetry, it must strictly comply with the standards of orthodox Sanskrit grammar. As such, words that qualify for use in poetry must have proper morphology capable of supporting proper declensional and conjugational suffixes through which correct syntax can be achieved. This morphology is based on a purity of derivation that traces itself back to the original bases of language, the verbal roots, or is grounded in convention established and preserved by the unbroken lineage of correct Sanskrit speakers. Whereas Sanskrit poetry may convey unexpected meanings through ornaments and the alternate modes of verbal signification, the words themselves must be rooted in the two accepted modes of derivation: convention and etymology. This is to say that Sanskrit poets do not have the license to invent or modify words, but rather they must resort only to words accepted by linguistic orthodoxy. In so doing, poetry is said to appeal to the gnosis of the original *śiṣṭa*-s, those whose spiritual purity them to perceive the words signifying each and every entity. Just as the grammarians had the responsibility of preserving the purity of speech so as to safeguard ritual efficacy as well as proper decorum in society,[238] so the poets and *ālaṃkārika*-s, in order to mine the full aesthetic potency of language, are said to strictly obey the rules and conventions of the

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[238] *yājñikāḥ paṭhanti. prayājāḥ savibhaktikāḥ kāryā iti. na câtareṇa vyākaraṇaṃ prayājāḥ savibhaktikāḥ śakyāḥ kartum* ("Authorities on sacrifice say that the Prayāja hymns should be recited with words possessed of case-affixes; and it is not possible to utter them with case-affixes duly applied, unless grammar has been studied.") [*MB*, vṛtti 1.1.1, trans. Abhyankar, 14.] *yathaîva hi śabdajñāne dharma evam apaśabdajñāne 'py adharmaḥ* ("And just as one obtains merit by the knowledge of correct words, so also one incurs demerit by the knowledge of incorrect word") [*MBh*, *vṛtti* 1.1.1, trans. Abhyankar, 12.]

grammarians. This verse, of course, does not account for the fact that so many verses written in Prākṛt language are considered by tradition to be poetry.[239]

Śaradāgama 1.9:

In order to clarify those things that have become the qualification [of poetic speech] such as "faultlessness," in the verse *vibhakti*...he describes the speech that is to be qualified [by these]. The property of being speech that accords with grammatical science is the delimiter of the property of being what is described [by the definition in the verse]. There is not an absence of pervasion in words such as *bherī*, because precisely those words in their original form (*prakṛti*) taking the form of a radical basis (*dhātu*) and a gender (*liṅga*) that have the property of being suitable for conjugational and declensional endings. These [suitable words] are threefold. They are [either] [derived through] convention, [derived from] etymological roots, or [derived through] a mixture of these.

Rākāgama 1.9:

Because the property of being poetry has the property of being based in sentences, he describes the varieties of words that are the constituent parts [of poetic sentences] in the verse beginning *vibhakti*.... Words that conform to *śāstra*, that is correct words, are apportioned with an original form (*prakṛti*) that is suitable for the generation of declensional

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[239] Gāgābhaṭṭa refers to this problem at the end of his comment to verse 1.7, where he states: *kecit tu - bhāṣāślokādau cyutasaṃskṛtitvādidoṣasattvena nirdoṣatvābhāve 'pi kāvyapadaprayogān nirdoṣādikam api na viśeṣaṇam kintûpalakṣaṇam ity āhuḥ* (*RĀ*, 1.7) ("But others say that because the word poetry is commonly used with respect to verses composed in dialect (*prakṛt*) even though here there is the existence of faults such as *cyutasaṃskṛti*, the properties such as faultlessness are not the qualification [of poetry] but rather a property in extension (*upalakṣaṇam*).")

and conjugational endings. There are three types: those [derived by] convention, those [derived form] etymological roots and those that are [derived through] a combination of these. A conventionally derived word produces an understanding through the denotation of the [word as a] whole. A word [derived from] etymological roots produces a meaning through the denotation of its parts. Words that are[derived through a] combination [of these] produce their understanding through the denotation of the parts and the whole. Hence, the statement "all words are [derived from] etymological roots" is refuted, because [some] etymologies have the property of not being possible. Similarly, [this statement is refuted] because even when there is the formation of an etymology in some way or another, there is [still] an understanding of the meaning without the knowledge that is produced through this etymology. If someone were to object: "since [the fact that] all words have the property of being etymologically derived is established by the definition of the "crude form" (*prātipadika*) precisely because of this [sūtra of Pāṇini], *kṛttaddhitasamāsāś ca,*[240] there is an unsuitability of the preceding sūtra *arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam,*[241] then [we should answer] "no, because this sūtra is purposeful on account of [the fact] that the words *bahupaṭu* ("slightly intelligent") which possesses the affix *bahuc*, expressing the meaning "almost complete," and which is slightly in reverse order.[242] Because, here, [with

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[240] "The forms ending in *Kṛt* affixes, or *Taddhita* affixes, or compounds are also called *prātipadika*" (*Pāṇini,* trans. Vasu, 1.2.46).

[241] "A significant form of the word, not being a verbal root (*dhātu*), or an affix (*pratyaya*) is called a *prātipadika* or 'crude form'" (*Pāṇini*, trans. Vasu, 1.2.45).

[242] Someone might argue that all words are etymologically derived, justifying this view through Pāṇini's sūtra 1.2.46. Because this sūtra states that a word ending in a verbal or nominal affix or a word that is a compound is designated a "crude form," one might be tempted to believe that the preceding sūtra (1.2.45), which states that any significant form of a word that is not a verbal root or an affix is a "crude form," is unnecessary. The author refutes such a view by stating that the word *bahupaṭu* ("slightly intelligent") is considered a *prātipadika*, thus demonstrating that this sūtra indeed has a purpose. According to Sūtra 1.2.46, this would not be a *prātipadika*

respect to the word *bahupaṭu*], there would be no attainment of the designation of this (*prātipadika*) through the sūtra *kṛttaddhitasamāsāś ca* because there is an absence of the property of ending in a *taddhita* affix,[243] and there is also [such a] consequence in the case of the word *pacataki* even though there is an application of the suffix *akac*,[244] since this is intended to mean just the connection to the nominal affix. But some say that even though the designation "crude form" is established for compounds by the sūtra *arthavat...*, the sūtra *kṛttaddhitasamāsaś ca* has the purpose of establishing the designation "crude form" for compounds without meaning such as *a rabbit's horn* or *a sky flower*. Still others say that while both sentences and compounds acquire the designation ["crude form"] by the sūtra *arthavadadhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam* .., the purpose of this applying this designation to compounds [a second time] is for the sake of excluding sentences. Only by this [sūtra] is there the refutation of the idea that "all signifiers [are crude forms]." It is not possible for there to be a conventional derivation or an etymological derivation in all cases, because all meanings do not have literal signifiers, on account of the absence of any mode of signification [in certain cases]. If someone suggests that [in the cases where a literal signifier is absent] there is the property of being a revealer of meaning (*bodhakatvam*), [we counter] that the common forms [of such "revealers"] such as indication are not established in some cases.

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because it begins with the *taddhita* suffix *bahuc* rather than ending in a *taddhita* suffix. Hence, it requires the understanding of 1.2.45 to substantiate that it is a *prātipadika*.

[243] Since it begins with what is usually a suffix.

[244] *tūṣṇīṃ śīlas tūṣṇīkaḥ. pacataki* (*Siddhāntakaumudī*, 2026). Here since *pacataki* is a verb ending in a nominal affix *akac* it would not be a *prātipadika* according to *Pāṇ*. 1.2.46. Still, since it has a meaning -- *taddhitayogamātravivakṣāyāṃ* -- it is significant and thus is considered a *prātipadika* according to 1.2.45, according to this argument.

Ramā 1.9:

Because the property of being poetry has the property of residing in such a type of speech, in order to bring together the qualifications [of this speech] such as "faultlessness" he states the definition *vibhaktyutpattaye....* so as to clarify the faults [and other properties], so as to express the different types of words along with their definitions and so as to state the varieties of word [components] that that are the constituent parts of [whole] words. The sense is because there is trueness only of a word that is apportioned with a root that is either a verbal root (*dhātu*) or the crude form of a noun suitable for the generation of declensional or conjugational endings, speech [in poetry] should conforms to grammatical science, that is, it should be generated according to [grammatical science], and should be a correct signifier of meaning. Similarly, the property of being a word that conforms to grammatical science is the delimiter of the property of what is to be defined [here], and accordingly, there is no lack of pervasion for words such as *bherī.* Such a word may be of three types: a word that is derived through convention, a word that is derived from etymological roots and a word that is derived from a combination of these. The word *punaḥ* is used as an ornament of sound or an ornament of meaning. By this it suggests that a word derived through convention conveys a meaning through the denotation of only the whole word, a word that is derived from etymological roots conveys a meaning through the denotation of only [its] parts, and a meaning that is a combination of these conveys a meaning through the denotation of the parts and the denotation of the whole.

Verse 1.10:

avyaktayoganiryogayogābhāsais tridhâdimaḥ[245]

te ca vṛkṣādibhūvādimaṇḍapādyā yathākramam

The first [of these three derivations, i.e., derivation through convention,] has three varieties: [words] having unmanifest etymological derivation,[246] [words] without any etymological derivation, and [words] having [only] an apparent etymological derivation.[247] These [are exemplified] in sequence [by words] such as *vṛkṣa*, the word *bhūvādi*, and words such as *maṇḍapa*.

Explanation 1.10:

In this verse, Jayadeva explains three different varieties of words that are derived through convention rather than etymology. In the second half he provides examples for each of these. Jayadeva's explanation indicates that a conventional derivation takes place when 1) an etymological derivation is too obscure, 2) when an etymological derivation cannot be found, or 3) when no etymological derivation can be found that leads to the intended meaning. Hence, at one level, etymological derivation is the first consideration in the

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[245] From his commentary, it is clear that Pradyotanabhaṭṭa understands the reading to be *agrima* instead of *ādima*. This reading is not reflected in Rāya's editing of the *Candrāloka*, in the Chaukhambha edition of 1985, *The Candrāloka of Jayadeva along with the Commentary Śaradāgama of Prdyotana Bhaṭṭacārya.*

[246] The reader should not be alarmed that the varieties of words derived through convention are defined with respect to etymology rather than convention. These definitions are based on the theory that derivation through convention occurs when there is an absence of an etymological derivation or some deficiency regarding the available etymological derivation.

[247] This last variety is *yogābhāsa.* "Apparent etymology" refers a derivation that appears to be an correct etymology, but is not a true etymology.

cognition of verbal signification. Whenever possible, a word meaning is understood through the combination of the meanings of its constituent parts. When the meanings of these parts fail to produce the meaning, a meaning is understood which is connected by convention to the meaning of the word as a whole. In this respect, the operation of *rūḍha* or "derivation through convention" is similar to that of *lakṣaṇā* (indication). Both commence their operation upon the failure of a previously considered mode of signification. However, in the case of indication, the failure consists of the incapacity of a denoted meaning of a word to produce a meaning that is compatible with the expression as a whole, as in the case of the expression "the boy is fire," whereas in the case of "derivation through convention," the individual denoted meaning of the consitutent parts of a word cannot be integrated into a satisfactory meaning for the word as a whole. In the case of indication, this failure leads to the presumption of a meaning related to the literal meaning that more adequately completes the sense of the expression such as "the boy is bright like fire." In the case of derivation through convention, this failure leads to the understanding of a meaning connected to the word as whole, which is established through convention. The different interpretations of verbal convention within different philosophical systems is discussed by the commentators in their comments to chapter ten of the *Candrāloka*. Even in the case of etymological derivation, the constituent parts of words are similarly connected to meanings by way of convention. The denoted meanings of all words are at base established through convention.

The distinctions between the different types of failed etymological derivations that lead to derivation through convention are rather subtle. The illustrations for these in the second half of the verse are instrumental in differentiating these. Words in the first category do not produce a meaning through etymology, because even though an etymology can be

found with some effort, this etymology does not manifest in the process of verbal signification. This means that the convention that is found is sufficiently recondite that it does not come into consideration until after one already recollects the meaning of the word by force of convention. Jayadeva's example for such a word is *vṛkṣa*. The commentators explain that even though an etymology, *vṛścaty ātapam*[248] ("that which cuts heat"), can be found, the power of the meaning established by convention is stronger and more immediate, so that this etymology does not manifest in the process of signification. It is not clear whether Jayadeva intends that such an etymology is unmanifest in the mind of the listener, or whether he intends that this is unmanifest in the semantic process itself, or whether the etymology was unmanifest prior to the establishment of meaning by convention. Such a determination depends to a large degree on whether we believe the act of verbal signification operates within language, within the cognition of a listener or in the combination of the two. We should be also aware that the obscure etymology, *vṛścaty ātapam*, might apply to any number of tall entities that have the property of blocking the sun's rays from human subjects such that human subjects experience this as "cutting heat," whereas the conventional meaning, "tree-ness"[249] is a particular entity that might be experienced as "cutting heat." To this extent, this word might be confused for an example of a word that is derived through both

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[248] Turner's *Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages* states that in the *Ṛg Veda* the word *vṛścati* means "cuts down or off or asunder." (p. 699). According to this definition, the current expression, *vṛścaty ātapam*, means "that which cuts heat."

[249] The commentators all agree here that the meaning of the word *vṛkṣa*, as established by convention, is *vṛkṣatvam* (tree-ness). This is consistent with the earliest *Mīmāṃsā* interpretation that the primary meaning of a word is a generic property.

convention and etymology (*yogarūḍha* -- see verse 10.12). Yet because the obscurity of the etymology is so striking, such an understanding is unnecessary.[250]

Jayadeva's example of a word for which an etymology cannot be found is the term *bhūvādi* ("the verbal roots"), which is fashioned by Pāṇini in sūtra 1.3.1. The use of this example is somewhat confusing since a number of formidable grammarians throughout history have construed etymologies for this term.[251] It is frequently, and mistakenly, assumed that this term has the etymological meaning "that class of things whose first member is *bhū*, i.e., the verbal roots." Yet this etymology would be appropriate for the word *bhvādi*, not *bhūvādi*. Some say that because the word *bhvādi* is inauspicious sounding, Pāṇini has added the syllable *va* for auspiciousness.[252] Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita has argued that the verbal root √*vā* is added to the sūtra as the object of comparison, and that the sūtra should be understood as "that class whose first member is *bhū* and whose members are like *vā*.[253]" None of these attempts is particularly satisfactory, and hence commentators to the *Candrāloka* seem to agree that in Jayadeva's view, Pāṇini has intentionally produced a word lacking a successful

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[250] The issue here is not whether etymology operates in tandem with convention, but whether it operates at all. Because of the obscurity of the etymology *vṛścaty ātapam*, this etymology does not manifestly contribute to signification of this word.

[251] The following etymology is found in the *Bālamanoramā* commentary to the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī*, attributed to either Vāsudevadīkṣita or to Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita himself: *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ. bhūś ca vāś ca bhūvau. ādiś ca ādiś ca ādī. prathamaḥ ādiśabdaḥ prabhṛtivacanaḥ, dvitīyas tu prakāravacanaḥ. bhūvau ādī yeṣām te bhūvādayaḥ. Bhūprabhṛtayo vāsadṛśāś ca ye, te dhātusaṃjñakā ity arthaḥ.* in Bhattojidīkṣita, *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī* ("[The word] *bhūvādayo* [designates] the verbal roots. [The compound *bhūvādayaḥ* includes the sense] *bhūvau*, [that is] the verbal root √*bhū* and the verbal root √*vā*. The word *ādi* [should be understood] twice. The first *ādi* signifies "first," [while] the second signifies "variety." Those whose first and whose variety are the verbal root √*bhū* and the verbal root √*vā* are [designated by] the word *bhūvādayaḥ*. The sense is 'those that have √*bhū* as their first and √*vā* as a variety are designated as the verbal roots'"). (*Bālomanoramā* in *VSK* {Vārānasī: Chaukhambhā Saṃskṛt saṃsthān, 1998} #18, p. 24).

[252] *bhūvādīnāṃ vakāro 'yaṃ maṅgalārthaḥ prayujyate* (Unattributed verse cited in both the *Mahābhāṣya* 1.3.1.1 and the *Kāśikāvṛtti* 1.3.1.).

[253] In this case we understand the word *ādi* twice in this sūtra in two separate meanings, as Bhaṭṭoji has explained (see not 251).

etymology in order to demonstrate that this word has significance only in relation to this sūtra.[254] Hence, according to this interpretation, this word does not involve an "apparent" etymology because of Pāṇini's desire to preclude all vestiges of etymological derivation for this word, even unmanifest or misleading etymologies.

The final category of words having derivations through convention is that in which only an apparent etymological derivation (*yogābhāsa*) is found. This means that while an etymological derivation seems to appear for a word, this does not produce the intended meaning of the word. Jayadeva's example for this type of word is *maṇḍapa* which when analyzed into the components *maṇḍa* ("rice scum") and *pa* (from the verbal root √*pā* ("to drink") produces the understanding "that which drinks rice scum," a meaning that is sufficiently off target from the intended meaning of *maṇḍapa*, "a shelter." It is reasonable to question what distinguishes this category of words from the first category, those that have unmanifest etymological derivations. We should remember, however, that in the example for the first category *vṛkṣa* ("tree"), the etymology, *vṛścaty ātapam* ("that which cuts heat"), produces a meaning that is in accordance with the intended meaning "tree." The deficiency of this etymology lies in the obscurity of its connection to the word in consideration, *vṛkṣa*. Only someone highly trained in etymological derivations might perceive such a connection, and then only with some difficulty. In the current case, the apparent etymology *maṇḍa* + *pa* is found simply through the separation of the components of the word in consideration, *maṇḍapa*, which is the usual procedure for imputing an etymology. The deficiency of this etymology lies not the obscurity of its connection, but rather the in the fact that it produces a meaning off-target from the intended meaning of the word.

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[254] Special thanks to Dr. Gary Tubb for sharing this insight.

Considering the number and variety of attempts to produce an etymology for the word *bhūvādi* that are listed in the *Mahābhāṣya*, one might well be tempted to classify this word as a member of the third category. This is in part due to the subtlety of the distinction between the second and third categories of words derived through convention. Gāgābhaṭṭa perhaps adds to this ambiguity by qualifying the absence of etymology in the second category by the condition "with respect to the intended meaning of the word" (*tātparyaviṣaye*).[255] The identical qualification also appears in his explanation of the third category: "an apparent etymology [presents] meanings for the parts of words that are not connected to the intended meaning of the word" (*tātparyaviṣaye 'nanvitāvayavārtho yogābhāsaḥ*[256]). According to these requirements, there is nothing to prevent a word having an apparent etymology from also being classified within the second category, since a word possessing only an etymology that fails to accord with the intended meaning (qualifications for words of the third category) would also be said to lack an etymology that accords with the intended meaning of the word (Gāgābhaṭṭa's qualification for words of the second category). Gāgābhaṭṭa's explanation of the second category does not sufficiently differentiate a non-existent etymology from an apparent etymology. For this very reason, Vaidyanātha challenges the appropriateness of the qualification *tātparyaviṣaye* in the second category. He explains that in the case of *bhūvādi*, there is no reason to suspect that there might be an apparent etymology because Pāṇini's intention is precisely for this expression to lack an etymology, in order to suggest that this word is found only in the sūtra. For this reason, he states that there would be no reason to classify *bhūvādi* as an example of a word in the third category. He also states that there are no unwarrnted consequences that result from the

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[255] *tātparyaviṣaye asambhavadyogo niryogaḥ* (*RĀ*, 1.10, p. 6).

[256] *RĀ*, 1.10, p. 6.

distinction of the third category from the second. For the above reasons, Vaidyanātha states that the use of the qualification *tātparyaviṣaye* in the second category is refuted.[257]

Śaradāgama 1.10:

The first of these derivations has three varieties which he states in the verse *avyakta*.... The word *agrima*[258] means "the first." Derivation through etymology involves the denotation of [a word's] parts; derivation through convention involves a denotation of the whole word. Where a word has an etymological derivation that is unmanifest, even though an etymological meaning exists, it is not understood, as in the case [of the word] *vṛkṣādi* ("tree etc."). Here, even though the etymology *vṛścaty ātapam* ("that which cuts heat") is found, its application is not understood, since the understanding [of this word] is just "tree-ness."[259] Because this [understanding] has the property of taking the form of a generic property (*jāti*).[260]

When a word has a [complete] absence of etymological derivation, no etymological derivation exists for a word, as in the case of the word *bhūvādi.* This word is established through convention [to have] the meaning "the verbal roots, " through the recollection of Pāṇini's [sūtra] *bhūvādayo dhātuṣu* (1.3.1), because this word is not produced through the

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[257] *etena tātparyaviṣaye iti atrāpi viśeṣaṇam ity apāstam*...(*Ramā*, 1.10).

[258] As mentioned in the footnote to the verse, Pradyotanabhaṭṭa accepts a different reading to the verse than does the editor of the Chaukhamba edition.

[259] While this marginally applies to the meaning "tree-ness," Pradyotanabhaṭṭa states that this meaning is understood through convention and that the etymology remains unmanifest during the operation of verbal signification.

[260] The understanding that a noun denotes a generic property (*jāti*) corresponds to the original Mīmāṃsā understanding of verbal signification.

derivation *bhūr ādir yeṣām* ("those of whom the verbal root √*bhū* is the first.), since [such a derivation] would have the unwanted consequence of stemming from the etymology *bhvādi.*[261] Nor is something that conveys the verbal roots produced by the [etymology] *bhūvâdir yeṣām* (those things such as √*bhū* "to be" and √*vā* etc.), because in this case the verbal roots would lack the property of having a first [member].[262] Therefore, this word (*bhūvādi*) has only a derivation through convention, because through recollection and through the force of the speaker's intention, it is well known that [this word] communicates the verbal roots.

When a word has [only] an apparent etymology, the etymological meaning, even though it can be found, does not correspond to the natural meaning [of the word], as is the case for the apparent etymological meaning of the word *maṇḍapa*, "*maṇḍam pibati*" ("that which drinks rice scum"), which does not correspond to the [natural meaning of the word], "a shelter."

Rākāgama 1.10:

The property of producing a meaning through the denotation of the whole [word] even though the application of the meaning of the parts is possible is the property of being a word having an etymological derivation that is not manifest. The absence of a meaning [found] in the parts [of a word] is the property of being a word in which an etymological derivation does not exist. The property of having a meanings found in the parts of the word that does not connect to the intended meaning [of the word] is the property of being a derivation being

[261] The etymology *bhvādi* is said to be unwarranted because the form of the word itself is said to have an inauspicious sound, and because it is is not precisely traceable to the expression *bhūvādi.*

[262] Here, two verbal roots are mentioned, and hence there would be no *āditva*, "property of having a first."

a word having [only] an apparent etymology. He states examples [of these] in [the half verse beginning] *te ca*.... In the case of the word *vṛkṣa* (tree), there is the understanding of an existing etymology, *vṛścaty ātapam* ("that which cuts heat"), only on account [of the understanding] of the generic property "tree-ness" (*vṛkṣatva*). Accordingly, since there is no application of the meaning of the parts [of the word], [the word *vṛkṣa*] has the property of producing its meaning through the denotation of the whole [word]. When a word lacks an etymological derivation, an etymological derivation does not exist for the meaning that is the object of [the speaker's] intention.[263] The verbal root *bhū* has the meaning of "existence", and the verbal root *vā* is the signifier of motion and because of the word *ādi* [there is the understanding of] inflectional suffixes, verbal prefixes and particles.[264] A word having an apparent etymological derivation has meanings for its parts that do not relate to the intended meaning of the word, [just as] there is no relation of the meanings [of the parts of the word *maṇḍapa*], which take the form "scum drinker," to the intended meaning "shelter."

Ramā 1.10:

He states that the first among these [types of derivations, derivation through convention,] has three varieties in the verse beginning *avyakta*.... The word *ādima* means "the first." [The

[263] *tātparyviṣaye 'rthe asambhavad yogo niryogaḥ* (*RĀ*, 1.10). As mentioned earlier, it would be difficult to distinguish the second and third categories, since in both cases there is an absence of etymologies that correspond to the intended meaning of words. The difference seems to be that in the third case, an apparent etymology manifests, which upon inspection proves insufficient to the intended meaning of the word, whereas in the second case, an apparent etymology does not actively manifest.

[264] *ādipadād vibhaktyupasarganipātāḥ*. The implication is that the meanings of the parts of the expression *bhūvādi*, -- when this word is separated into the words *bhū*, *vā* and *ādi* -- do not provide a suitable derivation for the intended meaning of the expression *bhūvādi* which means the "the verbal roots." As pointed out earlier, many other etymological interpretations are possible.

meaning] is still the same if we understand *agrima.*[265] When a word in which meanings exist for its individual parts has the property of conveying a meaning that is the denoted meaning of the whole [word] alone, even though [the meanings of the parts] have not been investigated on account of the fact that these are not invariably comcomitant and because they are unmanifest, [such a word] has the property of having an unmanifest etymology. A word in which there is a non-existence of meanings for its parts is said to have the property being a word lacking an etymological derivation. When a word has the property of having only apparent meanings [found in its parts] that are unrelated to the intended meaning [of the word], [such a word] is said to have the property of being a word having [only] an apparent etymology. He expresses [examples of the types of words] that he has [previously] defined, in the [half verse beginning] *te ca*.... "And these" (*te ca*), that is words having unmanifest etymologies etc., are to be understood [as exemplified by the words] *vṛkṣa* etc. Here there is a *dvandva* formed of three *bahuvrīhi* compounds.[266] Here in the first [of the examples] (*vṛkṣa*), even though there is [the sense] *vṛścaty ātapam* ("that which blocks heat"), through an existing etymological derivation, an etymological derivation is not understood in the manner that has been explained [as appropriate for etymological derivation]. Rather, in all case there is an understanding of the denotation of the [word as a] whole, because the understanding [of the meaning of this word] is the generic property "tree-ness." Thus there is a connection [of this word] with the definition that was stated. In the second example, even though there exists the verbal root √*bhū* in the sense of "being", there is an absence of an

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[265] Here, he acknowledges Pradyotanabhaṭṭa's reading.

[266] The *dvandva* compound *vṛkṣādibhūvādimaṇḍapādyāḥ* is formed of three individual *bahuvrīhi* compounds *vṛkṣādi*, *bhūvādi* and *maṇḍapādi*.

etymology.[267] Despite the fact that an etymology exists in the sense of the agent of this verb, etc., this does not have the property of being the definition [of the word *bhūvādi*]. This has been stated to suggest that the word *bhūvādi* occurs only in Pāṇini's sutras.[268] Here, there is not [the etymology] "those that are similar to this verbal root" which is conceived by another scholar.[269] Accordingly, there is a refutation that in this case there is also the qualification *tātparyaviṣaye* ("in the intended meaning"),[270] because of the reason just stated[271] and because no unwarranted consequence results from the distinction [of the second category] from the third.[272] Here, there is the cognition of the word *ādi* and the suffix *ādi*, because of the double [operation of the word] *ādi*. Still, the expression *bhūvādi*, which is explained as being based in [Pāṇini's] sūtras and as having the meaning of a collection, is derived through the convention of Pāṇini and produces [the meaning] "all verbal roots beginning with √*bhū*." An etymology does not exist in [the form of] a *bahuvrīhi* compound possessing the word *bhū* or the word *bhūvā*, because in the first case there would be the unwarranted consequence of

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[267] Even though the meaning of one of the parts of the expression *bhūvādi*, specifically the root √*bhū* exists in the sense of an absolute generic property, no etymology exists for the word *bhūvādi*, because this meaning is known through convention through the recollection of the sūtra of Pāṇini (1.3.1).

[268] The idea is that Pāṇini has intentionally created an untraceable expression to indicate that this occurs only in the sūtra.

[269] This may well refer to the author of the *Bālamanoramā* (see quotation in footnote 251).

[270] This qualification was stated earlier by Gāgābhaṭṭa in his commentary to the same verse: *tātparyaviṣaye asambhavadyogo niryogaḥ* (*RĀ*, 1.10). In Vaidyanātha's view, the qualification *tātparyaviṣaye* ("with respect to [the meaning] that is the object of intention") applies only to the third category where apparent etymologies do not correspond to the intended meaning of a word. As was mentioned earlier, Gāgābhaṭṭa's explanation does not provide a clear distinction between words of the second and third categories. This is because his explanation of the second category does not categorically demand that words entirely lack etymologies, but rather that they lack etymologies consistent with their intended meanings. Vaidyanātha clarifies the issue by stating plainly that no etymologies exist for words in the second category. He emphasizes that in the case of the word *bhūvā*, no appropiate etymology exists, because this is precisely Pāṇini's intent.

[271] The "reason" referred to here is that Pāṇini intended that the word not have an etymology.

[272] The implication is that if this qualification were accepted in the second category, the consequence would be the loss of the distinction between the second and third categories.

bhvādi,[273] and in the latter case the class of verbal roots would not have the property of having a first member.[274] Nor [should we accept the argument] that in other applications, exactly this etymology has the property of being manifest. As for the other case, the third [variety], even though there is a logical connection of the parts of the word [*maṇḍapa*] in the meaning of the etymology "the property of being the agent of the action of drinking rice scum," there is an absence of [a logical connection of the parts of this word] in the meaning that is the intended referent [for the word *maṇḍapa*] which [takes] the form "a shelter."[275]

Verse 1.11:

śuddhatanmūlasambhinnaprabhedair yaugikas tridhā

te ca bhrāntisphuratkāntikaunteyādisvarūpiṇaḥ

There are three varieties of etymologically derived words: words derived from pure etymologies, words derived from the etymological derivation of their bases[276] and hybrid etymologies. These [varieties] have as their forms [words] such as *bhrānti*, *sphuratkānti* and *kaunteya*.

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[273] The etymology "that which has √*bhū* as a first member" would correspond to the word *bhvādi* not *bhūvādi*.

[274] If the etymology took the form of a *bahuvrīhi* compound having the form *bhū-vā-ādi*, the meaning would be "that which has has its first √*bhū* and √*vā*." This is contradictory since two things are identified as being the first.

[275] This means that the components of a word cannot be logically construed with one another so as to produce the intended meaning of the whole word.

[276] As in the case of compounds where the meaning of the word is derived through the etymology of the word bases that serve as the components of the whole word. In the case of pure etymological derivation, the components of a word are already the most basic elements of a word, and therefore their meanings are derived through convention rather than etymological analysis.

Explanation 1.11:

Having previously classified and exemplified three types of words that have insufficient etymologies and that require derivation through convention, Jayadeva proceeds to categorize and exemplify three types of words that have successful etymological derivations: words having pure etymological derivations, words whose etymological derivation is through the etymological derivation of word components, and words that have hybrid etymologies. Here it is important to remember that an etymologically derived word signifies a meaning through the denotation of its parts. In the case of words having pure etymologies, these parts are the most basic constituents of a word: the original bases (*prakṛti*) and affixes (*pratyaya*). The original bases are of two types: noun bases (*prātipadika*) and verbal roots (*dhātu*). The affixes are of six types: declensional affixes (*suppratyaya*), conjugational affixes (*tiṅpratyaya*), verbal suffixes (*kṛtpratyaya*), nominal suffixes (*taddhitapratyaya*), secondary root affixes (*dhātupratyaya*)[277] and feminine suffixes (*strīpratyaya*).[278] These bases and suffixes are considered the primary constituents of words that cannot be further subdivided or analyzed. Whenever possible, it is desirable to analyze a word back to a verbal root which is considered more original than a nominal base. While some grammarians have maintained that all words are traceable to verbal roots, for practical purposes this is not always feasible or desirable -- as was seen in the case of the unsuitably

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[277] These are the suffixes that are used in the formation of secondary verb bases such as the causative, denominative, desiderative etc. (see Abhyankar's *Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*).

[278] The varieties of original bases and suffixes have been paraphrased from *Abhyankar's Dicitionary of Sanskrit Grammar*.

obscure etymology *vṛścaty ātapam* ("that which cuts heat"), which attempts to trace the noun *vṛkṣa* (tree) to the verbal root √*vṛśc* (to cut).

Words that can be derived through etymology provide the impression of having a higher degree of linguistic purity than words derived through convention, since their meanings are built from the meanings of most basic constituents of words. They appear to have stronger roots in the "original" meanings and less prone to modification through the transactional patterns of human speech. However, while the meanings of suffixes are highly stipulated in the various grammatical treatises, the conventions governing the meanings of verbal roots and nominal bases are susceptible to evolution, modification and variation in meaning. Despite the attractiveness of etymological meaning, Pāṇini has stated that "the authority of the *saṃjñā*, or the popular usage of words, must always supercede the authority of the meaning dependent on derivation"[279] and Patañjali reiterates that educated language users (*śiṣṭa*-s) are the ultimate authority on the use of words. There is rather universal agreement among traditional Indian scholars regarding this point.[280]

Since the meanings of words derived through pure etymologies are construed through the integration of the meanings of these parts, one may well wonder how the meanings of the parts themselves are construed. As these cannot be analyzed further, these parts directly denote their own meanings. In order to do denote their meanings, they must be connected to meanings through some type of relationship. The logicians and grammarians have determined that this relationship is a convention, albeit one that, in their view, is usually established by God. The Mīmāṃsakas, on the otherhand, hold that this relationship is eternal

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[279] Kunjuni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning* (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963) 65. This statement is based on Pāṇini's Sutra 1.2.53: *tad aśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt.*

[280] Ibid.

and cannot be established through a convention. If we accept the position of the grammarians and logicians, a word derived through a pure etymology denotes a meaning derived through the meanings of its most basic parts. Here the meanings of the most basic components of a word are necessarily derived through convention. Thus all denotation is built on verbal convention at its most basic level, in this view.

The word *bhrānti* is an example of a word having a pure etymological derivation, since the meaning of this word can be discerned through the meaning of its parts -- the verbal root √*bhram* meaning "wandering" or "confusion" and the verbal suffix *ktin*,[281] which signifies a verbal action. As is the case in all pure etymological derivations, the meaning of these components into which the word *bhrānti* has been analyzed, are directly understood through convention rather than further etymological derivation.

The compound *sphuratkānti* is an example of the second category, a word whose meaning is derived through the etymological derivation of its components. Hence, the meaning of *sphuratkānti* is understood through the etymological derivation of *sphurat* from the verbal root √*sphur* ("to palpitate") and the suffix *śatṛ*[282] (the verbal suffix having the sense of the present time) combined with the etymological derivation of *kānti* from the verbal root √*kam*[283] in the sense "to shine" and the verbal suffix *ktin* in the sense of the feminine

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[281] The suffix *ktin* is the technical name for the verbal suffix that appears as *ti*. The letter *k* and *n* are indicatory letters that explain how the suffix is to be applied. This suffix is added to a verb to express an action in the feminine gender. *striyām ktin* (Pāṇ, 3.3.94).

[282] "kṛt affix *at* in the sense of 'the present time,' applied to any root which takes the *parasmaipada* personal affixes…The words formed with this *śatṛ* (*at*) affix are termed present participles in the declension of which, by virtue of the indicatory vowel *ṛ* in *śatṛ*, the augment *num* is inserted after the last vowel off the base, and the root receives such modifications as are caused by a *sārvadhātuka* afiix, the affix *śatṛ* being looked upon as a *sārvadhātuka* affix on account of the indicatory letter *ś*. The word ending in this affix, *śatṛ*, governs a noun forming its object, in the accusative case" (Abhyānkar, 354-5).

[283] Most commonly, the verb √*kam* means "to love," or "to desire." Gāgābhaṭṭa explains that in the context of the word *kānti*, √*kam* signifies "to shine" (*RĀ*, 11). A similar correspondence exists for the word *śṛngāra* which means both "erotic" and "shininess."

gender. Here, the original word *sphuratkānti* is analyzed into words – *sphurat* and *kānti* - whose meanings are understood through etymological derivation rather than directly through convention.

Jayadeva uses the word *kaunteya* (an offspring of *kuntī*) to exemplify the category of words having hybrid etymologies, that is, words derived through both etymology and convention. The most successful explanation for this classification is presented by Gāgābhaṭṭa. He states that the word *kaunteya* is a hybrid word because one component of the word, *kunṭī*, has a meaning that is derived etymologically from the word *kunti* and the nominal suffix (*taddhita*) *ṅīṣ* signifying femininity, while another component, the patronymic suffix *ḍhak*,[284] has a meaning that is derived directly through convention.[285] More specifically, *kaunteya* is a hybrid word because even though it is not derived purely through convention, it cannot be classified as a word having a pure etymology or a word having an etymology through the etymological derivation of its components. If *kaunteya* were a pure etymology, than it would be analyzed into two components (one being either a verbal root (*dhātu*) or an original form of a noun (*prātipadika*) and and the other being a suffix) both of which would be derived immediately through convention. In the case of *kaunteya*, however, while the second component, the patronymic suffix *ḍhak*, fulfills the second requirement, the first component, *kuntī* is not derived through convention, because this is derived etymologically from the word *kunti* and the feminine suffix *ṅiś*. If, on the other hand, *kaunteya* were a word derived through the etymological derivation of its parts, then both

[284] The following Pāṇinian Sūtras and commentary from the *Kāśikāvṛtti* explain the formation of this suffix: *strībhyo ḍhak* (Paṇ., 4.1.120). *Iha strīgrahaṇena ṭābādipratyayāntāḥ śabdā gṛhyante. strībhyo 'patye ḍhak pratyayo bhavati. sauparṇeyaḥ vainateyaḥ....*(*Kāś.*, 4.1.120). *āyaneyīnīyiyaḥ phaḍakhacchaghāṃ pratyayādīnām.* (Pāṇ., 7.1.2). Thanks to Diwakar Acharya for pointing me to these sūtras.

[285] A suffix cannot be etymologically derived, because its meaning is necessarily established by convention.

components of *kaunteya* would be derived through pure etymologies. In the case of *kaunteya*, however, the first component, *kuntī*, is not derived through a pure etymology, because this is derived from the word *kunti*, which is still subject to further etymological derivation. Furthermore, the second component, the patronymic suffix *ḍhak*, is not subject to etymological derivation whatsoever, since it is derived immediately through convention. Therefore, the word *kaunteya*, not being derived through pure etymological derivation, not being derived from the pure etymological derivation of its parts, and not being derived purely through convention, is classified as a word having a hybrid derivation.

Pradyotana explains this classification in slightly different terms. He states that the word *kaunteya* is derived from the word *kuntī*. The word *kuntī*, he claims, cannot be derived through a pure etymological derivation, because the word *kunti*, from which it is derived, is itself derived through an etymological derivation. He does not state the reason for this last judgement, and both Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha disagree with him on this point.[286]

While the classifications within the past three verses are overtly technical and on the surface might appear to have little bearing on literary aesthetics (*poetics*), we should consider that the investigation into the derivation of words is essential to the full understanding of the full range of pathways through which words can produce meanings. The logic through which one differentiates conventionally and etymologically derived meanings becomes highly instrumental in the differentiation of the operations of verbal signification which is perhaps the most essential topic in Indian poetic discourse.

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[286] *deśavācino hrasvasya strītvavācakaṅīṣpratyayāntatvena yaugikasya kuntītśabdasyâyaugikāpatyārthataddhitasya ca yogena niṣpannasya kaunteyapadasyârjunādipratyāyakatvam* (*RĀ*, 1.11, p. 6). *Tṛtīye 'pi rājādivācikuntiśabdāt taddhitaluki ṅīṣi yaugikakuntīśabdasyâyaugikataddhitayogena niṣpannakaunteyapadasyârjunādibodhakatvāt tathêti bodhyam ādinā pācakādiparigrahaḥ.* (*Ramā*, 1.11. p. 8).

Śaradāgama 1.11:

The author states that etymologically derived words are also threefold in the verse beginning *śuddha*.... An etymological derivation that is produced from the orignal base of a word and its suffix is said to be pure, as in the case of words such as *bhrānti* etc. The word *tanmūla* means "a word having bases (*mūla*[287]) that are etymologically derived." [This is necessarily] a compound of two words having etymological derivations, such a compound that is constructed from the original bases [of the two words] alone.[288] As in the case of words such as *sphuratkānti etc.* The word *kaunteya*, which is produced from the [word *kuntī*], is said to be a word having a hybrid etymology, because it is derived from the word *kuntī* which has an impure etymological derivation since [its etymological component] the word *kunti* [itself] has an etymological derivation.[289]

Rākāgama 1.11:

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[287] Literally, "root."

[288] This simply indicates that the basal form of a compound is formed from the basal forms of its components. Therefore, when the integrated meaning of a compound is cognized, the understanding of gender, number and grammatical case is not understood by force of etymological derivation, since the inflectional endings are omitted from the formation.

[289] Here I have replaced Gangasagar Rai's reading of *kuntiśabdād ayogikaniṣpatteḥ* with the reading *kuntiśabdād yogikaniṣpatteḥ*. Both readings might appear the same in a manuscript. Since the word *kuntī* has an impure etymology, the word from which it is derived, *kunti*, should still be subject to etymological derivation (*yaugikaniṣpatti*). If *kunti* were said not to have an etymological derivation (*ayaugikaniṣpatti*), than it would be derived through convention and the word *kuntī* would have a pure etymological derivation (*śuddho yoga*). In actuality, it is inconsequential whether *kuntī* as a pure or impure etymological derivation. The very fact that *kuntī*, as a component of the word *kaunteya*, is still subject to etymology while the other component of *kaunteya* is not, is enough to demonstrate the hybrid derivation of *kaunteya*. An alternate interpretation of the original reading is "the word *kuṇṭī* has an impure etymological derivation because it does not have an etymological derivation from the word *kunti*." This seems to be illogical.

[In the verse beginning] *śuddha*, a word called "a pure etymology" is that which produces a meaning through the etymology of the original base and suffix [of a word], that which is called "a word having an etymological derivation through roots that are etymologically derived" produces a meaning through a compound that is the joining of two words having this [pure] type of eymology and a word that is called "a word having a hybrid etymology" produces a meaning through, the joining of a word that has an etymological derivation with a word that does not have an etymological derivation. He exemplifies these [in the half of the verse beginning] *te ca*.... As in the case of words such as *bhrānti* and *pācaka*,[290] even though the verbal root √*bhram* -- in the sense of going -- has the property of commuciating "movement" and "deviant understanding,"[291] there is an absence of the cognition of this through the base alone, because the understanding of "going" and "understanding a meaning in another way" is [achieved] only through the etymology of [both] the original base and the suffix of the word *bhrānti*.[292] Because there is a compounding of the word *sphurat* and the word *kānti*, which are words derived from pure etymologies produced [respectively] from the verbal root √*sphur* accompanied by the suffix *śatṛ*[293] and the verbal root √*kam* in the sense of "splendor" followed by the affix *ktin*[294] in the sense of the feminine gender, and which are the components of the word *sphuratkānti*, these words are said to have the

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[290] Gāgābhaṭṭa's listing of the word *pācaka* confuses his explanation somewhat, since the bulk of the explanation specifically applies to the word *bhrānti*.

[291] Understanding something improperly.

[292] While a verbal root is connected through convention to a meaning, it requires the addition of a suffix, either conjugational or verbal, to actually signify a meaning.

[293] A *kṛt* suffix communicating the present time, used in the formation of the present participle.

[294] *striyāṃ ktin* (Pāṇ, 3.3.94). ("To express an action and co., by a word in the feminine gender, the affix 'ktin' is added to the root.") Trans., Vāsu.

property of producing the meaning pertaining to this [compound]. Because the word *kaunteya* is produced from the combination of 1) the word *kuntī*, which is etymologically derived on account of the fact that the word (*kuntī*) a) has a [base having] a short vowel, b) signifies direction, and c) has the property of ending in the suffix *ṅīṣ* which signifies the feminine gender; and 2) a *taddhita* suffix signifying a patronymic which is not etymologically derived, therefore it (*kaunteya*) has the property of signifying Ārjuna, etc.[295]

Ramā 1.11:

The author states that etymologically derived words also have three varieties [in the verse beginning] *śuddha*.... The three varieties, the last of which is *saṃbhinna*, are words having pure etymological derivations, words whose etymological derivation is through components[296] that have [pure] etymological derivations, and words having mixed etymological derivation. Here, that which has the property of producing a meaning through the combination of the meaning of its root and its affix, [both of which] are devoid of etymological derivation, is called a word that has the property of being a pure etymological derivation. That which has the property of producing [its] meaning through a compound, which is the joining of two words of such [pure] etymological derivation is said to be a word that has the property of being etymologically derived through components that have etymological derivation. That which has the property of producing [its] meaning through the

[295] The offspring of Kuntī. The point here is that one of its components, *kuntī*, is etymologically derived (from the word *kunti*) while another part, the patronymic suffix, is understood through convention, and hence the word *kaunteya* is a hybrid word.

[296] Here, such a word is comprised of components that themselves etymologically derived words. The meaning is of such a word is produced through combining the meanings of these components.

combination of an etymologically derived meaning and a meaning that is not etymologically derived is said to have the property of being a hybrid etymology. In the half of the verse beginning *te ca*, he state [examples of the types of words] that he has [just] defined .... The meaning of [these two words – *te* and *ca*] is the same as in the previous [verse]. The [compound] *bhrānti*..., however, has a different form [than the compound in the previous verse], and has an appositional (*karmadhāraya*) compounds as its base, this containing a bahuvrīhi compound that [itself contains] a *dvandva* compound.[297] Here, in the first example, even though the verbal root √*bhram* has the property of being called the signifier of both "motion" and "confusion," this is not due solely to the utility of the base of the word alone. Therefore, only through the etymological derivation from the base of the word and its suffix, [which operates] through an understanding of the meaning of these, is there an understanding of these two [meanings i.e., "motion" and "confusion"]. This is the condensed explanation. Because of the compounding of the two words *kānti* and *sphurat* which have as their [respective] endings the suffix *ktin* coming after ther verbal root √*kam* and the suffix *śatṛ* coming after the verbal root √*sphur*, and which are words derived from pure etymological derivations, there is another meaning which is [produced from] the combination of the [meanings of] these words.

Since, in the third case as well, the word *kaunteya* is similarly produced through a combination, [in this case of] 1) the word *kuntī*, which is etymologically derived on account of the elided *taddhita* suffix *ṅiṣ* following the word *kunti* which signifies the [name of] a king

[297] The point here is that the compound *bhrāntisphuratkāntikaunteyādisvarūpiṇaḥ* as a whole is a *karmadhāraya* compound meaning "having forms [of words] that have as their first members *bhrānti*, *sphuratkānti* and *kaunteya*." This *karmadhāraya* contains a *bahuvrīhi* compound *bhrāntisphuratkāntikaunteyādi* ("having as their first members [the words] *bhrānti*, *sphurikānti* and *kaunteya*.") Lastly this *bahuvrīhi* contains the *dvandva* compound *bhrāntisphuratkāntikaunteya* ("[the words] *bhrānti*, *sphuratkānti* and *kaunteya*").

etc., and 2) a *taddhita* suffix that is not derived etymologically,[298] [*kaunteya*] has the property of signifying [the meaning] Arjuna and his brothers.[299] There should be an understanding of the meaning " and similarly" [in this verse] beecause of the word *ādi*, and hence there an understanding of other [words] such as *pācaka* ("cook").

Verse 1.12 –13ab:

tanmiśro 'nyonyasāmānyaviśeṣaparivartanāt

nīradhiḥ paṅkajaṃ saudhaṃ sāgaro bhūruhaḥ śaśī

kṣīranīradhir ākāśapaṅkajaṃ tena siddhyati

The mixture of these[300] [two types of derivation[301]] is due to the substitution of a particular [for a generality], a generality [for a particular], or the [co-existence] of both of theses together. [The words] *nīradhi* ("ocean"), *paṅkaja* ("lotus"), *saudha* ("house"), *sāgara* ("ocean"), *śaśin* ("moon"), *kṣīranīradhi* ("ocean of milk") and *ākāśapaṇkaja* ("sky-lotus") are established [in their meanings] by these [processes].

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[298] The patronymic suffix *ḍhak.* This has been explained in a note to my own explanation of this verse.

[299] This statement simply qualifies that the above explanation concerns the derivation of the word *kaunteya* when it signifies the meaning "a Pāndava brother." It might be possible to conceive an alternate derivation if this word were used to signify a different meaning based on a different original base such as *kunta.*

[300] *tanmiśro.* This refers to the derivation known as *yogarūḍha*, through which a third category of words such as *nirādhi* is produced. This term might lead to some confusion with the third type of etymological derivation. We should remember that in the former case, etymology and convention operate separately within different components of a word. In the current case, there is an alternation of their operations or a co-participation of their operations in the same word or component of a word. This will be clarified in the explanation and commentaries.

[301] Derivation through convention and derivation through etymology.

Explanation 1.12 - 13ab:

In the current verse, Jayadeva explains a third type of derivation, which incorporates both the operation of convention and the operation of etymology. This type of derivation is technically known as *yogarūḍha.* It is important to differentiate words that are *yogarūḍha* from words that have the second type of etymological derivation, "hybrid derivation," since these latter are also understood through the combination of etymological and conventional derivation.

We recall that in the case of hybrid etymologies, a word is analyzed into components that have distinct derivational status. At least one component of the word will have a derivation through convention, and at least one component of the word will have a derivation through etymology. Thus, when the word *kaunteya* is analyzed into components, one component, *kuntī,* can still be subject to further etymological analysis and hence is said to be etymologically derived, while another component, the patronymic suffix, is derived through convention. Hence, etymology and convention, while co-particpating in the derivation, operate in separate portions of the word. In the case of *yogarūḍha,* however, the same word or portion of a word is derived through both convention and etymology in alternation. For example, the meaning of the word *nīradhi* may provisionally be derived through etymology, through the meaning of its parts "a substrate (*dhi*) of water (*nīra*)." Ultimately, however, through convention, the word *nīradhi* is understood to mean "the ocean." Here we notice that the meaning established through convention ("the ocean") is a particularization of the meaning established through etymology ("any substrate of water"). Similarly, an etymological derivation of the word *paṅkaja* produces the meaning "that which is born in the mud." This meaning is particularized by the conventionally derived meaning "lotus" which is

a specific thing born in the mud. These two words illustrate the type of *yogarūḍha* where there is a substitution of a particular (derived through convention) for a generality (derived through etymology). A similar procedure operates in the derivation of the words 1) *saudha,* 2) *sāgara,* 3) *bhūruha,* and 4) *śaśī.* Here the etymologically derived meanings 1) "that which is made of whitewash," 2) "That which is fashioned by king Sagara," 3) "that which arises from the earth," and 4) "that which possesses a rabbit" serve as general meanings that are particularized by the conventionally derived meanings 1) "a mansion," 2) "the ocean,"[302] 3) "a tree" and 4) "the moon."[303]

One might argue that in these cases, the conventional meaning still operates as a generality that is present in the particular. For instance, the derivation of the the meaning of *nīradhi* might be understood as "that which has the property of being a substrate of water qualified by the property of being a lotus (*padmatva*)." In this case both the general and particular meanings of the word *paṅkaja,* and likewise both the etymological and

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[302] Etymologically, the word *sāgara* means "something associated with King Sagara (a king of the solar dynasty)." By convention, this word comes to mean "ocean," which is a particular thing associated with King Sagara. Sagara's sons were said to have widened the girth of the ocean in their efforts to find Sagara's missing sacrificial horse. Apte's *Sanskrit English Dictionary* contains the following description of this king:

> He was a son of Bāhu and was called Sagara because he was born together with *gara* or poison given to his mother by the other wife of his father. By his wife Sumati he had 60,000 sons. He successfully performed 99 sacrifices but when he commenced the hundredth, his sacrificial horse was stolen by Indra and carried down to the Pātāla [the lowest of seven worlds inhabited by the Nāgas ("serpents")]. Sagara thereupon commanded his 6000 sons to search it out. Finding no trace of the animal on earth they began to dig down toward the Pātāla, and in doing this they naturally increased the boundaries of the ocean which was therefore clled *Sāgara.* Meeting with the sage Kapila they rashly accused him of having stolen their horse, as a punishment for which they were instantly reduced to ashes by that sage. It was after several thousands of years that Bhagīratha (q.v.) succeeded in bringing down to the Pātāla the celestial river Ganges to water and purify their ashes and thus to convey their souls to heaven (p. 1601).

[303] The moon is called *śaśin* because ancient Indians perceived the image of a rabbit (*śaśa*) within its form, just as English speakers refer to "the man in the moon." Accordingly, the moon is a specific "substrate" of a rabbit, which by convention replaces the generality "any substrate of a rabbit."

conventional derivations of the word meaning of the word *paṅkaja* would function simultaneously.

One might also argue that in the case of these words, the etymologically derived generality is the true denoted meaning, and that the conventionally derived particular is actually an incidence of *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā* ("indication through convention"). Stated simply, *lakṣaṇā* functions when than a word produces a denoted meaning that leads to a contradiction or an undesired sentence meaning and hence there is a substitution of a meaning related to the denoted meaning. When such a substitution occurs commonly enough that a word in certain specific contexts automatically produces the indicated meaning as if it were a denoted meaning, such a signification is known as *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā.* For instance, when someone in America says to a companion, "give it the whole nine yards," the average listener understands that he should apply all of his energy or strength to a certain task. Few people, however, are aware that the expression "the whole nine yards" originally referred to the nine yards of a full round of ammunition for the Thompson submachine gun[304] that was commonly used in World War I. Hence, most native speakers automatically understand the metaphoric meaning without even considering the literal meaning of this expression.

In a similar fashion, in the majority of cases when the word *paṅkaja* is spoken, the etymologically produced meaning "birth in the mud" has little bearing on the overall meaning of the sentence incorporating this word, since the word specifically refers to a lotus, rather than to some other thing that might be born in mud, such as a frog or another variety of aquatic plant. Hence, out of habit, the listener or reader disregards or is unaware of the etymological meaning "the property of being the agent of a birth in the mud," and instead assumes the conventionally established meaning "lotus-ness". Both of these meanings,

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[304] Commonly known as the "Tommy Gun."

however, may effectively be used to refer to a lotus, since a lotus possesses both the property of having birth in mud and the property "lotus-ness." Still, the conventionally established meaning, "lotus-ness," more efficiently directs the listeners awareness to a lotus since this excludes other entities such as frogs. If the etymological meaning, "the property of having a mud birth," were to refer to a lotus, the listener would have understand that the word *paṅkaja* specifically refers to a lotus by force of other factors such as intention and context.

While the conventionally derived meaning of the word *paṅkaja*, "lotus-ness," may more efficiently identify a lotus, some may argue that there is no overwhelming proof that the conventionally derived meaning, "lotus-ness" is a denoted meaning rather than a meaning indicated through convention. When the word *paṅkaja* is used literally, there is no particular reason to reject the denoted meaning derived through etymology, "the property of being the agent of birth in mud." We recall that in verse 1.10, three reasons were listed for dismissing an etymological derivation and accepting instead a conventionally derived meaning. These were 1) an overly obscure etymology, 2) a non-existent etymology, and 3) an etymology that leads to an unintended meaning. In the majority of incidences of the word *paṅkaja*, however, the etymologically derived meaning "the property of being the agent of birth in mud" is neither overly obscure, non-existent or unintended. Hence we might be tempted to believe that the etymologically derived meaning "the property of being the agent of birth in mud" is the only denoted meaning and the meaning "lotus-ness" is an indicated meaning substituted through convention in order to speed up the semantic process.

While such an argument may have its strengths, if we refer to the formal definitions of indication, we find that in the case of indication, whether this indication is due to some purpose or due to convention (*nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*), a related meaning substitutes for the literal meaning only when some contradiction precludes the literal meaning (according to

Mammaṭa[305]) or when the denoted meaning is not desired for some reason (according to Jayadeva[306]). At this point, the question to consider is whether the relative inefficiency of the etymologically derived meaning "the property of being the agent of a mud birth" in identifying a lotus is a sufficient cause for the presumption of an indicated meaning i.e., "lotusness." In this respect, Gāgābhaṭṭa says that it is possible for both indication and derivation through *yogarūḍha* to produce the same meaning for the same word. When this is the case, however, the indication occurs because of a property that is associated with the literal meaning rather than a property that contradicts the literal meaning.[307] In the current example, while we may claim that the with respect to the word *paṅkaja*, the meaning "the property of being the agent of a birth in mud" is the literal meaning while the meaning "lotus-ness" is an indicated meaning, Gāgābhaṭṭa argues that in this case, the indicated meaning simply agrees with a literal meaning which is produced through convention. Even if some people may conceive of the meaning "lotus-ness" by associating lotuses with the etymological meaning "having birth in the mud," formally there is no reason to reject the idea that "lotus-ness" is a denoted meaning established through convention.

Some scholars apparently rejected the operation of particular and general meanings in the case of words such as *nīradhi* and *paṅkaja*. Gāgābhaṭṭa explains that in their view, the understanding is derived only through etymology. Acordingly, the meaning of the word *paṅkaja* would not be derived through convention as "lotus-ness," but rather only through

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[305] *mukyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito'tha prayojanāt / anyo 'rtho lakṣyate lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā//* (*KP*, sū 12, 2.9, p. 40).

[306] *mukhyārthasyâvivakṣāyāṃ pūrvārvācī ca rūḍitaḥ / prayojanāc ca sambandhaṃ vadantī lakṣaṇā matā* (*CĀ*, 9.1).

[307] *yadyapi sāmānyaviśeṣamātraparatve 'nyataradharmatyāgenaîkadeśe lakṣaṇā yogarūḍhāṅgīkāre 'pi tulyā, tathāpi śakyatāvacchedakānanupraviṣṭadharmeṇa lakṣaṇāpekṣayā tadanupraviṣṭadharmeṇa lakṣaṇā laghīyasī* (*RĀ*, 1.12-13ab, p. 6-7).

etymology as "the agent of birth in the mud." In other words, even though we may understand that in the majority of cases this word refers to a lotus, what is actually denoted by the word *paṅkaja* is the distinguishing property that is possessed by each and every thing that is born in the mud.[308] There is no categorical proof that when someone has a cognition of a lotus upon hearing the word *paṅkaja*, the property which delimits such a cognition is "lotus-ness" rather than "the property of being the agent of birth in the mud." Even though formally the delimiter "the property of being the agent of birth in the mud" might delimit the cognition of frogs as the cognition of lotuses, because of the force of the previous cognitions of lotuses through such a delimitation, the word *paṅkaja* specifically identifies a lotus by force of the etymologically derived meaning alone. The concept that one rcognizes a verbal reference by force of previous usage, however, is identical to the process of convention, and hence such a view does not hold its ground.

Alternatively, one might argue that in the case of words, such as *nīradhi* and *paṅkaja*, two meanings are separately produced, one through etymology and one through convention.[309] Depending on the context, one or the other is accepted. In this view, the etymological and conventionally derived meanings are not related to one another through a relation of general to specific and Jayadeva's explanation of *yogarūḍha* is dismissed. Other scholars differentiate such a dual derivation as a fourth type *yaugikarūḍha*, and preserve the accepted understanding of *yogarūḍha*. In their view, when both etymology and convention contribute to the understanding of a word, such a word is said to be derived through *yogarūḍha*, but when a word is said to have two separate meanings in separate contexts, one

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[308] *Etena paṅkajādipadānām api yaugikatvam eva. paṅkajapadād avayavaśaktyā paṅkajanikartṛtvamātraprakārakabodhena padmatvaprakārakabodhābhāvāt* (*RĀ*, 1.12-13ab).

[309] Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 62.

derived through etymology and the other through convention, such a word is said to be *yaugikarūḍha.* Still other scholars, such as *Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa*, while accepting this last type of derivation, argue that this is but a sub-category of *yogarūḍha.*[310] The question to consider in this case is whether the conventionally derived meanings of words such as *nīradhi* and *paṅkaja* are sufficiently independent of the etymological derived meanings to merit classification as a separate denoted meaning. The classification of a second and separate denoted meaning raises difficulties of its own since this damages the one to one correspondence of denoted word to denoted meaning. Practically speaking, however, such a one-to-one correspondence does not truly exist.

In order to reinforce his interpretation of *yogarūḍha*, Jayadeva mentions a series of words that clearly demonstrates the relinquishment of an etymolygically established meaning and the assumption of a conventionally established meaning. These words -- *kṣīranīradhi* and *ākāśapaṅkaja* --effectively refute most of the counterarguments presented above. In the case of the word *kṣīranīradhi* ("a milk ocean"), the etymologically derived meaning of *nīradhi*, "the property of being a substrate of water," which amounts to a general meaning, contradicts the meaning of the word *kṣīra*, "milk-ness," to which the word *nīradhi* is compounded and hence in the semantic resolution of the compound, the etymologically derived meaning "the property of being a substrate of water" must be fully displaced by the conventionally derived meaning "ocean-ness." Interestingly enough, while the conventionally derived meaning of *nīradhi* "ocean-ness" originally served as a particularizer of the general meaning derived through convention "the property of being a substrate of water," in the context of the compound *kṣīranīradhi* ("a milk ocean"), "ocean-ness" becomes the general meaning which

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[310] Ibid, p. 63.

is qualified by the word *kṣira* (milk-ness). Similarly, in the case of the word *ākāśapaṅkaja* (a sky lotus), the general and etymologically derived meaning of the word *paṅkaja* "the property of being the agent of birth in the mud," must be fully displaced by the particular and conventionally derived meaning "lotus-ness" in order for the word *paṅkaja* to be able to semantically relate to the meaning of the word *ākāśa* ("sky-ness") with which it is compounded. Otherwise, the meaning "the property of being the agent of birth in the mud" conflicts with the qualification "sky-ness." In these cases, there can be no doubt that the denoted meanings for *nīradhi* and *paṅkaja*, established via etymology, cease to operate when these word are conjoined in the compounds *kṣīranīradhi* and *ākāśapaṅkaja.* This dismisses the argument that only the etymologically derived meaning (the property of being the agent of mud birth) contributes to the cognition of a lotus in the case of the word *paṅkaja.*

Someone might still try to argue that such words demonstrate that the conventionally derived meanings of words that are said to be *yogarūḍha* are actually revealed through indication rather than denotation. By this logic, the etymologically established meaning of the word *nīradhi*, "the property of being a substrate of water," which leads to the cognition of an ordinary ocean, contradicts the cognition of a "milk ocean," and hence this leads to the assumption of a related meaning "ocean-ness" which is to be classified as an indicated meaning established through convention. Such an argument, however, is contingent on the assumption that the denoted meaning of the original word *nīradhi*, in ordinary usage, is in fact the etymologically derived meaning "the property of being the substrate of water." Otherwise there would be no contradiction in the literal meaning. This assumption cannot be definitely proven, and thus neither can the view that the conventionally established meanings of word said to be *yogarūḍha* are conveyed through indication rather denotation.

Furthermore, we also observe a reverse process of displacement in certain cases such cases as the expression *kūpa nīradhi* ("a well that holds water"). Such an expression clearly precludes the conventionally established meaning of the word *nīradhi* (ocean-ness), which would conflict with the meaning "a well," and instead utilizes the etymologically derived meaning "the property of being a subtrate of water." Most commonly, the word *nīradhi* is used to refer to used to an ocean and hence the conventionally derived meaning is the most efficient way to identify this verbally. In the expression *kūpa nīradhi*, the word *nīradhi* serves as a qualifier of the word *kūpa.* In other words, what is referred to here is a well (*kūpa*) that is qualified as being full of water or literally a substrate of water. In this case, it is more efficient to achieve this reference through the etymologically derived meaning of the word *nīradhi* ("the property of being a substrate of water") than through the conventionally derived meaning ("ocean-ness"), which would necessitate some subsequent form of metaphorical identification. Once again there are different ways that we might interpret the verbal signification in the expression *kūpanīradhi.* If we assume the view that words such as *nīradhi* automatically denote their etymologically derived meanings, in this expression as well the word *nīradhi* simply denotes its ordinary meaning, "the property of being the substrate of water." Such an interpretation, however, would indicate a deviation in denotation since in the previous example *kṣiranīradhi*, the word *nīradhi* was said to denote only its conventionally derived meaning, "ocean-ness." Alternatively, we might understand that the denoted meaning of the word *nīradhi* is always the conventionally established meaning ("ocean-ness"), and that in the current expression this meaning produces a contradiction leading to the presumption of an indicated meaning in the form of the etymologically derived meaning of *nīradhi*, "the property of being a substrate of water." This is impossible, however, since an etymologically derived meaning of a word is understood through the denotation of

its components, and it makes no sense to say that a word indicates the denoted meaning of its components. A third view is that the word *nīradhi* can denote either a meaning derived through etymology or a meaning derived through convention, depending on the context. In the current example, *kūpa nīradhi,* the word *nīradhi* relinquishes its conventionally derived meaning, "ocean-ness" and denotes only its etymologically derived meaning, "the property of being a substrate of water" which is the only one of the two that can semantically relate to the meaning of the word *kūpa*, "the property of being a well." In the case of the expression *kṣīranīradhi* ("an ocean of milk"), however, the word *nīradhi*, relinquishes its etymologically derived meaning, "the property of being a substrate of water," and denotes only its conventionally derived meaning, "ocean-ness." In the conventional use of the word *nīradhi* -- i.e., when this is used to refer to the ocean -- the word can denote both its etymologically derived meaning, "the property of being a substrate of water," which is a generality, and its conventionally derived meaning, "ocean-ness," which is a particularization of the etymologically derived meaning. This is the only successful interpretation.

The commentators disagree on the varieties within this type of derivation. Pradyotanabhaṭṭa states that there is really only one variety of *yogarūḍha*.[311] Vaidyanātha disagrees and states that clearly there are three varieties within this derivation.[312] Pradyotana's interpretation is that in all cases of *yogarūḍha*, the derivation operates through the alternation of etymological derivation and conventional derivation, and that the alternation of general and particular meanings is in actuality an expedient devised by

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[311] *viśeṣasya sāmānyatāyāḥ sāmānyasya viśeṣatāyāḥ yogarūḍhāśrayaṇaṃ kāraṇavaśenānyonyasāmānyaviśeṣaparivarttamāna eka evâyaṃ bheda* (*ŚA*, 1.12 – 13ab, p. 17).

[312] *sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ dharmayoḥ kvacit pratīyamānayor anyonyaṃ mitho yatparivartanaṃ vinimayaḥ kvacit tasmād ayaṃ tanmiśro 'pi tridhêty anuṣaṅgeṇa tridhaîvêty arthaḥ. eka evâyaṃ bheda iti tu prācaḥ pramādaḥ, bhedasambhavāt* (*Ramā*, 1.12. p. 9).

Jayadeva to help clarify the operation of this derivation. Vaidyanātha, on the other hand, contends that the alternation of generality and particularity is an essential component of *yogarūḍha*.

Śaradāgama 1.12 - 13b:

The author explains words whose derivation is through convention and etymology[313] [in the verse beginning] *tanmiśra*....The mutual substitution of generalities and particulars is referred to as *yogarūḍha* ("derviation through etymology and convention"). This variety is only one [type], because a particular has the property of being a generality, and a generality has the property of being qualified.[314] In the case of [the word *nīradhi* which has its meaning] "that which bears water," when the generality ["the property of being a substrate of water"], which possesses the property of being common to [different things] such as ponds, has the property of having [only] the ocean as its referent, there is a substitution of a particular. In the case of the word *paṅkaja*, when the generality "lotuses and other such things" has the property of having [only] a lotus as its referent, [there is likewise the substitution of a particular]. When the word *saudha* which is common to different things connected to *sudha*

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[313] *rūḍhayaugika*. The use of this term here is surprising, because customarily this term is synonymous with *yaugikarūḍha* and hence designates a word that signifies one meaning that is derived through etymology and another through convention, these being independent of one another. The explanation and illustrations in these three half verses (12-13ab), however, apply to *yogarūḍha* generally, since words such as *nīradhi* and *paṅkaja* are clearly incidences of *yogarūḍha* and not *yaugikarūḍha*.

[314] Of the three commentators discussed in this thesis, Pradyotanabhaṭṭa is only one to present this interpretation. His argument is best understood with respect to the example *nīradhi*. The conventionally derived meaning, "lotus-ness" is considered to be a particular in relation to the etymologically derived meaning "the property of being the agent in a mud birth." "Lotus-ness," however, being a generic property in its own right, also has the property of being a generality. The etymologically derived meaning, "the property of being the agent of birth in the mud," which is a generality in relation to the conventionally derived meaning, "lotus-ness," also has the property of being something that is qualified -- in this case by the particular "lotus-ness." The basic argument here is that while provisionally we can understand derivation through etymology and convention to operate through the exchange of particulars and generalities, these categories are themselves relative and artificial.

("whitewash") has a house as its referent, when the word *sāgara* which is common to different things connected with King Sagara has the ocean as its referent, when [the word] *bhūruha* which is common to different things that are born from the earth has a tree has its referent and when [the word] *śaśī* which is common to different substrates of rabbits refers to the moon, [there is likewise a substitution of a particular].

He states those [words] that are established by the substitution of a generality in the [half verse beginning] *kṣīra*....[315] Here the meaning "milk" would be contradictory in relation to the particularity "that which holds water." Still, this [expression] is not unfeasable if the understanding [of the word *nīradhi* concerns] the ocean as a generality.[316]

[If someone were to object:] "Since the word *paṅkaja*, which is based [in the referent of] a lotus, has the property of having a specific referent,[317] and also has the property of having a general referent which is common to things such as the moon,[318] how can there be the establishment of the meaning 'sky-lotus,' (*ākāśapaṅkaja*) since there would be an

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[315] Once again, Pradyotanabhaṭṭa is the only commentator to interpret the verse in this way. The others hold that in word such as *kṣīranīradhi*, there is a rejection of generality in favor of the particular.

[316] In this case, we would understand meaning of the word *nīradhi* according to the meaning established by convention, that is, "ocean." Pradyotanabhaṭṭa's claim is that when the word word *nīradhi* is compounded with the word *kṣīra* ("milk"), the etymologically derived meaning "having the property of being a substrate of water" becomes a particular since this now conflicts with the meanings of the word *kṣīra* ("milk"). As the etymologically derived meaning ("the property of being a substrate of water") has been rejected, the conventionally derived meaning ("ocean-ness") is no longer a particular, but instead becomes a generality which itself is particularized by qualification of being composed of milk.

[317] The referent of the word *paṅkaja* is a particularization of the generality "born in the mud," that is, its referent is "lotus" which is a particular thing born in the mud.

[318] The moon, which is equated with soma, was believe to have originated during the churning of the ocean by the gods. To this extent, the general meaning of the word *paṅkajam*, "the property of being born in the mud," might be said to loosely apply to the moon.

absence of the property of having an origin in the sky?"[319] [To this we reply:] "No, because the use of the expression *ākāśapaṅkaja* ("sky-lotus") has only a connection to the sky."[320]

There is also a similar understanding when there is a usage [of the word *paṅkaja*] when the speaker's intent is that a lotus be characterized by the meaning "the Ganges" (*mandākinī*).[321] Similarly the expression *kaladhautasaudha* ("a silver house") [is possible] if the word *saudha* has the property of having a house as its only referent."[322] The expression *kṣirasāgara* [is possible] if the word *sāgara* has the property of having the ocean as its only referent.[323] The word *surabhūruhaḥ* ("tree of the gods") [is possible] if the word *bhūruha* has a tree as its only referent. When the word *śaśalāñchana* ("having the mark of a rabbit") has the property of having the moon as its only referent, the word *niṣkalaṅkaśaśalāñchana* ("a stainless moon") is possible. But if [the word *śaśalāñchana*] has the property of having the referent "qualified by the property of having the mark of a rabbit," the word *niṣkalaṅkaśaśalāñchana* would be a contradiction.[324]

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[319] The objector's claim is that neither the particular referent of the word *paṅkaja*, a lotus, or the general referent, the property of being the agent of birth in the mud, could justify the referent of the expression "a sky lotus" (*ākāśapaṅkaja*).

[320] The rebuttal, here, rests on the view that within the expression *ākāśapaṅkaja*, a *paṅkaja* is understood to have an association with the sky. In this case we understand the conventionally derived meaning of *paṅkaja*, "lotus-ness" rather than the etymologically derived meaning "the property of being an agent of mud birth." Otherwise, the meaning of *ākāśapaṅkaja* would be "the property of being the agent of a birth in the mud of heaven, which is contradictory.

[321] This case is more or less equivalent to the previous one, except the qualification is "a lotus in the Ganges." The word *paṅkaja*, once again abandons the general referent in favor or the particular referent. If not, the association with mud would conflict with the property of originating in the Ganges, which has its own origin in the sky.

[322] The word *saudha*, within the expression *kaladhautasaudha* abandons its etymological meaning "something connected with whitewash" in favor of the conventionally derived meaning "a mansion," in order to avoid the contradiction of whitewash and silver. Hence the only connection is between "silver" and "house."

[323] Here the explanation is the same as in the case of the word *kṣīranīradhi*.

[324] In this case the generality "stainlessness" (*niṣkalaṅkatva*) would be contradicted by the generality "the property of being marked by a rabbit."

Rākāgama 1.12 -13ab:

The author explains words having [at once both] derivations through convention and derivations through etymology. The sense is that [such words] acquire the exchange of two things: a generality and a particularity, [or these acquire the exchange] of a generality and a particularity together. Because words such as *nīradhi* etc., which possess generalities [such as] the property of being a substrate of water, the property of the agent of the activity of arising from the mud, the property of being made of whitewash, the property of being born from the earth, and the property of being a substrate of a rabbit,[325] and also possess particular forms such as the property of being the ocean, the property of being a lotus, the property of being a house, the property of being the ocean, the property of being the ocean, the property of being a tree and the property of being the moon,[326] and because [these words] have the property of causing direct experience of a recollection [of meaning], there is the idea [that these words] have derivations through both convention and etymology for the purpose of establishing both of these (conventionally derived meaning and etymologically derived meaning) as the chief qualifier which delimits the property of being the literal meaning [of the aforementioned words].[327] The result of this is that there is the common use of words such as *kṣīranīradhi* ("ocean of milk"). There is the unwarranted consequence of lack of syntax for

[325] Here, he lists the referents, in the form of generalities, in sequence for the words provided as examples in the verse.

[326] He does the same for the examples, except that these referents serve as particularizations of the above mentioned generalities.

[327] The words listed as examples in the verses 12-13ab have general meanings that are etymologically derived and particular meanings that are established through convention. Hence Gāgābhaṭṭa explains that as both general and particular meanings contribute to the production of the ultimate meaning of these words, both the conventional derivation and the etymological derivation delimit the literal meaning of these words.

the word *kṣīra* ("milk"), when this does not have the property of being that which causes the recollection "the property of being the ocean", but rather has the property of being that which causes the recollection "the property of being the substrate of water."

Similarly, if the word *sāgara* within the expression *kṣīrasāgara* has the property of having the universal referent "the property of being fashioned by [King] Sagara" there will be no semantic connection with the word *kṣīra* (milk).[328] Therefore, there is the establishment [that the referent for the word *sāgara* when it is a component in the expression *kṣirasāgara*] has the form of a particular thing [fashioned by king Sagara], the ocean.[329] Similarly, in the case of the expressions *surabhūruha* and *niṣkalaṅkaḥ śaśadharaḥ* the words *bhūruha* and *śaśadhara* have the property of having as their referents the particulars "a tree" and "the moon."[330] Similarly the word *ākāśapaṅkaja* has the property of establishing its meaning as something that has the form of "lotus-ness." In this case, the application [of the word *ākāśapaṅkaja*] has a connection only to the sky.[331] This [procedure] is similarly perceived in the words *svarṇapaṅkaja* ("golden lotus")[332] and *kaladhautasaudha* ("silver house").[333] In a

[328] Milk is not fashioned by King Sagara, but rather by the gods during the churning of the ocean.

[329] Ths syntax of this sentence is difficult to convey in English. The overall sense is that when the word *sāgara* is used in the compound *kṣīrasāgara* (milk ocean) it cannot have the etymological meaning of the generality "having the property of being fashioned by King Sagara" because milk is not fashioned by King Sagara. Therefore it must be understood as a particular thing fashioned by King Sagara, that is the ocean. The referent of the word *sāgara* here is *samudratva* ("ocean-ness") because the meaning of a noun is established to be a generic property in Gāgābhaṭṭa's view, even though it is problematic to say that King Sagara fashioned the generic property "ocean-ness."

[330] A tree is a particular thing that rises from the ground, and the moon is a particular thing that is the substrate of a rabbit.

[331] As the etymological meaning has been abandoned here, the expression *ākāśapaṅkaja* involves no association with "mud," but only with "sky" (*ākāśa*).

[332] Since the etymological meaning "the property of being born from mud" is abandoned, there is no contradictory association of the meanings "gold" and "mud."

[333] In this case the etymological meaning "the property of being associated with whitewash" is abandoned so that there is no contradiction between the meanings "silver" (*kaladhauta*) and "whitewash."

similar fashion, in the expression *nīradhiḥ kūpaḥ* ("a hole that is the substrate of water") there is an abandonment of the particular meaning ("the ocean") on the part of the word *nīradhi*, which takes as its referent only the generality ("the property of being a substrate of water").[334]

Even though indication can be the equivalent [to denotation][335] in the case of a single [word] that is accepted as being derived through both convention and etymology (*yogarūḍha*) and that has the property of having only a generality or only a particularity as its referent on account of the abandonment of the other, even so such an indication [that operates] through a property that accords with the delimiter of the property of being the literal meaning is less laborious[336] than such an indication [that operates] through a property that does not accord with the delimiter of the property of being the literal meaning.[337] The conception of simply a semantic connection through this form is economical, but the

[334] So as to avoid the contradiction in the meaning "a hole that is the ocean."

[335] The concession is that in some cases of *yogarūḍha*, the same meaning can be arrived at through indication as well as denotation.

[336] *laghīyasī.*

[337] One might possibly say that indication produces the same meaning for a single word as that which is accepted as being derived through both convention and etymology (*yogarūḍha*). Such an indication, however, is more efficient if it functions through a property that accords with the literal meaning than if it operates through a property that contradicts the literal meaning. In the case of the word *ākāśapaṅkaja*, having a meaning -- "sky lotus" -- which is accepted as being derived through *yogarūḍha*, one might say that the meaning "sky lotus" can be cognized through indication. In this case we would understand that the literal meaning is just the etymologically derived meaning "that which is born in the mud in the sky," but that due to the contradiction in this meaning, we are compelled to substitute the meaning "lotus" for the meaning "that which is born in the mud." Such an indication will be more efficient if it operates through a property that accords through the literal meaning i.e. "lotus-ness" than if it operates through a property that does not accord with the literal meaning. If the indication operates through a property that accords with the literal meaning, we do not need to search for such a property as it is right at hand in the conventionally derived meaning of the word *paṅkaja.* If the indication operates through a property that does not accord with the literal meaning, than it is necessary to search for some property that has another relationship with the literal meaning and this is a more laborious procedure.

rememberance in addition [to this conception] is not [economical].[338] This is the heart of the matter.

Accordingly, the abandonment of [generality and particularity] in tandem is also perceived. In this way, words such as *paṅkaja* have precisely the property of being only etymologically derived. This is because from the word *paṅkaja*, there is an absence of the a cognition whose chief qualifier is "lotus-ness," since through the denotation of the parts [of this word] there is a cognition whose chief qualifier is just the property of being the agent of birth from mud.[339] Accordingly, it should not be said that [here] there is the unwarranted consequence that the awareness whose chief qualifier is the the property of being the agent of birth in mud has as its qualificands things such as frogs and water lilies,[340] because there is the concession that when there is verbal cognition produced by this word, the property of being the cause belongs to either a knowledge whose chief qualifier is the property of being a pre-existent application or a knowledge whose chief qualifier is the property of being an application that precedes that action whose qualificand is a lotus.[341] Alternatively, [it should be understood that] there is no extra-association to this explanation, nor is there an

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[338] If the meaning of *ākāśapaṅkaja* ("sky-lotus") is understood merely through the connection of the conventionally derived meaning of *paṅkaja* ("lotus-ness") and the meaning of *ākāśa* ("sky-ness"), this is said to be economical. If we need to recollect a meaning related to the contradictory literal meaning ("the property of being the agent of birth in the mud") and then proceed to semantically connect this to the meaning "sky-ness," this is not economical.

[339] Here Gāgābhaṭṭa presents an alternate way of understanding the meaning of the word *paṅkaja* which does not incorporate Jayadeva's conception of generality and particularity.

[340] The objection is that if we conceive that meaning of the word *paṅkaja* is understood only through a cognition of whose chief qualification is something that is the property of being born in the mud, such a cognition might equally apply to things such as frogs and water lilies which also possess the property of being born in the mud.

[341] The sense is that the previous objection is invalid because when someone cognizes the meaning of the word *paṅkaja* the cause of this cognition is either prior knowledge of the application of the word, or prior knowledge that the action of birth in the mud applies to lotuses.

impossibility of the cognition of lotuses that will exist in the future or perished lotuses,[342] because the property of being the cause of a verbal cognition produced through the comprehension of the denotation of the parts of the word *paṅkaja* through the relationship between the property of being the chief qualifier which is based in the property of being the agent of birth in the mud and the property of being the ascertained qualificand[343] belongs to either 1) the property of being a lotus, because of a relationship of inherence, or 2) the property of being a cognition, because of a relationship to the existence of a lotus alone.[344] This being so, there is a refutation of the statement of Master Udayana[345] that: "when a cognition also has as its qualificand a specific lotus or when there is a cognition in the form of a direct experience[346] whose chief qualifier is "lotus-ness," [this cognition] is to be produced only through indication.[347] Hence, only the other mode of verbal signification[348] is appropriate here.

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[342] This statement wards off the objections that the cognition of the property of being the agent of mud birth 1) applies to things beyond the intended referent, such as frogs and water lilies, and 2) does not apply to potential legitimate referents such as a future lotus or a perished lotus.

[343] This formally defines the verbal cognition in question i.e., the identification of a lotus through the etymologically produced meaning of the word *paṅkaja*, that is the denotation of the parts. Gāgābhaṭṭa states that this cognition functions because of a relation between a qualificand, a lotus, and the chief qualifying property, the property of being born in the mud.

[344] What has been stated here is that two things can be the cause of the verbal cognition of the word *paṅkaja* by way of the etymologically derived meaning: 1) a lotus itself, because the property of being the agent of birth in mud inheres in lotuses, and 2) the cognition which is related an existing lotus. Because these two are said to be the only cause for verbal cognition of the word *paṅkaja* through the etymologically derived meaning, there is no reason to suspect that one might have such a verbal cognition with respect to undesired referents such as frogs and waterlilies, as these are neither lotuses nor cognitions associated with lotuses, and there is no reason to deny that one could have verbal cognition with respect to lotuses that have perished or lotuses that are to exist in the future, because a such a verbal cognition can be caused by just the concept of the existence of a lotus.

[345] The author of the *Ātmatattvaviveka* and the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, among other works: a highly influential *nāiyayika* who lived at the turn of the first millennium, and whom Ingalls considers the most important forerunner to the *navyanyāya* movement.

[346] *ānubhavika*. This refers to an experience that is produce through the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

[347] Udayana's argument (at least as it is presented by Gāgābhaṭṭā) refers more generally to denotation. In his view, when a generic property, which is the denoted meaning of a word, is cognized with respect to a specific

Still others state that there are four types of words, saying: "a word that conveys two meanings, [one] through etymological derivation and [another] through conventional derivation, [is called] *yaugikarūḍha.* In this way, the word *maṇḍapa* conveys the meaning 'the agent of drinking rice scum' through etymology and conveys the meaning 'a house' through convention." This is [to be] disregarded, however, because there is the concession that the varieties of words are due to the varieties of meanings, which have as their precedent the variety of modes of verbal signification, and because there is the observation of speech usage such as *suvarṇasya suvarṇasya,*[349] and also because of the fact that well executed turns of speech such as *sakalakala*[350] have the property of conveying other meanings through the recollection of other similar words.[351]

lotus, this cognition is the product of indication. According to this interpretation, while a word denotes only the generic property, in most cases the context demands the understanding of a specific entity. Thus, as the denoted meaning does not of its own accord produce the desired understanding – the cognition of the specific entity – this understanding is produced through indication. Gāgābhaṭṭa's statement regarding the cognition of a specific lotus via the etymologically derived meaning of the word *paṅkaja* refutes Udayana's view, since he states the cause of such a cognition is not inference, but rather the understanding of the inherence of the "the property of being the agent of birth in the mud" within the specific lotus. Such a causality would similarly apply to the generic property "lotus-ness" which is the literal meaning of the word "lotus."

[348] Denotation.

[349] Here the word *suvarṇasya* is used twice, once in its conventionally derived sense, "gold," and once in its etymologically derived sense, "having a beautiful color."

[350] The word *kala* appears twice in the compound *sakalakala.* In the first case, it is understood as a component of the compound *sakala*, in which case its conventional meaning ("melodious") is relinquished within the conventionally established meaning of the word *sakala* ("complete"). In the second incidence, the word *kala* retains its conventionally derived sense.

[351] The rejection of the *yaugikarūḍha* as a fourth type of derivation accords with the interpretation of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa: *śaktis tridhā rūdhir yogo yogarūḍhiś ca* (*Laghumañjūṣā*, as cited in Kunjunni Rāja's *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 63, note 1).

Ramā 1.12 - 13ab:

The author explains that words derived through convention and etymology also have three varieties in [the verse beginning] *tanmiśra*...The sense is that there are three varieties [of words derived through both convention and etymology] as a result of the explanation: "combinations of these have three varieties because sometimes there is the mutual existence of a generality and particular and sometimes there is the exchange of generality for a particularity or [the exchange of] a particularity for a generality."[352][The understanding that "the varieties [of this] are just one" is a mistake of an earlier scholar,[353] because varieties [of *yogarūḍha*] do exist. Accordingly, the statement [in the verse] is of the cause [of these varieties]. The resultant [of this causal statement is that] sometimes there is a resorting to just the conventionally derived meaning, in place of the etymologically derived meaning, sometimes [there is a resorting] to just the etymologically derived meaning in place of the conventionally derived meaning and sometimes there is an existence of both [the conventionally and etymologically derived meanings]. The word *anyonya* should be understood in the dual and means "the two separate" or "the two together." Still, the

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[352] The derivation of a word through both etymology and convention can occur in three different ways. In the first variety, both a general property that is understood through etymology and a specific property that is understood through convention are mutually accepted in the meaning of a word. In the second variety, a general property that is understood through etymological derivation is replaced by a specific property that is understood through conventional derivation. In the third variety, a specific property that is understood through conventional derivation is replaced by a general property that is understood through etymological derivation. These varieties become clearer upon consideration of the examples.

[353] This is a refutation of the view of Pradyotanabhaṭṭa: *viśeṣasya sāmānyatāyāḥ sāmānyasya viśeṣyatāyāḥ yogarūḍha āśrayaṇaṃ kāraṇavaśenânyonyasāmānyaviśeṣaparivarttamāna eka evâyaṃ bhedaḥ.*

explanation that the word *parivartana* means *upasthiti* while appropriate [in the context] of vowels and consonants does not produce a desirable [effect] here].[354]

He states examples of these in the two half verses beginning *nīradhiḥ*.... On account of the words *nīradhi* etc., even though sometimes there is an understanding according to the general properties such as the property of being the substrate of water, the property of being the agent of the action of being born from mud, the property of being fashioned with whitewash, the property of being produced from the earth and the property of being the substrate of a rabbit and [sometimes there is an understanding] according to specific properties such as the property of being the ocean, the property of being a lotus, the property of being of being a house, the property of being the moon, there is a resorting to one [type] through the rejection of the other,[355] and even though sometimes there is [provisionally] an understanding of both types, [ultimately] only the understanding of one or the other is to be accepted because of [some] reason.

At this point, [the author] states the result of the substitution of a general term in the half verse beginning *kṣīranīradhi*.... The word *tena* ("by this [process]") means "by the displacement of a particular by a generality." Otherwise, even if there were signification according to generality there would be no semantic connection to the word *kṣīra* ("milk"). It is clear that the statement of an earlier scholar, "there is a common understanding of a particular with respect to [properties] such as "the property of being a substrate of water" and a common understanding of generality with respect to properties such as "the property of

[354] Here Vaidyanātha criticizes Gāgābhaṭṭa's gloss of the word *parivartana* with the word *upasthiti*, arguing that while *parivartana* has a similar meaning to that of *upasthiti* in the context of consonants and vowels, these two words are not synonymous in the current context.

[355] There is a resorting to the general property or specific property upon the rejection of the other.

being the ocean," is contrary to everyday experience.[356] Similarly, in the case of the word *kṣīrasāgara* as well, there is no semantic connection when there is this type of [general] understanding.[357] Similarly, when there is an establishing [of the meaning] with respect to words such as *surabhūruha* ("tree of the gods" or "something belonging to the gods which rises from the earth") and *niṣkalaṅkaḥ śaśī* ("stainless moon" or "something stainless having the mark of a rabbit"), there is a lack of semantic connection for the words such as *sura* ("gods"). This is to be similarly understood with respect to the words *svargapaṅkaja* ("lotus in heaven"/"that born in the mud in heaven"). This is the sense. Even a lotus and the moon do not have the property of having their origin in the sky;[358] nevertheless, because [these] have an association with the (sky), there is speech usage of this type.[359] And this is contradicted when there is the verbal cognition in the form of the generality [the property of being the agent of birth in the mud of the sky], because a lotus has the property of being related to the earth. Even though in a similar type of verbal signification (*samudrapaṅkaja*) there is no contradiction, because the moon has the property of being the agent of birth in the mud of the ocean, mud does not exist in the ocean because the ocean has the property of

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[356] Here Vaidyanātha refutes Pradyotana's interpretation that, in the case of the word *nīradhi*, the etymolgocial derivation "that which is a substrate of water" correspond to a particular, while the conventional derivation "ocean" corresponds to a generality. Pradyotana's view had rested on the interpretation that the meaning "ocean," being a denoted meaning, must be a *jāti* ("generic property") and hence corresponds to a generality. Similarly, in Pradyotana's view "being a substrate of water" is a particularization of "substrate."Vaidyanātha states this is contrary to worldly practice, whereby "ocean-ness" is a particularization of the generality "the property of being a substrate of water."

[357] When *sāgara* is understood according to its general meaning, "the property of being fashioned by king Sāgara," there is not semantic connection with the meaning "milk."

[358] A lotus has its origin in the mud, and the moon, according to tradition cosmology, has its origin in the ocean.

[359] This statement suggest that the expression "sky lotus" (*ākāśapaṅkaja*) is metaphor for the moon. The point of this statement is that the word *ākāśapaṅkaja* cannot be understood through a only etymolical derivation, because the intended meanings, "lotus" or "moon" do not have their origin in the sky, *ākāśajatva*. What is conveyed in this expression is not an origin in the sky, but rather an association (*sambandha*) *with* the sky.

being fathomless water.[360] Even if mud did exist, there is not the experience of the arising of lotuses [in the ocean]. Or alternatively, there is such a speech usage (*ākāśapaṅkaja*) because the residence of lotuses is described in the Ganges, i.e., "the river of the gods" (*suradhunī*).[361] Therefore, in all cases where the literal meaning is to be conjoined with a particularity meaning alone, there is a displacement of a general property by a particular property. Still this result (*yogarūḍha*) is understood also in the expressions *nīradhiḥ kūpaḥ* and *sāgaraḥ kūpaḥ*. Here, there is a lack of semantic connection for the word *kūpa* ("a well") when there is a signification [of *nīradhi* or *sāgaraḥ*] as a particulars; therefore, [the words *nīradhi* and *sāgara*] have the property of having generalites as their referents. Thus, the passage *kṣīra*...(verse 13ab) is an extension [of the illustration of *yogarūḍha*].[362] Accordingly, a fourfold classification [of words] is not stated, because there is an inclusion of *yaugikarūḍha*[363] [within *yogarūḍha*], and because there is the concession that the division of words has the division of modes of verbal signification as its precedent.[364]

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[360] The argument is that even if you try to justify the etymological derivation of the expression *samudrapaṅkaja* by saying that it is possible for lotuses to be born in the mud of the ocean because according to legend, the moon was born in the mud of the ocean, this would still present difficulties, because the ocean is defined as being fathomless water, and hence, mud would not exist there. Even one argues that there is mud in the ocean, we do not perceive lotuses growing out of the ocean.

[361] Here the Ganges is referred to as *suradhunī*, the river of heaven. Hence, lotuses in the Ganges, even if they are understood to be mud-born, might still be said to have an origin in the sky.

[362] The point seems to be that the examples *kṣīranīradhi* and *ākāśapaṅkaja* should also be understood as examples of *yogarūḍha*, and are not intended to illustrate a fourth type of word *yaugikanirūḍha*.

[363] A type of word that is said to signify two separate meanings, one derived through etymology and the other through convention. Both Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha agree with Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa that this should be considered a variety of *yogarūḍha*, since technically the meaning of the word is still derived through etymology and convention.

[364] The varieties of modes of verbal signification are three: denotation, indication and suggestion. This threefold-ness to set a precedent for the three categories of words: words whose meanings are etymologically derived, words whose meaning is derived through convention, and words whose meaning is derived through both convention and etymology.

Verse 1.13cd -- 15:

vibhaktyantaṃ[365] padaṃ vākyaṃ tadvyūho 'rthasamāptitaḥ

yuktārthānāṃ [366]tāṃ ca vinā khaṇḍavākyaṃ[367] sa iṣyate

vākyaṃ ca khaṇḍavākyaṃ ca padam ekam api kvacit

dhūmavattvād iti yathā devêty āmantraṇaṃ yathā

vākyāny ekārthaviśrāntāny āhur vākyakadambakam

The experts state [the following definitions] in sequence. A *pada* is that which ends in a declensional or conjugational suffix. A sentence is that collection of *pada*-s in which there is a completion of meaning. That [collection of *pada*-s] connected to meanings which lacks a completion of meaning is said to be a broken sentence. Sometimes a single word can be a sentence or a sentence fragment as in the utterances such as *dhūmavattvāt*[368] ("because of having the property of possessing smoke") or [as in utterances] such as *deva* ("lord!"). [Multiple] sentences that repose in a single meaning are called "a group of sentences" (*vākyakadamba*).[369]

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[365] *suptiṅantam padam* (Pāṇ, 1.4.14). Patañjali cites the injunction *vibhaktiṃ kurvanti* in the *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1.1.

[366] Pradyotanabhaṭṭa accepts an alternate reading here, *yuktārthatām.* I have selected the reading accepted by Gāgābhaṭṭa and Vaidyanātha.

[367] The Gujarati Printing Press edition (1939) prints *khaṇḍakāvyaṃ*. I have chosen to replace this with *khaṇḍavākyaṃ*, which is a more logical reading and is consistent with the reading in the manuscript of the *Ramā* from the Bhandarkar Institute as well as the readings in the Chowkhaṃba printed edition of the *Candrāloka* accompanied by the *Śaradāgama* and that accompanied by the *Rākāgama.*

[368] This is the statement of the cause for the inference of fire on the basis of the observation of smoke, which appears in the most widely used *nyāya* syllogism.

[369] A *kadamba* is a common tree in India said to have fragrant blossoms.

Explanation 1.13cd – 15:

Here, the author defines sentences and broken sentences as well as the inflected words that compose these. These definitions are worded quite simply, but are surpisingly specific in their effect. The definition of an inflected word, *pada*, is derived from Pāṇini 1.4.14, *suptiṅantam padam* ("a pada is that which ends in a declensional or conjugational endings"), and is almost identifical to that found in the *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.57, *te vibhaktyantāḥ padam* ("These that end in conjugational or declensional endings [are called] *pada*"). By virtue of possessing a declensional or conjugational ending, a word gains the capacity of actively signifying a meaning. *Pada*-s are the constituent parts of both sentences and broken sentences. While these generally contain a collection of *pada*-s, it is possible for a single word to be either a sentence or a broken sentence. A sentence is distinguished from a broken sentence by the completion of a meaning. While Jayadeva does not manifestly state this fact, all three commentators define the completion of a sentence meaning as the absence of *ākāṅkṣā* or expectation. *Ākāṅkṣā* is the expectation which arises from the apprehension that additional word meanings will subsequently complete the sense. Hence when a collection of words is without further expectation, it expresses a complete meaning. A broken sentence is a collection of *pada*-s that does not express a complete meaning, or in other terms, a collection of words that still has expectation. According to the reading that Pradyotanabhaṭṭa accepts in this verse, *yuktārthānāṃ tāṃ ca vinā khaṇḍavākyaṃ*[370] *sa iṣyate*, Jayadeva has excluded compounds from the class of broken sentences. His interpretation of Jayadeva's intent is that a broken sentence does not have the property of being an aggregation of meanings within a

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[370] The printing of *khaṇḍakāvyaṃ* in the Chowkhambha editiona is clearly a misprint of *khaṇḍavākyaṃ*.

compound word. Otherwise, any sentence composed of a single compound that is not *aluk* could be considered a broken sentence, since the components of the compound are not accompanied by the case endings that complete our understanding.

Gāgābhaṭṭa states that while the absence of *ākāṅkṣā* is clearly a determining factor for a sentence, this implies that a sentence must also possess logical compatibility (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*āsatti*) as well.[371] In order to complete a meaning, each word in a sentence must be logically compatible with each of the other words, that is, each word must have a semantic relation to all the other words in a sentence. Similarly, the semantic relations within a sentence must occur between words that have proximity with one another.

Even though Jayadeva initially qualifies a sentence as a collection (*vyūha*) of *pada*-s, in verse 14cd he states that even a single word can be a sentence. His illustration for this occurrence is *dhūmavattvāt*, "because it has the property of possessing smoke." This expression is the second term or *hetu* of the famous five part *nyāya* syllogism establishing that there is fire on a mountain. While the translation of this expression does not fulfill the requirements of an English sentence, the Sanskrit compound does fulfill the requirements of a *vākya*, a Sanskrit sentence. Here the collection is of a single word that produces a completed meaning in the opinion of both grammarians and logicians. While Pradyotanabhaṭṭa has determined that a compound cannot be a broken sentence, he does not mention any prohibition that a compound cannot be a sentence. Jayadeva also illustrates that a single word can be a broken sentence through the word *deva!* A vocative expression used in this way still has the expectation of some action, which is to be fulfilled by the deity. Significantly, the example for a broken sentence is a single uncompouned word.

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[371] *ākāṅkṣā ca tadvyatirekaprayuktānvayānanubhāvakatvarūpā. idam upalakṣaṇam yogyatāsattyoḥ* (*RA*, 1.13cd -- 14ab, p. 8).

Śaradāgama 1.13cd - 15:

Having defined speech as that which has the form of words, he defines the form of the *pada*-s etc., [in the half verse beginning] *vibhaktyantaṃ padam....*] A *pada* is that which ends in a conjugational or declensional suffix. When there is a completion of meaning, a collection of *pada*-s is called a sentence (*vākya*). A mere collection of words [in the absence of a completed meaning] is a broken sentence (*khaṇḍavākya*).

In the half verse beginning *yuktārthatām...*, the author defines a broken sentence as [a collection] of *pada*-s which is without "that" -- "that" (*tām*) means "a completion of meaning" -- and which is without the property of being a collection of meanings whose basis is a compound. In this way, a compound that is *aluk*[372] is not also a sentence fragment, because a compound lacks the property of being a collection of *pada*-s.[373] [In the verse-half beginning] *vākyaṃ...*, the author states "sometimes within a single word there is the property of being a sentence or the property of being a word or a sentence." [In the half-verse beginning] *dhūmattvāt*, he exemplifies [a sentence and a sentence fragment] in sequence. Here [in the case of words such as *dhūmattvād*], [a sentence] is not a collection of inflected words. [The word *dhūmavattvāt*] has the property of being a sentence because it has the property of bestowing a qualified meaning that removes further expectation. The word *deva* [however, is a broken sentence] because it lacks a completion of meaning. A collection of sentences delimited by a single meaning is called "a great sentence" (*mahāvākya*).

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[372] A compound in which a member other than the final term is still affixed to its declensional termination.

[373] A compound is considered to be a single word.

Rākāgama 1.13cd – 15:

The author defines *pada* (declined noun) and *vākya* (sentence) [in the two half verses beginning] *vibhaktyantam*.... The word *pada* means *sādhu* (correct). "That by which a meaning is attained (*padyate*)" is the derivation. The correctness (*sādhutva*) [of a pada] is its property of producing a meaning that is to be conferred by knowledge of a beginningless mode of verbal signification.[374] Accordingly, prakṛt (*bhāsā*) words do not have correctness, because in their case knowledge exists through indication, since there is an absence of a denoted meaning due to the absence of an original denotion. In the case of word used indicatively such as *gaṅgā*, there is no damage [to the correctness].[375] There is correctness, even in the case of words such as *ḍittha* which have been conventionally derived only recently,[376] and in the case of words such as *vṛddhi* which have been conventionally derived by Pāṇini,[377] because there exists a knowledge of a beginningless mode of verbal signification, [in the first case] through the Vedic injunctions *pitā nāma kuryād* ("the father should name the son") and [in the second case] by means of a grammatical rule

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[374] A correct word is said to be a word that conveys a meaning, such that this meaning is occassioned by a knowledge of the original, beginningless signification of the word. This definition allows for the inclusion of words used indicatively or suggestively, but does not include prakṛt words, which, while they indicate the meanings denoted by Sanskrit words, are held not to have an original denotation of their own.

[375] This refers to the most famous example of indication or metaphorical identification: *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* ("a hamlet on the Ganges"). Even though (according to tradition) there exists a beginningless denotative convention for the word *gaṇga,* in the sense of the "the river Ganges," in the context of this sentence, this denoted meaning produces a contradiction (a hamlet cannot literally exist on or in a river), and hence, this motivates the replacement of the targeted meaning ("on the shore").

[376] The word *dittha* is a proper noun and hence its convention in the invention of the namer.

[377] Words whose meanings have been determined through Pāṇini's intention through their use in his sūtras. As a demonstration of the purity of Pāṇini's speech, Patañjali explains: *kathaṃ punar idaṃ bhagavataḥ pāṇiner ācāryasya lakṣaṇaṃ pravṛttam. siddhaśabdārthasaṃbandhe.* ("But, how is this grammar of the divine preceptor Pāṇini written? Is it written by the Grammarian with permanence of word in his mind or producedness of word in his mind? (The Vārttikakāra to expound this lays down—) With word, its sense and the connection between the two established --...") (Trans. Abhyankar, p. 24).

putratvanāmatvopādhinā vyākṛtā vāk utpadyate ("a word is produced which is analyzed through the means of generic properties 'son-ness' and 'name-ness.'" Some people say: "Incorrectness (*asādhutvam*) is the property of signifying a meaning through a deviating mode of verbal signification, as in the case of vernacular words." But the *Rāṇaka*[378] states: "Correctness is held to be the property of being qualified by an absence of convention established by man; words derived conventionally through grammatical rules have the property of being impure."

As for "a sentence," this is a collection of words having conjugational or declensional endings, such that a meaning is accomplished [by this collection]. The point here is that there is no [further] expectation[379] of word meanings. By this, there is the result that a sentence is a collection of *pada*-s that has no such further expection and which produces a single qualified meaning.[380] Moreover, the property of being a unified meaning is the property of being free of multiple distinct meanings that are the objects of different cognitions. Accordingly, even if there are varieties of expressions [of a word], the determination of meaning from one single expression [of the word] has the property of being the chief qualifier of the meaning of [the word] in other expressions. Just as the expressions *yo ghaṭas tiṣṭhati tam ānaya* ("Bring the pot that stands") and *paśya mṛgo dhāvati* ("Look! A deer runs") [each] possess unique properties of being a sentence. By this, there is a refutation

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[378] A commentary on the *Tantravarttika* more commonly known as *Nyāyasudhā* and written by Bhaṭṭa Someśvara, the son of Bhaṭṭa Mādhava (Gaṅganātha Jha, Introduction to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Tantravārtika: A commentary on Śabara's Bhāṣya on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini*, trans. Gaṅganātha Jha (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publication, 1983) xix.)

[379] *ākāṅkṣā*. A sentence produces a meaning such that the listener does not expect, or require, subsequent words in order to complete the semantic purposes of the previous words.

[380] *viśiṣṭaikārthapratipādakanirākāṅkṣapadasamūha*. That a sentence produces a single qualified meaning, means that it produces a determinate conception of a substrate qualified by some property.

of the definition "a sentence is a collection of words, which end in declensional and conjugational suffixes."[381]

The author defines sentence fragments [in the half verse beginning] *yuktārthānām*.... [The word *yuktārthānām* means] "words conveying a connected meaning."[382] The words *tām ca vinā* means without a completion of meaning. Just as [expressions] such as *yo gaur asti tam āhara* ("this cow is, bring this"), which is a collection of words revealing a meaning that is qualified by [further] expection, is a sentence fragment. Expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*) is that whose nature is such that it does not provide the experience of the natural connection to [the words] that have been employed, [nor] of their disassociation.[383] This (*ākāṅkṣā*) is the extension of logical consistency (*yogyatā*), and proximity (*āsatti*). Logical compatibility (*yogyatā*) is the absence, in the [semantic] association of one word [in a sentence], of the property of being a counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) of a total absence (*atyantābhāva*) with respect to the meaning of another word [in the sentence].[384] Proximity (*āsatti*) is the acquiring of a counterpart in a non-intermediated relation.[385] Alternatively, proximity is the

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[381] Such a collection must also produce a unified meaning.

[382] The sense is that each of the words in the collection has an associated meaning. Hence, the failure of the collection to produce a unified meaning is not due to the involvement of meaningless words.

[383] The point is, when there is expection, the listener is unable to tell if a collection of the meanings of words are mutually connected with one another, or whether these are mutually dissociated from one another. There is an expectation that additional words will be spoken that will clarify what pertains to the syntactic unity and what is excluded from this.

[384] *yoygyaṭā caîkapadārthasaṃsarge 'parapadārthaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvābhāvaḥ*. This definition is quite similar to Gaṅgeśa's explanation in the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*: *sā cêtarapadārthasaṃsarge 'parapadārthaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvapramāviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ* [*Tattvacintāmaṇi,* Vol IV: Part 1, *Śabdakhaṇḍa,* ed. Kamakhyanath Tarkavagish (Delhi: Chaukhamba, 1990), p. 262]. More simply and less technically stated, this means that in order for there to be logical compatibility in a sentence, each and every word in the sentence must have the capacity to be syntactically connected with all the other words in the sentence.

[385] *avyavadhānenânvayapratiyogyupasthitir āsattiḥ*. This is a direct citation from the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (IV.1): *āsattiścâvyavadhānenânvayapratiyogyupasthitiḥ*. This means that the words in a sentence have semantic relationships only with words that are in direct proximity.

non-intermediation of a word that brings a counterpart into a semantic relationship. Accordingly, there is not proximity between two words that are brought into semantic relationships by the same word.[386] Proximity is the the intention that "the placement of counterpart words occurs without intermediation with respect to the placement of the words [to which they are counterparts]. There is the cognition of semantic relation through a knowledge of such an intention (*tātparya*) only through this connection. The qualification of intention (*tātparya*) is that it has the property of not being in opposition to the objective of the speaker. Accordingly, when the sentence *nīlo ghaṭo dravyaṃ paṭa* ("the possessions, that are a pot and a blue cloth") [is spoken] and, while the speaker intends that there is a semantic disconnection between the word *nīla* ("blue") and the word *ghaṭa* ("pot"), a listener has the cognition of words *nīla ghaṭa* [as being semantically connected], despite the fact that there is no mention of this, then this awareness is on account of the intention of god or because he has some confusion with respect to the [speaker's] intention.[387] This is the same with respect to a sentence [uttered by] a parrot.[388] The Miśras[389] state that when two sentences are the locus of the property of being a single sentence, the placement of a word meaning that serves

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[386] In this case, there would be intermediation by that word.

[387] Here Gāgābhaṭṭa accounts for the fact that sometimes a listener will understand different semantic connections than those intended by the speaker. In this case, he argues, the speaker may have a deeper understanding informed by the intention of god, or he may simply be confused as to the intent of the speaker.

[388] We may understand the meaning of sentence that is uttered by a parrot, even though the parrot is merely repeating sounds for which he has no semantic comprehension, in all likelihood.

[389] Members of the Miśra school of Mīmāṃsā. Potter and Bhattacharyya briefly describe these as follows:

> A third type of Mīmāṃsā is that known as the Miśra school, a system whose literature is largely lost to us but which appears as an important role in Gaṅgeśa's discussions. The Miśra account of truth is rather more complex than those of the other Mīmāṃsakas [Karl H. Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, ed., *Indian Philosophical Analysis: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from Gaṅgeśa to Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, vol. 6, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993),

as an intermediary [for the two sentence meanings] does not have the property of being intervenient. Here the traditional *naiyāyika*-s say that knowledge is the cause of expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*) and logical compatibility (*yogyatā*), and proximity (*āsatti*), whose nature is essential, is the cause [of knowledge].[390] [Still] the *Navyanaiyāyikas* ("modern logicians") and the *Mīmāṃsakas* (exegetists) state that expectation and logical compatibility do not have the property of being causes [for verbal cognition], but because we do not observe cognition [as occuring] with respect to sentences such a *vahninā siñca* ("sprinkle with fire!"), the lack of certainty that is the absence of logical compatibility is an obstructor [of verbal cognition].[391] Even in the case of another verbal cognition [that operates] precisely through the knowledge of a contradiction that becomes an obstructor [to the comprehension of the literal meaning], and [that is achieved] only through generalizations such as inferential knowledge,[392] the absence of logical compatibility is the obstructor. There is no other obstructor [in this case.[393] Accordingly, there is no [verbal] cognition in expressions such as "sprinkle with fire." Still, having specified some [logical compatibility], because there is no single logical compatibility on account of the fact that there is a need for a relationship with individual causes, since there is no establishment of an equivalent verbal signification in all expressions such as "sprinkle with fire," universal "causeness" would not exist in logical

[390] In the Miśras' view, logical compatibility and proximity are not the cause of expectation, but rather the cause of the knowledge that is the cause of expectation.

[391] In Gāgābhaṭṭa's view, the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the *Navyanaiyāyikas* do not believe that logical compatibility is the cause of the verbal cognition of a sentence, but rather that it removes the obstruction to verbal cognition that is caused by logical incompatibility.

[392] Logical incompatibility is that which obstructs the literal meaning and motivates tha ttribution of a related meaning in the case of indication.

[393] There are not separate obstructors for the different modes of verbal signification. Logical incompatibility is the only obstructor of verbal signification.

compatibility.[394] Moreover, because there is an absence of a single cause for logical compatibility in all cases, since [this would entail] a necessary relationship between reason and proposition and [it can be seen that] there is not a well established verbal cognition for statements such as "sprinkle with fire," therefore there does not exist the conception that logical compatibility is the cause of [verbal cognition]. Therefore, knowledge of logical compatibility is not a cause, but the determination of the absence of logical compatibility is the obstructon [of verbal cognition]. Still the *ālaṃkārikas* say that knowledge of logical compatibility is not the cause of of verbal cognition and that the determination of the absence of logical compatibility is not the obstructor of verbal cognition, because there is an occurrence of verbal cognition in cases such as metaphors such as as "moon face" (*candramukhaḥ*) where there is an existence as well as an absence of logical compatibility, and because there is an experience of exceptional charm through the comprehension of verses such as the "son of a barren women acquires a garland of sky lotuses.[395]" And it should not be said that here there is no verbal cognition, only the recollection of word meanings. Similarly, even in sentences such as "bring [the] pot,"[396] because there is a capacity to be stated, there is the unwarranted consequence of an extirpation of mere verbal cognition. But concerning the determination of contradiction, [here] only an other-ness of meaning is to be excluded. Moreover, there is not, in this way, fault in operation, etc., because knowledge free from doubt concerning authoritativeness has the property of being

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[394] This further refutes that logical compatibility is the cause of verbal cognition. The argument states that it would be necessary to specify a particular logical compatibilities in different expressions, since different expression are cognized through different modes of verbal signification, and hence it is not possible to establish logical compatibility as the universal cause of verbal cognition.

[395] *eṣa vandhyāsuto yāti khapuṣpakṛtaśekharaḥ.*

[396] *ghaṭam ānaya.*

the cause with respect to application, and there is an impossibility of bringing forth application through an absence of such a knowledge only through doubt concerning the authoritativeness of an arising knowledge, because of the previously [mentioned] contradiction. It has been stated in the *Khaṇḍaṇa*[397]: "Even if a meaning is completely nonexistent, each word in a sentence produces a knowledge." But in reality, because from expressions such as "moon face," there is an arising of knowledge for fools and an arising of charm for *ālaṃkārika*-s, only that [speech] having a particular imagination is to be called "animated speech." Nor do we believe it to be correct that the absence of certainty regarding contradiction qualified by the absence of mation has the property of being the cause of the application [of speech]. Here, this sequence is due to the sentence and the arising of cognition of the meaning of the sentence. In the case of all words, there is consequence of a signification of word meaning, [since] this is produced by *pada*–s that are spoken sequentially. The establishing [of sentence meanings] in the mind takes the form of [a knowledge] having a collection as its support. Since the signification of word meanings has the nature of having a collection for its support, the knowledge of sentence meaning has the form of an aggregation [of meanings]. Otherwise, because there would be a destruction of the signification of a previous word meaning by the signification of a latter word meaning, there could be no verbal signification. Nor should it be said there is a signification of meaning without the support of the collection of words, because then would be the unwarranted consequence that a contradiction between the cause and the affect would be conceived, since the sentence would not have the property of being produced by the words. Therefore, some people say that it is necessary that the support [of verbal signification] be the collection of words....

[397] Most likely the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of Śri Harśa.

He states that sometimes a single word has the property of being a sentence or a sentence fragment in the half verse beginning *vākyam*.... Sometimes even a single word is a sentence or a sentence fragment. He exemplifies [these] in the half verse beginning *dhūmavattvāt* ("because of the property of possessing smoke"). Here [this word which] ends in the fifth case (ablative) ending has the property of being a single word and the property of being a sentence on account of having the property of conveying a meaning qualified as being the remover of the further expectation a reason.[398] In the case of the word *deva!* ("lord!"), there is the property of being a broken sentence because there is an absence of the completion of a meaning since here there is [just] the production of the meaning "lord" qualified by the property of being a vocative. A collection of sentences qualified by a single meaning is called a discourse (*prabandha*).

Ramā 1.13cd – 15:

Now he defines inflected words (*pada*) and the like in the half verse beginning *vibhakti*.... An inflected word is a word whose termination is a conjugational ending or [a word] whose termination is a declensional ending. [A sentence] is a collection of these (inflected words). The affix *tasi* here follows a word ending in the seventh case(?)[399] having

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[398] The word *dhūmavattvāt* ("On account of the property of possessing smoke") is said to convey and integrated meaning which is qualified by the property of removing the expectation of a reason, since this expression supplies the reason for inferring that there is fire someplace,

[399] This may be an error in the text, as none of Pāṇini's sūtras detailing the use of the suffix *tasi* describes the use of this suffix following the locative.

a meaning such as "first-ness" etc.[400] The point here is that when there is a completion of meaning there is not any [further] expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*). Hence, the result is that a collection of inflected words not having any [further] expectation that bestows a single qualified meaning is known as a sentence. The author defines a sentence fragment in the half verse beginning *yuktārthānāṃ*.... That collection of inflected words having connected meanings, which [itself] does not have a completion of meaning is called a sentence fragment. As in the expression *yo gaur asti tam ānaya* ("This cow is, fetch this."). This is a collection of words conveying a meaning that [still] has further expectation. Sometimes there is the reading *yuktārthatāṃ.*[401] This [collection of words] is connected,[402] because otherwise there would be the unwarranted consequences of a lack of cohesion [within the collection]. With respecting to the reading [*yuktārthatām*], [a sentence fragment] is without a complete meaning and is without the property of being a connected meaning within the substrate of a compound. Accordingly, a compound cannot be also a broken sentence.[403] [In the verse half beginning] *vākyaṃ*, the author states that sometimes there can be the separate existence of the property of being a sentence fragment as well as the property of being a sentence within a single word. The sense is that a single word can sometimes be a sentence and sometimes be a

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400 In response to Pāṇ 5.4.44 -- *pratiyoge pañcamyās tasiḥ* -- concerning the suffix *tasi*, Kātyāyana's Vārttika 3339 states *ādyādibya upasaṅkhyānam.* Commenting on this within this vārttika, Battoji Dīkṣita states *ādau āditaḥ* (*VSK*, 2111).

401 This corresponds to Pradyotanabhaṭṭa's reading of the verse.

402 The words in comprising a broken sentence must be connected to one another. Hence the collection is not said to be broken because the words do not have a connection to each other but rather that they fail to convey a completed sense, and hence leave the listener with the expectation for further information.

403 Here a broken sentence is a collection of *pada*-s having two conditions. The first is that it does not have a completed meaning. The second is that is not a compound having connected word meanings. Otherwise the species of compound where the case ending of a word constituent word is not omitted, might be considered a broken sentence, and this is not the case.

sentence fragment. This is similarly to be understood in the case of the previous definition, which lacks "the property of being a collection of words."

He exemplifies [sentences and sentence fragments] in [the verse half beginning] *dhūmavattvāt.* Here, (in the case of the word *dhūmavattvāt*), because this word having a fifth case ending has the property of being a single word having an inflectional ending, [this has] the property of being a single inflected word, not the property of being a collection of inflected words and [also] has the property of being a sentence on account of its property of conveying a single meaning qualified by the absence of further expection since it has the property of removing the expectation of a reason.[404] In the case of the word *deva!*, there is the understanding that [this] has the property of being a single inflected word as before on account of [the possession of] the property of conveying [the meaning] "god" in the vocative sense, and that [this] has the property of being a sentence fragment on account of the non-completion of meaning due to the existence of expectation of an action.[405] This truth is made clear in treatises such as the *Mañjūṣā.*[406] He defines an extended sentence (*mahāvākya*) in [the half verse beginning] *vākyāni*.... The sense is that this is [a plurality of sentences] whose intent is a single meaning. In other words, a composition is a collection of sentences having as its intent a single meaning.

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[404] Because this expression, "on account of the property of possessing smoke," supplies a reason (*hetu*) for inferring that there is fire somewhere, the expression is said to have the property of removing the expectation of a reason (*hetvākāṅkṣānivartakatā*).

[406] This most likely refers to one of three works by *Nāgeśabhaṭṭa*, Vaidyanātha's Guru, or to all three collectively: the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjūṣā*, the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā*, or the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntaparamalaghumañjūṣā.*

Verse 1.16:

mahādevaḥ satrapramukhamakhavidyaikacaturaḥ

sumitrā tadbhaktipraṇihitamatir yasya pitarau.

Anenâsāv ādyaḥ sukavijayadevena racite

ciraṃ candraloke sukhayatu mayūkhaḥ sumanasaḥ

May this first chapter of the great *Candrāloka*, composed by the true poet Jayadeva -- he whose father is Mahādeva, the one most knowledgeable[407] in the science of rituals, the most important[408] of which is the *Satra* (Soma sacrifice), and whose mother is Sumitrā, she whose mind is engaged in devotion to him (Mahādeva) -- bring delight to the gods and scholars for a long time to come.

Explanation 1.16:

Here Jayadeva first introduces a verse expressing homage to his parents as well as the aspiration for the fame of his text. This verse is exactly repeated at the conclusion of each chapter, except for the declaration of the number of the chapter which changes appropriately. This statement of his parentage accounts for the full extent of our biographical knowledge of Jayadeva. This declaration allows us almost certainly to confirm that the

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[407] *ekacaturah.* Lit. "skillful."

[408] *ādya.* Lit. "first."

author of the *Candrāloka* was also the author of the drama the *Prasannarāghava*. A verse in the prologue of this work identifies the author as Jayadeva, the son of Mahādeva and Sumitrā.[409]

Śaradāgama 1.16:

Thus the first ray (i.e., chapter) of the moonlight (*Candrāloka*), and thus the first ray of the autumn moon (*Śaradāgama*), the explanation of the *Candrāloka*, which has been written by Pradyotanabhaṭṭa, who is the son of Balabhadra, the lotus of all *śāstra*-s, and which is associated with the command[410] of Prince Śrī Virabhadra the son of the great and foremost king, King Śri Rāmacandradeva.[411]

Rākāgama 1.16:

Thus the first ray known as the examination of speech (*vākvicāra*) within the *Ornament of the Moonlight* (*Candrālokālaṃkāra*[412]), which was written by glorious Pīyūṣavarṣa [otherwise known as] Jayadeva.

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[409] 1.14 vilāso yadvācām asamarasaniṣyandamadhuraḥ
kuraṅgākṣībimbādharamadhurabhāvaṃ gamayati
kavīndraḥ kauṇḍinyaḥ sa tava jayadevaḥ śravaṇayor
ayāsīdātithyaṃ na kim iha mahādevatanayaḥ.

1.15 lakṣmanasyêva yasyâsya sumitrākukṣijanmnaḥ
rāmacandrapadāmbhoje bhramadbhṛṅgāyate manaḥ (*Prasannarāghava*, 1.14-5).

[410] The sense is that prince Vīrabhadradeva commissioned the work.

[411] *mahārājādhirājaśrīrāmacandradeva.*

[412] This is an uncommon name for the work.

May this first ray in the treatise known as the *Candrāloka*, which was written by the scholar named Jayadeva, who became famous on account of this work, delight scholars for a long time. The father and mother of this [author] have the names Mahādeva and Sumitra. Who was Mahādeva? [He was the one] most skillful in the science of rituals, the chief of which is the *Satra*. Who was Sumitra? [She was one] who devoted her mind to the highest degree to the service of that Mahādeva.

This explanation of the *Candrāloka*, concerning the first ray (i.e., chapter) was written by the learned Gāgābhaṭṭa otherwise known as Viśveśvara.

Thus the first ray in the commentary to the *Candrāloka* having the designation "the *Rākāgama* written by Gāgābhaṭṭa."

Ramā 1.16:

For the sake of his own celebrity, he states [the verse beginning] *mahādeva....* May this first ray fashioned in the treatise known as the *Candrāloka*, which was composed by the true poet Jayadeva, that is the scholar Jayadeva, delight those with true minds, that is, scholars and gods, for a long time. By whom [is this text]? [By the one] whose father and mother are called Mahādeva and Sumitra. Who is Mahādeva? The one who is supremely skilled in the sciences of the sacrifices, the chief of which is the *Satra*. What was Sumitrā like? She was one who devoted her mind to the highest degree to the service of that Mahādeva. [Thus] the first flash in the commentary to the *Candrāloka* composed by Vaidyanātha whose alias is Pāyaguṇḍa.

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